Trump’s Message To Cuba To “Make A Deal” May Not Be A Bad Deal For Cuba. Witkoff And Kushner Add Another Assignment. 23 February 2026 Is Consequential.

Trump’s Message To Cuba To “Make A Deal” May Not Be A Bad Deal For Cuba 

On The Road Again… Witkoff And Kushner Adding To Their Envoy, Son-In-Law Portfolios 

Return Of Mauricio Claver-Carone 

Compensation For Certified Claimants 

Cuba Had Opportunity From 2015-2017 To Extinguish At Least Three Highly Visible Claims Without “Paying” Anything.  They Refused. 

Watch 23 February 2026 For Arguments In Two United States Supreme Court Decisions Which Will Influence Trump-Vance Administration 

United States Supreme Court Decisions Could Be Impetus To Change Libertad Act To Make It More Expansive For Plaintiffs And More Expensive For Defendants 

Donald Trump, President of the United States (2017-2021 and 2025-2029), upon confirming the abduction of Nicolas Maduro, President of Venezuela (2013-2026), shared that the government of the United States was “running” Venezuela. 

He stated the export of oil from Venezuela would be controlled by the government of the United States.   

He spoke of compensating United States-based companies whose assets were expropriated without compensation by successive governments of Venezuela. 

The government of the Republic of Cuba dismissed overtures from the last three occupants of The White House to resolve- or at least attempt to resolve or pretend to attempt to resolve the issue of United States-based company assets expropriated without compensation by the government of the Republic of Cuba.

Successive governments of the Republic of Cuba believed they could rely upon Angola, Belarus, China, Iran, Russia, Turkiye, Venezuela, and Vietnam among other countries to prevent settling its obligations to United States-based companies and mitigating the impact of policies, regulations, and statues implemented by the government of the United States.  They were correct.  Until they were not.   

The mention of using assets (gas, gold, minerals, oil) of the government of Venezuela to compensate United States-based companies should pique Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez, President of the Republic of Cuba (2019- ), at the Palacio de Revoluciones in Havana, Republic of Cuba.  It is a threat and can be an opportunity. 

There are 8,821 claims against the government of the Republic of Cuba of which 5,913 awards valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC) and have not been resolved for nearing sixty-five years (some assets were officially confiscated in the 1960’s, some in the 1970’s and some in the 1990’s).   

The USFCSC permitted simple (not compound) interest of 6% per annum (approximately US$114,132,137.10).  The current value of the certified claims is approximately US$9.3 billion.

While the Central Bank of the Republic of Cuba does have US$9.3 billion in assets and the archipelago’s resources (cobalt, gold, nickel, oil) are limited currently in quantity and extractability, there are mechanisms (duty free, fee exemption, tax suspension, a marketplace for claim values) the government of the Republic of Cuba could deploy to provide compensation for expropriated assets.  One result could be a hastened return by United States companies with their capital, market access, and management strategies.  Another result, perhaps more desired by the government of the Republic of Cuba would be engagement and re-engagement with non-United States-based companies who would now view or view again, the Republic of Cuba as a viable location to disperse assets.

United States-based accounting firms and United States-based law firms could become the new best friends for the government of the Republic of Cuba as they seek to successfully align the desires of their clients with the realities of the Republic of Cuba marketplace. 

Given the outcomes thus far in Venezuela, not unreasonable to expect the Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029) to engage and re-engage with the government of the Republic of Cuba if the government of the Republic of Cuba changes its behavior rather than await engagement and re-engagement until all of the desired changes in personnel within the government of the Republic of Cuba.  

Not unreasonable to expect South Florida residents Steven Witkoff, Assistant to the President, Senior Advisor, and Special Envoy (2025- ) of the Trump-Vance Administration, and Jared Kushner, a son-in-law (2009- ) of President Trump, to be tasked by President Trump with negotiating a solution with the government of the Republic of Cuba.  South Florida is home to approximately 2 million inhabitants identifying as of Cuban descent. 

Whatever the post-Maduro-abduction decisions by the Trump-Vance Administration relating to the Republic of Cuba, Mauricio Claver-Carone, who resides in South Florida, and retains proximity throughout the Trump-Vance Administration, particularly with Marco Rubio, United States Secretary of State (2025- ), who has a home in South Florida, is among those who will have relevance.  The government of the Republic of Cuba will hallucinate at the prospect and recoil at the reality.  When appointed Senior Director, Western Hemisphere Affairs at the National Security Council (2018-2020), everyone involved in anything relating to the Republic of Cuba was terrified because for the first time in The White House was an individual whose previous life’s focus was the Republic of Cuba- and how to dismantle anything that smelled of engagement, re-engagement, cooperation, or appeasement.  He had the authority and desire to use the authority- which he did with immense impact.   

Two United States Supreme Court Cases 

President Trump will be listening for the outcome of two cases before the United States Supreme Court both of which have oral arguments scheduled for 23 February 2026.  In each case, the United States Department of Justice submitted briefs in support of the plaintiffs.   

One United States District Court Judge suggested the United States Congress consider making changes to the text of Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”) if it disadvantaged plaintiffs. 

A decision for the plaintiffs in both cases may result in new Libertad Act Title III lawsuits filed in United States District Courts- many in the State of Florida.  A result could be an increase in non-United States-based company and United States-based company operational departures from the Republic of Cuba and an increase in financial institution reticence to engage with Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions.  The tourism sector and re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba will likely suffer additional hardship.

SCOTUS BLOG: Havana Docks Corporation Issue: Whether a plaintiff under Title III of the LIBERTAD Act must prove that the defendant trafficked in property confiscated by the Cuban government as to which the plaintiff owns a claim, or instead that the defendant trafficked in property that the plaintiff would have continued to own at the time of trafficking in a counterfactual world "as if there had been no expropriation." 

• Docket for 24-983 (Filed 13 March 2025).  Title: Havana Docks Corporation, Petitioner v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., et al.  Motion to extend the time to Reply of petitioner Havana Docks Corporation filed. (Distributed) Supplemental brief of petitioner Havana Docks Corporation filed. Party name: Havana Docks Corporation 

• https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-983.html 

• https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/case-files/havana-docks-corporation-v-royal-caribbean-cruises-ltd/ 

SCOTUS BLOG: Exxon Mobil Issue: Whether the Helms-Burton Act abrogates foreign sovereign immunity in cases against Cuban instrumentalities, or whether parties proceeding under that act must also satisfy an exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 

• Docket for 24-699 (Filed 31 December 2024).  Title: Exxon Mobil Corporation, Petitioner v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba), et al.  Brief of respondents Corporación CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba), et al. in opposition filed. Brief of Corporación CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba), Corporación CIMEX, S.A (Panama), Unión Cuba-Petróleo submitted. 

• https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-699.html 

• https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/case-files/exxon-mobil-corp-v-corporacion-cimex-s-a/ 

• Docket for 24A330 (Filed 7 October 2024).  Title: Exxon Mobil Corporation, Applicant v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba), et al.  United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Application (24A330) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from October 28, 2024 to December 27, 2024 

• https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24a330.html 

From 2015 to 2017, during the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017), Raúl Modesto Castro Ruz, President of the Republic of Cuba (2008-2018), had opportunities to engage deeply and widely with United States-based companies including to begin a negotiation about the certified claims.  He did not. 

One consequence was during the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) much, but not all, of the commercial, economic, and financial engagement commenced in 2015 was interrupted.  Although anticipated due to President Trump’s real estate dealing background, the Trump-Pence Administration did not seek negotiations on behalf of the certified claimants. 

The Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025) reversed some, but not all, decisions implemented by the Trump-Pence Administration.  One new initiative was the 10 May 2022 license issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury authorizing from the United States private sector direct financing and direct investment into a Republic of Cuba-based private company owned by Republic of Cuba national.  Unfortunately, the government of the Republic of Cuba has yet to issue regulations necessary to deliver the financing and investment.  The lack of regulations- now nearing four years, impacts sourcing of financing and investment for all countries, including those which the government of the Republic of Cuba deems as friendly- Belarus, China, Iran, Russia, Spain, Turkiye, and Vietnam.   

Opportunities Missed To Settle Certified Claims 

Delta Air Lines & Western Union Plus US$1.15 Million Could Be Keys To Resolving Certified Claims June 04, 2019 

The Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) on 2 May 2019 made operational Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”).  

Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.   

Certified Claims Background 

There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC) and have not been resolved for nearing sixty-five years (some assets were officially confiscated in the 1960’s, some in the 1970’s and some in the 1990’s).   

The USFCSC permitted simple interest (not compound interest) of 6% per annum (approximately US$114,132,137.10); with the approximate current value of the 5,913 certified claims is approximately US$9.3 billion.  

The first asset (along with 382 enterprises the same day) to be expropriated by the Republic of Cuba was an oil refinery on 6 August 1960 owned by White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation (USFCSC: CU-1331/CU-1332/CU-1333 valued at US$56,196,422.73).  

• From the certified claim filed by Texaco: “The Cuban corporation was intervened on June 29, 1960, pursuant to Resolution 188 of June 28, 1960, under Law 635 of 1959.  Resolution 188 was promulgated by the Government of Cuba when the Cuban corporation assertedly refused to refine certain crude oil as assertedly provided under a 1938 law pertaining to combustible materials.  Subsequently, this Cuban firm was listed as nationalized in Resolution 19 of August 6, 1960, pursuant to Cuban Law 851.  The Commission finds, however, that the Cuban corporation was effectively intervened within the meaning of Title V of the Act by the Government of Cuba on June 29, 1960.” 

The largest certified claim (Cuban Electric Company) valued at US$267,568,413.62 is controlled by Boca Raton, Florida-based Office Depot, Inc.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International; the certified claim also includes land adjacent to the Jose Marti International Airport in Havana, Republic of Cuba.  The third-largest certified claim valued at US$97,373,414.72 is controlled by New York, New York-based North American Sugar Industries, Inc.  The smallest certified claim is by Sara W. Fishman in the amount of US$1.00 with reference to the Cuban-Venezuelan Oil Voting Trust. 

The two (2) largest certified claims total US$449,377,207.76, representing 24% of the total value of the certified claims.  Thirty (30) certified claimants hold 56% of the total value of the certified claims.  This concentration of value creates an efficient pathway towards a settlement.   

Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 requires that an asset had a value of US$50,000.00 when expropriated by the Republic of Cuba without compensation to the original owner.  Of the 5,913 certified claims, 913, or 15%, are valued at US$50,000.00 or more.   

The ITT Corporation Agreement 

In July 1997, then-New York City, New York-based ITT Corporation and then-Amsterdam, the Netherlands-based STET International Netherlands N.V. signed an agreement whereby STET International Netherlands N.V. would pay approximately US$25 million to ITT Corporation for a ten-year right (after which the agreement could be renewed and was renewed) to use assets (telephone facilities and telephone equipment) within the Republic of Cuba upon which ITT Corporation has a certified claim valued at approximately US$130.8 million.  ETECSA, which is now wholly-owned by the government of the Republic of Cuba, was a joint venture controlled by the Ministry of Information and Communications of the Republic of Cuba within which Amsterdam, the Netherlands-based Telecom Italia International N.V. (formerly Stet International Netherlands N.V.), a subsidiary of Rome, Italy-based Telecom Italia S.p.A. was a shareholder.  Telecom Italia S.p.A., was at one time a subsidiary of Ivrea, Italy-based Olivetti S.p.A.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International. 

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

US Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Decreased 3.1% In October 2025; Increased 13.3% Year-To-Year; Private Sector Exports Since 2015 Reach US$360 Million Including US$200 Million In Vehicles Since 2022

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
December 2025

October 2025 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Decrease 3.1%% -
Year-To-Year Increase 13.3%
51st Of 221 October 2025 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Cuba Ranked 49th Of 221 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets – 2
Re-Emerging Private Sector Exports - 3
October 2025 CDA Healthcare Product Exports US$102,609.00 - 6
October 2025 Humanitarian Donations US$17,198,344.00 - 7
U.S. Port Export Data- 20

OCTOBER 2025 AG/FOOD EXPORTS TO CUBA INCREASE 3.1%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in October 2025 were US$40,293,718.00 compared to US$41,611,234.00 in October 2024 and US$15,928,609.00 in October 2023.  

US$399,716,952.00 for the period January 2025 through October 2025 compared to US$352,577,247.00 for the period January 2024 through October 2024, representing an 13.3% increase year-to-year.

Since 2022, when the first BIS license was issued for the export of vehicles to Republic of Cuba nationals and to private companies in the Republic of Cuba, the cumulative export value of the initiatives in place during the Obama-Biden Administration, Trump-Pence Administration, Biden-Harris Administration, and Trump-Vance Administration exceeds US$360 million of which electric and gasoline-powered new and used vehicles, bicycles, trucks, motorcycles and mopeds, and parts, exceeds US$200 million (Year 2025: January through October US$122,472,519.00; Year 2024: US$67,241,234.00; Year 2023: US$10,546,419.00; Year 2022: US$89,848.00), and purchases (equipment and products) for use by the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba driving the growth.

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, and United States Department of State.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA, CDA, and other regulations, specifically including products exported from the United States to the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba.

The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

LINK TO COMPLETE REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

U.S. PORT EXPORT DATA

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2024 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2023 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

The Bank Shot Is How Departure Of Maduro From Venezuela Hastens Changes, Rather Than Departures From Cuba. The Law Of Intended Consequences

The Bank Shot Is How Departure Of Maduro From Venezuela Hastens Changes, Rather Than Departures From Cuba 

The Law Of Intended Consequences 

The Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029) has confirmed the departure of Nicolas Maduro President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (2013-2025), and Mrs. Maduro from the capital city of Caracas. 

Remaining unknown is if the type of departure was negotiated.  Meaning, President Maduro said he would not voluntarily depart, but if there is a viable effort to abduct him, he will not resist.  For him, where he will reside and how he will finance the remainder of his life is an important concern.   

Do not expect United States Navy Seals or United States Army Rangers to repel from a CH-A47F Chinnock helicopter and dislodge Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez, President of the Republic of Cuba (2019- ) from his office at the Palacio de Revoluciones in Havana, Republic of Cuba. 

The Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2019- ) has been modeling since 20 January 2025 for an outcome they desperately neither wanted nor knew they would not have the capacity to prevent if Donald Trump, President of the United States (2017-2021 and 2025-2029) directed the United States Department of Defense (War) to implement. 

For President Diaz-Canel, the immediate post-Maduro issues are short-term, medium-term, and long-term implications for the commercial, economic, financial, military, political, and social relationship with the government of Venezuela. 

The replacement of President Maduro with Delcy Rodríguez, Executive Vice President of Venezuela (2018-2026) may not result in an immediate impact upon the government of the Republic of Cuba. 

The government of the Republic of Cuba may need to replace commercial opportunities provided by Venezuela specifically payment for Republic of Cuba nationals providing education, healthcare, and military services in Venezuela; energy products sourced from Venezuela, direct financial support provided by the government of Venezuela, and even the provision of aircraft by the government of Venezuela to transport officials of the government of the Republic of Cuba. 

While finding sources for energy imports will not be problematic for Republic of Cuba government-operated enterprises, structuring payments for energy imports with the same terms as provided by Venezuela-based enterprises will be immensely challenging.  The government of the Republic of Cuba does not timely make payments for energy imports from Venezuela.   

The reason is the government of Venezuela has since 2000 agreements signed by Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías, President of Venezuela (1999-2013), and Dr. Fidel Castro Ruz, President of the Republic of Cuba (1976-2008).  Those agreements provided and continue to provide substantial energy product deliveries, substantial discounts to market prices, and long-term payment terms- which the government of the Republic of Cuba has not maintained.   

Other country sources for energy include Mexico (which has been providing donated and subsidized energy products despite increasing criticism from the Trump-Vance Administration and pressure likely with further intensity as Mexico City negotiates trade agreements with Washington DC); Russian Federation (which has been which has been providing donated and subsidized energy products); and Iran (which has been providing donated and subsidized energy products).  

This morning is a Shock and Awe moment for the government of the Republic of Cuba and for those governments interacting with the government of the Republic of Cuba.  However, if the behavior of the new government of Venezuela does not meaningfully and rather quickly pivot diplomatically and politically in directions desired by the Trump-Vance Administration, then officials in Beijing, Havana, Mexico City, Moscow, and Tehran may adapt to a different head on the same body.   

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

U.S. Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increased 8.6% In September 2025; Up 15.5% Year-To-Year.

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
October 2025

September 2025 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increase 8.6% -
Year-To-Year Increase 15.5%
52nd Of 221 September 2025 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Cuba Ranked 49th Of 221 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets – 2
Re-Emerging Private Sector Exports - 3
September 2025 CDA Healthcare Product Exports US$55,194.00 - 6
September 2025 Humanitarian Donations US$11,878,011.00 - 7
U.S. Port Export Data- 20


SEPTEMBER 2025 AG/FOOD EXPORTS TO CUBA INCREASE 8.6%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in September 2025 were US$33,851,193.00 compared to US$31,150,492.00 in September 2024 and US$20,317,573.00 in September 2023.  

US$359,423,234.00 for the period January 2025 through September 2025 compared to US$310,967,013.00 for the period January 2024 through September 2024, representing an 18.0% increase year-to-year.

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, and United States Department of State.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA, CDA, and other regulations, specifically including products exported from the United States to the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba.

The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

LINK TO COMPLETE REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

U.S. PORT EXPORT DATA

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2024 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2023 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

Simple fee realty

Milestone Reached: U.S. Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Exceed US$8 Billion Since First Deliveries In December 2001

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, and United States Department of State.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA, CDA, and other regulations, specifically including products exported from the United States to the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba.

The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

LINK TO COMPLETE REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

U.S. Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increased 5.6% In August 2025; Up 16.3% Year-To-Year.

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
October 2025

August 2025 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increase 5.6% -
Year-To-Year Increase 16.3%
48th Of 221 August 2025 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Cuba Ranked 48th Of 221 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets – 2
Re-Emerging Private Sector Exports - 3
August 2025 CDA Healthcare Product Exports US$25,456.00 - 6
August 2025 Humanitarian Donations US$17,679,678.00 - 7
U.S. Port Export Data- 20

AUGUST 2025 AG/FOOD EXPORTS TO CUBA INCREASE 5.6%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in August 2025 were US$39,862,688.00 compared to US$37,729,568.00 in August 2024 and US$39,913,983.00 in August 2023.  

US$325,572,041 for the period January 2025 through August 2025 compared to US$279,816,521.00 for the period January 2024 through August 2024, representing an 18.0% increase year-to-year representing.

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, and United States Department of State.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA, CDA, and other regulations, specifically including products exported from the United States to the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba.

The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

LINK TO COMPLETE REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

U.S. PORT EXPORT DATA

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2024 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2023 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

Inch calculator

U.S. Department Of State Issues Unusual Readout Of Specifically To Thank Country For Supporting US Position On Cuba At UN

United States Department of State
Washington DC
14 November 2025

Deputy Secretary Landau’s Call with North Macedonia Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade Mucunski 

The below is attributable to Principal Deputy Spokesperson Tommy Pigott:

Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau spoke with Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade Timčo Mucunski to thank North Macedonia for its opposition to Cuba’s annual anti-embargo resolution at the United Nations General Assembly. The call underscored the strong bilateral relationship between the United States and North Macedonia.

Expedia Prevails As Judge In Libertad Act Cuba Lawsuit Rules On "Claim-Splitting"

U.S. District Court
Southern District of Florida (Miami)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:19-cv-22529-CMA

Mata et al v. Expedia, Inc., et al
Assigned to: Chief Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga
Referred to: Magistrate Judge Lisette M. Reid
Cause: 22:6082 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996    
Date Filed: 06/18/2019
Jury Demand: Plaintiff
Nature of Suit: 890 Other Statutory Actions
Jurisdiction: Federal Question

Link To Court Document

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendants, Expedia Group, Inc. (“Expedia Group”); Expedia, Inc.; Hotels.com L.P.; Hotels.com GP; and Orbitz, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint [ECF No. 156]. Plaintiffs, Maricela Mata, Bibiana Hernandez, José Ramón López Regueiro, Mario Echevarría, Aureliano A. Echevarría, and Maria Echevarría Ochoa filed a Response [ECF No. 159]; to which Defendants filed a Reply [ECF No. 160]. The Court has reviewed the parties’ written submissions, the record, and applicable law. For the following reasons, the Motion is granted in part.

Because all four elements of claim preclusion are satisfied, the Court dismisses Mario Echevarría’s claim against Expedia Group, Hotels.com L.P., Hotels.com GP, and Orbitz, LLC. The Court does not dismiss his claim against Expedia, Inc.

Dismissal of Maria Echevarría Ochoa and Aureliano Echevarría’s claims based on claim-splitting is warranted.

U.S. Supreme Court Agrees To Hear Two Cuba Libertad Act Cases. Trump Administration Supports Both Plaintiffs.

Briefs from plaintiffs and defendants are anticipated to be presented to the United States Supreme Court (SCOTUS) in November 2025 with oral arguments anticipated during the period mid-January 2026 to April 2026.

Links To Related Analyses

DOJ Supports Exxon Mobil In U.S. Supreme Court Case Against Cuba Companies. Now, Both Plaintiffs Before SCOTUS Have Trump-Vance Administration Support. Aug 27, 2025

U.S. Supreme Court: Trump-Vance Administration Supports Libertad Act Cuba Lawsuit Against U.S. Cruise Lines; Says 11th Circuit Court Of Appeals Was Wrong. Will DOJ Support Exxon-Mobil Lawsuit Too? Aug 27, 2025

Exxon Mobil Asks U.S. Supreme Court To Resolve Libertad Act Lawsuit Issue Against Cuba's Coroporacion Cimex April 17, 2025 

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals Is Not Preventing Havana Docks Corporation From Appealing To The United States Supreme Court January 24, 2025 

Cuba’s 55-Page Annual Report To 2025 UNGA Includes Truths And Lapses From Realities About Commercial Engagement With The US Government And US Companies. Blame Not All North To South.

Government Of Cuba’s 2025 55-Page Annual Report To The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Includes Truths And Lapses From Realities About Commercial Engagement With The United States. 

Had The Government of The Republic Of Cuba From 2015 Accepted A Robust Return By United States-Based Companies, Many Of The Complaints Today Would Not Exist.  Havana Continues To Fail To Embrace What Is Authorized And That Has Consequences. 

Engagement With And Support For The Re-Emerging Private Sector Is The Only Viable Pathway For Government Of The Republic Of Cuba To Provide Value To Its Declining Population.   

Strategy Should Not Solely Focus On Survival- It Must Pivot To Focus On Prosperity. 

Link: Not "Ironclad" So At UN Why Does Cuba Government Continue To Misstate Realities Of US Company Exports To Government Companies And Private Companies? US$8+ Billion Is Real. September 27, 2025 

“CUBA’S REPORT [May 2025] Pursuant to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 79/7, entitled “Necessity of ending the economic, commercial, and financial blockade imposed by the United States of America against Cuba””  Link To Document In PDF Format 

Excerpts: 

“Until April, 2025, there were 11,233 private micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) registered in Cuba.  

The blockade also affects the activity of these private entrepreneurs, business owners and Cuban cooperatives. In 2024, 608 MSMEs -6 per cent of the total- reported losses. The US administration has repeatedly claimed that the blockade is only intended to punish the Cuban government and not the people or the private sector.   

The measures announced in May 2024, supposedly to benefit this sector in terms of access to digital and financial services, never materialized. The structural barriers of the blockade and its legal framework remain the main obstacle to any economic activity in Cuba. US technology companies intended to unlock tools face the challenge of discriminating between state and private actors. 

Coercive measures by the US government against financial institutions have led several payment and e-commerce platforms, such as PayPal, to refuse to provide services to these individuals simply because they are Cuban, regardless of the type of business they run. They are equally unable to access Visa or Mastercard cards to acquire supplies for their businesses, since these are banned for Cubans anywhere in the world. Therefore, they do not have a secure online payment method, not even through a third country. Consequently, bank branches do not complete their transactions and many customers decide not to continue their relationships with private Cuban entities.” 

Page 49 of 55 

Annex 3: Prerogatives of the US President to modify the implementation of the blockade against Cuba. 

Note: Comment and links to previously-published analyses relating to the respective prerogatives included under some of the nine (9) prerogatives, which are in bold.  

• “Enable Cuban entities to open correspondent accounts in US banks.” 

Beginning in 2015, the government of the Republic of Cuba was requested, but refused, to have Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions officially request correspondent banking licenses from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury.  The Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) had inexplicably authorized United States-based financial institutions to have correspondent accounts with Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions, but did not authorize Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions to have correspondent accounts with United States-based financial institutions.  Applications to the OFAC from Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions would have been particularly of value in 2022 when the Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025) directed the OFAC to license direct investment into and direct financing for privately-owned companies in the Republic of Cuba.   

Link: State Department, NSC, OFAC, BIS, USDA Don't Understand Requirements For Financial Plumbing To Function Efficiently.  They Excel In Creating, Maintaining, And Defending Clogs. May 16, 2023 

Link: Biden-Harris Administration Re-Engagement With Cuba’s Re-Emerging Private Sector Brings Urgency To Re-Authorization Of Direct Correspondent Banking, U-Turn Transactions. One-Way Does Not Work. October 06, 2022 

Link: Facing Extinction Like Javan Rhino? Non-U.S. Banks Engaging With U.S. And Non-U.S. Entities For Authorized Transactions Involving Cuba Due To Risk Of OFAC Penalties. Since 2015, Only Two U.S. Banks. October 17, 2022 

Link: American Airlines & United Airlines Are Correcting Their Internet Sites About Using Credit Cards In Cuba April 17, 2017 

• “Authorize exports to Cuba of US products for key sectors of the economy, such as mining, tourism and biotechnology.”  

• “Authorize the importation by the US of any merchandise manufactured or derived from products grown, produced or manufactured in Cuba by state-owned enterprises (nickel, sugar, tobacco, rum or others).”  

Link: Coffee & Charcoal Have Been Imported From Cuba; U.S. Companies Want More. Agricultural Commodities/Food Products/Healthcare Products Have Been Exported To Cuba; U.S. Companies Want More. October 02, 2021 

• “Allow the export to Cuba of medical supplies and equipment that can be used in the manufacture of Cuban biotechnology products.”  

• “Relax the policy to grant licenses to US companies to invest in Cuba.”  

Link: Biden-Harris Administration Approves First Equity Investment Since 1960 In A Private Cuban Company May 10, 2022 

Link: With U.S. Government Authorization For First Direct Equity Investment Into A Private Company In Cuba, Here Is Important Context And Details.  About The Parties; About The Message. May 16, 2022 

• “Authorize US citizens to receive medical treatment in Cuba.”  

• “Authorize broader forms of cooperation for the development, marketing and supply of Cuban-made medicines and biomedical products, for example, through direct investments by US companies and joint ventures.”  

Link: Roswell Park Announces Joint Venture In Cuba For Healthcare Product Development September 26, 2018 

Link: Roswell Park In Buffalo, New York, Has Unique Partnership With Cuba; Has It Explored COVID-19 Treatment? June 15, 2020 

Link: Roswell Park Comprehensive Cancer Center References Its Clinical Trials For Cuba's CIMAvax-EGF. After Five Years Of Activity, RPCCC Continues Refusal To Provide Data/Comment On Joint Venture Status. November 02, 2021 

Link: Will Cuba Seek EUA From United States FDA? Not Required, But Politically Might Be Prudent Marketing Strategy To Reinforce What Cuba Can Do Under Sanctions June 23, 2021 

• “Authorize sales of the raw materials that Cuba needs to produce medicines for the Cuban population and other developing countries.”  

• “Authorize US subsidiaries to do business with Cuba that is not related to the import and export of goods to Cuba (prohibited by the Torricelli Act). [1992 Cuban Democracy Act]”

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Not "Ironclad" So At UN Why Does Cuba Government Continue To Misstate Realities Of US Company Exports To Government Companies And Private Companies? US$8+ Billion Is Real.

Why Does The Government Of The Republic Of Cuba Continue To Exaggerate Unnecessarily At The United Nations (UN) About The Impact On Purchases From United States Companies Using Provisions Within The CDA And TSREEA, And Authorizations By The BIS And United States Department Of State?  

Since 2001, United States Companies Have Exported More Than US$8 Billion In Products To The Republic Of Cuba- With Purchasers Both Government-Operated Companies And Re-Emerging Private Sector 

There is no reasonable debate using export data, import data, and exporter statements where the outcome supports that policies, regulations, and statutes do not constrain and restrain the export of products from the United States to the Republic of Cuba and imports from the Republic of Cuba to the United States.  There can be and is debate as to the impact of the impact, qualifying and quantifying the level of deterrents and inconveniences. 

Could there be an increase in United States exports to the Republic of Cuba within existing policies, regulations, and statutes in place by the government of the United States and the government of the Republic of Cuba?  Yes.  There is shared responsibility for Washington DC and Havana.  The two most important: Washington DC could authorize direct correspondent banking.  Havana could authorize the direct investment into and the direct financing for privately-owned companies- which the Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025) authorized on 10 May 2022.   

Link: Biden-Harris Administration Approves First Equity Investment Since 1960 In A Private Cuban Company May 10, 2022 

Link: With U.S. Government Authorization For First Direct Equity Investment Into A Private Company In Cuba, Here Is Important Context And Details.  About The Parties; About The Message. May 16, 2022 

Three statements by Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba, at the Human Rights Council (HRC) of the United Nations (UN). 

• “For more than six decades, the Cuban people have been facing the consequences of an ironclad economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the United States Government…” Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba

Reality: 

Since 2022, when the first Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce license was issued for the export of vehicles to Republic of Cuba nationals and to private companies in the Republic of Cuba, the cumulative export value of the initiatives in place during the Obama-Biden Administration, Trump-Pence Administration, Biden-Harris Administration, and Trump-Vance Administration exceeds US$191 million of which electric and gasoline-powered new and used vehicles, bicycles, trucks, motorcycles and mopeds, and parts, exceeds US$128 million (January 2025 through July 2025: US$50,288,310.00; year 2024: US$67,241,234.00; year 2023: US$10,546,419.00; year 2022: US$89,848.00 by the end of 2025 and purchases (equipment and products) for use by the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba driving the growth. 

The following data is a guide with approximate values for non-agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  Primarily products (including vehicles) used for the benefit of the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba and Republic of Cuba nationals.  

Year    Approximate U.S. Dollar Value
2015    US$4,836,627.00
2016    US$7,644,628.00
2017    US$11,137,712.00
2018    US$32,690,672.00
2019    US$21,144,294.00
2020    US$10,326,641.00
2021    US$5,204,355.00
2022    US$11,812,859.00
2023    US$30,334,066.00
2024    US$85,615,889.00
2025    US$63,891,338.00 (through July)
Total    US$284,639,081.00 

Link: Since 2022, US$191+ Million U.S. Exports To Cuba's Re-Emerging Private Sector- Including US$128 Million In Vehicles September 08, 2025 

In 2008, the highest value year, for example, the government of the Republic of Cuba purchased US$717,878,764.00 in agricultural commodities and food products from United States-based companies.  The transactions were on a cash-in-advance basis as required by the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, which re-authorized the direct export of agricultural commodities and food products from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  The Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 re-authorized the direct export of healthcare products (medical equipment, medical instruments, medical supplies, medicines, and pharmaceuticals from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  Payment terms are authorized within the CDA. 

Link To 2008 Export List In PDF Format 

• “… impact of a policy that threatens the food security of our population, as it prevents the acquisition of fertilizers, agricultural machinery, fuels, chemical products and essential technologies to guarantee national food production.”  Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba 

Reality: 

In 2017, Deere & Company (2024 revenues approximately US$61.3 billion) established a distribution center in the Republic of Cuba, joining San Juan, Puerto Rico-based RIMCO, the Republic of Cuba distributor for Irving, Texas-based Caterpillar Inc. (2024 revenues US$66.5 billion) established the same year.  At the time, neither Deere & Company nor Caterpillar issued media releases or posted information on their respective Internet sites.  

Since November 2017, Deere & Company delivered nearing US$2 million in agricultural equipment to the Republic of Cuba for use at its distribution center. Antioch, Tennessee-based Wirtgen America, Inc., a subsidiary of Windhagen, Germany-based Wirtgen Group (2020 revenues approximately US$3 billion), a construction equipment machinery subsidiary (acquired in 2017) of Deere & Company has also delivered products to the Republic of Cuba.  RIMCO continues to deliver equipment for use at its distribution center in the Republic of Cuba, including excavators, backhoes, graders, scrapers, bulldozers, railway fixtures, and signaling equipment, valued at more than US$4 million since December 2018.  John Deere Financial Services was to provide payment terms/financing for the exports, primarily Series 5000 (price range US$25,000.00 to US$80,000.00) with a limited quantity of Series 7000 (price range US$219,000.00 to US$280,000.00).  According to the company, several hundred tractors, parts and accessories may be exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba during the next four years, with the first deliveries (for testing and evaluation) scheduled for mid-November 2017.  The potential value of the several hundred products exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba that would be financed could range from US$9 million to US$30 million.  John Deere Financial Services has not commented as to whether the product sales goals have been achieved or if there have been issues relating to the receipt of payments.  Caterpillar has not disclosed if the company has provided payment terms for its products exported to the Republic of Cuba.  

Since December 2017, Boston, Massachusetts-based General Electric (GE; 2024 revenues approximately US$64.6 billion) delivered from the United States to the Republic of Cuba “parts for steam turbines” valued at more than US$21 million. Some of the parts traveled from Atlanta, Georgia, to Port Everglades, Florida, then to Port Mariel in the Republic of Cuba. GE is the largest (by revenue) United States-based industrial company to have engaged with the Republic of Cuba. Although GE has not issued a media release relating to the project in the Republic of Cuba, in 2017 the government of the Republic of Cuba confirmed in a PowerPoint presentation used by the Embassy of the Republic of Cuba in Washington DC that the company was providing parts and equipment for a power plant. The total value of the project has not been reported. The Obama Administration first authorized the transactions by GE as primarily advancing benefit to the citizens of the Republic of Cuba rather than to the government of the Republic of Cuba. This type of transaction was and remains licensable (general or specific) through the OFAC and BIS. In November 2015, GE purchased for approximately US$10.6 billion the power and grid division of Paris, France-based Alstom (2018 revenues approximately US$8 billion). In 2016, GE commenced a power generation project in the Republic of Cuba resulting, in part, from a relationship between Alstom and the Republic of Cuba prior to the 2015 acquisition by GE of the power and grid division of Alstom, which had exported products to the Republic of Cuba. On 31 March 1971, GE certified a claim against the Republic of Cuba in the amount of US$5,870,436.86 through the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC) within the United States Department of Justice.  Interest accrued at 6% per annum from the respective date(s) of loss to the date of settlement.  

• “… blockade hinders and disrupts even the arrival of supplies already paid for, affecting the availability of basic commodities such as rice, beans, powdered milk, oil, meat, bread and coffee.”  Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba 

Reality: 

United States exports to the Republic of Cuba (government-operated entities and the re-emerging private sectors) were US$285,709,353.00 for the period January 2025 through July 2025 compared to US$242,085,953.00 for the period January 2024 through July 2024, representing an 18.0% increase year-to-year representing.  The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the TSREEA and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, and United States Department of State.

Link To Complete Report In Pdf Format

Link To Complete List Of Products In 2024 Exported From The United States To Cuba

Link To Complete List Of Products In 2023 Exported From The United States To Cuba 

Year    Value Of TSREEA Exports
2025    US$285,709,353.00
2024    US$433,662,216.00
2023    US$342,607,027.00
2022    US$328,536,988.00
2021    US$304,774,413.00
2020    US$163,354,728.00
2019    US$257,659,479.00
2018    US$224,910,413.00
2017    US$268,800,005.00 (revised +US$8,132,930.00 on 6/18)
2016    US$232,064,645.00
2015    US$170,551,329.00
2014    US$291,258,881.00
2013    US$348,747,293.00
2012    US$457,318,357.00
2011    US$358,457,389.00
2010    US$366,467,782.00
2009    US$528,482,955.00
2008    US$710,086,323.00
2007    US$437,564,824.00
2006    US$340,433,442.00
2005    US$350,218,040.00
2004    US$391,990,382.00
2003    US$256,901,471.00
2002    US$138,634,784.00
2001    US$4,318,906.00 (December- 1st sales under TSREEA)
Total Sales    US$7,966,705,182.00 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Havana, Republic of Cuba
12 September 2025

Cuba denounces the impact of the blockade on the right to food at the Human Rights Council 

Geneva, September 12, 2025.- The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, denounced before the Human Rights Council (HRC) of the United Nations (UN), the impact of the blockade imposed by the United States on the right to food and food security of the Cuban people. 

The Cuban Deputy Foreign Minister intervened, in virtual format, in the Biennial Panel on Unilateral Coercive Measures of the 60th session of the UNHRC, and pointed out that the U.S. policy towards the island had caused damage to the Cuban agri-food sector for more than 441 million dollars between March 2023 and February 2024 alone.  He also exemplified how extraterritorial pressure measures prevent and hinder the acquisition of fertilizers, agricultural machinery, fuels, chemical products and essential technologies to guarantee food production. He illustrated the consequences of the blockade for Cuba's access to financing for agricultural development programs, modernization of rural infrastructures and adaptation to climate change. 

The central theme of the Biennial Panel was "Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures and Excessive Compliance on the Right to Food and Food Security". It was attended by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk; the Special Rapporteur on Unilateral Coercive Measures, Alena Douhan; the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Michael Fakhri; the independent expert on Foreign Debt, Attiya Waris; as well as representatives of governments and civil society. 

Related information: 

Intervention of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, at the Biennial Panel on Unilateral Coercive Measures. Geneva, 12 September 2025. 

Mr. President, We are grateful to the Office of the High Commissioner for its efforts to fulfil the mandate of organizing this biennial panel, in the difficult context of the liquidity crisis facing the United Nations.  For more than six decades, the Cuban people have been facing the consequences of an ironclad economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the United States Government, which has been intensified in recent years with new pressure measures, extraterritorial actions and financial restrictions.  This unilateral policy constitutes a massive, flagrant and systematic violation of the human rights of the Cuban people, and directly affects national food security, limiting access to inputs, technologies, financing and international cooperation. 

During the period between March 2023 and February 2024, the damage caused by the blockade in the Cuban agri-food sector amounted to more than 441 million dollars.  This figure not only represents an economic loss, but also reflects the human impact of a policy that threatens the food security of our population, as it prevents the acquisition of fertilizers, agricultural machinery, fuels, chemical products and essential technologies to guarantee national food production.   

The blockade hinders and disrupts even the arrival of supplies already paid for, affecting the availability of basic commodities such as rice, beans, powdered milk, oil, meat, bread and coffee.  The chilling effect of the embargo has even reached entities of the United Nations system.  In 2024, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) attempted to procure tractors for small Cuban producers worth $1.5 million, but the manufacturer refused to take the risk of trading with Cuba, due to U.S. coercion. 

Mr. President, The embargo has also restricted Cuba's access to external multilateral financing for agricultural development programs, modernization of rural infrastructure, and strengthening climate resilience.  This limitation affects the Cuban state's ability to guarantee an adequate standard of living, especially in a context marked by global crises, economic volatility and environmental challenges.  Various mandate-holders of this Council have been categorical in pointing out that unilateral coercive measures, such as the blockade, contravene international law, the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States and the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.  In January 2024, Special Rapporteur Alena Douhan, together with the special procedures on the right to food, the right to development, extreme poverty and human rights, sent a joint communication to the Government of the United States, in which they described the blockade as a serious violation of the human rights of the Cuban people. including the right to life. 

Mr. President, Despite these adversities, the Cuban State has deployed multiple efforts to guarantee equitable access to food, protect vulnerable sectors and promote local food production.  One of the pillars of this strategy is the Food Sovereignty and Food and Nutrition Security (FSN) Law, approved in 2022 and which is articulated with the Sustainable Development Goals; and the National Economic and Social Development Plan until 2030.  On the other hand, the urban, suburban and family agriculture program has been revitalized as a strategic tool for municipal self-sufficiency.  In collaboration with the World Food Programme (WFP), Cuba has implemented actions to strengthen maternal and child nutrition, school feeding and care for the elderly.  WFP supports the Municipal Self-Sufficiency Program, the Plan for the Prevention and Control of Anemia, and the "Life" Task, a Cuban State program that, among other aspects, addresses the impacts of climate change on food security. 

Mr. President, We reiterate our call for the immediate and unconditional cessation of the blockade. This demand is not only a matter of justice for the Cuban people: it is an ethical, legal and humanitarian demand that calls into question the credibility of the international system for the protection of human rights.  The Human Rights Council must continue to promote events like this, which make visible the effects of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights by millions of people around the world.  We urge the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to continue to follow up on this important issue.  In that regard, we highlight the rigorous and professional work carried out by Special Rapporteur Alena Douhan in carrying out her mandate.  Cuba will continue to defend its right to live without blockade, to produce its food, and to build a model of fair, sustainable and solidary development.  Thanks a lot. 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Havana, Republic of Cuba
12 September 2025

Cuba denuncia en el Consejo de Derechos Humanos el impacto del bloqueo en el derecho a la alimentación 

Ginebra, 12 de septiembre de 2025.- La viceministra de la Relaciones Exteriores, Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, denunció ante el Consejo de Derechos Humanos (CDH) de la Organización de Naciones Unidas (ONU), el impacto del bloqueo impuesto por Estados Unidos, en el derecho a la alimentación y la seguridad alimentaria del pueblo cubano. 

La Vicecanciller cubana intervino, en formato virtual, en el Panel Bienal sobre Medidas Coercitivas Unilaterales del 60 período de sesiones del CDH, y señaló que la política estadounidense hacia la Isla había causado daños al sector agroalimentario cubano por más de 441 millones de dólares solo entre marzo de 2023 y febrero de 2024. 

Asimismo, ejemplificó cómo las medidas de presión extraterritoriales impiden y obstaculizan la adquisición de fertilizantes, maquinaria agrícola, combustibles, productos químicos y tecnologías esenciales para garantizar la producción de alimentos. Ilustró las consecuencias del bloqueo para el acceso de Cuba a financiamiento para programas de desarrollo agrícola, modernización de infraestructuras rurales y adaptación al cambio climático. 

El Panel Bienal tuvo como tema central "Impacto de las medidas coercitivas unilaterales y el cumplimiento excesivo en el derecho a la alimentación y la seguridad alimentaria". Contó con la participación del alto comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos, Volker Türk; la relatora especial sobre Medidas Coercitivas Unilaterales, Alena Douhan; el relator especial sobre el derecho a la alimentación, Michael Fakhri; la experta independiente sobre Deuda Externa, Attiya Waris; además de representantes de gobiernos y de la sociedad civil. 

Información relacionada:  

Intervención de la viceministra de Relaciones Exteriores, Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, en el Panel Bienal sobre Medidas Coercitivas Unilaterales. Ginebra, 12 de septiembre de 2025.

Señor presidente: 

Agradecemos a la Oficina del Alto Comisionado los esfuerzos para cumplir el mandato de organizar este panel bienal, en el difícil contexto de la crisis de liquidez que enfrentan las Naciones Unidas. 

Desde hace más de seis décadas, el pueblo cubano enfrenta las consecuencias de un férreo bloqueo económico, comercial y financiero impuesto por el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos, que ha sido recrudecido en los últimos años con nuevas medidas de presión, acciones extraterritoriales y restricciones financieras. 

Esta política, de carácter unilateral, constituye una violación masiva, flagrante y sistemática de los derechos humanos del pueblo cubano, y afecta de manera directa la seguridad alimentaria nacional, limitando el acceso a insumos, tecnologías, financiamiento y cooperación internacional. 

Durante el período comprendido entre marzo de 2023 y febrero de 2024, los daños provocados por el bloqueo en el sector agroalimentario cubano ascendieron a más de 441 millones de dólares. 

Esta cifra no representa únicamente una pérdida económica, sino que refleja el impacto humano de una política que atenta contra la seguridad alimentaria de nuestra población, pues impide la adquisición de fertilizantes, maquinaria agrícola, combustibles, productos químicos y tecnologías esenciales para garantizar la producción nacional de alimentos. 

El bloqueo obstaculiza e interrumpe incluso la llegada de suministros ya pagados, afectando la disponibilidad de productos básicos como arroz, frijoles, leche en polvo, aceite, carne, pan y café. 

El efecto intimidatorio del bloqueo ha alcanzado incluso a entidades del sistema de las Naciones Unidas. 

En 2024, la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Agricultura y la Alimentación (FAO) intentó adquirir tractores para pequeños productores cubanos por un valor de 1,5 millones de dólares, pero el fabricante se negó a asumir el riesgo de comerciar con Cuba, debido a la coerción estadounidense. 

Señor presidente: 

El bloqueo también ha restringido el acceso de Cuba a financiamiento multilateral externo para programas de desarrollo agrícola, modernización de infraestructuras rurales y fortalecimiento de la resiliencia climática. 

Esta limitación afecta la capacidad del Estado cubano para garantizar un nivel de vida adecuado, especialmente en un contexto marcado por crisis globales, volatilidad económica y desafíos medioambientales. 

Diversos titulares de mandatos de este Consejo han sido categóricos al señalar que las medidas coercitivas unilaterales, como el bloqueo, contravienen el Derecho Internacional, el principio de no intervención en los asuntos internos de los Estados y los propósitos de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas. 

En enero de 2024, la Relatora Especial Alena Douhan, de conjunto con los procedimientos especiales sobre el derecho a la alimentación, el derecho al desarrollo, la extrema pobreza y los derechos humanos, enviaron una comunicación conjunta al Gobierno de los Estados Unidos, en la que calificaron el bloqueo como una grave violación de los derechos humanos del pueblo cubano, incluido el derecho a la vida. 

Señor presidente: 

A pesar de estas adversidades, el Estado cubano ha desplegado múltiples esfuerzos para garantizar el acceso equitativo a los alimentos, proteger a los sectores vulnerables y promover la producción local de alimentos. 

Uno de los pilares de esta estrategia es la Ley de Soberanía Alimentaria y Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional (SAN), aprobada en 2022 y que se articula con los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible; y el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Económico y Social hasta 2030. 

Por otra parte, el programa de agricultura urbana, suburbana y familiar, ha sido revitalizado como herramienta estratégica para el autoabastecimiento municipal. 

En colaboración con el Programa Mundial de Alimentos (PMA), Cuba ha implementado acciones para fortalecer la nutrición materno-infantil, la alimentación escolar y la atención a adultos mayores. 

El PMA apoya el Programa de Autoabastecimiento Municipal, el Plan para la prevención y control de la anemia, y la Tarea “Vida”, Programa del Estado cubano que, entre otros aspectos, aborda los impactos del cambio climático sobre la seguridad alimentaria. 

Señor presidente: 

Reiteramos nuestro llamado al cese inmediato e incondicional del bloqueo. Esta demanda no es solo una cuestión de justicia para el pueblo cubano: es una exigencia ética, jurídica y humanitaria que interpela la credibilidad del sistema internacional de protección de los derechos humanos. 

El Consejo de Derechos Humanos debe continuar fomentando eventos como este, que visibilicen las afectaciones de las medidas coercitivas unilaterales en el disfrute de los derechos humanos de millones de personas en el mundo. 

Exhortamos a la Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos a mantener el seguimiento a esta importante temática.  

En ese sentido, destacamos el trabajo riguroso y profesional que ha realizado la Relatora Especial Alena Douhan en el desarrollo de su mandato. 

Cuba continuará defendiendo su derecho a vivir sin bloqueo, a producir sus alimentos, y a construir un modelo de desarrollo justo, sostenible y solidario.  Muchas gracias.

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Another Cuba Libertad Act Case To U.S. Supreme Court. Seaboard Marine Writes 11th Circuit Court of Appeals "stretched the Act's text beyond its breaking point"

From The Filing: "QUESTIONS PRESENTED- Title III of the Helms-Burton Act creates a right of action against businesses that traffic in property confiscated by the Cuban government. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6023, 6082. In the decision below, the Eleventh Circuit stretched the Act’s text beyond its breaking point: the court of appeals held that shipping companies that, in accordance with federal regulations, lawfully carry agricultural commodities from the U.S. to Cuba could be traffickers, each of whom owes Respondent personally hundreds of millions of dollars, based on her theory that Cuba’s principal container terminal partially extends onto land once owned by a Cuban corporation in which she claims to be the lone surviving shareholder.  The questions presented are: 1. Does the Helms-Burton Act abrograte basic corporate law and permit shareholders to maintain Title III actions based on confiscated corporate property the shareholders never personally owned? 2. Does delivering cargo to a facility partially constructed atop confiscated land qualify as trafficking in confiscated property under the Act? 3. Do companies that lawfully carry agricultural commodities from the U.S. to Cuba engage in lawful travel under the Act?"

No. 25-283 
Title: Seaboard Marine Ltd., Petitioner v. Odette Blanco De Fernandez, aka Blanco Rosell 
Docketed: September 11, 2025
Lower Ct: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Case Numbers: (22-12966)
Decision Date:  April 14, 2025 
Rehearing Denied: June 10, 2025
 
Proceedings and Orders
Sep 08 2025- Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due October 14, 2025) 
Petition Appendix Certificate of Word Count Proof of Service 

Attorneys
Attorneys for Petitioners 
Bryan Michael Killian
Counsel of Record
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP
1111 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20004
bryan.killian@morganlewis.com
Ph: 202-373-6191
Party name: Seaboard Marine Ltd.

Link To PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Link To APPENDIX
Link To WORD COUNT

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL, Plaintiff, v. SEABOARD   MARINE, LTD., Defendant. [1:20-cv-25176; Southern Florida District]

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Exxon Mobil Asks U.S. Supreme Court To Resolve Libertad Act Lawsuit Issue Against Cuba's Coroporacion Cimex April 17, 2025 

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U.S. Supreme Court Refuses Request By Expedia To Dismiss Libertad Act Lawsuit. Thus Far, U.S. Supreme Court Has Refused All Libertad Act Titlle III Requests. Case Returns To District Court. October 02, 2023

France Company Introduces New Honey From Cuba- 7 Euros For 250 Grams

Miel Factory
28 rue de Sévigné,
75004 PARIS

MIEL DE CUBA- Link To Company Site

Une récolte attendue, un miel d’exception.  Le voilà enfin de retour : notre miel de Cuba, issu de la nouvelle récolte, est à nouveau disponible!  Récolté dans les forêts tropicales de l’île, ce miel est produit à partir du nectar de l’amaryllis, du bougainvillier, de l'orchidée, de la campanile, ou encore l’amandier.  Son goût est doux avec des effluves fruités et épicées. Il procure des saveurs chaleureuses pleine d’exotisme. À Cuba, l'apiculture a une place bien particulière.  Privée d'intrants chimiques depuis des décennies, l'île bénéficie d’une biodiversité préservée et d’une apiculture naturelle presque unique au monde.  Les abeilles y butinent en toute liberté, loin des cultures intensives.

Links To Related Analyses 

Miel Factory In France Unveils New Cuba Honey Harvest- 7 EUR For 250 Grams  March 20, 2024 

2024 U.S. Cane/Beet Sugar/Syrup/Artificial Honey Exports To Cuba January Through July Were US$1,033,615.00. Cuba Reportedly Allocating 90% Of Honey Production For Export Rather Than Domestic Market.  September 07, 2024 

Ag Delegations Traveling To Cuba Must Know What Is Possible, Advocate To Government Of Cuba To Permit All That Is Permissible- Direct Export Of Coffee, Cacao, Honey. Complaining Not Constructive.  April 14, 2022 

Might Cubaexport In 2020 Permit “Independent Entrepreneurs” To Export Coffee Beans, Cocoa and Honey To The United States?  January 14, 2020 

Honey From Cuba Could Be Imported To The U.S.; Thus Far Cuba Says No  September 28, 2018 

U.S. Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increased 34% In July 2025; Increased 18% Year-To-Year. US$15.3 Million In Vehicles; US$50,000.00 Blow Molding Machines; US$1.2 Million Communion Wafers

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
September 2025

July 2025 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increase 34.6% - 1
48th Of 221 July 2025 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Cuba Ranked 48th Of 221 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets – 2
Re-Emerging Private Sector Exports - 3
July 2025 CDA Healthcare Product Exports US$0.00 - 6
July 2025 Humanitarian Donations US$14,028,699.00 - 7
U.S. Port Export Data- 20

JULY 2025 AG/FOOD EXPORTS TO CUBA INCREASE 34.6%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in July 2025 were US$42,353,477.00 compared to US$31,457,528.00 in July 2024 and US$32,313,837.00 in July 2023.

US$285,709,353.00 for the period January 2025 through July 2025 compared to US$242,085,953.00 for the period January 2024 through July 2024, representing an 18.0% increase year-to-year representing.

Highlights: Birds’ Eggs (US$500,827.00); Wheat (US$1,695,022); Corn (US$11.951.00); Peanuts (US$4,060.00); Soybean Oil Cake (US$53,330.00); Hydraulic Brake Fluid (US$12,700.00); Anti-freezing Prep (US$2,862.00); Babies’ Garments (US$6,420.00); Bed Nets (US$41,250.00); AC Generators (US$7,448.00); Used Vehicles, Only SK 1g (1500-3000 cc) (US$13,949,836.00); Motorcycles (including mopeds) (US$1,339,883.00); Baseball Articles (US$19,670.00).

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, and United States Department of State.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA, CDA, and other regulations, specifically including products exported from the United States to the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba.

The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

LINK TO COMPLETE REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

U.S. PORT EXPORT DATA

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2024 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2023 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

Since 2022, US$191+ Million U.S. Exports To Cuba's Re-Emerging Private Sector- Including US$128 Million In Vehicles

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA© 

RE-EMERGING PRIVATE SECTOR EXPORTS- On 17 December 2014, the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) announced commercial, economic, financial, political, and social changes to the bilateral relationship with the government of the Republic of Cuba and with Republic of Cuba nationals.  On 20 July 2015, the government of the United States and the government of the Republic of Cuba re-established diplomatic relations. 

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, and United States Department of State expanded the variety of products and services authorized for export to the Republic of Cuba and the variety of products and services authorized for import from the Republic of Cuba.  These expansions included some exports and imports through third countries.  The focus of the expansions was to benefit Republic of Cuba nationals and to benefit the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba.   

The Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) did not demonstrably interfere with product exports and product imports, but did interfere with service exports and service imports.   

The Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029) has not interfered with product exports and product imports initiated by the Obama-Biden Administration and the Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025), but has interrupted some service exports.   

The Obama-Biden Administration and Biden-Harris Administration focused upon products (durable, non-durable, consumable) to individuals and entities not affiliated with the government of the Republic of Cuba.  The government of the Republic of Cuba initially prohibited some imports.  From 2015 to 2017, the government of the Republic of Cuba authorized: One United States company with two hotel management contracts, although only one hotel management contract was operational prior to 2020 when the OFAC license was rescinded; multiple United States airlines servicing United States-Republic of Cuba routes; cruise lines operating itineraries from the United States to the Republic of Cuba until the OFAC license was rescinded in 2019; one company with a power generation equipment contract, reported to have been completed; and two United States companies operating agricultural equipment distribution centers. 

Since 2022, when the first BIS license was issued for the export of vehicles to Republic of Cuba nationals and to private companies in the Republic of Cuba, the cumulative export value of the initiatives in place during the Obama-Biden Administration, Trump-Pence Administration, Biden-Harris Administration, and Trump-Vance Administration exceeds US$191 million of which electric and gasoline-powered new and used vehicles, bicycles, trucks, motorcycles and mopeds, and parts, exceeds US$128 million (January 2025 through July 2025: US$50,288,310.00; year 2024: US$67,241,234.00; year 2023: US$10,546,419.00; year 2022: US$89,848.00 by the end of 2025 and purchases (equipment and products) for use by the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba driving the growth. 

The following data is a guide with approximate values for non-agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  Primarily products (including vehicles) used for the benefit of the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba and Republic of Cuba nationals.

Year    Approximate U.S. Dollar Value
2015    US$4,836,627.00
2016    US$7,644,628.00
2017    US$11,137,712.00
2018    US$32,690,672.00
2019    US$21,144,294.00
2020    US$10,326,641.00
2021    US$5,204,355.00
2022    US$11,812,859.00
2023    US$30,334,066.00
2024    US$85,615,889.00
2025    US$63,891,338.00 (through July)
Total    US$284,639,081.00

LINK TO REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

US$29.85 Million Jury Verdict Against Expedia For Cuba Activities Set Aside By U.S. District Court In Miami

MARIO ECHEVARRIA, Plaintiff, vs. EXPEDIA, INC., HOTELS.COM L.P., HOTELS.COM GP, LLC, and ORBITZ, LLC, Defendants.  Case Number: 19-22621-CIV-MORENO  

5 September 2025

“VI. CONCLUSION
A trial court's decision to set aside a jury's verdict should never be taken lightly, particularly in a case where great lawyers on both sides have well represented their clients admirably, with passion but respect, over a long period of time.  Much time and money has been spent by the parties and counsel as the Court struggled with the multitude of legal issues, which may well be decided differently by the wiser Court of Appeals.  Perhaps, now we understand better the decisions of our United States Presidents, both Democrat and Republican, to suspend provisionally Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act.  There may be little comfort for either side of this first-ever Helms-Burton Act jury trial in President Trump's decision in his first term not to defer any longer the bipartisan Congressional intent in 1996, after the shooting of the airplanes used to save Cuban refugees fleeing the island suffering a Communist dictatorship for the last 65 years.  After all, even without a money judgment in favor of Plaintiff, the intent of the Helms-Burton Act was indeed followed.  Those parties who are notified that their actions violate the Act must stop their activity. Defendants did cease bookings with the hotels located on Plaintiffs inherited property within the 30 days provided by the Act and thus complied with the purpose of the law passed by· Congress and signed by President Clinton.  Therefore, the Court sets aside the jury verdicts and enters judgments in. favor of Defendants Expedia Group, Inc., Hotels.com GP, LLC, Hotels.com L.P., and Orbitz, LLC.”

LINK TO COURT DOCUMENTS IN PDF FORMAT

On 18 April 2025, a jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Miami, Division, held that defendant Expedia and three related entities were ordered to pay US$29.85 million to the plaintiffs for violating provisions of Title III of the the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act” or “Helms-Burton Act”).  

Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.   

The Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) on 2 May 2019 made operational Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act.  

The plaintiffs sued Expedia for offering reservations for resorts constructed on a barrier island within the internationally-recognized territory of the Republic of Cuba.  The plaintiffs argued the property was confiscated absent compensation by the government of the Republic of Cuba. 

LINK: Plaintiffs Oppose Expedia Motion For New Cuba Services Trial Where Jury Awarded US$29.85 Million August 08, 2025

LINK: Expedia Owes US$29.85 Million From First Jury Decision In Libertad Act Lawsuit For "Trafficking" In Expropriated Cuba Asset.  April 19, 2025

Trump-Vance Administration Continues Trading With The Enemy Act Cuba Provisions For One Year

Federal Register
Vol. 90, No. 169
Thursday, September 4, 2025
Title 3—
The President
Presidential Determination No. 2025–11 of August 29, 2025 Continuation of the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading With the Enemy Act
Memorandum for the Secretary of State [and] the Secretary of the Treasury Under section 101(b) of Public Law 95–223 (91 Stat. 1625; 50 U.S.C. 4305
note), and a previous determination on September 13, 2024 (89 FR 76397, September 18, 2024), the exercise of certain authorities under the Trading With the Enemy Act is scheduled to expire on September 14, 2025.  I hereby determine that the continuation of the exercise of those authorities with respect to Cuba for 1 year is in the national interest of the United  States.  Therefore, consistent with the authority vested in me by section 101(b) of Public Law 95–223, I continue for 1 year, until September 14, 2026, the exercise of those authorities with respect to Cuba, as implemented by the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 CFR Part 515.  The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to publish this determination in the Federal Register.

Donald J. Trump

Expedia Wants At Least US$1.5 Million And Sanctions Against Plaintiffs In Libertad Act Title III Cuba Lawsuit

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

Central Santa Lucia, L.C., Plaintiff, v. Expedia Group, Inc., Defendant.  
C.A. No. 22-00367-JLH

Cross & Simon, LLC (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields LLC (plaintiff)
Ballard Spahr LLP (defendant)

DEFENDANT EXPEDIA GROUP, INC.’S RENEWED AND REVISED MOTION FOR SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO THE COURT’S INHERENT AUTHORITY AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1927 AND RULE 37(c)(2)

08/27/2025    NOTICE of Withdrawal of 279 MOTION for Sanctions, by Expedia Group, Inc. (Moskow-Schnoll, Beth) Modified on 8/27/2025 (ceg).
08/26/2025    ORDER REGARDING POST-TRIAL BRIEFING. (*See Order for details). Signed by Judge Jennifer L. Hall on 8/26/2025. (ceg) 
08/26/2025    JUDGMENT FOLLOWING JURY VERDICT. Signed by Judge Jennifer L. Hall on 8/26/2025. (ceg) 
08/25/2025    MOTION for Sanctions - filed by Expedia Group, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I)(Moskow-Schnoll, Beth) 

Excerpt

"From the beginning, this lawsuit was a fraud. It was a fraud jointly and intentionally perpetrated by plaintiff Central Santa Lucia L.C. (“CSL”) and its lawyers. The purpose of this fraud was to use a knowingly false allegation and the threat of multi-billion-dollar statutory damages to extract a settlement from defendant Expedia Group. Although this fraud ultimately failed, it was costly. To date, Expedia Group has incurred more than $1.5 million in fees and expenses defending this fraudulent case. And it is entitled to be made whole. Expedia Group therefore renews its previously filed motion for sanctions under Rule 11, through which it seeks the reasonable attorneys’ fees and other expenses it incurred defending this case. Additionally, and to the extent necessary, Expedia Group moves for (A) sanctions against CSL’s attorneys pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Court’s inherent authority; (B) sanctions against CSL pursuant to the Court’s inherent authority; and (C) sanctions against CSL under Rule 37(c)(2) for failing to admit that the three assignment of rights documents at issue (the “Assignment Documents”) were backdated."

Link To 23-Page Court Filing In PDF Format
Link To Notice Of Withdrawal of D.I. 279, Expedia Group, Inc.'s Motion for Sanctions

Link To Expedia Prevails In Cuba Libertad Act Lawsuit Filed In Delaware After Loss In Lawsuit Filed In Florida Aug 27, 2025

DOJ Supports Exxon Mobil In U.S. Supreme Court Case Against Cuba Companies. Now, Both Plaintiffs Before SCOTUS Have Trump-Vance Administration Support.

Exxon Mobil Corporation, Petitioner v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba), et al. 
Docketed: December 31, 2024
Linked with: 24A330
Lower Ct: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Case Numbers: (21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020)
Decision Date: July 30, 2024 

Excerpts: 

QUESTION PRESENTED 

Whether Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. 6021 et seq., which creates for U.S. victims of unlawful expropriation by the Cuban government a damages action against those who traffic in the expropriated property, permits suit against Cuban agencies or instrumentalities, or whether such claims are barred by foreign sovereign immunity unless they also satisfy an exception codified in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. 1330, 1391(f ), 1441(d), 1602 et seq. 

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES 

This brief is submitted in response to the Court’s order inviting the Solicitor General to express the views of the United States. In the view of the United States, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.  

INTRODUCTION 

The United States has compelling foreign-policy interests in ensuring that U.S. nationals whose assets were illegally expropriated by Fidel Castro’s communist regime receive recompense and in preventing the Cuban government from further benefiting from its wrongdoing.  In the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. 6021 et seq., Congress provided a vital mechanism to impose accountability on the Cuban government by authorizing private parties to bring suits against “any person” who traffics in property confiscated by the Cuban government, 22 U.S.C. 

This Court should grant review and hold that Title III suits against Cuban agencies and instrumentalities can proceed without having to additionally satisfy one of the enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity under the FSIA. The D.C. Circuit incorrectly superimposed the FSIA’s general framework on a narrow, Cuba-focused statute that clearly abrogates Cuban agencies’ and instrumentalities’ immunity. That erroneous holding impedes private suits against Cuban agencies and instrumentalities and stymies important foreign-policy interests in holding the Cuban government accountable for continuing to benefit from its illegal expropriations. Review is especially warranted now, during a window when the President has allowed Title III suits to proceed, and at a time when the United States believes that such suits could meaningfully contribute to American foreign-policy objectives involving Cuba. 

Link To 31-Page Document In PDF Format

Link: U.S. Supreme Court: Trump-Vance Administration Supports Libertad Act Cuba Lawsuit Against U.S. Cruise Lines; Says 11th Circuit Court Of Appeals Was Wrong. Will DOJ Support Exxon-Mobil Lawsuit Too? Aug 27, 2025