UK-Based BAT Sells 50% Shareholding In Cuba Tobacco Joint Venture

British American Tobacco Leaves Cuba After 30 Years: Sold Its 50% Stake In Brascuba, The Factory Of H. Upmann And Cohiba 

CiberCuba
4 October 2026

British American Tobacco (BAT), one of the largest tobacco multinationals in the world, ended more than three decades of business presence in Cuba by selling its 50% stake in Brascuba Cigarrillos S.A., the joint venture associated with the production in the island of brands such as Popular, Cohiba, H. Upmann, and Romeo y Julieta. 

The operation has not yet occurred: the sale was completed in February 2026, although it has gained visibility now following the financial statements of the multinational and a study published by the German portal Kubakunde. 

The half-year report of British American Tobacco for the six months ending June 30 confirms that the group had agreed to sell its 50% stake in Brascuba to Tabagest S.A., a company established in Cuba that was already listed as an investor in the joint venture. 

The same document, also presented by BAT to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), specifies that the transaction was completed in February and that, from that point on, the Cuban business was deconsolidated from the group's balance sheet. 

The exit also had an economic impact for the multinational. BAT reported a net loss of 12 million pounds sterling related to the sale of Brascuba, a figure that includes four million pounds corresponding to previously recognized exchange losses. 

The financial report also explicitly acknowledges the impact of the Cuban withdrawal on its regional business.  When analyzing the results from America and Europe, BAT notes that the growth in revenue from combustible products in markets like Turkey was partially offset, among other factors, by "the exit from Cuba". 

The company's documents do not detail in that semiannual report the price paid by Tabagest. Kubakunde, based on BAT's financial documentation, estimates that the agreed price for the shares is approximately 25 million dollars, to which around 35 million dollars corresponding to the transfer of outstanding commercial credits against BAT subsidiaries in Brazil would have been added.  The German outlet also notes that BAT had previously accumulated impairments of around £231 million on assets related to Brascuba.  

The public documentation also does not clarify who ultimately controls Tabagest S.A.. BAT only identifies it as a company registered in Cuba and a previous shareholder of Brascuba, so there are not enough elements in those documents to attribute connections to other Cuban state conglomerates. 

Brascuba was founded in 1995 as a joint venture between the Cuban state monopoly Tabacuba and Souza Cruz, a Brazilian company that is part of the BAT group. Since then, it has become one of the most prominent foreign investments in the Cuban tobacco industry.  The company began producing Popular cigars in 1996 and subsequently manufactured, under license, cigarettes of brands such as Cohiba, H. Upmann, and Romeo y Julieta, for both the domestic market and export, as Kubakunde recalls. 

Brascuba also expanded its portfolio on the island over the years. In 2018, the company announced that it would begin manufacturing Dunhill cigarettes in Cuba, one of the premium brands of British American Tobacco, as part of a strategy to replace imports and increase domestic production.  The company also developed a modern factory in the Mariel Special Development Zone, a project announced in 2016 with an estimated investment of around 120 million dollars, and considered one of the largest industrial projects with foreign capital outside the tourism sector. 

The Cuban tobacco industry is also facing pressures in some of its traditional markets. In August, Cuba was involved in a diplomatic dispute with the United Kingdom over new measures against tobacco that could impact the marketing of cigars in that country, including the expansion of plain packaging to premium cigars.

Will Trump Administration Require Antilles Gold, Melbana Energy, Sherritt International To Pay Cuba Nationals In U.S. Dollars As Condition To Save Their Operations In Cuba?

Will Trump-Vance Administration Require Antilles Gold, Melbana Energy, And Sherritt International Corporation To Pay Cuba National Employees In U.S. Dollars As Condition For Approvals To Save Their Operations In Cuba? 

A Deal Clock Continues To Tick 

Does The White House Want Deals Implemented Or Want Only Discussion About Deals? 

In Australia, Canada, and United States, bondholders, exporters, employees, financial institutions, government officials, importers, investors, management, and shareholders are increasingly nervous.   

Simultaneously, those same constituencies in the People’s Republic of China and Russian Federation are sensing opportunities.  

For three Republic of Cuba-connected private-sector proposals to have successful trajectories, they require the decision-maker-in-chief in Washington DC to accept yes for an answer rather than an unabated strategy of pressure towards believing there is a better deal tomorrow than today or yesterday.   

Concern by law firms retained to represent companies whose interest is authorized engagement or authorized re-engagement with the Republic of Cuba is directed towards those advising the decision-maker-in-chief.   

Rather than abstain from making decisions- issuing authorizations and issuing licenses, attorneys are advocating to presidential advisors for prompt issuance of authorizations and issuing licenses so proposals may shift from ideas to negotiations and eventually to operations.  

• NOTE: The issuance of authorizations and licenses does not mean once issued the United States government forgoes oversight.  The United States government retains authority to alter, revoke, or suspend an authorization and license if they are no longer in the interests of United States government policy.  This is nothing new. 

One, two, or three proposal disruptions could set in motion a chain of commercial, economic, financial, and political outcomes unlikely to create for the Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029) desired cost-effective, efficient, timely, and transparent outcomes.   

Most importantly for the Trump-Vance Administration is likelihood that delay in providing authorizations and licenses put at risk an announcement by The White House of an investment trifecta where political prizes include resolution of two of the largest claims against the government of the Republic of Cuba certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC) within the United States Department of Justice.  

The fear among management of United States-based companies is the Trump-Vance Administration will fail to deliver soon what United States-based companies need to negotiate deals prior to those deals becoming no longer viable.  Worse, that the deal process shifts from decisions by politicians and the officials who support them to decisions by the judicial branch- which means far more time and unpredictable outcomes. 

Management of United States-based companies are concerned Washington DC-based and Florida-based advocacy groups and lobbying organizations believe more financial advantage to them by deploying tactics to impede commercial opportunities from becoming realities than supporting commercial opportunities becoming realities. 

On 12 October 2026, one proposal expires.  Two others, while having no statutory expiration, do have consequential decisions to consider. 

Recent changes to the Labor Code in the Republic of Cuba may be the basis for the Trump-Vance Administration to require a company subject to United States jurisdiction operating in the energy/mineral sector within the internationally-recognized territory of the Republic of Cuba to compensate (salary, bonus, benefits) in U.S. Dollars or other convertible currency all employees who are Republic of Cuba nationals.  Such a position will complicate, but not derail interests. 

The Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2019-2028) in Havana, Republic of Cuba, will grudgingly accept conditions from Bowral, Australia-based Antilles Gold Limited, Sydney, Australia-based Melbana Energy Limited, and Toronto, Canada-based Sherritt International Corporation (2025 revenue approximately US$389 million) required by authorizations and licenses from the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, Office of Legal Adviser (OLA) of the United States Department of State, United States Department of Defense (War) Office of Strategic Capital, (OSC) and connectivity with the USFCSC.  

• NOTE: The Commonwealth of Australia and Canada are members of the fifty-six-country Commonwealth created in 1931 by the United Kingdom (England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales).  Charles III, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of His other Realms and Territories King, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith, is considered to be a friend of Donald Trump, President of the United States (2017-2021 and 2025-2029).  That friendship might be an impetus for a timely decision impacting two Australia-based companies and one Canada-based company.   

With every change my by the government of the Republic of Cuba to the commercial, economic, and financial infrastructure on the 800-mile archipelago home to approximately 9.5 million citizens, the Trump-Vance Administration will determine how to extract additional elasticity- moving how Cuba, Inc. operates nearer to how U.S.A., Inc. operates.     

If the Trump-Vance Administration requires what Antilles Gold Limited, Melbana Energy Limited, and Sherritt International Corporation find impossible to provide, then the government of the Republic of Cuba will engage with companies in the People’s Republic of China and Russian Federation who have an interest in cobalt, copper, gold, oil, nickel, and silver.  

For the Trump-Vance Administration, the United States Navy might then need be deployed to the Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea to prevent China-based companies and Russia-based companies from exporting cobalt, copper, gold, oil, nickel, and silver from the Republic of Cuba.  A costly exercise expensed to United States taxpayers. 

Link To Related Analyses 

Saving Antilles Gold: Will GEM Global Yield LLC SCS Obtain OFAC, BIS, Department Of State Authorizations? September 24, 2026 

Melbana Energy Of Australia Determining If Trump Administration Targeting Of Cuba Energy Sector Permits Continuing Operations. Similar Strategy To Australia's Antilles Gold September 23, 2026 

Might Trump Administration Focus On Sourcing Copper Lead To Approval Of U.S. Investor Control Of Copper, Gold, And Silver Operations Of Australia Company? September 11, 2026 

DOD (War) OSC Could Be U.S. Taxpayer Partner Of Last Resort For Canada’s Sherritt And Australia’s Antilles. Cobalt, Copper, Gold, Nickel, Silver Are Strategic Minerals. August 30, 2026 

Cuba: And Now There Are Two…  Antilles Gold Has Until 25 January 2027 And Sherritt International Has Until 12 October 2026 August 27, 2026 

Potential Triple Play? Carney, Diaz-Canel, Trump Deal. U.S. Secretary Of Defense Hegseth Wants Cobalt. Cuba Has It. Settling One Libertad Act Issue. And Opening Doors? August 23, 2025

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

CiberCuba
3 October 2026

Foreign companies can now hire directly in Cuba, but are they allowed to pay salaries in dollars? 

“The recent authorization for certain companies and foreign representatives to directly hire Cuban workers has raised an unavoidable question: if the foreign company becomes the employer, will it also be able to pay salaries directly in dollars?  The response arising from the new regulations is more complex than a simple yes or no. Direct hiring eliminates the obligation to use a state employer in certain cases, but does not automatically convert the salary into a payment in foreign currency. 

The new Cuban Labor Code maintains an explicit rule: the salary is a remuneration in Cuban pesos and must be paid in CUP. At the same time, other regulations allow certain workers to receive gratuities in foreign currency, a legal category different from salary. 

What changed with direct contracting?  October 2 in Official Gazette No. 82, allows foreign commercial representations established in Cuba to directly hire their employees.  Until now, hiring had to be carried out exclusively through employer entities authorized by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, which formalized the employment relationship with the worker and then provided that workforce to the foreign representation. 

The outlines the new system and establishes that foreign commercial representations can hire directly or may continue to rely on an employer entity.  When opting for direct hiring, the representation itself assumes the role of employer and must comply with Cuban labor and social security legislation. 

The key to understanding what currency can be used appears in a regulation published just two weeks prior: Article 7 expressly states that foreign investment modalities and foreign commercial representations based in Cuba are governed by the Labor Code, along with the adjustments provided in their specific regulations.  Article 246 is even more precise: it defines salary as “the payment in Cuban pesos that the employer pays to the worker”.  Article 261 establishes that the salary is paid in Cuban pesos at least once a month, whether in cash, through a banking instrument, or electronically.  Therefore, the possibility of a foreign commercial representation directly signing a contract with a Cuban worker does not in itself authorize the establishment of that ordinary salary in dollars, euros, or another foreign currency. 

What fundamentally changes is who acts as the employer and who signs the contract, not the currency in which the Labor Code defines the salary.  Salary and bonus are not the same.  Here a fundamental difference appears.  The Labor Code itself states that a person's remuneration can consist of salary and other legally established income.  Article 246 clearly states that bonuses are not considered salary.  This opens up the possibility for certain workers to receive additional income in foreign currency without those payments replacing the mandatory salary in CUP. 

The Foreign Investment Law does provide for bonuses in foreign currency.  The situation is particularly clear for the so-called foreign investment modalities.  The updated version of the , modified in 2026, establishes in its Article 29 that joint ventures, fully foreign-owned enterprises, and international economic association contracts can create incentive funds using their profits.  The same provision states that workers “may receive bonuses in foreign currency, provided that the form of foreign investment generates them”.  This means that a worker can have a salary subject to general rules in Cuban pesos and, in addition, receive certain additional payments in foreign currency when specific legislation allows for it.  They are not legally the same.  Not all foreign companies fall into the same category. 

This distinction is particularly important because a foreign commercial representation is not necessarily a form of foreign investment under Law 118 which includes mixed enterprises, wholly foreign-owned companies, and international economic association contracts as its fundamental modalities.  For these entities, direct contracting had already been relaxed in September through the and the modifications introduced in the Foreign Investment Law. 

The reform of October 2 extends a similar logic to foreign commercial representations, but through another regulatory package: Decree-Law 137 and Resolution 62.  And what about the bonuses for branch and representation workers?  The Cuban legislation already acknowledges the existence of bonuses received by workers linked to branches of foreign firms and other representations.  The law explicitly mentions individuals who receive bonuses for working in branches of foreign commercial firms, representative offices of banks, financial companies, and other representations of foreign entities accredited in Cuba.  But having that additional income recognized for tax purposes does not convert a bonus into salary nor does it automatically allow for the replacement of the salary in CUP with a monthly payment in dollars.  The Central Bank allows currency transfers, but only when they are authorized.  Another element that can cause confusion arises in the banking regulation. 

The sets new rules for foreign currency bank accounts and includes transfers from legal entities to individuals for reasons such as remunerations, bonuses, authorized travel expenses, and per diems.The key word is "authorized."  The Resolution 102 regulates how a payment in foreign currency can be processed bank-wise when there is a legal basis to do so, but it does not replace labor legislation nor does it by itself constitute a general authorization to pay any salary in dollars.   

What changes then for the worker?  The change is not insignificant.  When a foreign commercial representation uses direct contracting, the worker signs their contract with the representation itself, and it assumes the responsibility of the employer, instead of maintaining a contractual relationship with a state intermediary agency.  Resolution 62 also establishes that those who were already working for these representations cannot receive lower income than what they earned prior to the transition.  For foreign investment modalities, a similar situation occurs under Resolution 56: the company can hire directly and assume the corresponding labor and social security obligations.  But the liberalization of who is hired does not equate to a complete liberalization of how payments are made. 

So, can a foreign company offer a monthly salary of US$500.00?  With the revised regulations, direct hiring alone does not provide a basis for replacing the legal salary in Cuban pesos with an ordinary salary expressed entirely in dollars.  The Labor Code explicitly maintains the salary in CUP.  It is different in that, in addition to the salary, there are bonuses or other income in foreign currency expressly permitted by the regulations applicable to each type of company or representation, which can be channeled through the banking system.  Therefore, the main novelty of the reforms is not that Cuban workers have started to be paid automatically in dollars, but that certain foreign companies can hire directly and negotiate the employment relationship without the mandatory mediation of a state employer entity.  The dollar may appear as a bonus or additional income in authorized cases. The salary, according to the current Labor Code, continues to be in Cuban pesos.”

Vima Of Spain Departing Cuba Less Than One Month After Ending Trump-Connected Lobbying Contract. Will Government Of Spain Or EU Do Anything? Not Likely.

On 24 July 2026, Madrid, Spain-based Vima World S.L. retained Washington DC-based Continental Strategy LLC for US$30,000.00 for matters relating to TRD: Trade (Domestic and Foreign); FOO: Food Industry- Safety, Labeling, etc.; and FOR: Foreign Relations.  On 1 September 2026, the agreement was terminated.  Now, the company has reportedly ceased operations in the Republic of Cuba.

• Link: Spain-Based Company That Exports Food To Cuba Retains Washington Lobbyists With Connections To U.S. Secretary Of State, The White House. August 30, 2026

• Link: EU Not Updating Cuba Blocking Statute After Executive Orders By Trump Administration. Collective Weakness, Forgetfulness, Or Political Impotence? June 23, 2026 

• Link: EC Now Has To Decide What It Perhaps Doesn’t Want To Decide- Iberostar Of Spain Libertad Act Lawsuit Is First To Report U.S. Court Recognizing EC’s Interest In Title III Lawsuits April 26, 2020 

• Link: Text of Letter From European Union To United States In Response To Implementation Of Provisions Of Libertad Act April 16, 2019

Neither the leadership of the Brussels, Belgium-based European Commission (EC) nor leadership of the Brussels, Belgium-based European Council (EC) nor members of the twenty-seven country Brussels, Belgium-based European Union (EU) taken any decision to add Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029) Executive Order 14404 to the Annex to its Blocking Statute that includes specific extraterritorial measures, including the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”) and Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury. 

• EU: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden.  

Cuba Headlines
3 September 2026
Excerpt

“The Spanish food company, Vima, has removed its branding and all corporate signage from its sole Havana store, located at Infanta and Santa Marta in Central Havana, on September 30th. This move is widely viewed as a direct response to the increased pressure from US sanctions against GAESA, the business conglomerate run by the Cuban military.

According to reports from international media, the decision came just a day after the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced its most comprehensive sanctions package against Cuba to date, on September 29th. The sanctions, which took immediate effect, prohibit indirect transactions with entities on the Cuba Restricted List and eliminate so-called U-Turn transactions, while also blocking Cuban private entrepreneurs' bank accounts in the US.

Two employees at the Infanta and Santa Marta store confirmed to 14ymedio the nature of the pullback. "The company is in the process of withdrawing," one worker stated. Marks from the removed signs were still visible on the storefront, according to the media outlet.

The store operated in partnership with Cimex, a corporation part of GAESA, and Vima's products occupied a substantial portion of its shelves. While some canned and packaged items from Vima remained, fresh products had disappeared.

The contraction signs extended beyond the store. At the Berroa warehouses, east of the capital, only one of the three facilities linked to Vima still had goods, with the other two sitting empty, although employees in company uniforms were still present.

Vima's reliance on Cuba was significant. The company's food division, based in A Coruña, generated approximately 106 million euros in 2025, with roughly 49 million euros (about 46%) stemming from operations on the island, according to US State Department data. Cuba was its largest market, surpassing the Dominican Republic (33 million euros) and Mexico (15.4 million euros).  This market exposure was built through its subsidiary, Vima Caribe S.A., which partners locally with Tiendas Caribe, an entity linked to the Cuban military. In May 2024, Vima signed an agreement to manage 20 stores on the island and exports products from the US via Vima USA Ltd., with offices in New York and Miami, exposing it to US sanctions through two different channels.

Vima's attempt to mitigate political pressure unraveled quickly. In July, the company hired lobbying firm Continental Strategy LLC—whose partners include former US Ambassador to the OAS Carlos Trujillo and former Chief of Staff to Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Alberto Martínez—to handle its interests in Washington. However, the $37,742 contract was terminated just five weeks later, on September 1st, according to an investigation into the failed lobbying effort. A few weeks later, Vima's branding disappeared from the Havana store.

The situation with Vima adds to a growing list of foreign companies that have exited or scaled back operations in Cuba since the US formally designated GAESA under Executive Order 14404 on May 7th. Prior to Vima, hotel chains like Meliá, Iberostar, Barceló, and Blue Diamond Resorts either left or reduced their hotel operations. Vima's case marks the expansion of this phenomenon into food supply through foreign currency stores, a key channel for imported goods among Cubans with access to foreign currency.

Vima has not released an official statement on whether the withdrawal is permanent, a rebranding, or a temporary pause. The Spanish government pledged on September 23rd to defend its businesses and opposed the extraterritoriality of the sanctions, but no practical outcomes have materialized.

In August, US Deputy Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Juan Pablo Segura, warned, "Foreign companies wishing to invest in Cuba must partner with a Cuban state enterprise, making them complicit in the dictatorship's corruption scheme."”

Cuba Government: "We are aware that we are alone." Why Are They Alone? They Have Not (Yet) Created Enough Value To Others So As To Not Be Alone.

“We are aware that we are alone.  If we have to face foreign aggression, we must keep in mind that perhaps no country will come to our aid.”  Carlos Fernández de Cossío, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba (2022- ), to Washington Journal (27 September 2026).

Trump Administration Suggesting Cuba Entrepreneurs Become Authors If They Want A Bank Account In The United States.

748. May U.S. banks open and operate accounts for Cuban nationals present in Cuba? 

“Yes. Section 515.584(h) of the CACR contains a general license that allows banking institutions to open and maintain bank accounts in the United States solely in the name of a Cuban national located in Cuba, to receive payments in the United States for transactions authorized pursuant to, or exempt from the prohibitions of, the CACR and to remit such payments back to Cuba, including through an online payment platform. For example, an author who is a Cuban national located in Cuba may open an account with a bank in the United States to receive payments for sales of their book.  On September 30, 2026, OFAC amended § 515.584 to remove the authorization for U.S. banking institutions to open and maintain an account solely in the name of a Cuban national who is an independent private sector entrepreneur (as defined in 31 CFR § 515.340) for the purpose of conducting authorized or exempt transactions. Unless separately authorized, banking institutions subject to U.S. jurisdiction are required to immediately block these funds and accounts, and will require a specific license from OFAC to unblock any such accounts or funds.”

9,000 Words: OFAC Issues New And Revised Cuba Regulations And Issues OFAC Alert. Good Banking News For Cuba Authors; Not So For Cuba Entrepreneurs.

U.S. Tightens Cuba Sanctions to Counter Regime Repression
Press Statement
September 30, 2026

This week, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) published new Cuba Sanctions Regulations implementing President Trump’s Executive Order 14404, “Imposing Sanctions on Those Responsible for Repression in Cuba and Threats to the United States National Security and Foreign Policy,” which invokes the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to significantly broaden and sharpen sanctions and economic pressure on Communist Cuba, its repressive military and intelligence apparatus, subversive and terror networks, and financial enablers. Treasury also amended the longstanding Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) to close loopholes the Cuban regime has long exploited to engage in sanctions evasion, enrich regime insiders, and fund dangerous subversive and military activities which threaten the national security of the United States.  The Trump Administration remains committed to leveraging all available sanctions authorities to drive meaningful reform in Cuba, support the Cuban people’s aspirations for freedom, and hold accountable the individuals and entities that pose a threat to the national security of the United States.

Publication of Regulatory Amendments

The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issuing a rule removing duplicative regulatory provisions and reorganizing multiple parts within the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Through these actions, OFAC is eliminating over 100 subparts from its chapter of the CFR, and making information regarding delegations of authority, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements, and the Paperwork Reduction Act easier to locate.

Additionally, OFAC is amending the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations to incorporate Executive Order (E.O.) 13902 of January 10, 2020, "Imposing Sanctions With Respect to Additional Sectors of Iran."

OFAC is also publishing regulations to implement E.O. 14404 of May 1, 2026, "Imposing Sanctions on Those Responsible for Repression in Cuba and Threats to the United States National Security and Foreign Policy." Further, OFAC is amending the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 515 (CACR) to implement portions of the President's foreign policy toward Cuba.

These rules are currently available for public inspection with the Federal Register and will take effect upon publication in the Federal Register on September 30, 2026.

OFAC is also issuing five new, Cuba-related Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs 1271–1275) and 29 amended, Cuba-related Frequently Asked Questions.

Finally, OFAC is publishing an OFAC Alert, "Expanded Sanctions Against Cuba," which highlights increased sanctions risks for transactions involving Cuba.

Link To Federal Register Document

Link One- OFAC Alert

Link Two

Link Three

1275. How does the September 30, 2026 amendment to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) affect previous authorizations for professional meetings or conferences in Cuba?  Effective September 30, 2026, OFAC amended § 515.564 to eliminate the authorization related to the attendance at, or organization of, professional meetings or conferences in Cuba. Persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction are no longer authorized to attend or organize professional meetings or conferences in Cuba. OFAC is replacing that authorization with a limited wind down authorization for persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction who were in Cuba on September 30, 2026 pursuant to the former professional meetings authorization to engage in travel-related and other previously authorized transactions through October 30, 2026, provided they depart Cuba by October 30, 2026. In addition, OFAC is also authorizing persons to terminate and obtain refunds for travel and related transactions for trips consistent with the former professional meetings authorization until October 30, 2026.

1274. How does the September 30, 2026 amendment to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) affect educational travel to Cuba by persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction?  Effective September 30, 2026, OFAC narrowed the authorization for persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction, including U.S. academic institutions and their faculty, staff, and students, to engage in certain education-related transactions involving Cuba. Persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction that wish to engage in educational activities, including travel-related transactions, involving Cuba must now fit within one of these categories:  Educational Activities by Accredited U.S. Undergraduate or Graduate-Degree Granting Institutions: 31 CFR § 515.565(a)(1) authorizes accredited U.S. undergraduate or graduate-degree granting institutions, their students, and full time permanent employees to engage in certain educational activities, such as noncommercial research in Cuba specifically related to Cuba and for the purpose of obtaining a graduate degree, under the auspices of the academic institution without accompaniment by a representative from a sponsoring organization.  Educational Activities by Other Institutions: § 515.565(a)(2) authorizes certain educational activities not authorized under § 515.565(a)(1), such as certain educational exchanges sponsored by Cuban or U.S. secondary schools, provided that the activity takes places under the auspices of an organization subject to U.S. jurisdiction and that all travelers are accompanied by a representative of the sponsoring organization.  Additionally, OFAC removed the previous authorization at § 515.565(b) for group people-to-people educational travel.  OFAC replaced these education-related authorizations with "grandfathering" provisions authorizing certain educational travel and group people-to-people educational travel that previously was authorized under § 515.565(a) and § 515.565(b), respectively, where the traveler has already completed at least one travel-related transaction (such as purchasing a flight or reserving accommodation) prior to September 30, 2026.

1273. How does the September 30, 2026 amendment to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) affect previous authorizations related to Cuban private sector entrepreneurs?  Effective September 30, 2026, OFAC amended § 515.584(h) to remove the authorization for banking institutions subject to U.S. jurisdiction to open and maintain accounts solely in the name of a Cuban national who is an independent private sector entrepreneur, as defined in § 515.340, for the purposes of conducting certain transactions authorized or exempt under the CACR. Unless separately authorized, banking institutions subject to U.S. jurisdiction are required to immediately block these funds and accounts, and will require a specific license from OFAC to unblock any such accounts or funds.

1272. How does the September 30, 2026 amendment to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) affect those previously authorized "U-turn" transactions in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest?  Effective September 30, 2026, OFAC amended 31 CFR § 515.584(d) by removing the authorization for banking institutions subject to U.S. jurisdiction to process transactions that originate and terminate outside the United States, provided that neither the originator nor the beneficiary was a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction (the "U-turn general license"). Pursuant to 31 CFR § 515.584(d), banking institutions subject to U.S. jurisdiction are now only authorized to reject (vice block) such transactions.  To account for the removal of the "U-Turn" authorization, OFAC also amended § 515.584(e) to remove the authorization for the unblocking and return of any transfer that would have been authorized pursuant to the prior "U-Turn" general license.

1271. How does the September 30, 2026 amendment to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) affect prohibitions related to the U.S. Department of State's List of Restricted Entities and Subentities Associated with Cuba (Cuba Restricted List or CRL)?  Effective September 30, 2026, OFAC amended § 515.209 to reflect the expanded scope of activities for which the Secretary of State, as directed by the 2025 National Security Presidential Memorandum-5 (NSPM-5), may add entities or subentities to the CRL. Specifically, the Secretary of State may now add to the CRL any entities or subentities that are under the control of, or act for or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel and with which direct or indirect financial transactions would disproportionately benefit such services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba.  Additionally, the prohibition at 31 CFR § 515.209 previously prohibited persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction from engaging in "direct financial transactions" with entities or subentities on the CRL. Effective September 30, 2026, OFAC amended § 515.209 to also prohibit persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction from engaging in an "indirect financial transaction" with any entity or subentity on the CRL. See the prohibition at § 515.209 and FAQ 735 for more information regarding a "direct" and "indirect" financial transaction.  Further, to guard against evasion of the prohibition on direct or indirect transactions with entities or subentities on the CRL, OFAC also amended § 515.201(c) to add a prohibition on any transaction that has the purpose or effect of evading or avoiding prohibitions on direct or indirect transactions with entities or subentities on the CRL.  To account for these changes, OFAC amended the following general licenses that previously only excluded direct financial transactions with entities or subentities on the CRL to now also exclude indirect financial transactions with such entities: §§ 515.530 (powers of attorney); 515.534 (contingent contracts); 515.545 (information/informational materials); 515.560 (travel-related transactions); 515.561 (family visits); 515.564 (professional research); 515.565 (educational activities); 515.566 (religious activities); 515.567 (public performances); 515.572 (travel services); 515.573 (physical and business presence in Cuba); 515.574 (support for the Cuban people); 515.576 (private foundations or research or educational institutes); 515.577 (publishing); 515.578 (internet-based services); 515.581 (conferences in third countries); 515.584 (certain financial transactions); and 515.590 (certain grants, scholarships, and awards). For a complete description of what each general license authorizes and the restrictions that apply, see the aforementioned general licenses.  OFAC also amended 31 CFR § 515.421 to clarify that transactions ordinarily incident to licensed transactions do not include direct or indirect financial transactions with entities and subentities on the CRL if the terms of the applicable general or specific license expressly exclude such direct or indirect financial transactions.

794. What types of grants or awards in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest are authorized for persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction to provide? Section 515.590 of the CACR authorizes the provision of certain grants, scholarships, or awards to Cuban nationals or in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest. Such grants, scholarships, or awards must relate to educational activities, certain humanitarian projects (as set forth in § 515.575 (b)), scientific research, or religious activities. This general license excludes direct or, effective September 30, 2026, indirect financial transactions with entities and subentities identified on the State Department’s Cuba Restricted List. For a complete description of what this general license authorizes and the restrictions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.590. 

774. May U.S. insurers issue policies and pay claims related to group health, life, and travel insurance on behalf of third-country nationals traveling to or within Cuba?  Yes, provided that the insurance policy is a global policy, and not specific to the third-country national’s travel to or within Cuba. Section 515.580 of the CACR authorizes persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction to issue or provide global health, life, or travel insurance policies for individuals ordinarily resident in a country outside of Cuba who travel to or within Cuba, regardless of whether the insurance policy is issued only to that individual or to a group, such as to all employees of a particular company. For instance, a U.S. insurer may pay medical claims pursuant to a group health insurance policy to or on behalf of a covered third-country national injured while traveling in Cuba. However, this provision does not authorize a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction to issue an insurance policy that is specific to travel to Cuba. A separate provision of the CACR, § 515.560, authorizes the provision of health, life, and travel insurance-related services that are specific to Cuba for authorized U.S. travelers. However, please note that § 515.560 excludes from the authorization at § 515.560(c)(2) the lodging, paying for lodging, or making any reservation for or on behalf of a third party to lodge, at any property in Cuba on the Cuba Prohibited Accommodations List to the extent prohibited by § 515.210, as well as any direct or, effective September 30, 2026, indirect financial transactions with any entity or subentity on the State Department’s Cuba Restricted List. For a complete description of the scope of this prohibition, see 31 CFR § 515.210. 

766. What types of payment or financing terms may be utilized for authorized exports and reexports of items other than agricultural commodities to Cuba?  Section 515.533(a) of the CACR does not restrict payment and financing terms for exports of items from the United States or reexports of 100 percent U.S-origin items from a third country, other than agricultural commodities. Examples of permissible payment and financing terms for authorized exports and reexports that are not agricultural commodities include: payment of cash in advance; sales on an open account; and financing by U.S. or third-country financial institutions.  OFAC has issued a general license authorizing banking institutions to provide financing for such authorized exports or reexports of items other than agricultural commodities, including issuing, advising, negotiating, paying, or confirming letters of credit (including letters of credit issued by a financial institution that is a national of Cuba), accepting collateral for issuing or confirming letters of credit, and processing documentary collections. For a complete description of what this general license authorizes and the restrictions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.584(f). With the exception of transactions related to exports or reexports of medicines or medical supplies, items associated with the provision of telecommunications and internet services for the Cuban people, or items associated with air and sea operations that support permissible travel, cargo, or trade, the general license at § 515.584(f) excludes direct or, effective September 30, 2026, indirect financial transactions with entities and subentities identified on the State Department’s Cuba Restricted List. For a description of the scope of the prohibition on direct and indirect financial transactions and the restrictions and exceptions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.209.

765. May persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction open an office in Cuba?  Pursuant to 31 CFR § 515.573, persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction may establish and maintain a physical presence, such as an office, warehouse, or retail outlet, in Cuba to engage in transactions authorized by or exempt from the CACR in the following categories: entities engaging in non-commercial activities authorized by section 515.574 (support for the Cuban people); entities engaging in humanitarian projects set forth in section 515.575(b) (humanitarian projects); private foundations or research or educational institutes engaging in transactions authorized by § 515.576; news bureaus; exporters of certain goods authorized for export or reexport pursuant to 31 CFR §§ 515.533 and 515.559; entities providing mail or parcel transmission services; providers of telecommunications or internet-based services; entities organizing or conducting certain educational activities; religious organizations; and providers of carrier and certain travel services. These persons may employ Cuban nationals in Cuba as well as persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction in Cuba (and such persons may maintain a domicile in Cuba). These persons may open and maintain bank accounts to facilitate authorized transactions. 31 CFR § 515.573 excludes from the authorization direct or, effective September 30, 2026, indirect financial transactions with entities and subentities identified on the State Department’s Cuba Restricted List. For a complete description of what this general license authorizes and the restrictions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.573. Persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction that do not meet the terms of the general license may apply to OFAC for a specific license. Such applications will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. Additional authorizations from the Cuban government may also be required.

761. Can U.S. trade delegations travel to Cuba?  Trade delegations are authorized to travel to Cuba only if each member of the delegation meets the criteria of an applicable general license authorizing travel to Cuba or has obtained a specific license from OFAC. Authorized trade delegations generally fall under one of two general licenses for travel authorization: either (1) 31 CFR § 515.533(c)(1), which authorizes travel-related and other transactions incident to the exportation of certain authorized goods from the U.S. to Cuba, specifically the conduct of "market research, commercial marketing, sales or contract negotiation, accompanied delivery, installation, leasing, servicing, or repair in Cuba of items consistent with the export or reexport licensing policy of the Commerce Department,” or (2) 31 CFR § 515.564(a)(1), which authorizes transactions related to professional research in Cuba. Both general licenses exclude from the authorizations lodging, paying for lodging, or making any reservation for or on behalf of a third party to lodge, at any property in Cuba on the Cuba Prohibited Accommodations List to the extent prohibited by § 515.210.  For a complete description of the scope of this prohibition, see 31 CFR § 515.210.  In addition, the general license related to professional research in Cuba excludes from its authorization direct or, effective September 30, 2026, indirect financial transactions with entities or subentities identified on the State Department’s Cuba Restricted List.  For a complete description of the scope of this prohibition, see 31 CFR § 515.209.

760. How do U.S. companies know if a Cuban counterpart is affiliated with an entity or subentity on the Cuba Restricted List?  The names of the entities and subentities that the State Department identifies as under the control of, or acting for or on behalf of, or for the benefit of, the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel and with which direct or indirect financial transactions would disproportionally benefit such services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba are published on the Cuba Restricted List (CRL), which is available on the State Department’s website and in the Federal Register (updates to the CRL will also be published in the Federal Register).  Entities or subentities that are owned or controlled by another entity or subentity on the CRL are not treated as restricted unless also specified by name on the CRL.

758. Is Cuba open for U.S. business and investment?  Persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction are prohibited from doing business or investing in Cuba unless authorized by OFAC.  An OFAC general license authorizes, subject to certain conditions and limitations, the exportation from the United States, and the reexportation from third countries, of items to Cuba where the exportation or reexportation is licensed or otherwise authorized by BIS.  See 31 CFR § 515.533(a). BIS currently authorizes certain categories of items to be exported or reexported to Cuba. In addition, OFAC currently generally licenses the establishment of a business presence or physical presence in Cuba for certain types of entities or persons.  See 31 CFR § 515.573. The general licenses for the establishment of a business presence or physical presence in Cuba exclude from the authorizations direct or, effective September 30, 2026, indirect financial transactions with entities and subentities identified on the State Department’s Cuba Restricted List. For a description of the scope of the prohibition on direct or indirect financial transactions and the restrictions and exceptions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.209.

757. Are U.S. banking institutions authorized to process "U-turn" transactions in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest?  No. Effective September 30, 2026, banking institutions subject to U.S. jurisdiction are prohibited from processing "U-turn" transactions, i.e., funds transfers originating and terminating outside the United States, where neither the originator nor the beneficiary is a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction. However, banking institutions subject to U.S. jurisdiction are authorized pursuant to 31 CFR § 515.584(d) to reject (vice block) such "U-turn" transactions.

756. May a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction utilize online payment platforms to facilitate or process authorized transactions involving Cuba or a Cuban entity?  Yes. Subject to certain exceptions, transactions that are ordinarily incident to an authorized transaction are permitted. See the examples in 31 CFR § 515.421. Such transactions may include use of online payment platforms to facilitate authorized transactions. Authorized transactions ordinarily incident to licensed transactions exclude any direct or, effective September 30, 2026, indirect financial transaction with Cuba Restricted List (CRL) entities, as well as lodging, paying for lodging, or making any reservation for or on behalf of a third party to lodge, at any property in Cuba on the Cuba Prohibited Accommodations List to the extent prohibited by § 515.210, if the terms of the applicable general or specific license expressly exclude such transactions. See 31 CFR § 515.421(5)-(6). Also, 31 CFR § 515.421 tfurther notes that a transaction relating to the collection, forwarding, or receipt of remittances involving any entity or subentity identified on the CRL is not authorized as an ordinarily incident transaction where the terms of the general or specific license expressly exclude any such transactions. For a complete description of the scope of transactions ordinarily incident to a licensed transaction and the restrictions and exceptions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.421.

754. Is the U.S. originating bank, U.S. intermediary bank, or U.S. beneficiary bank required to independently verify that a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction is not engaging in a direct or indirect financial transaction as defined in § 515.209 when processing Cuba-related transactions?  No. To the extent the transaction involves an entity or subentity on the Cuba Restricted List, a financial institution can rely on the statements of its customer or information available to them in the ordinary course of business that the transaction is authorized unless it knows or has reason to know the transaction is not authorized. A banking institution is expected to conduct a level of due diligence commensurate with its overall risk profile and internal compliance policies and procedures with respect a transaction involving Cuba or a Cuban national and which may be authorized pursuant to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.

748. May U.S. banks open and operate accounts for Cuban nationals present in Cuba?  Yes. Section 515.584(h) of the CACR contains a general license that allows banking institutions to open and maintain bank accounts in the United States solely in the name of a Cuban national located in Cuba, to receive payments in the United States for transactions authorized pursuant to, or exempt from the prohibitions of, the CACR and to remit such payments back to Cuba, including through an online payment platform. For example, an author who is a Cuban national located in Cuba may open an account with a bank in the United States to receive payments for sales of their book.  On September 30, 2026, OFAC amended § 515.584 to remove the authorization for U.S. banking institutions to open and maintain an account solely in the name of a Cuban national who is an independent private sector entrepreneur (as defined in 31 CFR § 515.340) for the purpose of conducting authorized or exempt transactions. Unless separately authorized, banking institutions subject to U.S. jurisdiction are required to immediately block these funds and accounts, and will require a specific license from OFAC to unblock any such accounts or funds.

745. May U.S. banks open and operate accounts for Cuban nationals lawfully present in the United States?  Yes.  Pursuant to section 515.571(a)(5) of the CACR, banking institutions are permitted to maintain accounts for certain Cuban nationals present in the United States in a non-immigrant status or pursuant to other non-immigrant travel authorization.  Although the account may remain open while the Cuban national is not in the United States, access to such accounts must be limited to periods during which the Cuban national is lawfully present in the United States.  For a complete description of what the OFAC general license authorizes and the restrictions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.571(a)(5).

737. Are authorized travelers permitted to open bank accounts in Cuba?  Yes.  Persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction who are traveling to Cuba pursuant to one of the 12 authorized categories of travel may open and maintain bank accounts in order to access funds while located in Cuba for authorized transactions, and are authorized to close such accounts.  For a complete description of what this general license authorizes and the restrictions that apply, see 31 CFR §  515.560(c)(6). This general license excludes direct or, effective September 30, 2026, indirect financial transactions with entities and subentities identified on the State Department’s Cuba Restricted List. For a description of the scope of the prohibition on direct or indirect financial transactions and the restrictions and exceptions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.209.

736. May the U.S. dollar be used to conduct transactions in Cuba or with Cuban nationals?  Yes, under certain circumstances. Persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction may engage in transactions in U.S. dollars in Cuba or with Cuban nationals with respect to activity that is authorized pursuant to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR). For example, payments for telecommunications services in Cuba provided pursuant to 31 CFR § 515.542 may be provided in U.S. dollars. Further, the use of U.S. dollars for transactions that are exempt from the prohibitions of, or authorized by, the CACR is also allowed. For example, payments related to the importation or exportation of informational materials as defined in 31 CFR § 515.332, such as books or musical recordings, may be made in U.S. dollars.  Please note that, effective September 30, 2026, banking institutions subject to U.S. jurisdiction are no longer authorized to process transactions in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest that originate and terminate outside the United States, even where neither the originator nor the beneficiary is a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction (i.e., "U-turn" transactions). Such banking institutions are now only authorized to reject (vice block) these transactions.

735. What would constitute What are examples of a direct or indirect financial transactions with an entity or subentity on the State Department’s Cuba Restricted List (CRL) prohibited by 31 CFR § 515.209?  What are some examples of this prohibited conduct?  Section 515.209 prohibits persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction from engaging in a direct or, effective September 30, 2026, an indirect financial transaction with entities and subentities on the CRL. A person engages in a direct financial transaction by either acting as the originator on a transfer of funds whose ultimate beneficiary is on the CRL or as the ultimate beneficiary on a transfer of funds whose originator is an entity or subentity on the CRL, including a transaction by wire transfer, credit card, check, or payment of cash. A person engages in an indirect financial transaction by participating in a transfer of funds despite not acting as an originator or ultimate beneficiary of that funds transfer, where either the originator or the ultimate beneficiary is an entity or subentity on the CRL, including a transaction by wire transfer, credit card, check, or payment of cash. This definition of "indirect financial transaction" is unique to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations and should not be interpreted to apply to other OFAC programs.  Below are some examples of direct and indirect financial transactions that 31 CFR § 515.209 would prohibit.  

Direct Financial Transactions

• A person subject to U.S. jurisdiction is traveling to Cuba to engage in an authorized family visit pursuant to 31 CFR § 515.561. The traveler books and pays for a hotel room directly with a hotel included on the CRL. This is a prohibited direct financial transaction because the traveler is a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction who would be the originator of a transfer of funds (i.e., payment for the room) whose ultimate beneficiary would be a hotel that is on the CRL.

• An individual working for a church subject to U.S. jurisdiction is interested in establishing a physical presence in Cuba pursuant to 31 CFR § 515.573(d)(3). The individual signs a new contract directly with a real estate company on the CRL to rent a location for the church’s physical presence, and the church begins making rent payments shortly thereafter. This is a prohibited direct financial transaction because the church is a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction who would be originating a transfer of funds (i.e., rent payments) whose ultimate beneficiary would be an entity on the CRL.

• A person subject to U.S. jurisdiction is traveling to Cuba to engage in professional research pursuant to 31 CFR § 515.564(a). The traveler books a stay a hotel that is on the CRL through a travel agency that is not subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The traveler pays for the trip, including for the room at the hotel, through the travel agency so that the traveler pays the travel agency, which in turn pays the Cuban entities, including the hotel. This is a prohibited direct financial transaction because the traveler is a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction who would be originating a transfer of funds (i.e., payment for the room) whose ultimate beneficiary would be an entity on the CRL.

Indirect Financial Transactions

• A Cuban beverage manufacturer on the CRL seeks to pay for goods provided by a fruit supply company that is not subject to U.S. jurisdiction. The payment is routed to the fruit supply company’s bank via a U.S. correspondent bank. This is a prohibited indirect financial transaction because the U.S. bank is acting as an intermediary in a transfer of funds that originates from an entity on the CRL.

• A U.S. banking institution processes a payment from a non-U.S. person tourist for goods at a Cuban store on the CRL. This is a prohibited indirect financial transaction because the U.S. banking institution is acting as an intermediary in a transfer of funds where the ultimate beneficiary is an entity on the CRL.

• A U.S. banking institution processes a payment from a non-U.S. person tourist to a Cuban hotel on the CRL. This is a prohibited indirect financial transaction because the U.S. banking institution is acting as an intermediary in a transfer of funds where the ultimate beneficiary is an entity on the CRL.

Please note that § 515.201(c) also prohibits any transaction for the purpose or which has the effect of evading or avoiding § 515.209’s prohibition on engaging in a direct or indirect financial transaction with entities or subentities on the CRL.

734. What is the Cuba Restricted List and how does it impact Cuba-related transactions?  The State Department publishes a list of entities and subentities that the Secretary of State has determined are under the control of, or act for, on behalf of, or for the benefit of the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel, and with which direct or indirect financial transactions would disproportionately benefit the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba. This list is called the Cuba Restricted List (CRL), and is available on the State Department's website at https://www.state.gov/division-for-counter-threat-finance-and-sanctions/cuba-restricted-list.  The Cuban Asset Control Regulations (CACR) prohibit any direct or, effective September 30, 2026, indirect financial transaction with entities and subentities on the CRL. For a complete description of the scope of the prohibition on direct or indirect financial transactions and the restrictions and exceptions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.209. Please see FAQ 735 for additional information regarding a "direct financial transaction" and "indirect financial transaction." Please see FAQ 1271 for additional information on the effect of OFAC's September 30, 2026 amendment to the CACR on the CRL.  The prohibition on direct or indirect financial transactions with entities and subentities on the CRL applies to the following general licenses: §§ 515.530 (powers of attorney); 515.534 (contingent contracts); 515.545 (information/informational materials); 515.560 (travel-related transactions); 515.561 (family visits); 515.564 (professional research); 515.565 (educational activities); 515.566 (religious activities); 515.567 (public performances); 515.572 (travel services); 515.573 (physical and business presence in Cuba); 515.574 (support for the Cuban people); 515.576 (private foundations or research or educational institutes); 515.577 (publishing); 515.578 (internet-based services); 515.581 (conferences in third countries); 515.584 (certain financial transactions); and 515.590 (certain grants, scholarships, and awards). For a complete description of what each general license authorizes and the restrictions that apply, see the aforementioned general licenses.  The CACR also excludes from the scope of certain remittance-related general licenses any transactions relating to the collection, forwarding, or receipt of remittances involving any entity or subentity identified on the CRL. This restriction is distinct from the prohibition in § 515.209, which, for example, contains certain exceptions for pre-existing commercial engagements with CRL entities or subentities. See Note 2 to § 515.209, reinforcing this distinction. Specifically, OFAC excludes from the scope of certain general licenses any transaction relating to the collection, forwarding, or receipt of remittances involving any entity or subentity on the CRL, regardless of the existence of any pre-existing commercial engagements.  In addition, § 515.421 of the CACR contains an interpretive provision for incidental transactions where OFAC has clarified that authorized transactions ordinarily incident to licensed transactions and necessary to give effect thereto exclude direct and indirect financial transactions with such entities or subentities on the CRL if the terms of the applicable general or specific license expressly exclude such direct or indirect financial transactions. Section 515.421 also clarifies that a transaction relating to the collection, forwarding, or receipt of remittances involving any entity or subentity identified on the CRL is not authorized as an ordinarily incident transaction where the terms of the general or specific license expressly exclude any such transactions. For a complete description of the scope of the interpretive provision and the restrictions and exceptions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.421.  Finally, effective September 30, 2026, § 515.201(c) prohibits any transaction that has the purpose or effect of evading or avoiding the prohibitions on direct or indirect transactions with entities or subentities on the CRL.

724. Do travel service providers (such as travel agents and tour group operators) need to obtain specific licenses from OFAC to provide services for travel to Cuba?  No.  A general license authorizes persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction, including travel agents and tour group operators, to provide travel services in connection with authorized travel without the need for specific licenses from OFAC.  For a complete description of what this general license authorizes and the restrictions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.572(a)(1). This general license excludes direct or, effective September 30, 2026, indirect financial transactions with entities and subentities identified on the State Department’s Cuba Restricted List. This general license further excludes from the authorization lodging, paying for lodging, or making any reservation for or on behalf of a third party to lodge, at any property in Cuba on the Cuba Prohibited Accommodations List to the extent prohibited by § 515.210. For a complete description of the scope of this prohibition, see 31 CFR § 515.210. The provision of services related to travel for tourist activities or other unauthorized travel to Cuba remains prohibited. 

717. Are there any spending limits for authorized U.S. travelers while in Cuba?  There is no specific dollar limit on authorized expenses; however, the Cuban Assets Control Regulations restrict persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction from engaging in direct or, effective September 30, 2026, indirect financial transactions with entities or subentities identified on the State Department’s Cuba Restricted List, with certain exceptions. See 31 CFR §§ 515.209 and 515.421.  Consistent with these authorizations and restrictions, authorized travelers may engage in transactions ordinarily incident to travel within Cuba, including payment of living expenses and the acquisition in Cuba of goods for personal consumption there. 31 CFR § 515.421 also  excludes from the authorization lodging, paying for lodging, or making any reservation for or on behalf of a third party to lodge, at any property in Cuba on the State Department’s Cuba Prohibited Accommodations List to the extent prohibited by 31 CFR § 515.210.  For a complete description of the scope of this prohibition, see 31 CFR § 515.210. In addition, travelers are authorized to acquire in Cuba and import as accompanied baggage into the United States merchandise for personal use only; this authorization excludes imports into the United States of Cuban-origin alcohol or tobacco products.  OFAC considers “personal use” of an imported item to include giving the item to another individual as a personal gift, but not the transfer of the item to another person for payment or other consideration. Value imports remain subject to the normal limits on duty and tax exemptions for merchandise imported as accompanied baggage and for personal use. 

710. What constitutes “exportation, importation, or transmission of information or informational materials” for generally authorized travel?  The general license at 31 CFR § 515.545(b)(1) authorizes, subject to conditions, travel-related transactions and other transactions that are directly incident to the exportation, importation, or transmission of information or informational materials.  This general license excludes from its authorization direct or, effective September 30, 2026, indirect financial transactions with entities and subentities identified on the State Department’s Cuba Restricted List. This general license also excludes from the authorization lodging, paying for lodging, or making any reservation for or on behalf of a third party to lodge, at any property in Cuba on the Cuba Prohibited Accommodations List to the extent prohibited by § 515.210. For a complete description of the scope of this prohibition, see 31 CFR § 515.210.  The traveler’s schedule of activities must not include free time or recreation in excess of that consistent with a full- time schedule in Cuba. For a complete description of what this general license authorizes and the restrictions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.545(b)(1).  The general license at 31 CFR §515.545(b)(2) authorizes, subject to conditions, travel-related transactions and other transactions that are directly incident to professional media or artistic productions of information or informational materials for exportation, importation, or transmission, including the filming or production of media programs (such as movies and television programs), the recording of music, and the creation of artworks in Cuba, provided that the traveler is regularly employed in or has demonstrated professional experience in a field relevant to such professional media or artistic productions. This general license excludes from the authorization direct or, effective September 30, 2026, indirect financial transactions with entities and subentities identified on the State Department’s Cuba Restricted List.  This general license also excludes from the authorization lodging, paying for lodging, or making any reservation for or on behalf of a third party to lodge, at any property in Cuba on the Cuba Prohibited Accommodations List to the extent prohibited by § 515.210.  For a complete description of the scope of this prohibition, see 31 CFR § 515.210.  The traveler’s schedule of activities must not include free time or recreation in excess of that consistent with a full-time schedule.  For a complete description of what this general license authorizes and the restrictions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.545(b)(2).  The definition of “information and informational materials” may be found at 31 CFR § 515.332. 

709. What constitutes “activities of private foundations or research or educational institutes” for generally authorized travel?  Section 515.576 of the CACR contains a general license that authorizes, subject to conditions, travel-related transactions and other transactions that are directly incident to activities by private foundations or research or educational institutes with an established interest in international relations to collect information related to Cuba for noncommercial purposes, among other things.  This general license excludes direct or, effective September 30, 2026, indirect financial transactions with entities and subentities identified on the State Department’s Cuba Restricted List. This general license also excludes lodging, paying for lodging, or making any reservation for or on behalf of a third party to lodge, at any property in Cuba on the Cuba Prohibited Accommodations List to the extent prohibited by § 515.210.  For a complete description of the scope of this prohibition, see 31 CFR § 515.210.  The traveler’s schedule of activities must not include free time or recreation in excess of that consistent with a full-time schedule in Cuba.  For a complete description of what this general license authorizes and the restrictions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.576.  Additionally, 31 CFR § 515.573(d) authorizes private foundations or research or educational institutes engaging in transactions authorized by § 515.576 to establish a physical presence in Cuba, such as an office.  For a complete description of what this general license authorizes and the restrictions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.573(a).

707. What constitutes “support for the Cuban people” for generally authorized travel and other transactions?  Section 515.574 of the CACR contains a general license that authorizes, subject to conditions, travel-related transactions and other transactions that are intended to provide support for the Cuban people, which include activities of recognized human rights organizations; independent organizations designed to promote a rapid, peaceful transition to democracy; and individuals and non-governmental organizations that promote independent activity intended to strengthen civil society in Cuba.  In accordance with NSPM-5 as issued June 16, 2017, OFAC amended this general license on November 8, 2017, to require that each traveler utilizing this authorization engage in a full-time schedule of activities that enhance contact with the Cuban people, support civil society in Cuba, or promote the Cuban people’s independence from Cuban authorities and that result in meaningful interactions with individuals in Cuba. This general license excludes direct or, effective September 30, 2026, indirect financial transactions with entities and subentities identified on the State Department’s Cuba Restricted List. This general license also excludes lodging, paying for lodging, or making any reservation for or on behalf of a third party to lodge, at any property in Cuba on the Cuba Prohibited Accommodations List to the extent prohibited by § 515.210.  For a complete description of the scope of this prohibition, see 31 CFR § 515.210.  The traveler’s schedule of activities must not include free time or recreation in excess of that consistent with a full-time schedule in Cuba.  An entire group does not qualify for this general license merely because some members of the group qualify individually.  For a complete description of what this general license authorizes and the restrictions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.574.

706. What constitutes generally authorized travel under the travel-related category of “public performances, clinics, workshops, athletic and other competitions, and exhibitions”?  Section 515.567(a) of the CACR contains a general license that authorizes, subject to conditions, travel-related transactions and other transactions that are directly incident to organization of and participation in amateur and semi-professional international sports federation competitions.  Transactions incident to the organization of such competitions include marketing related to those specific events in Cuba.  OFAC will consider issuing specific licenses, on a case-by-case basis, for travel-related transactions and other transactions that are directly incident to participation in or organization of a public performance, clinic, workshop, athletic competition not covered by the general license in § 515.567(a), non-athletic competition, or exhibition in Cuba, subject to certain conditions.  OFAC excludes from this authorization direct or, effective September 30, 2026, indirect financial transactions with entities and subentities identified on the Cuba Restricted List.  OFAC also excludes from the authorization lodging, paying for lodging, or making any reservation for or on behalf of a third party to lodge, at any property in Cuba on the Cuba Prohibited Accommodations List to the extent prohibited by § 515.210.  For a complete description of the scope of this prohibition, see 31 CFR § 515.210.  For a complete description of what this general license authorizes and the restrictions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.567.

705. Who is generally authorized to engage in travel-related transactions for “religious activities”?  Section 515.566 of the CACR contains a general license that authorizes, subject to conditions, travel-related transactions and other transactions that are directly incident to religious activities in Cuba.  All persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction, including religious organizations located in the United States and members and staff of such organizations, are generally authorized to engage in travel-related transactions that are directly incident to engaging in religious activities in Cuba provided, among other things, that the travel must be for the purpose of engaging in a program of religious activities.  This general license excludes direct and, effective September 30, 2026, indirect financial transactions with entities and subentities identified on the State Department’s Cuba Restricted List. This general license also excludes from the authorization lodging, paying for lodging, or making any reservation for or on behalf of a third party to lodge, at any property in Cuba on the Cuba Prohibited Accommodations List to the extent prohibited by § 515.210.  For a complete description of the scope of this prohibition, see 31 CFR § 515.210.  The traveler’s schedule of activities must not include free time or recreation in excess of that consistent with a full-time schedule in Cuba.  For a complete description of what this general license authorizes and the restrictions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.566.

704. Can travelers engage in "people-to-people travel" to Cuba on an individual basis or as a part of a group?  No, persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction may not travel to Cuba to engage in "people-to-people" educational exchanges on an individual basis or, effective September 30, 2026, as part of a group.  However, § 515.565(c) includes a grandfathering provision, authorizing certain educational travel that was previously authorized under § 515.565(a). Specifically, travelers may still engage in group people-to-people travel for educational activities consistent with the authorization for educational travel (31 CFR § 515.565(b)) as the authorization existed on June 30, 2025 (when the 2026 NSPM-5 was issued) provided the traveler has already completed at least one travel-related transaction (such as purchasing a flight or reserving accommodation) prior to September 30, 2026. Any travel-related transactions under this grandfather provision, however, cannot involve either a direct or indirect financial transaction with entities or subentities on the State Department’s Cuba Restricted List. Please see FAQ 1274 for more information about how the September 30, 2026 amendment to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) affected travel to Cuba for persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction.

702. What constitutes "educational activities" for generally authorized travel and other transactions?  On September 30, 2026, OFAC amended 31 CFR § 515.565(a) to restore particular requirements for authorized educational activities related to Cuba. As of September 30, 2026, the requirements related to a person's use of the educational activities- authorization depend on whether the person engaging in the activity is associated with an accredited U.S. undergraduate or graduate degree-granting academic institution.  Effective September 30, 2026, § 515.565(a)(1) authorizes accredited U.S. undergraduate or graduate degree-granting academic institutions and their faculty, staff, and students, to engage in the travel-related transactions set forth in 31 CFR § 515.560(c) and such additional transactions as are directly incident to the six categories of educational activities enumerated in § 515.565(a)(1). Among other educational activities, this general license authorizes, subject to conditions outlined in § 515.565(a)(1), faculty, staff, and students at accredited U.S. undergraduate or graduate degree-granting academic institutions to participate in a structured educational program in Cuba or to teach at a Cuban academic institution, as well as authorizes Cuban scholars to engage in certain educational activities in the United States. For a complete description of authorized educational activities related to accredited U.S. undergraduate or graduate degree-granting academic institutions, and the restrictions that apply, see § 515.565(a)(1).  Effective September 30, 2026, § 515.565(a)(2) authorizes persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction, including, for example, U.S. secondary schools, to engage in additional educational activities that are not authorized under § 515.565(a)(1), provided that: (1) any travel-related transactions pursuant to these authorizations take place under the auspices of an organization that is a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction (the "sponsoring organization"), and (2) all travelers are accompanied by a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction who is an employee, paid consultant, agent, or other representative of the sponsoring organization (subject to certain exceptions). These authorized transactions include the travel-related transactions set forth in § 515.560(c) and such transactions as are directly incident to the 12 categories of educational activities enumerated in § 515.565(a)(2). For example, under this general license, U.S. and Cuban universities may engage in academic exchanges and joint non-commercial academic research, and persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction may provide standardized testing services and certain internet-based courses to Cuban nationals. For a complete description of what this general license authorizes and the restrictions that apply, see § 515.565(a)(2).  Effective September 30, 2026, OFAC further amended § 515.565 to remove the authorization for group people-to-people educational travel.  Please note that the general license at § 515.565 excludes any direct or, effective September 30, 2026, indirect financial transaction with entities and subentities identified on the State Department's Cuba Restricted List. For a description of the scope of the prohibition on direct or indirect financial transactions and the restrictions and exceptions that apply, see § 515.209. This general license also excludes from the authorization lodging, paying for lodging, or making any reservation for or on behalf of a third party to lodge, at any property in Cuba on the Cuba Prohibited Accommodations List to the extent prohibited by § 515.210.

701. What constitutes generally authorized travel-related transactions for "professional research" in Cuba?  31 CFR § 515.564 (a)(1) contains a general license that authorizes, subject to conditions, travel-related transactions and other transactions that are directly incident to professional research in Cuba. Among other things, this general license authorizes, subject to conditions, professional research in Cuba relating to a traveler's profession, professional background, or area of expertise.  Effective September 30, 2026, OFAC amended § 515.564(a) to remove the previous license authorizing travel-related and other transactions incident to attendance at or organization of professional meetings or conferences in Cuba. However, specific licenses may be issued on a case-by-case basis for transactions related to such professional meetings. See FAQ 1275 for additional information on these changes.  Please note that § 515.564 excludes from its authorization lodging, paying for lodging, or making any reservation for or on behalf of a third party to lodge, at any property in Cuba on the Cuba Prohibited Accommodations List to the extent prohibited by § 515.210. For a complete description of the scope of this prohibition, see § 515.210. § 515.564 also excludes from its authorization any direct or indirect financial transaction with an entity or subentity identified on the State Department’s Cuba Restricted List. For a complete description of the scope of this prohibition, see § 515.209.  The traveler's schedule of activities must not include free time or recreation in excess of that consistent with a full-time schedule of professional research or a full-time schedule of attendance at, or organization of, professional meetings or conferences, respectively. An entire group does not qualify for the general license merely because some members of the group qualify individually. For a complete description of what these general licenses authorize and the restrictions that apply, see § 515.564.

699. What constitutes “a close relative” for generally authorized family travel?  OFAC regulations generally authorize persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction and those sharing a dwelling with them as a family to visit a close relative in Cuba, including a close relative who is a Cuban national or a person ordinarily resident in Cuba, or to visit or accompany a close relative who is located in or traveling to Cuba pursuant to the authorizations in § 515.562 (official government business), § 515.563 (journalistic activity), § 515.564(a) (professional research), § 515.565(a)(1)(i) through (iv) and (vi) (educational activities), § 515.566 (religious activities), § 515.575 (humanitarian projects), or § 515.576 (activities of private foundations or research or educational institutes). A close relative is defined as any individual related to a person “by blood, marriage, or adoption who is no more than three generations removed from that person or from a common ancestor with that person.” For a complete description of what this general license authorizes and the restrictions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.339 and § 515.561. The authorizations contained within § 515.561 exclude direct or, effective September 30, 2026, indirect financial transactions with entities and subentities identified on the State Department’s Cuba Restricted List. For a description of the scope of the prohibition on direct or indirect financial transactions and the restrictions and exceptions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.209 or FAQ 735. 

696. Are authorized travelers who have initiated travel arrangements prior to the addition of an entity or subentity on the State Department’s Cuba Restricted List required to cancel their Cuba-related travel plans if their travel arrangements involve direct or indirect financial transactions with a listed entity or subentity?  Any travel-related arrangements that include direct or indirect financial transactions with entities and subentities that appear on the State Department’s Cuba Restricted List will continue to be permitted, provided that those travel arrangements were initiated prior to the State Department’s addition of the entity or subentity to the list. Once the State Department adds an entity or subentity to the Cuba Restricted List, new direct or, effective September 30, 2026, indirect financial transactions with the entity or subentity are prohibited, unless authorized by OFAC or exempt. For a complete description of the scope of the prohibition on direct or indirect financial transactions and the restrictions and exceptions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.209.

695. What are the general travel authorizations in the Cuba program?  Travel-related transactions are permitted by general or specific licenses for certain travel related to the 12 categories of activities identified in 31 CFR § 515.560(a). Those travel-related transactions permitted by general license, subject to specified criteria and conditions, include: family visits; official business of the U.S. government, foreign governments, and certain intergovernmental organizations; journalistic activity; professional research and professional meetings; educational activities; religious activities; athletic competitions by amateur or semi-professional athletes or athletic teams; support for the Cuban people; humanitarian projects; activities of private foundations or research or educational institutes; exportation, importation, or transmission of information or information materials; and certain authorized export transactions. Each person relying on a certain general authorization must retain specific records related to the authorized travel transactions. See §§ 501.601 and 501.602 of the Reporting, Procedures and Penalties Regulations for applicable recordkeeping and reporting requirements.  Effective September 30, 2026, OFAC amended § 515.564(a) to remove the authorization for persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction to travel to Cuba for purposes of attending or organizing professional meetings or conferences in Cuba. OFAC also amended § 515.565 to reinstate certain restrictions on authorized academic educational activities to require certain educational travel to occur under the auspices of an organization subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and a representative of that sponsoring organization to accompany those travelers. Finally, OFAC removed the authorization for group people-to-people educational travel previously included in § 515.565. See FAQs 1274 and 1275 for more information on changes to travel-related authorizations under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR).  Furthermore, the CACR includes a prohibition at § 515.209 that restricts certain direct and, effective September 30, 2026, indirect financial transactions with entities and subentities identified on the State Department's Cuba Restricted List (CRL). For a description of the scope of the prohibition on direct and indirect financial transactions with entities or subentities on the CRL, and the restrictions and exceptions that apply, see § 515.209.  Additionally, § 515.210 prohibits any person subject to U.S. jurisdiction from lodging, paying for lodging, or making any reservation for or on behalf of a third party to lodge, at any property that the Secretary of State has identified as a property in Cuba that is owned or controlled by: the Cuban government; a prohibited official of the Government of Cuba, as defined in § 515.337; a prohibited member of the Cuban Communist Party, as defined in § 515.338; a close relative, as defined in § 515.339, of a prohibited official of the Government of Cuba, or a close relative of a prohibited member of the Cuban Communist Party, when the terms of the general or specific license expressly exclude such a transaction. The State Department maintains the Cuba Prohibited Accommodations List, which identifies the names, addresses, or other identifying details, as relevant, of properties identified as meeting such criteria.

U.S. Secretary Of State Rubio About Cuba: "preference of our President is to solve these things diplomatically"

Fox News
New York, New York
28 September 2026

Marco Rubio, United States Secretary of State

QUESTION:  Is Cuba about to fall, and can you update us on Venezuela?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, the truth is Cuba has already fallen.  It’s not – it doesn’t have a functional economy and it’s governed by people who continue to preach about some revolution that has been dead for 20 years that’s never worked.  And that’s the problem they have.  The problem that Cuba has basically right now is that it is a failed state in every sense of the word.  Now, they may have a government that’s capable of jailing and killing people.  They have a regime that’s capable of and has jailed and killed people.  But it’s not a functional government and it’s not a functional country.  It just simply isn’t.

And in addition to that, it’s one that’s fueled by corruption, graft, and theft.  The Cuban economy – there is no Cuban economy that benefits the Cuban people.  Anything that had a chance of making money in Cuba was controlled by the Cuban military and the Cuban Communist Party to line the pockets of a handful of individuals at the expense of the entire country.  You know that since 2021 at least close to 20 percent of Cuba’s population has left the country?  Has left it because it’s a failure, a complete failure.

So we are hopeful that Cuba will choose a different path.  We are hopeful that the people that today sort of control the arms and the repressive regime, that there will be some people in there that open their eyes to the reality of what they’re facing.  What they’re no longer going to do as long as Donald Trump is President is they’re no longer going to be able to steal money and make money off the backs of the Cuban people.  And what we’re not going to allow ever under any circumstances as long as President Trump is President is we’re never going to allow Cuba to become a base of operation against American interests or pose a threat to our national security.  On that we are abundantly clear.

As in every case – you can ask about any country or any problem in the world, and I will tell you that the preference of our President is to solve these things diplomatically and in a way that you can reach an agreement and get Cuba or any country on a path to irreversible, positive change that involves economic freedoms but also involves political freedoms.  In fact, you cannot have economic freedom in Cuba if you don’t have political freedom first.  You have to have both happening at least at the same time.  That will require a period of transition.  Unfortunately, the people that continue there to chant revolutionary slogans – too many of them – still believe that they could wait out this administration and make no changes or do nothing.  They are wrong and they will learn the lesson the hard way if they don’t correct.

Cuba Government "wouldn't discard" Mediator. Resurrect Idea During Trump-Pence Administration In 2016? Calling (Again) Kenneth Feinberg.

Carlos Fernández de Cossío, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba (2022- ), shared the following three observations during an interview on 25 September 2026 with Bloomberg during the 81st United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York City, New York. 

• “If the US eases the amount of pressure, then those transformations in Cuba can go a long way and become truly irreversible, which is our aim and in theory is what the US wants to happen.” 

• “The resources in Cuba belong to the people of Cuba.  Our government does not have the right to deprive them of that and hand it over to another country.” 

Link: DOD (War) OSC Could Be U.S. Taxpayer Partner Of Last Resort For Canada’s Sherritt And Australia’s Antilles. Cobalt, Copper, Gold, Nickel, Silver Are Strategic Minerals. August 30, 2026 

Link: Cuba: And Now There Are Two…  Antilles Gold Has Until 25 January 2027 And Sherritt International Has Until 12 October 2026 August 27, 2026 

Link: Potential Triple Play? Carney, Diaz-Canel, Trump Deal. U.S. Secretary Of Defense Hegseth Wants Cobalt. Cuba Has It. Settling One Libertad Act Issue. And Opening Doors? August 23, 2025

• Third-party mediator: “wouldn't discard it… It’s not that we need someone to put us together in a specific place.” 

Link: The Negotiator-in-Chief For Cuba: We’re Grown-Ups- Let’s Make A Deal; Calling Mr. Kenneth Feinberg December 01, 2016 

new york times

There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC) and have not been resolved for nearing sixty years (some assets were officially confiscated in the 1960’s, some in the 1970’s and some in the 1990’s).  The USFCSC permitted simple interest (not compound interest) of 6% per annum (approximately US$114,132,137.10); with the approximate current value of the 5,913 certified claims is approximately US$9.4 billion.  

The first asset (along with 382 enterprises the same day) to be expropriated by the Republic of Cuba was an oil refinery on 6 August 1960 owned by White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation (USFCSC: CU-1331/CU-1332/CU-1333 valued at US$56,196,422.73).  

From the certified claim filed by Texaco: “The Cuban corporation was intervened on June 29, 1960, pursuant to Resolution 188 of June 28, 1960, under Law 635 of 1959.  Resolution 188 was promulgated by the Government of Cuba when the Cuban corporation assertedly refused to refine certain crude oil as assertedly provided under a 1938 law pertaining to combustible materials.  Subsequently, this Cuban firm was listed as nationalized in Resolution 19 of August 6, 1960, pursuant to Cuban Law 851.  The Commission finds, however, that the Cuban corporation was effectively intervened within the meaning of Title V of the Act by the Government of Cuba on June 29, 1960.” 

The largest certified claim (Cuban Electric Company) valued at US$267,568,413.62 is controlled by Boca Raton, Florida-based Office Depot, Inc.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International; the certified claim also includes land adjacent to the Jose Marti International Airport in Havana, Republic of Cuba.  The third-largest certified claim valued at US$97,373,414.72 is controlled by New York, New York-based North American Sugar Industries, Inc.  The smallest certified claim is by Sara W. Fishman in the amount of US$1.00 with reference to the Cuban-Venezuelan Oil Voting Trust. 

The two (2) largest certified claims total US$449,377,207.76, representing 24% of the total value of the certified claims.  Thirty (30) certified claimants hold 56% of the total value of the certified claims.  This concentration of value creates an efficient pathway towards a settlement. 

Links To Related Analyses

Troika To Negotiate Settlement Of Certified Claims Against Cuba? Kushner, Greenblatt & Feinberg December 11, 2018 

Background Interview With Trump Administration Officials April 08, 2019 

Is It Time For President Trump To Appoint A Special Representative For Cuba? February 12, 2020

President Biden: A Special Presidential Representative For Cuba Negotiations- With Or Without An Ambassador January 31, 2021

Cuba Could Resolve Western Union's Certified Claim By Waiving Four Months Of Electronic Remittance Transfer Fees. Biden Administration Should Support And Negotiate Certified Claims Settlement. September 17, 2021 

bloomberg

President Trump: "We want to open Cuba to our people."

The White House
Washington DC
26 September 2026

"Cuba and us will make a deal. I don't think we'll need the military.  Cuba is failing very badly. We want to help Cuba.  We want to open Cuba up to our people.  We have great Cuban Americans who want to go back.  We want to open Cuba up to our people."  Donald Trump, President of the United States (2017-2021 and 2025-2029) 

Benjamin Franklin Not Always Welcome In Cuba And Russia. Depends Upon His Appearance. Challenge Using US$100.00 Bill.

Benjamin Franklin Not Always Welcome In Cuba And Russia

Depends Upon His Appearance

Challenge Using US$100.00 Bill  

A visitor to the Russian Federation is required to use the Ruble for transactions- whether electronically through a credit card or debit card or through currency. 

When visiting a financial institution in the Russian Federation, particularly in the capital, Moscow, and second-largest city, St. Petersburg, bank branches and currency exchange companies require that United States currency be near mint condition- no creases, no markings, no printing irregularities (faded, etc.), no tears. 

Some bank branches and currency exchange companies may accept “damaged banknotes” although with an additional fifteen percent (15%) commission. 

There are prohibitions on exchanging United States currency which were printed in certain years and for some years, currency is accepted with an additional five percent (5%) commission.  For example, 1996, 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2006.  The acceptable years change absent advance notification.  

There are also prohibitions on exchanging United States currency which have certain letters next to the year.  The acceptable letters change absent advance notification.  

• For example: “When the Bureau of Engraving and Printing makes a change to a bill—such as a new Treasurer or Secretary of the Treasury taking office, or a minor production shift—they add a letter (like A, B, etc.) to the base series year.” 

• For example: “A plain Series 2006 bill has the base year design and signatures, while Series 2006A means a slight change (such as new signatures) occurred while keeping the core 2006 appearance.” 

• For example: “On U.S. paper currency, "Series 2007 C" means the bill was printed under a design whose base year was 2007, and the C suffix indicates a minor modification—specifically, a change in one or both of the official signatures (the Treasurer of the United States and the Secretary of the Treasury) or a minor plate/production adjustment without a complete redesign.” 

CiberCuba
24 September 2026 

MIPYME rejects US$100.00 bill for being folded, and a Cuban denounces the situation on social media. 

A Cuban identified as Camilo Velazco Montero reported on social media that a small and medium-sized enterprise refused to accept a US$100.00 bill because, as he explained, it was crumpled.  In a video posted on Facebook, Velazco displayed the bill in front of the camera and questioned the decision of the private business. 

"Because it's folded. It's not broken, it's not dirty, it's not fake. It's folded. The small and medium enterprises don't want to accept the money because it's folded," he stated.  The man pointed out that bills often get folded when stored in wallets or pockets and considered it exaggerated that some establishments require cash in almost perfect condition.  With an ironic tone, he recommended that businesses in need of "smooth" bills go directly to the Mint to obtain them freshly printed.  "If you need cash, please go to the Mint and get it at the Mint," he said. 

The post generated numerous reactions from users who claimed to have experienced similar situations with both private and state-run establishments.  "Not only in the micro, small, and medium enterprises, but also in state-owned stores," commented a user.  Another responded humorously: "You're outdated; you need to laminate it and soon you'll need to frame it." 

Some users tried to explain the practice by pointing out that certain businesses seek to receive bills in good condition because they later have to use them for payments, bank deposits, or purchases abroad, where there may also be restrictions on the physical condition of cash.  The rejection of banknotes due to their physical condition is not a new phenomenon in Cuba.  In November 2025, while in 2026 reports emerged about businesses refusing certain denominations of Cuban pesos.  In light of these situations, the Central Bank of Cuba warned that no establishment may arbitrarily decide which denominations it will accept. 

The debate occurs against the backdrop of a growing dependence on cash in the Cuban economy. The U.S. dollar recently hit record values in the informal market, while difficulties with electronic payments have kept physical money as a crucial tool for many transactions.  In mid-September, the Cuban government approved new regulations that allow micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (mipymes) and other private actors to receive cash in foreign currency and deposit it into bank accounts in foreign currency, a measure that has increased the significance of handling dollars within everyday economics.

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Today: United Kingdom's FCDO "advises against all but essential travel to Cuba"

Foreign Travel Advice- Cuba
FCDO advises against all but essential travel to Cuba.

Warnings and insurance

Still current at: 25 September 2026 
Updated: 25 September 2026 

Latest update:

This travel advice has been reviewed for accuracy with changes made throughout, including protests in Cuba, power outages and fuel and water shortages, travel disruption, international card transactions, travel insurance, visa requirements, travelling to the USA from Cuba, taking money into Cuba, crime, money, taxis, emergency medical numbers and healthcare in Cuba (‘Warnings and insurance’, ‘Entry requirements’, ‘Safety and security’ and ‘Health’ pages). 

Protests in Cuba

Cuba is experiencing a worsening economic situation with shortages of fuel, electricity, water and basic necessities. This is affecting tourism services and disrupting travel within the country.  The situation has led to frequent protests. To date most of these have remained peaceful but be aware that protests can escalate. You should stay away from large gatherings, monitor the media for updates and follow the advice of the local authorities.  The situation is also leading to an increase in opportunistic crime, but levels remain lower than in the UK. See ‘Crime’ on the Safety and security page.  

Power outages and fuel and water shortages

The Cuban National Electric grid has collapsed a number of times over the last few months. Given current circumstances, further grid collapses are likely. Low fuel reserves are leading to severe and sustained disruption to essential infrastructure and basic services, including transport, medical care, communications, water supply and street lighting. Authorities have introduced fuel rationing, scaled back public services, and made changes to healthcare, education, transport and tourism operations to conserve severely limited energy supplies. Access to safe drinking water and wastewater management can be problematic.  Take precautions by conserving fuel, water, food and mobile phone charge, and be prepared for significant disruption.

Travel disruption 

Cuban authorities have announced that all of its international airports are without aviation fuel. Only Terminal 3 at José Martí International Airport is currently in operation. Some airlines, including all Canadian airlines, Air France, Iberia, World2Fly and LATAM, have suspended flights to and from Cuba. Other airlines are keeping their routes under review. Options for leaving the country could reduce further if the situation worsens.  If you are currently in Cuba, carefully consider if your presence is essential. The situation has the potential to deteriorate quickly and without warning. Make sure you are ready to change your plans quickly if needed. If you are considering leaving Cuba, check for messaging from your airline or tour operator for up-to-date information. Ensure your travel documents remain valid and confirm you have any required visas for onward travel.  Continue to monitor local media and follow the instructions of local authorities. Subscribe to FCDO email alerts and read our guidance on how to deal with a crisis overseas. 

International card transactions

The Cuban Central Bank has announced that international cards such as Visa and Mastercard are no longer accepted in Cuba. Available payment methods include cash and Cuban prepaid cards. You will not be able to withdraw cash through ATMs with an international card.  If you need to visit Cuba, you should bring enough cash to cover your expenses for the entire length of your stay and in case of an emergency (such as medical treatment or delayed departure). US dollars and euros are widely accepted and can be exchanged in Cuba. See ‘Money’ on the Safety and security page.

Update For Use Of In Cuba Of USDA MAP And FMD Programs Authorized Since 2018

Update For Use Of In Cuba Of USDA MAP And FMD Programs Authorized Since 2018 

In 2018, legislative advocates for issues relating to the Republic of Cuba maintained that inserting into the Farm Bill authorization for the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to include Market Access Program (MAP) and Foreign Market Development (FMD) for the Republic of Cuba was critical to “laying the groundwork” for increasing exports of agricultural commodities and food products to the Republic of Cuba. 

Statements from members of the United States Congress included: “… an important first step to regaining our presence in Cuba.”    

During the last eight years, use to date of USDA MAP/FMD Republic of Cuba-focused funding provisions in the Farm Bill remains anemic.   

For FMD, the program years for all groups run as follows:
FMD PY 2026: January 1, 2026 to June 30, 2027
FMD PY 2027: January 1, 2027 to June 30, 2028
 
For MAP, recipients can be on one of two possible program year cycles with different beginning and ending dates:
MAP PY 2026 begins either January 1, 2026 or July 1, 2026 and ends June 30, 2027 or December 31, 2027, respectively
MAP PY 2027 begins either January 1, 2027 or July 1, 2027 and ends June 30, 2028 or December 31, 2028, respectively

What Is FMD & MAP?  

The USDA does not provide any payments to selected applicants in advance of the applicant making disbursements. The USDA provides payment upon receipt of an invoice from the applicant. The invoices are audited by the USDA and a claw back of payments is permitted.  

MAP: “Through the Market Access Program (MAP), FAS partners with U.S. agricultural trade associations, cooperatives, state regional trade groups and small businesses to share the costs of overseas marketing and promotional activities that help build commercial export markets for U.S. agricultural products and commodities.”   

“MAP reaches virtually every corner of the globe, helping to build markets for a wide variety U.S. farm and food products. FAS provides cost-share assistance to eligible U.S. organizations for activities such as consumer advertising, public relations, point-of-sale demonstrations, participation in trade fairs and exhibits, market research and technical assistance. When MAP funds are used for generic marketing and promotion, participants must contribute a minimum 10-percent match. For promotion of branded products, a dollar-for-dollar match is required. Each year, FAS announces the MAP application period and criteria in the Federal Register. Applicants apply for MAP through the Unified Export Strategy (UES) process, which allows eligible organizations to request funding from multiple USDA market development programs through a single, strategically coordinated proposal. FAS reviews the proposals and awards funds to applicants that demonstrate the potential for effective performance based on a clear, long-term strategic plan.”   

FMD: “The Foreign Market Development (FMD) Program, also known as the Cooperator Program, helps create, expand and maintain long-term export markets for U.S. agricultural products. Under the program, FAS partners with U.S. agricultural producers and processors, who are represented by non-profit commodity or trade associations called “cooperators,” to promote U.S. commodities overseas.”   

“The FMD program focuses on generic promotion of U.S. commodities, rather than consumer-oriented promotion of branded products. Preference is given to organizations that represent an entire industry or are nationwide in membership and scope.   

FMD-funded projects generally address long-term opportunities to reduce foreign import constraints or expand export growth opportunities. For example, this might include efforts to: reduce infrastructural or historical market impediments, improve processing capabilities, modify codes and standards, or identify new markets or new uses for the agricultural commodity or product.   

Each year, FAS announces the FMD application period and criteria in the Federal Register. Organizations apply for the FMD program through the Unified Export Strategy (UES) process, which allows applicants to request funding from multiple USDA market development programs through a single, strategically coordinated proposal. FAS reviews the proposals and awards funds to applicants that demonstrate the potential for effective performance based on a clear, long-term strategic plan.”   

Links To Related Analyses 

Defining Anemic: In Five Years, 2018 Farm Bill USDA Provision For Cuba Had No Use Of FMD And Two Uses Of MAP. Approximately 90 U.S.-Based Entities Could Have Participated. That’s A 2.2% Use Rate. February 03, 2023 

USDA Updates Usage In Cuba Of MAP And FMD Funding Authorized By 2018 Farm Bill. In Four Funding Periods In Four Years, Two Uses Of MAP; No Uses Of FMD. Anemic Response By Export Advocates. November 11, 2021 

After Nearing 700 Days Since Farm Bill Authorized Use Of USDA FMD/MAP Funding In Cuba, 1st Request Is Reported- For Potatoes December 24, 2020

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Saving Antilles Gold: Will GEM Global Yield LLC SCS Obtain OFAC, BIS, Department Of State Authorizations?

27 August 2026  

BINDING MoU SIGNED TO INITIATE POSSIBLE LIFTING OF US SANCTION OF CUBAN JOINT VENTURE COMPANY  

Antilles Gold Limited (“Antilles Gold” or the “Company”) (ASX: AAU) is pleased to advise that on 25 August 2026 the Company signed a binding Memorandum of Understanding ("MoU") with GEM Global Yield LLC SCS ("GEM") whereby GEM is expected to become a 25% shareholder in the Company’s Cayman Islands registered subsidiary, Antilles Gold Inc (“AGI”), which holds 50% of Cuban joint venture mining company, Minera La Victoria (“MLV”).  

GEM will assist in making representations and commitments to the U.S. Department of State (“DoS”) in an endeavour to lift the sanction recently imposed by DoS on MLV, so that the suspended construction of its Nueva Sabana gold-copper mine can resume. GEM Global Yield LLC SCS is an entity registered in Luxembourg, and 100% owned by U.S. citizens, including New York based directors (refer “About GEM” below).  

Refer ASX announcements dated 10, 18, and 24 June, and 7 July 2026 for a chronology of this matter. The primary terms of the MoU are as follows:   

GEM will promptly approach DoS to advise the intentions of the Parties and to seek permission for GEM and the various stakeholders, including MLV, to negotiate the commercial arrangements and commitments to DoS that could result in DoS lifting the sanction, and MLV being licenced by the U.S. Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") to transact with U.S. entities and person.  

GEM will commit to DoS that, subject to the completion of satisfactory due diligence and the lifting of the sanction, it will incorporate a new subsidiary in the U.S. which will subscribe for a 25% shareholding in AGI as the first step towards a minimum of 51% of AGI’s shares being held by U.S. entities.   

GEM will complete its due diligence within 60 days. • AGL and GEM will commit to DoS that, subject to the sanction being lifted, AGI will place sufficient of its shares to U.S. investors to achieve a minimum of 51% being held by U.S. entities, by no later than 30 June 2028.  

AGL and GEM recognise that by early 2028, with the Nueva Sabana mine expected to be operating profitably and the La Demajagua gold-silver antimony mine being construction-ready after completion of its Definitive Feasibility Study ("DFS"), the AGI shares to be placed should be attractive for U.S. investors.  

AGI will commit to DoS that: − its Board will be reconstituted if the sanction is lifted and GEM’s subsidiary becomes a minority shareholder, by the appointment of a U.S. citizen as the independent Chairperson, two U.S. citizens nominated by GEM being appointed as non-executive directors, and AGL nominating one non-executive director and one executive director, and − the surplus cash generated from the first two years of operation of the Nueva Sabana mine will be retained as equity for the La Demajagua mine rather than being distributed as dividends.

AGL and GEM will commit to DoS that they will negotiate in good faith, the terms of a Shareholders Agreement within 90 days of the date of the MoU, which will be formalised concurrently with GEM’s subsidiary becoming a shareholder of AGI, and will: − establish the conduct of AGI and reinforce the agreed commitments to DoS, and − recognise the intention of AGI to apply the US$18.0M of capital received from GEM’s subsidiary to a short-term loan to MLV for financing the construction of the Nueva Sabana mine (US$12.0M), and to meet the cost of the Definitive Feasibility Study (“DFS”) for the La Demajagua gold-silver-antimony mine (US$4.0M), with the balance (US$2.0M) available for working capital, and − confirm AGI’s intention to continue its current initiative to purchase the Cuban partner’s 50% shareholding in MLV, and − include a provision for the preferential sale to U.S. buyers of strategic metal in the form of antimony cathodes, that will be produced by the La Demajagua mine.   

The Term of the MoU is for six months from the date of the MoU, unless extended by mutual agreement. The MoU will also terminate: − if GEM has not engaged with DoS within 15 days of the signing of the MoU, or − if GEM is not satisfied by its due diligence within 60 Days of the signing of the MoU, or − at AGL’s option, if DoS does not engage positively with GEM within 60 days of the date of the MoU with respect to the prospect of lifting the sanction, or − at AGL’s option, if the terms of the Shareholders Agreement have not been agreed within 90 days of the date of the MoU.  

The Chairman of Antilles Gold, Mr Brian Johnson, commented “shareholders will appreciate that though the proposed transaction with GEM would result in the Company’s shareholding in AGI being reduced, it will not reduce the value of its shares in AGI because of the 33% increase in the capital which is expected to be subscribed by GEM’s subsidiary.  

Based on the subscription price for 25% of AGI’s shares, the residual 75% held by the Company would be valued at ~A$75M 

Based on the positive dealings with GEM to date, and their understanding of the commercial potential of MLV and the Cuban mining sector in general, it is anticipated that GEM’s partnering with Antilles Gold in the Cuban projects would be rewarding for all stakeholders, however, it must be emphasised that there is no certainty as to the outcome of negotiations with GEM or DoS. Shareholders will be kept informed of any developments on this matter in accordance with the Company’s continuous disclosure obligations.”  

About GEM Global Emerging Markets ("GEM") is a $3.4 billion, alternative investment group with offices in Paris, New York, and Nassau (Bahamas). GEM manages a diverse set of investment vehicles focused on emerging markets and has completed over 600 transactions in 75 countries. Each investment vehicle has a different degree of operational control, risk-adjusted return, and liquidity profile. The family of funds and investment vehicles provide GEM and its partners with exposure to: Small-Mid Cap Management Buyouts, Private Investments in Public Equities and select venture investments. For more information: http://www.gemny.com 

Link To Media Release

Links To Related Analysis 

Might Trump Administration Focus On Sourcing Copper Lead To Approval Of U.S. Investor Control Of Copper, Gold, And Silver Operations Of Australia Company? September 11, 2026  

DOD (War) OSC Could Be U.S. Taxpayer Partner Of Last Resort For Canada’s Sherritt And Australia’s Antilles. Cobalt, Copper, Gold, Nickel, Silver Are Strategic Minerals. August 30, 2026 

Cuba: And Now There Are Two…  Antilles Gold Has Until 25 January 2027 And Sherritt International Has Until 12 October 2026 August 27, 2026 

Can Antilles Gold Of Australia Convince The Trump-Vance Administration And Government Of Cuba To Restructure Company Operations And Assets In Cuba?  July 31, 2026

U.S. Secretary Of State Rubio Discusses Cuba While At UNGA In New York City

Marco Rubio
United States Secretary of State
Palace Hotel
New York City, New York 
23 September 2026

QUESTION:  Mr. Secretary, the President said that freedom will come to Cuba.

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Yes.

QUESTION:  How will that happen?  In the past you’ve said that it’ll collapse on its own, but –

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Who has said that?

QUESTION:  Well, the administration has said that the regime –

SECRETARY RUBIO:  No, no.  Look —

QUESTION:  The President has said it. 

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Yeah, look.  The Cuban revolution – want to answer.  I know your question.  The Cuban revolution has failed.  It has failed for 60-something years.  It is a failure now.  And I think there’s acknowledgment within the Cuban system that the revolution has failed.  The question is what replaces it or what – and they have an opportunity to make changes; they have an opportunity to begin to put their country on an irreversible trajectory towards progress and a better future.  And that involves both political and economic freedom, no doubt about it.  And so, we’ll be reengaged in that portfolio.  We’ll do – we’re open to measures moving forward that begin that process of change.  And it will be a process that will not be easy.  We’ve seen these transitions happen historically throughout the world.  They don’t happen overnight.  They don’t happen immediately.  You don’t reverse 60-something years of mismanagement, corruption, and incompetence in six months.  But I do think that Cuba has a golden opportunity to place itself on an irreversible path towards a better future, and we are prepared to be helpful in that regard if they’re open to it, obviously.  Right now, I mean, Cuba still – at least the people that speak on behalf of the government and led by people who, at least publicly, are quite recalcitrant.  But the reality of their situation is things are not going to get better in Cuba without them making very substantial changes.

QUESTION:  But could it involve something like Venezuela, changing the regime with some military extraction?  There’s an indictment against the former president.  There are other actions.  Would you rule that out?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Look, first of all, the United States – and I say this – this is a general answer, not even specific towards Cuba – if there was a threat to the national security of the United States, the President has both the power and the obligation to address it.  That’s just my general statement, not just Cuba-specific.  That said, our preference always is to deal with these things in a – I don’t want to call it diplomatic, but in a negotiated way, in a political way, in a way in which progress is made through substantial changes to a country that don’t involve the use of military force.  So, I’m not going to speculate beyond that, and I’m certainly not going to threaten anything.  I’m just going to tell you that Cuba and its leaders, or the people that are in charge of its government now, have an opportunity to begin the process of forever positively changing that country.  And it’s an opportunity that they should take, and I’m hopefully that they will.  I’m not confident that they will, but I’m hopeful that they will.  And we stand prepared to contribute towards that.  Obviously, there are some individuals in that regime with whom we can never work because their hands are stained in blood.  But there are people there that I believe that you could work with, if they are willing to put the country on a path towards political and economic freedom and the process that will get us to that ultimate goal, although that’ll take some time to get there.

QUESTION:  Back on the subject of Cuba, how far along are the opportunities —

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Ah, how come I always get the Cuba questions?  (Laughter.)  Go ahead.  I’m sorry.  Yeah, yeah.  I know.  I know.  I get you. 

QUESTION:  (Inaudible.)

SECRETARY RUBIO:  I know.  It’s a joke. 

QUESTION:  How far along are the opportunities for American privatization of Cuban industrial sectors?  And have you personally seen any of the proposals for U.S. business interest to own or operate on the island that would satisfy some of the administration’s goals?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, first of all, here’s – it’s actually a good question about – the question is on Cuba and American private sector.  What people have to understand is unlike some other parts of the world, U.S. policy towards Cuba is codified in law, in statute, by Helms-Burton.  So, there are substantial limitations to what any American company can do in Cuba, because Helms-Burton – a law that was passed by Congress and is on the books – limits it.  It makes certain conditions have to be met in order for that commercial interaction to happen.  Now, do I believe that American business interests could play a positive role in a future Cuba in which its economy is free and open and people are allowed to self-employ or work for whoever they want?  Sure, of course.  We’re the largest economy in the world.  I also think, by the way, that one of the huge opportunities that Cuba has is that it has a very large expatriate community of Cuban Americans and Cubans living in other parts of the world that could contribute greatly, the diaspora that could contribute greatly to Cuba’s future.  And there are also companies from other parts of the world that could contribute as well. 

The fundamental challenge in Cuba, and what keeps companies – forget about American companies for a moment, because obviously they’re impeded by – from some investments by Helms-Burton.  What keeps – Cuba can do trade and commerce with any country in the world they want, outside the United States.  The reason why they don’t is because why would I invest – giving you an example – why I, businessperson from whatever, Spain – why would I invest $10 million in Cuba if two years from now they just decide on their own to change the rules, take it from me, and keep the money and never pay me back?  And that’s happened over and over and over in Cuba.  Even now, as they announce these reforms, everyone’s saying, well, these things are just on paper; (a) you have to implement them, and (b) you have to keep them.  So, certainty is the problem, and there’s simply no legitimacy or credibility that this regime will ever live up to these conditions, because they never have before.  So, that ultimately is an impediment.

But to answer your question, have I reviewed any of these, well, look, people are always pitching things.  I’m aware that there are some companies and individuals and others that would love to be involved in Cuba’s economic future.  But right now, that’s not possible; (a) it’s not feasible, because of Helms-Burton, and also because of the lack of certainty about its future.  No one is going to invest in Cuba under their current governance model.  They’re just not going to do it.  Which is why I always go back to it’s not just about political freedom, which is incredibly important, but it is about having a governance model on that island that give the private sector confidence that if they invest, they’re going to make their money back with a profit and have – not have it taken from them and never get paid back. 

Melbana Energy Of Australia Determining If Trump Administration Targeting Of Cuba Energy Sector Permits Continuing Operations. Similar Strategy To Australia's Antilles Gold

Sydney, Australia-based Melbana Energy "is an Australian ASX listed, independent oil and gas company that has a portfolio of attractive exploration, appraisal and development stage opportunities in Cuba and Australia.  Melbana Energy is listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX: MAY) and is headquartered in Sydney, Australia with satellite offices in Melbourne, Havana and Varadero."  

18 June 2026 Market Announcement: Melbana Energy Limited (ASX: MAY)- Reinstatement to Quotation.  The suspension of trading in the securities of Melbana Energy Limited (‘MAY’) will be lifted immediately following the release by MAY of an announcement regarding an update about its Cuban operations and the United States Government sanctions against Unión Cuba-Petróleo (‘CUPET').

18 June 2026 Cuban Operational Update: Melbana Energy Limited (ASX: MAY) (Melbana or Company) provides this operational update regarding Block 9 Production Sharing Contract (PSC) onshore Cuba, in which it holds a 30%1 interest via a wholly owned subsidiary that is also the operator.  On 11 June 2026, the U.S. Department of State designated Cuba’s state-owned oil and gas company Union Cuba-Petroleo (CUPET) as a Specially Designated National (SDN)2, pursuant to the U.S. President’s Executive Order 14404 (Executive Order) of 1 May 20263. An SDN generally prohibits a U.S. entity from transacting with it and the possibility of secondary sanctions on parties from other jurisdictions. Neither Melbana nor any of its subsidiaries has been designated as an SDN under the Executive Order or under any other applicable U.S. sanctions programme administered by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).  CUPET is the Company’s contractual counterparty to the PSC, with the Company being responsible for funding the safe and timely execution of the agreed work program, as varied from time to time, in satisfaction of its obligations under the PSC. The PSC is in the exploration stage, and no revenue has been generated.  Operations under the PSC ceased in late 2025 due to the non-payment of cash calls by its joint operations partner1,4. As a result, all the Company’s expatriate personnel and contractors were instructed late last year to leave Cuba. As Operator, the Company has continued to discharge its obligations for site safety and security by engaging Cuban contractors to provide these services. Following CUPET’s SDN designation, the Company has immediately suspended its direct participation in financial, technical or administrative support of the PSC whilst it undertakes a more detailed review of these developments and has informed CUPET of this.

The Company has been and continues to seek external advice on the implications of the Executive Order for its Cuban operations. This includes ongoing discussions with legal counsel and other subject matter experts, including sanctions and regulatory advisers, on the scope and effect of CUPET’s SDN designation on the PSC and the potential consequences for the Company’s business, operations and contractual position. The review includes consideration of the applicable OFAC sanctions framework as it relates to the Company as a non-U.S. operator, any potential secondary sanctions exposure.

Those discussions and meetings are continuing. As at the date of this announcement, the Company has not reached any conclusions or determined any definitive course of action. The Company wishes to emphasise that the applicable sanctions framework is highly technical in nature and that the legal and regulatory consequences of the Executive Order are not straightforward. The Company expects to receive further guidance from its advisers following the next scheduled meetings with its advisers and will update  the market in accordance with its continuous disclosure obligations if and when there is information capable of disclosure.  The Company continues to receive external advice on the steps it should take to address the implications of the Executive Order for its operations in Cuba. The Company has also requested advice on whether any available avenues exist to seek the necessary clarification from OFAC or the U.S. State Department to resume its operations in Cuba.  The Company’s portfolio of exploration licences in Australia is unaffected by this Executive Order.

1 See ASX announcement dated 20 April 2026 regarding the transfer to Melbana of Sonangol’s 70% interest, subject to the receipt of Cuban regulatory approvals
2 https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/06/sanctioning-cubas-state-owned-oil-and-gas-company-union-cuba-petroleo/
3 https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/05/imposing-sanctions-on-those-responsible-for-repression-in-cuba-and-for-threats-to-united-states-national-security-and-foreign-policy/

Cuba- Block 9 PSC
Cuba Block 9- World Class Exploration Acreage

Melbana Energy was awarded a 100% participating interest in the Block 9 Production Sharing Contract (Block 9 PSC) on 3rd September 2015 and in May 2020, Melbana agreed to transfer a 70% interest in Block 9 to Sonangol (the National Oil Company of Angola) in consideration for it funding 85% of two exploration wells there.  Melbana Energy, as Operator, had a 30% interest in this two well exploration drilling program that commenced in September 2021 and concluded in October 2022.  The wells targeted four separate targets with a combined 235 million barrels of prospective resource (best estimate).  The Block 9 PSC covers 2,344km2 onshore on the north coast of Cuba, 140 km east of Havana in a proven hydrocarbon system and along trend with the multi-billion-barrel Varadero oil field.  Independent reserves and resources certifier, McDaniel & Associates, prepared an original Competent Persons Report (30 June 2018) that estimated the following resources for Block 9: Oil in Place: ~15.7 billion barrels (best estimate).  Prospective resource: 676 million barrels (best estimate).

In 2022, Melbana drilled the Alameda-1 well to a total depth of 3,916mMD (April 2022).  The well intersected moveable oil in three independent reservoirs for total net pay zone of 278 m TVD with strong oil shows flowing to surface.  Ultimately, high formation pressures at depth resulted in the well being suspended pending testing and appraisal wells.

Reserves and Resources

In August 2022, Melbana announced a new independent assessment of the reservoirs encountered by the Alameda-1 exploration well.  This assessment estimated the total resource for the three structures encountered whilst drilling the Alameda-1 well (Amistad, Alameda and Marti) at: 6.4 billion barrels of OOIP and 362 million barrels of Prospective Resource1. (1 100% Gross, Unrisked Mean Estimate)

Appraisal Drilling

In 2024, Melbana completed a two well appraisal program was designed to collect more information on the oil quality in these formations, their production and geological characteristics and the capabilities of the oil processing facilities and related oil storage and logistics.

ALAMEDA-2 (first appraisal well and also called Amistad-1).  This well had the objective of testing the different sections (called Units 1, 2 and 3) of the Amistad (shallowest) structure.  Highlights included: Successfully reached target total depth on time and on budget; Unit 1 shown to comprise two different productive units, Unit 1A and Unit 1B; Unit 1A: 12° API oil recovered at surface without assistance; Unit 1B: 19.8° API low (<3%) sulphur oil recovered at surface without assistance at a controlled rate of 1,235 BOPD; Unit 2: No oil encountered at the tested location; Unit 3: 16.9° API oil unable to be recovered at surface without assistance, implied flow rate of 750 BOPD; Unit 1B: Completed as a production well then shut in to allow for drilling of the Alameda-3 appraisal well. Subsequently put on extended production to better understand reservoir performance and capability of surface operations. Restarted flow of 300 BOPD suggested reservoir damage; Net Pay for the Amistad structure calculated to be 346 metres TVD (615 metres TVD when natural fracturing incorporated); Updated independent estimates of resource volumes: Unit 1A: 32 million barrels of Prospective Resource.  Unit 1B: 46 million barrels of Contingent Resource.  90 million barrels of Prospective Resource.

ALAMEDA-3 (second appraisal well) had the objective of testing the two deeper reservoirs (called Alameda and Marti): Highlights included: Successfully reached target total depth but neither on time nor budget due to operational and drilling issues; Management of these issues resulted in down hole conditions unlikely to be conducive to optimum reservoir performance; Neither reservoir successfully flowed oil to surface, despite being minimally offset to Alameda-1 trajectory where extensive accumulations of energetic and moveable hydrocarbons were encountered; Cores and high-quality logs were obtained, indicating highly fractured reservoir; and The well was suspended whilst studies were undertaken to determine possible causes of unexpected results and to formulate reservoir workover strategies; and, The studies concluded that the formation was damaged by long residence time / chemical impact of high weight mud.  

Development Plans

The first of the next seven new well pads were approved for construction in late 2024.   Each of the pads will be permitted for two production wells.  Work is underway to construct the first of these wells.  A revised Basis of Well Design (BOWD) concept for the upcoming development wells incorporates learnings from Alameda-2 and Alameda-3 regarding mud weight, drilling and completion techniques to minimise costs and formation damage whilst maximising flow rates by intercepting the entire net pay zone at optimal orientation.  Prior to the drilling of the next production wells, Alameda-2 was re-entered to remedy near-wellbore formation damage that was identified in Unit-1B via comparison with results from the original Drill Stem Test (DST) and Extended Production Test.  The goal of the workover program is to return the well to the superior rates observed in the initial DST (stabilised flow rate of 1,235 barrels of oil per day) achieved from perforations cover only about 20% of the net pay zone.  Key steps in the workover program include using a service rig (available in country) to pull the completion, add perforation intervals in the upper and lower Unit 1B and undertake an acid wash and squeeze before re-running the completion.

Commercialisation

Melbana’s engineering and commercial teams are working hard to develop and optimise their plans for the export of oil produced from the Block 9 PSC.  The plan is to truck crude to receiving pits connected to oil storage tanks at the Matanzas Supertanker port which has multiple oil storage tank options before being exported to market.  Melbana is in the final stages of formalising a joint marketing and sales agreement with all Block 9 stakeholders to export 100% of production.  Negotiations with major international commodity traders interested in purchasing the 19.8° API and 2.7% sulphur Unit 1B crude are also at an advanced stage.  Melbana continued its discussions with several potential new partners and credit providers who have demonstrated interest in participating in the development of Block 9.

Cuba – Santa Cruz

The Santa Cruz oil field is located approximately 45km from Havana between Boca de Jaruco and Canasí oil fields and approximately 150 km west of Melbana’s existing Block 9. Santa Cruz is in the northern foldbelt of Cuba – the trend that is responsible for the vast majority of Cuba’s oil and gas production. In December, 2018 Melbana finalised a long term binding incremental oil recovery contract with Cuba's national oil company, CubaPetroleo. The contract is subject to standard Cuban regulatory approvals.   

In close proximity to the Santa Cruz oil field, the Cuba national oil company (Cubapetroleo or Cupet) reported to Cuban media a significant potential discovery of lighter than typical crude oil in an exploration well drilled on the Bacuranao prospect in the northern part of the western region of the island. The discovery was made late in 2017 and has been undergoing long term testing. Cupet representatives reported that the oil produced from the field has a density of 22° API, which is the highest quality oil discovered in the area and is encouraging for oil exploration activities in the area. The Bacuranao discovery is in the northern fold belt trend that continues into Melbana’s Block 9 and is in close proximity to the Santa Cruz oil field.

Link To Related Analysis:

Might Trump Administration Focus On Sourcing Copper Lead To Approval Of U.S. Investor Control Of Copper, Gold, And Silver Operations Of Australia Company? September 11, 2026

Trump-Vance Administration "Further Sanctions On Cuba’s Mineral Wealth And Military Modernization Apparatus"

United States Department of State
Washington DC
17 September 2026

Further Sanctions on Cuba’s Mineral Wealth and Military Modernization Apparatus
Marco Rubio, Secretary of State

For decades, the Cuban regime has channeled all of the island’s resources into the hands of a narrow and corrupt military elite, leaving ordinary Cubans without reliable power, food, or dignity. Today, pursuant to President Trump’s Executive Order (E.O.) 14404, “Imposing Sanctions on Those Responsible for Repression in Cuba and for Threats to United States National Security and Foreign Policy,” I am designating 11 actors that fuel this exploitation: four state-run enterprises that strip Cuba’s nickel reserves for regime profit, four military enterprises dedicated to research and development for weapons systems, naval capabilities, and battlefield simulation, and three military officials leading them.

The Trump Administration will not stand by as Cuba’s elite enrich themselves through resource extraction and hoard resources for Cuba’s repressive security apparatus while the Cuban people go without.  President Trump remains committed to a Cuba governed by its people, not by a military class that treats the island’s future as its own private inheritance.

The Department’s actions are being taken pursuant to E.O. 14404, which authorizes sweeping sanctions on Cuba, including against persons who support the Cuban regime’s security apparatus and those responsible for repression in Cuba and other threats to U.S. national security.  These actions also further both E.O. 14380, “Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba” and National Security Presidential Memorandum 5, which directs the Executive Branch to improve human rights, encourage the rule of law, foster free markets and free enterprise, and promote democracy in Cuba.  For more information on today’s action, see the Department of State’s Fact Sheet.

Specially Designated Nationals List Updates

The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List: 

CANCIO MONTEAGUDO, Joaquin Francisco, 58 #2906 Eyrpto, Playa, Havana, Cuba; DOB 16 Sep 1945; nationality Cuba; Gender Male; Passport E493203 (Cuba) expires 20 May 2031 (individual) [CUBA-EO14404]. 

HURTADO BETANCOURT, Julio, Cuba; DOB 04 Nov 1962; nationality Cuba; Gender Male; Passport E459994 (Cuba) expires 29 Apr 2031 (individual) [CUBA-EO14404]. 

PEDRERA ARGUELLO, Dioglis, Cuba; Calle 186 No 311531 Y 33, Playa, Havana, Cuba; DOB 13 Jun 1963; nationality Cuba; Gender Male; Passport A010659 (Cuba) expires 13 Aug 2030 (individual) [CUBA-EO14404]. 

The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

CENTRO DE INVESTIGACION Y DESARROLLO DE ARMAMENTO DE INFANTERIA (a.k.a. "CIDAI"), Circunvalacion Norte, Km 8 ½, Camaguey, Cuba; Organization Established Date 11 Apr 2010; Organization Type: Research and experimental development on natural sciences and engineering; alt. Organization Type: Defense activities; Target Type State-Owned Enterprise; Entity Code 14124 (Cuba) [CUBA-EO14404]. 

CENTRO DE INVESTIGACION Y DESARROLLO DE SIMULADORES (a.k.a. EMPRESA DE CIENCIA Y TECNOLOGIA SIMULADORES; a.k.a. "CID-SIM"; a.k.a. "ECTSIM"; a.k.a. "SIMPRO"), Loma S/N, Entre Santa Ana Y Conill, Nuevo Vedado, Plaza De La Revolucion, Havana, Cuba; Organization Established Date 09 Jul 2009; Organization Type: Research and experimental development on natural sciences and engineering; alt. Organization Type: Defense activities; Target Type State-Owned Enterprise; Entity Code 14032 (Cuba) [CUBA-EO14404]. 

CENTRO DE INVESTIGACION Y DESARROLLO NAVAL (a.k.a. CIDNAV), Estrada Palma No. 13, Casablanca, Regla, Havana, Cuba; Organization Established Date 09 Jul 2009; Organization Type: Research and experimental development on natural sciences and engineering; alt. Organization Type: Defense activities; Target Type State-Owned Enterprise; Entity Code 14034 (Cuba) [CUBA-EO14404]. 

CENTRO DE INVESTIGACION, DESARROLLO Y PRODUCCION GRITO DE BAIRE (a.k.a. CENTRO DE INVESTIGACION Y DESARROLLO GRITO DE BAIRE; a.k.a. CIDP GRITO DE BAIRE; a.k.a. GRITO DE BAIRE CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION; a.k.a. "CIDP-GB"; a.k.a. "GELCOM"; a.k.a. "GRUPO DE LA ELECTRONICA DE COMUNICACIONES"), Santa Ana S/N, Entre 47 Y Reforma, Nuevo Vedado, Plaza De La Revolucion, Havana, Cuba; Organization Established Date 11 Apr 2010; Organization Type: Research and experimental development on natural sciences and engineering; alt. Organization Type: Defense activities; Target Type State-Owned Enterprise; Entity Code 14123 (Cuba) [CUBA-EO14404]. 

CENTRO DE INVESTIGACIONES DEL NIQUEL CAPITAN ALBERTO FERNANDEZ MONTES DE OCA (a.k.a. CEDINIQ; a.k.a. "CEINNIQ"), Moa, Holguin, Cuba; Organization Established Date 31 Dec 1986; Organization Type: Support activities for other mining and quarrying; Target Type State-Owned Enterprise; Entity Code 6681 (Cuba) [CUBA-EO14404]. 

EMPRESA DE INGENIERIA Y PROYECTOS DEL NIQUEL (a.k.a. CEPRONIQUEL), Moa, Holguin, Cuba; Organization Established Date 31 May 2001; Organization Type: Support activities for other mining and quarrying; Target Type State-Owned Enterprise; Entity Code 12392 (Cuba) [CUBA-EO14404]. 

EMPRESA DE SERVICIOS TECNICOS DE COMPUTACION COMUNICACIONES Y ELECTRONICA (a.k.a. EMPRESA DE SERVICIOS DE COMPUTACION COMUNICACIONES Y ELECTRONICA DEL NIQUEL RAFAEL FAUSTO OREJON FORMENT; a.k.a. "SERCONI"), Moa, Holguin, Cuba; Organization Established Date 30 Sep 1996; Organization Type: Support activities for other mining and quarrying; Target Type State-Owned Enterprise; Entity Code 9987 (Cuba) [CUBA-EO14404]. 

PINARES S.A., Nicaro, Holguin, Cuba; Organization Established Date 31 Jan 2001; Organization Type: Support activities for other mining and quarrying; Target Type State-Owned Enterprise; Entity Code 60172 (Cuba) [CUBA-EO14404]. 

2026 U.S. Port Export Data For Cuba- Who Sold, What They Sold, Origin And Destination, How Much It Weighed

These are links to Excel Formatted Documents containing data listing United States-based exporters, the port of departure from the United States and the port of arrival to the Republic of Cuba, the product(s) exported, and the weight (metric tons, short tons, twenty-foot equivalent unit) to the Republic of Cuba.  Monthly data is added as available.

January 2026
February 2026
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April 2026
May 2026
June 2026
July 2026
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September 2026
October 2026
November 2026
December 2026

Might Trump Administration Focus On Sourcing Copper Lead To Approval Of U.S. Investor Control Of Copper, Gold, And Silver Operations Of Australia Company?

Might Trump Administration Focus On Sourcing Copper Lead To Approval Of U.S. Investor Control Of Copper, Gold, And Silver Operations Of Australia Company?  

Bowral, Australia-based Antilles Gold Limited (2026 assets approximately US$21 million) entered the Republic of Cuba in 2020 to develop copper, gold, and silver mining projects.  Link: https://antillesgold.net/  

• “The administration continues to evaluate all options to reshore copper and other critical manufacturing back to the United States.” White House Official  

Sierra Maestra Copper Belt: “A highly prospective area of outcropping copper-gold-molybdenum mineralization has been discovered by Antilles Gold within the Sierra Maestra copper belt in south east Cuba.  As a result, the 3,600ha La Cristina concession was delineated and issued to Minera La Victoria for geological investigation.  The copper belt is +200km terrain of Cretaceous arc geology intruded by Eocene stocks which are the source of widespread gold, and base-metals mineralization.  The concession incorporates a series of copper-gold-molybdenum zones that display significant footprints of hydrothermal alteration normally associated with potentially large porphyry systems, and show high prospectivity for associated epithermal gold-silver base metal systems. The Sierra Maestra belt is a large (+200km long) east-west trending island arc terrain of Cretaceous age geology that is intruded by Eocene age stocks which are the source for the widespread gold and base-metal mineralization that characterizes the underexplored belt which hosts the large El Cobre copper-gold-base metals deposit which is along strike from the concession.  El Cobre has been mined since 1540 and is ongoing, making it the oldest copper mine in the Americas.  The La Cristina concession hosts the same geological sequence as El Cobre and is located immediately to the south and further along strike to the west of this major mineralized system.” 

El Pilar Copper-Gold Porphyry System: “A 752ha concession in central Cuba is held by Minera La Victoria, and covers the Nueva Sabana gold-copper oxide deposit, and the El Pilar porphyry copper system.  The site is flat, unoccupied, and ideally located adjacent to a major highway, high tension power, and a 60km rail link to Palo Alto port.  Antilles Gold has identified surface exposure as the leached phyllic caps to underlying copper-gold porphyry intrusives in the El Pilar system.  The extent of surficial hydrothermal alteration indicates the porphyry intrusions have large dimensions, and potential depth greater than 1,000m.  Ground magnetics and Induced Polarisation surveys in early 2023 identified a cluster of three porphyry intrusives (El Pilar, Gaspar, and Camilo) within the concession.” 

“Key Risk Factors: Prospective investors should be aware that subscribing for Securities involves a number of risks and an investment in the Company should be considered as highly speculative. The future performance of the Company and the value of the Securities may be influenced by a range of factors, many of which are largely beyond the control of the Company and the Directors. The key risks associated with the Company’s business, the industry in which it operates and general risks applicable to all investments in listed securities and financial markets generally are set out in Section 5. In particular, prospective investors should have regard to the U.S. Department of State’s sanctioning of Minera La Victoria S.A., the Company’s 50% owned Cuban joint venture mining company, which is a significant risk relating to the Company and the Offer. Further details are set out in Section 5.2.” 

“U.S. Sanction of Cuban Joint Venture Company: On 4 June 2026, the U.S. Department of State (DoS) sanctioned Minera La Victoria S.A. (MLV), a Cuban joint venture mining company in which the Company's wholly owned Cayman Islands registered subsidiary, Antilles Gold Inc (AGI), holds a 50% shareholding, for operating in the Cuban mining sector. As a result of the sanction, MLV suspended construction of its Nueva Sabana mine and AGI suspended its management of MLV. Following informal discussions between Mr Brian Johnson (as Chairman of AGI) and senior executives of the DoS, it appeared that a potential pathway to have the sanction lifted would involve U.S. entities acquiring control of AGI, being a minimum of 51% of its shares. On 25 August 2026, the Company signed a binding Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with GEM Global Yield LLC SCS (GEM) to advance that pathway (refer to the Company's ASX announcement of 27 August 2026). Under the MOU, GEM will incorporate a new U.S. subsidiary which will initially subscribe for a 25% shareholding in AGI, as the first step towards a minimum of 51% of AGI's shares being held by U.S. entities by no later than 30 June 2028. GEM will also approach the DoS to seek permission for the parties to negotiate the commercial arrangements and commitments that could result in the sanction being lifted and MLV being licensed by the U.S. Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to transact with U.S. entities. AGI has agreed to certain governance and operational commitments in support of that pathway, including the reconstitution of AGI's board. While the steps contemplated by the MOU, together with future negotiations between MLV, AGI, GEM and the DoS, may result in the sanction being lifted and construction of the Nueva Sabana mine resuming, there is no certainty of that outcome. If the sanction is not lifted through the actions described above, the Company, AGI and MLV will have no option other than to maintain the suspension of activities in Cuba until the sanction is lifted as a result of geopolitical developments, the timing of which cannot be determined. In any event, AGI will retain its 50% shareholding in MLV.” 

Link To Announcement
Link To Presentation

Link: Cuba: And Now There Are Two…  Antilles Gold Has Until 25 January 2027 And Sherritt International Has Until 12 October 2026 August 27, 2026  

Link: Can Antilles Gold Of Australia Convince The Trump-Vance Administration And Government Of Cuba To Restructure Company Operations And Assets In Cuba? July 31, 2026 

Thomson Reuters
London, United Kingdom
10 September 2026

White House copper tariff plan stalls amid affordability concerns, sources say 

White House has yet to decide on refined copper tariffs amid concerns over higher manufacturing costs 

Copper prices have hit record highs as buyers stockpile metal ahead of possible tariffs 

Tariffs could boost US mining and refining but raise costs for manufacturers and tighten global supplies 

Sept 10 (Reuters) - The White House has not ​yet made a decision on refined copper tariffs as officials juggle concerns that higher prices for the red metal could raise manufacturing costs against ‌the potential benefits of encouraging more domestic mining, according to two people familiar with the matter. 

The hesitation comes as the administration is increasingly focused on affordability ahead of November's midterm elections, with President Donald Trump and Republican lawmakers facing pressure to demonstrate that their economic policies are lowering — rather than raising — costs for American consumers and businesses.  Copper prices have surged to record highs amid expectations that Trump would ​impose tariffs on refined copper products such as cathode, as well as copper concentrate produced at mine sites. Traders and industrial buyers have been rushing ​to build inventories in the United States to get ahead of any new duties, creating one of the world's largest stockpiles ⁠of the metal. 

A White House official said the administration had not made a final decision on the tariffs and confirmed that the Commerce Department provided an update to ​Trump by a June 30 deadline set by the White House.  "The administration continues to evaluate all options to reshore copper and other critical manufacturing back to the United States," ​the official said. 

The comments suggest tariffs are not a foregone conclusion, despite the market's expectation that the United States could extend existing duties to refined copper.  The administration has been considering tariffs on refined copper as part of Trump's broader push to rebuild U.S. manufacturing and reduce reliance on foreign supplies of critical materials.  Copper is used in construction, transportation, electronics and many other industries. S&P Global  ​expects growth in the to boost global copper demand 50% by 2040. 

The U.S. imports roughly half of its copper needs each year and only ​has two operational copper smelters, owned by Freeport-McMoRan and Rio Tinto, respectively. 

The proposed tariffs could make imported copper more expensive and improve the economics of U.S. mining, smelting and refining projects. A ‌Rio executive, ⁠for example, told Reuters earlier this year "the current set of mechanisms and tariffs around copper" do little to offset the challenging economics of its U.S. smelter. 

But broader copper tariffs could also raise costs for manufacturers that rely on the metal, including producers of electrical equipment, automobiles, construction products and other industrial goods.

That tension has complicated the administration's efforts to use tariffs to encourage domestic production without adding to inflation or undermining Trump's political message on lowering the cost of living. 

The tariff uncertainty is also preventing copper from ​flowing to markets outside the U.S., further ​tightening global supply.  "As long as (tariff) policy ⁠remains unresolved, that possibility reduces the incentive to return metal to international markets," said Jacob White, a minerals analyst at Sprott Asset Management, which invests in copper producers. 

U.S. RELIANT ON GLOBAL COPPER MINERS 

The expectation for a copper tariff echoes 2025, when the market expected ​a blanket tariff on all products containing the metal. Trump, however, stopped short in July 2025 of such a sweeping ​tariff and instead imposed ⁠levies on pipes, wiring and other semi-finished products, much to the chagrin of companies that mine copper itself.  Trump tasked Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick with updating him by June on copper markets and recommending whether to impose a 15% tariff starting on January 1, 2027, that would rise to 30% in 2028. It was not immediately clear what Lutnick recommended to ⁠Trump. 

U.S. refined ​copper imports have jumped 16-fold since 2015, even as production slipped 20%, according to U.S. Geological Survey ​data. The country has nearly 30 years' worth of supply within its borders.  Trump has pushed in the past year to bolster U.S. copper projects, including the Resolution Copper project in Arizona from BHP  and Rio, and ​the Twin Metals project in Minnesota from Antofagasta.  Trump also has moved to ban the export of electronic waste, which contains copper.

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

July 2026 U.S. Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Decrease 16.4%; Year-To-Year Down 11.0%. US$4.6 Million In Solar Cells/Modules/Panels; Coin Operated Washing Machines; Refrigerator-Freezer Combos.

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
September 2026

July 2026 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Decrease 16.4%- 1
Year-To-Year Decrease 11.0%- 2
50th Of 220 July 2026 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Ranking 51st Of 220 U.S. Ag/Export Markets- 2
Re-Emerging Private Sector Exports Continue To Increase - 3
Trump-Vance Administration Fuels Authorization- US$61,140,685.00- 3 
July 2026 CDA Healthcare Product Exports US$0.00- 6
July 2026 Humanitarian Donations US$26,468,962.00- 7
U.S. Port Export Data- 20

JULY 2026 AG/FOOD EXPORTS TO CUBA DECREASE 16.4%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in July 2026 were US$35,407,626.00 compared to US$42,353,477.00 in July 2025 and US$31,457,528.00 in July 2024.  

US$254,187,988.00 for January 2026 through July 2026 compared with US$285,709,573.00 during the same time frame in 2025 representing a decrease of 11.0% year-to-year.

Highlights: Liquefied Propane (US$240,660.00).  Refrigerator-Freezer Combo (US$85,190.00).  Coin Operated Washing Machine (US$117,905.00).  Solar Cells Modules/Panels (US$2,577,625.00).  Solar Cells (US$2,109,030.00). 

Since 2022, when the first BIS license was issued for the export of vehicles to Republic of Cuba nationals and to private companies in the Republic of Cuba, the cumulative export value of the initiatives in place during the Obama-Biden Administration, Trump-Pence Administration, Biden-Harris Administration, and Trump-Vance Administration exceeds US$766 million of which electric and gasoline-powered new and used vehicles, bicycles, trucks, motorcycles and mopeds, and parts, exceeds US$318 million (Year 2026: US$91,016,218.00; Year 2025: US$149,413,031.00; Year 2024: US$67,241,234.00; Year 2023: US$10,546,419.00; Year 2022: US$89,848.00), and purchases (equipment and products) for use by the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba driving the growth.

Fuels/Oils exports: 2024 (US$938,894.00- including US$4,485.00 in gasoline), 2025 (US$311,558.00), 2026 US$156,881,177.00 (January through July).

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, and United States Department of State.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA, CDA, and other regulations, specifically including products exported from the United States to the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba.

The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

LINK TO COMPLETE REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2026 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2025 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2024 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

LINK TO 2026 U.S. PORT EXPORT DATA