U.S. Supreme Court Agrees To Hear Two Cuba Libertad Act Cases. Trump Administration Supports Both Plaintiffs.

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Cuba’s 55-Page Annual Report To 2025 UNGA Includes Truths And Lapses From Realities About Commercial Engagement With The US Government And US Companies. Blame Not All North To South.

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Government Of Cuba’s 2025 55-Page Annual Report To The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Includes Truths And Lapses From Realities About Commercial Engagement With The United States. 

Had The Government of The Republic Of Cuba From 2015 Accepted A Robust Return By United States-Based Companies, Many Of The Complaints Today Would Not Exist.  Havana Continues To Fail To Embrace What Is Authorized And That Has Consequences. 

Engagement With And Support For The Re-Emerging Private Sector Is The Only Viable Pathway For Government Of The Republic Of Cuba To Provide Value To Its Declining Population.   

Strategy Should Not Solely Focus On Survival- It Must Pivot To Focus On Prosperity. 

Link: Not "Ironclad" So At UN Why Does Cuba Government Continue To Misstate Realities Of US Company Exports To Government Companies And Private Companies? US$8+ Billion Is Real. September 27, 2025 

“CUBA’S REPORT [May 2025] Pursuant to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 79/7, entitled “Necessity of ending the economic, commercial, and financial blockade imposed by the United States of America against Cuba””  Link To Document In PDF Format 

Excerpts: 

“Until April, 2025, there were 11,233 private micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) registered in Cuba.  

The blockade also affects the activity of these private entrepreneurs, business owners and Cuban cooperatives. In 2024, 608 MSMEs -6 per cent of the total- reported losses. The US administration has repeatedly claimed that the blockade is only intended to punish the Cuban government and not the people or the private sector.   

The measures announced in May 2024, supposedly to benefit this sector in terms of access to digital and financial services, never materialized. The structural barriers of the blockade and its legal framework remain the main obstacle to any economic activity in Cuba. US technology companies intended to unlock tools face the challenge of discriminating between state and private actors. 

Coercive measures by the US government against financial institutions have led several payment and e-commerce platforms, such as PayPal, to refuse to provide services to these individuals simply because they are Cuban, regardless of the type of business they run. They are equally unable to access Visa or Mastercard cards to acquire supplies for their businesses, since these are banned for Cubans anywhere in the world. Therefore, they do not have a secure online payment method, not even through a third country. Consequently, bank branches do not complete their transactions and many customers decide not to continue their relationships with private Cuban entities.” 

Page 49 of 55 

Annex 3: Prerogatives of the US President to modify the implementation of the blockade against Cuba. 

Note: Comment and links to previously-published analyses relating to the respective prerogatives included under some of the nine (9) prerogatives, which are in bold.  

  • “Enable Cuban entities to open correspondent accounts in US banks.” 

Beginning in 2015, the government of the Republic of Cuba was requested, but refused, to have Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions officially request correspondent banking licenses from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury.  The Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) had inexplicably authorized United States-based financial institutions to have correspondent accounts with Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions, but did not authorize Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions to have correspondent accounts with United States-based financial institutions.  Applications to the OFAC from Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions would have been particularly of value in 2022 when the Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025) directed the OFAC to license direct investment into and direct financing for privately-owned companies in the Republic of Cuba.   

Link: State Department, NSC, OFAC, BIS, USDA Don't Understand Requirements For Financial Plumbing To Function Efficiently.  They Excel In Creating, Maintaining, And Defending Clogs. May 16, 2023 

Link: Biden-Harris Administration Re-Engagement With Cuba’s Re-Emerging Private Sector Brings Urgency To Re-Authorization Of Direct Correspondent Banking, U-Turn Transactions. One-Way Does Not Work. October 06, 2022 

Link: Facing Extinction Like Javan Rhino? Non-U.S. Banks Engaging With U.S. And Non-U.S. Entities For Authorized Transactions Involving Cuba Due To Risk Of OFAC Penalties. Since 2015, Only Two U.S. Banks. October 17, 2022 

Link: American Airlines & United Airlines Are Correcting Their Internet Sites About Using Credit Cards In Cuba April 17, 2017 

  • “Authorize exports to Cuba of US products for key sectors of the economy, such as mining, tourism and biotechnology.”  

  • “Authorize the importation by the US of any merchandise manufactured or derived from products grown, produced or manufactured in Cuba by state-owned enterprises (nickel, sugar, tobacco, rum or others).”  

Link: Coffee & Charcoal Have Been Imported From Cuba; U.S. Companies Want More. Agricultural Commodities/Food Products/Healthcare Products Have Been Exported To Cuba; U.S. Companies Want More. October 02, 2021 

  • “Allow the export to Cuba of medical supplies and equipment that can be used in the manufacture of Cuban biotechnology products.”  

  • “Relax the policy to grant licenses to US companies to invest in Cuba.”  

Link: Biden-Harris Administration Approves First Equity Investment Since 1960 In A Private Cuban Company May 10, 2022 

Link: With U.S. Government Authorization For First Direct Equity Investment Into A Private Company In Cuba, Here Is Important Context And Details.  About The Parties; About The Message. May 16, 2022 

  • “Authorize US citizens to receive medical treatment in Cuba.”  

  • “Authorize broader forms of cooperation for the development, marketing and supply of Cuban-made medicines and biomedical products, for example, through direct investments by US companies and joint ventures.”  

Link: Roswell Park Announces Joint Venture In Cuba For Healthcare Product Development September 26, 2018 

Link: Roswell Park In Buffalo, New York, Has Unique Partnership With Cuba; Has It Explored COVID-19 Treatment? June 15, 2020 

Link: Roswell Park Comprehensive Cancer Center References Its Clinical Trials For Cuba's CIMAvax-EGF. After Five Years Of Activity, RPCCC Continues Refusal To Provide Data/Comment On Joint Venture Status. November 02, 2021 

Link: Will Cuba Seek EUA From United States FDA? Not Required, But Politically Might Be Prudent Marketing Strategy To Reinforce What Cuba Can Do Under Sanctions June 23, 2021 

  • “Authorize sales of the raw materials that Cuba needs to produce medicines for the Cuban population and other developing countries.”  

  • “Authorize US subsidiaries to do business with Cuba that is not related to the import and export of goods to Cuba (prohibited by the Torricelli Act). [1992 Cuban Democracy Act]”

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Not "Ironclad" So At UN Why Does Cuba Government Continue To Misstate Realities Of US Company Exports To Government Companies And Private Companies? US$8+ Billion Is Real.

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Why Does The Government Of The Republic Of Cuba Continue To Exaggerate Unnecessarily At The United Nations (UN) About The Impact On Purchases From United States Companies Using Provisions Within The CDA And TSREEA, And Authorizations By The BIS And United States Department Of State?  

Since 2001, United States Companies Have Exported More Than US$8 Billion In Products To The Republic Of Cuba- With Purchasers Both Government-Operated Companies And Re-Emerging Private Sector 

There is no reasonable debate using export data, import data, and exporter statements where the outcome supports that policies, regulations, and statutes do not constrain and restrain the export of products from the United States to the Republic of Cuba and imports from the Republic of Cuba to the United States.  There can be and is debate as to the impact of the impact, qualifying and quantifying the level of deterrents and inconveniences. 

Could there be an increase in United States exports to the Republic of Cuba within existing policies, regulations, and statutes in place by the government of the United States and the government of the Republic of Cuba?  Yes.  There is shared responsibility for Washington DC and Havana.  The two most important: Washington DC could authorize direct correspondent banking.  Havana could authorize the direct investment into and the direct financing for privately-owned companies- which the Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025) authorized on 10 May 2022.   

Link: Biden-Harris Administration Approves First Equity Investment Since 1960 In A Private Cuban Company May 10, 2022 

Link: With U.S. Government Authorization For First Direct Equity Investment Into A Private Company In Cuba, Here Is Important Context And Details.  About The Parties; About The Message. May 16, 2022 

Three statements by Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba, at the Human Rights Council (HRC) of the United Nations (UN). 

  • “For more than six decades, the Cuban people have been facing the consequences of an ironclad economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the United States Government…” Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba

Reality: 

Since 2022, when the first Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce license was issued for the export of vehicles to Republic of Cuba nationals and to private companies in the Republic of Cuba, the cumulative export value of the initiatives in place during the Obama-Biden Administration, Trump-Pence Administration, Biden-Harris Administration, and Trump-Vance Administration exceeds US$191 million of which electric and gasoline-powered new and used vehicles, bicycles, trucks, motorcycles and mopeds, and parts, exceeds US$128 million (January 2025 through July 2025: US$50,288,310.00; year 2024: US$67,241,234.00; year 2023: US$10,546,419.00; year 2022: US$89,848.00 by the end of 2025 and purchases (equipment and products) for use by the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba driving the growth. 

The following data is a guide with approximate values for non-agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  Primarily products (including vehicles) used for the benefit of the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba and Republic of Cuba nationals.  

Year    Approximate U.S. Dollar Value
2015    US$4,836,627.00
2016    US$7,644,628.00
2017    US$11,137,712.00
2018    US$32,690,672.00
2019    US$21,144,294.00
2020    US$10,326,641.00
2021    US$5,204,355.00
2022    US$11,812,859.00
2023    US$30,334,066.00
2024    US$85,615,889.00
2025    US$63,891,338.00 (through July)
Total    US$284,639,081.00 

Link: Since 2022, US$191+ Million U.S. Exports To Cuba's Re-Emerging Private Sector- Including US$128 Million In Vehicles September 08, 2025 

In 2008, the highest value year, for example, the government of the Republic of Cuba purchased US$717,878,764.00 in agricultural commodities and food products from United States-based companies.  The transactions were on a cash-in-advance basis as required by the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, which re-authorized the direct export of agricultural commodities and food products from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  The Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 re-authorized the direct export of healthcare products (medical equipment, medical instruments, medical supplies, medicines, and pharmaceuticals from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  Payment terms are authorized within the CDA. 

Link To 2008 Export List In PDF Format 

  • “… impact of a policy that threatens the food security of our population, as it prevents the acquisition of fertilizers, agricultural machinery, fuels, chemical products and essential technologies to guarantee national food production.”  Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba 

Reality: 

In 2017, Deere & Company (2024 revenues approximately US$61.3 billion) established a distribution center in the Republic of Cuba, joining San Juan, Puerto Rico-based RIMCO, the Republic of Cuba distributor for Irving, Texas-based Caterpillar Inc. (2024 revenues US$66.5 billion) established the same year.  At the time, neither Deere & Company nor Caterpillar issued media releases or posted information on their respective Internet sites.  

Since November 2017, Deere & Company delivered nearing US$2 million in agricultural equipment to the Republic of Cuba for use at its distribution center. Antioch, Tennessee-based Wirtgen America, Inc., a subsidiary of Windhagen, Germany-based Wirtgen Group (2020 revenues approximately US$3 billion), a construction equipment machinery subsidiary (acquired in 2017) of Deere & Company has also delivered products to the Republic of Cuba.  RIMCO continues to deliver equipment for use at its distribution center in the Republic of Cuba, including excavators, backhoes, graders, scrapers, bulldozers, railway fixtures, and signaling equipment, valued at more than US$4 million since December 2018.  John Deere Financial Services was to provide payment terms/financing for the exports, primarily Series 5000 (price range US$25,000.00 to US$80,000.00) with a limited quantity of Series 7000 (price range US$219,000.00 to US$280,000.00).  According to the company, several hundred tractors, parts and accessories may be exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba during the next four years, with the first deliveries (for testing and evaluation) scheduled for mid-November 2017.  The potential value of the several hundred products exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba that would be financed could range from US$9 million to US$30 million.  John Deere Financial Services has not commented as to whether the product sales goals have been achieved or if there have been issues relating to the receipt of payments.  Caterpillar has not disclosed if the company has provided payment terms for its products exported to the Republic of Cuba.  

Since December 2017, Boston, Massachusetts-based General Electric (GE; 2024 revenues approximately US$64.6 billion) delivered from the United States to the Republic of Cuba “parts for steam turbines” valued at more than US$21 million. Some of the parts traveled from Atlanta, Georgia, to Port Everglades, Florida, then to Port Mariel in the Republic of Cuba. GE is the largest (by revenue) United States-based industrial company to have engaged with the Republic of Cuba. Although GE has not issued a media release relating to the project in the Republic of Cuba, in 2017 the government of the Republic of Cuba confirmed in a PowerPoint presentation used by the Embassy of the Republic of Cuba in Washington DC that the company was providing parts and equipment for a power plant. The total value of the project has not been reported. The Obama Administration first authorized the transactions by GE as primarily advancing benefit to the citizens of the Republic of Cuba rather than to the government of the Republic of Cuba. This type of transaction was and remains licensable (general or specific) through the OFAC and BIS. In November 2015, GE purchased for approximately US$10.6 billion the power and grid division of Paris, France-based Alstom (2018 revenues approximately US$8 billion). In 2016, GE commenced a power generation project in the Republic of Cuba resulting, in part, from a relationship between Alstom and the Republic of Cuba prior to the 2015 acquisition by GE of the power and grid division of Alstom, which had exported products to the Republic of Cuba. On 31 March 1971, GE certified a claim against the Republic of Cuba in the amount of US$5,870,436.86 through the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC) within the United States Department of Justice.  Interest accrued at 6% per annum from the respective date(s) of loss to the date of settlement.  

  • “… blockade hinders and disrupts even the arrival of supplies already paid for, affecting the availability of basic commodities such as rice, beans, powdered milk, oil, meat, bread and coffee.”  Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba 

Reality: 

United States exports to the Republic of Cuba (government-operated entities and the re-emerging private sectors) were US$285,709,353.00 for the period January 2025 through July 2025 compared to US$242,085,953.00 for the period January 2024 through July 2024, representing an 18.0% increase year-to-year representing.  The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the TSREEA and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, and United States Department of State.

Link To Complete Report In Pdf Format

Link To Complete List Of Products In 2024 Exported From The United States To Cuba

Link To Complete List Of Products In 2023 Exported From The United States To Cuba 

Year    Value Of TSREEA Exports
2025    US$285,709,353.00
2024    US$433,662,216.00
2023    US$342,607,027.00
2022    US$328,536,988.00
2021    US$304,774,413.00
2020    US$163,354,728.00
2019    US$257,659,479.00
2018    US$224,910,413.00
2017    US$268,800,005.00 (revised +US$8,132,930.00 on 6/18)
2016    US$232,064,645.00
2015    US$170,551,329.00
2014    US$291,258,881.00
2013    US$348,747,293.00
2012    US$457,318,357.00
2011    US$358,457,389.00
2010    US$366,467,782.00
2009    US$528,482,955.00
2008    US$710,086,323.00
2007    US$437,564,824.00
2006    US$340,433,442.00
2005    US$350,218,040.00
2004    US$391,990,382.00
2003    US$256,901,471.00
2002    US$138,634,784.00
2001    US$4,318,906.00 (December- 1st sales under TSREEA)
Total Sales    US$7,966,705,182.00 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Havana, Republic of Cuba
12 September 2025

Cuba denounces the impact of the blockade on the right to food at the Human Rights Council 

Geneva, September 12, 2025.- The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, denounced before the Human Rights Council (HRC) of the United Nations (UN), the impact of the blockade imposed by the United States on the right to food and food security of the Cuban people. 

The Cuban Deputy Foreign Minister intervened, in virtual format, in the Biennial Panel on Unilateral Coercive Measures of the 60th session of the UNHRC, and pointed out that the U.S. policy towards the island had caused damage to the Cuban agri-food sector for more than 441 million dollars between March 2023 and February 2024 alone.  He also exemplified how extraterritorial pressure measures prevent and hinder the acquisition of fertilizers, agricultural machinery, fuels, chemical products and essential technologies to guarantee food production. He illustrated the consequences of the blockade for Cuba's access to financing for agricultural development programs, modernization of rural infrastructures and adaptation to climate change. 

The central theme of the Biennial Panel was "Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures and Excessive Compliance on the Right to Food and Food Security". It was attended by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk; the Special Rapporteur on Unilateral Coercive Measures, Alena Douhan; the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Michael Fakhri; the independent expert on Foreign Debt, Attiya Waris; as well as representatives of governments and civil society. 

Related information: 

Intervention of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, at the Biennial Panel on Unilateral Coercive Measures. Geneva, 12 September 2025. 

Mr. President, We are grateful to the Office of the High Commissioner for its efforts to fulfil the mandate of organizing this biennial panel, in the difficult context of the liquidity crisis facing the United Nations.  For more than six decades, the Cuban people have been facing the consequences of an ironclad economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the United States Government, which has been intensified in recent years with new pressure measures, extraterritorial actions and financial restrictions.  This unilateral policy constitutes a massive, flagrant and systematic violation of the human rights of the Cuban people, and directly affects national food security, limiting access to inputs, technologies, financing and international cooperation. 

During the period between March 2023 and February 2024, the damage caused by the blockade in the Cuban agri-food sector amounted to more than 441 million dollars.  This figure not only represents an economic loss, but also reflects the human impact of a policy that threatens the food security of our population, as it prevents the acquisition of fertilizers, agricultural machinery, fuels, chemical products and essential technologies to guarantee national food production.   

The blockade hinders and disrupts even the arrival of supplies already paid for, affecting the availability of basic commodities such as rice, beans, powdered milk, oil, meat, bread and coffee.  The chilling effect of the embargo has even reached entities of the United Nations system.  In 2024, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) attempted to procure tractors for small Cuban producers worth $1.5 million, but the manufacturer refused to take the risk of trading with Cuba, due to U.S. coercion. 

Mr. President, The embargo has also restricted Cuba's access to external multilateral financing for agricultural development programs, modernization of rural infrastructure, and strengthening climate resilience.  This limitation affects the Cuban state's ability to guarantee an adequate standard of living, especially in a context marked by global crises, economic volatility and environmental challenges.  Various mandate-holders of this Council have been categorical in pointing out that unilateral coercive measures, such as the blockade, contravene international law, the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States and the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.  In January 2024, Special Rapporteur Alena Douhan, together with the special procedures on the right to food, the right to development, extreme poverty and human rights, sent a joint communication to the Government of the United States, in which they described the blockade as a serious violation of the human rights of the Cuban people. including the right to life. 

Mr. President, Despite these adversities, the Cuban State has deployed multiple efforts to guarantee equitable access to food, protect vulnerable sectors and promote local food production.  One of the pillars of this strategy is the Food Sovereignty and Food and Nutrition Security (FSN) Law, approved in 2022 and which is articulated with the Sustainable Development Goals; and the National Economic and Social Development Plan until 2030.  On the other hand, the urban, suburban and family agriculture program has been revitalized as a strategic tool for municipal self-sufficiency.  In collaboration with the World Food Programme (WFP), Cuba has implemented actions to strengthen maternal and child nutrition, school feeding and care for the elderly.  WFP supports the Municipal Self-Sufficiency Program, the Plan for the Prevention and Control of Anemia, and the "Life" Task, a Cuban State program that, among other aspects, addresses the impacts of climate change on food security. 

Mr. President, We reiterate our call for the immediate and unconditional cessation of the blockade. This demand is not only a matter of justice for the Cuban people: it is an ethical, legal and humanitarian demand that calls into question the credibility of the international system for the protection of human rights.  The Human Rights Council must continue to promote events like this, which make visible the effects of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights by millions of people around the world.  We urge the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to continue to follow up on this important issue.  In that regard, we highlight the rigorous and professional work carried out by Special Rapporteur Alena Douhan in carrying out her mandate.  Cuba will continue to defend its right to live without blockade, to produce its food, and to build a model of fair, sustainable and solidary development.  Thanks a lot. 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Havana, Republic of Cuba
12 September 2025

Cuba denuncia en el Consejo de Derechos Humanos el impacto del bloqueo en el derecho a la alimentación 

Ginebra, 12 de septiembre de 2025.- La viceministra de la Relaciones Exteriores, Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, denunció ante el Consejo de Derechos Humanos (CDH) de la Organización de Naciones Unidas (ONU), el impacto del bloqueo impuesto por Estados Unidos, en el derecho a la alimentación y la seguridad alimentaria del pueblo cubano. 

La Vicecanciller cubana intervino, en formato virtual, en el Panel Bienal sobre Medidas Coercitivas Unilaterales del 60 período de sesiones del CDH, y señaló que la política estadounidense hacia la Isla había causado daños al sector agroalimentario cubano por más de 441 millones de dólares solo entre marzo de 2023 y febrero de 2024. 

Asimismo, ejemplificó cómo las medidas de presión extraterritoriales impiden y obstaculizan la adquisición de fertilizantes, maquinaria agrícola, combustibles, productos químicos y tecnologías esenciales para garantizar la producción de alimentos. Ilustró las consecuencias del bloqueo para el acceso de Cuba a financiamiento para programas de desarrollo agrícola, modernización de infraestructuras rurales y adaptación al cambio climático. 

El Panel Bienal tuvo como tema central "Impacto de las medidas coercitivas unilaterales y el cumplimiento excesivo en el derecho a la alimentación y la seguridad alimentaria". Contó con la participación del alto comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos, Volker Türk; la relatora especial sobre Medidas Coercitivas Unilaterales, Alena Douhan; el relator especial sobre el derecho a la alimentación, Michael Fakhri; la experta independiente sobre Deuda Externa, Attiya Waris; además de representantes de gobiernos y de la sociedad civil. 

Información relacionada:  

Intervención de la viceministra de Relaciones Exteriores, Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, en el Panel Bienal sobre Medidas Coercitivas Unilaterales. Ginebra, 12 de septiembre de 2025.

Señor presidente: 

Agradecemos a la Oficina del Alto Comisionado los esfuerzos para cumplir el mandato de organizar este panel bienal, en el difícil contexto de la crisis de liquidez que enfrentan las Naciones Unidas. 

Desde hace más de seis décadas, el pueblo cubano enfrenta las consecuencias de un férreo bloqueo económico, comercial y financiero impuesto por el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos, que ha sido recrudecido en los últimos años con nuevas medidas de presión, acciones extraterritoriales y restricciones financieras. 

Esta política, de carácter unilateral, constituye una violación masiva, flagrante y sistemática de los derechos humanos del pueblo cubano, y afecta de manera directa la seguridad alimentaria nacional, limitando el acceso a insumos, tecnologías, financiamiento y cooperación internacional. 

Durante el período comprendido entre marzo de 2023 y febrero de 2024, los daños provocados por el bloqueo en el sector agroalimentario cubano ascendieron a más de 441 millones de dólares. 

Esta cifra no representa únicamente una pérdida económica, sino que refleja el impacto humano de una política que atenta contra la seguridad alimentaria de nuestra población, pues impide la adquisición de fertilizantes, maquinaria agrícola, combustibles, productos químicos y tecnologías esenciales para garantizar la producción nacional de alimentos. 

El bloqueo obstaculiza e interrumpe incluso la llegada de suministros ya pagados, afectando la disponibilidad de productos básicos como arroz, frijoles, leche en polvo, aceite, carne, pan y café. 

El efecto intimidatorio del bloqueo ha alcanzado incluso a entidades del sistema de las Naciones Unidas. 

En 2024, la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Agricultura y la Alimentación (FAO) intentó adquirir tractores para pequeños productores cubanos por un valor de 1,5 millones de dólares, pero el fabricante se negó a asumir el riesgo de comerciar con Cuba, debido a la coerción estadounidense. 

Señor presidente: 

El bloqueo también ha restringido el acceso de Cuba a financiamiento multilateral externo para programas de desarrollo agrícola, modernización de infraestructuras rurales y fortalecimiento de la resiliencia climática. 

Esta limitación afecta la capacidad del Estado cubano para garantizar un nivel de vida adecuado, especialmente en un contexto marcado por crisis globales, volatilidad económica y desafíos medioambientales. 

Diversos titulares de mandatos de este Consejo han sido categóricos al señalar que las medidas coercitivas unilaterales, como el bloqueo, contravienen el Derecho Internacional, el principio de no intervención en los asuntos internos de los Estados y los propósitos de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas. 

En enero de 2024, la Relatora Especial Alena Douhan, de conjunto con los procedimientos especiales sobre el derecho a la alimentación, el derecho al desarrollo, la extrema pobreza y los derechos humanos, enviaron una comunicación conjunta al Gobierno de los Estados Unidos, en la que calificaron el bloqueo como una grave violación de los derechos humanos del pueblo cubano, incluido el derecho a la vida. 

Señor presidente: 

A pesar de estas adversidades, el Estado cubano ha desplegado múltiples esfuerzos para garantizar el acceso equitativo a los alimentos, proteger a los sectores vulnerables y promover la producción local de alimentos. 

Uno de los pilares de esta estrategia es la Ley de Soberanía Alimentaria y Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional (SAN), aprobada en 2022 y que se articula con los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible; y el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Económico y Social hasta 2030. 

Por otra parte, el programa de agricultura urbana, suburbana y familiar, ha sido revitalizado como herramienta estratégica para el autoabastecimiento municipal. 

En colaboración con el Programa Mundial de Alimentos (PMA), Cuba ha implementado acciones para fortalecer la nutrición materno-infantil, la alimentación escolar y la atención a adultos mayores. 

El PMA apoya el Programa de Autoabastecimiento Municipal, el Plan para la prevención y control de la anemia, y la Tarea “Vida”, Programa del Estado cubano que, entre otros aspectos, aborda los impactos del cambio climático sobre la seguridad alimentaria. 

Señor presidente: 

Reiteramos nuestro llamado al cese inmediato e incondicional del bloqueo. Esta demanda no es solo una cuestión de justicia para el pueblo cubano: es una exigencia ética, jurídica y humanitaria que interpela la credibilidad del sistema internacional de protección de los derechos humanos. 

El Consejo de Derechos Humanos debe continuar fomentando eventos como este, que visibilicen las afectaciones de las medidas coercitivas unilaterales en el disfrute de los derechos humanos de millones de personas en el mundo. 

Exhortamos a la Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos a mantener el seguimiento a esta importante temática.  

En ese sentido, destacamos el trabajo riguroso y profesional que ha realizado la Relatora Especial Alena Douhan en el desarrollo de su mandato. 

Cuba continuará defendiendo su derecho a vivir sin bloqueo, a producir sus alimentos, y a construir un modelo de desarrollo justo, sostenible y solidario.  Muchas gracias.

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Another Cuba Libertad Act Case To U.S. Supreme Court. Seaboard Marine Writes 11th Circuit Court of Appeals "stretched the Act's text beyond its breaking point"

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From The Filing: "QUESTIONS PRESENTED- Title III of the Helms-Burton Act creates a right of action against businesses that traffic in property confiscated by the Cuban government. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6023, 6082. In the decision below, the Eleventh Circuit stretched the Act’s text beyond its breaking point: the court of appeals held that shipping companies that, in accordance with federal regulations, lawfully carry agricultural commodities from the U.S. to Cuba could be traffickers, each of whom owes Respondent personally hundreds of millions of dollars, based on her theory that Cuba’s principal container terminal partially extends onto land once owned by a Cuban corporation in which she claims to be the lone surviving shareholder.  The questions presented are: 1. Does the Helms-Burton Act abrograte basic corporate law and permit shareholders to maintain Title III actions based on confiscated corporate property the shareholders never personally owned? 2. Does delivering cargo to a facility partially constructed atop confiscated land qualify as trafficking in confiscated property under the Act? 3. Do companies that lawfully carry agricultural commodities from the U.S. to Cuba engage in lawful travel under the Act?"

No. 25-283 
Title: Seaboard Marine Ltd., Petitioner v. Odette Blanco De Fernandez, aka Blanco Rosell 
Docketed: September 11, 2025
Lower Ct: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Case Numbers: (22-12966)
Decision Date:  April 14, 2025 
Rehearing Denied: June 10, 2025
 
Proceedings and Orders
Sep 08 2025- Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due October 14, 2025) 
Petition Appendix Certificate of Word Count Proof of Service 

Attorneys
Attorneys for Petitioners 
Bryan Michael Killian
Counsel of Record
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP
1111 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20004
bryan.killian@morganlewis.com
Ph: 202-373-6191
Party name: Seaboard Marine Ltd.

Link To PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Link To APPENDIX
Link To WORD COUNT

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL, Plaintiff, v. SEABOARD   MARINE, LTD., Defendant. [1:20-cv-25176; Southern Florida District]

Links To Related Cases 

DOJ Supports Exxon Mobil In U.S. Supreme Court Case Against Cuba Companies. Now, Both Plaintiffs Before SCOTUS Have Trump-Vance Administration Support.  Aug 27, 2025 

U.S. Supreme Court: Trump-Vance Administration Supports Libertad Act Cuba Lawsuit Against U.S. Cruise Lines; Says 11th Circuit Court Of Appeals Was Wrong. Will DOJ Support Exxon-Mobil Lawsuit Too?  Aug 27, 2025  

Exxon Mobil Asks U.S. Supreme Court To Resolve Libertad Act Lawsuit Issue Against Cuba's Coroporacion Cimex April 17, 2025 

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals Is Not Preventing Havana Docks Corporation From Appealing To The United States Supreme Court January 24, 2025 

U.S. Supreme Court Refuses Request By Expedia To Dismiss Libertad Act Lawsuit. Thus Far, U.S. Supreme Court Has Refused All Libertad Act Titlle III Requests. Case Returns To District Court. October 02, 2023

France Company Introduces New Honey From Cuba- 7 Euros For 250 Grams

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Miel Factory
28 rue de Sévigné,
75004 PARIS

MIEL DE CUBA- Link To Company Site

Une récolte attendue, un miel d’exception.  Le voilà enfin de retour : notre miel de Cuba, issu de la nouvelle récolte, est à nouveau disponible!  Récolté dans les forêts tropicales de l’île, ce miel est produit à partir du nectar de l’amaryllis, du bougainvillier, de l'orchidée, de la campanile, ou encore l’amandier.  Son goût est doux avec des effluves fruités et épicées. Il procure des saveurs chaleureuses pleine d’exotisme. À Cuba, l'apiculture a une place bien particulière.  Privée d'intrants chimiques depuis des décennies, l'île bénéficie d’une biodiversité préservée et d’une apiculture naturelle presque unique au monde.  Les abeilles y butinent en toute liberté, loin des cultures intensives.

U.S. Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increased 34% In July 2025; Increased 18% Year-To-Year. US$15.3 Million In Vehicles; US$50,000.00 Blow Molding Machines; US$1.2 Million Communion Wafers

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ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
September 2025

July 2025 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increase 34.6% - 1
48th Of 221 July 2025 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Cuba Ranked 48th Of 221 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets – 2
Re-Emerging Private Sector Exports - 3
July 2025 CDA Healthcare Product Exports US$0.00 - 6
July 2025 Humanitarian Donations US$14,028,699.00 - 7
U.S. Port Export Data- 20

JULY 2025 AG/FOOD EXPORTS TO CUBA INCREASE 34.6%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in July 2025 were US$42,353,477.00 compared to US$31,457,528.00 in July 2024 and US$32,313,837.00 in July 2023.

US$285,709,353.00 for the period January 2025 through July 2025 compared to US$242,085,953.00 for the period January 2024 through July 2024, representing an 18.0% increase year-to-year representing.

Highlights: Birds’ Eggs (US$500,827.00); Wheat (US$1,695,022); Corn (US$11.951.00); Peanuts (US$4,060.00); Soybean Oil Cake (US$53,330.00); Hydraulic Brake Fluid (US$12,700.00); Anti-freezing Prep (US$2,862.00); Babies’ Garments (US$6,420.00); Bed Nets (US$41,250.00); AC Generators (US$7,448.00); Used Vehicles, Only SK 1g (1500-3000 cc) (US$13,949,836.00); Motorcycles (including mopeds) (US$1,339,883.00); Baseball Articles (US$19,670.00).

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, and United States Department of State.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA, CDA, and other regulations, specifically including products exported from the United States to the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba.

The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

LINK TO COMPLETE REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

U.S. PORT EXPORT DATA

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2024 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2023 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

Since 2022, US$191+ Million U.S. Exports To Cuba's Re-Emerging Private Sector- Including US$128 Million In Vehicles

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ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA© 

RE-EMERGING PRIVATE SECTOR EXPORTS- On 17 December 2014, the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) announced commercial, economic, financial, political, and social changes to the bilateral relationship with the government of the Republic of Cuba and with Republic of Cuba nationals.  On 20 July 2015, the government of the United States and the government of the Republic of Cuba re-established diplomatic relations. 

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, and United States Department of State expanded the variety of products and services authorized for export to the Republic of Cuba and the variety of products and services authorized for import from the Republic of Cuba.  These expansions included some exports and imports through third countries.  The focus of the expansions was to benefit Republic of Cuba nationals and to benefit the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba.   

The Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) did not demonstrably interfere with product exports and product imports, but did interfere with service exports and service imports.   

The Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029) has not interfered with product exports and product imports initiated by the Obama-Biden Administration and the Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025), but has interrupted some service exports.   

The Obama-Biden Administration and Biden-Harris Administration focused upon products (durable, non-durable, consumable) to individuals and entities not affiliated with the government of the Republic of Cuba.  The government of the Republic of Cuba initially prohibited some imports.  From 2015 to 2017, the government of the Republic of Cuba authorized: One United States company with two hotel management contracts, although only one hotel management contract was operational prior to 2020 when the OFAC license was rescinded; multiple United States airlines servicing United States-Republic of Cuba routes; cruise lines operating itineraries from the United States to the Republic of Cuba until the OFAC license was rescinded in 2019; one company with a power generation equipment contract, reported to have been completed; and two United States companies operating agricultural equipment distribution centers. 

Since 2022, when the first BIS license was issued for the export of vehicles to Republic of Cuba nationals and to private companies in the Republic of Cuba, the cumulative export value of the initiatives in place during the Obama-Biden Administration, Trump-Pence Administration, Biden-Harris Administration, and Trump-Vance Administration exceeds US$191 million of which electric and gasoline-powered new and used vehicles, bicycles, trucks, motorcycles and mopeds, and parts, exceeds US$128 million (January 2025 through July 2025: US$50,288,310.00; year 2024: US$67,241,234.00; year 2023: US$10,546,419.00; year 2022: US$89,848.00 by the end of 2025 and purchases (equipment and products) for use by the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba driving the growth. 

The following data is a guide with approximate values for non-agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  Primarily products (including vehicles) used for the benefit of the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba and Republic of Cuba nationals.

Year    Approximate U.S. Dollar Value
2015    US$4,836,627.00
2016    US$7,644,628.00
2017    US$11,137,712.00
2018    US$32,690,672.00
2019    US$21,144,294.00
2020    US$10,326,641.00
2021    US$5,204,355.00
2022    US$11,812,859.00
2023    US$30,334,066.00
2024    US$85,615,889.00
2025    US$63,891,338.00 (through July)
Total    US$284,639,081.00

LINK TO REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

US$29.85 Million Jury Verdict Against Expedia For Cuba Activities Set Aside By U.S. District Court In Miami

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MARIO ECHEVARRIA, Plaintiff, vs. EXPEDIA, INC., HOTELS.COM L.P., HOTELS.COM GP, LLC, and ORBITZ, LLC, Defendants.  Case Number: 19-22621-CIV-MORENO  

5 September 2025

“VI. CONCLUSION
A trial court's decision to set aside a jury's verdict should never be taken lightly, particularly in a case where great lawyers on both sides have well represented their clients admirably, with passion but respect, over a long period of time.  Much time and money has been spent by the parties and counsel as the Court struggled with the multitude of legal issues, which may well be decided differently by the wiser Court of Appeals.  Perhaps, now we understand better the decisions of our United States Presidents, both Democrat and Republican, to suspend provisionally Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act.  There may be little comfort for either side of this first-ever Helms-Burton Act jury trial in President Trump's decision in his first term not to defer any longer the bipartisan Congressional intent in 1996, after the shooting of the airplanes used to save Cuban refugees fleeing the island suffering a Communist dictatorship for the last 65 years.  After all, even without a money judgment in favor of Plaintiff, the intent of the Helms-Burton Act was indeed followed.  Those parties who are notified that their actions violate the Act must stop their activity. Defendants did cease bookings with the hotels located on Plaintiffs inherited property within the 30 days provided by the Act and thus complied with the purpose of the law passed by· Congress and signed by President Clinton.  Therefore, the Court sets aside the jury verdicts and enters judgments in. favor of Defendants Expedia Group, Inc., Hotels.com GP, LLC, Hotels.com L.P., and Orbitz, LLC.”

LINK TO COURT DOCUMENTS IN PDF FORMAT

On 18 April 2025, a jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Miami, Division, held that defendant Expedia and three related entities were ordered to pay US$29.85 million to the plaintiffs for violating provisions of Title III of the the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act” or “Helms-Burton Act”).  

Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.   

The Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) on 2 May 2019 made operational Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act.  

The plaintiffs sued Expedia for offering reservations for resorts constructed on a barrier island within the internationally-recognized territory of the Republic of Cuba.  The plaintiffs argued the property was confiscated absent compensation by the government of the Republic of Cuba. 

LINK: Plaintiffs Oppose Expedia Motion For New Cuba Services Trial Where Jury Awarded US$29.85 Million August 08, 2025

LINK: Expedia Owes US$29.85 Million From First Jury Decision In Libertad Act Lawsuit For "Trafficking" In Expropriated Cuba Asset.  April 19, 2025

Trump-Vance Administration Continues Trading With The Enemy Act Cuba Provisions For One Year

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Federal Register
Vol. 90, No. 169
Thursday, September 4, 2025
Title 3—
The President
Presidential Determination No. 2025–11 of August 29, 2025 Continuation of the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading With the Enemy Act
Memorandum for the Secretary of State [and] the Secretary of the Treasury Under section 101(b) of Public Law 95–223 (91 Stat. 1625; 50 U.S.C. 4305
note), and a previous determination on September 13, 2024 (89 FR 76397, September 18, 2024), the exercise of certain authorities under the Trading With the Enemy Act is scheduled to expire on September 14, 2025.  I hereby determine that the continuation of the exercise of those authorities with respect to Cuba for 1 year is in the national interest of the United  States.  Therefore, consistent with the authority vested in me by section 101(b) of Public Law 95–223, I continue for 1 year, until September 14, 2026, the exercise of those authorities with respect to Cuba, as implemented by the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 CFR Part 515.  The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to publish this determination in the Federal Register.

Donald J. Trump

Expedia Wants At Least US$1.5 Million And Sanctions Against Plaintiffs In Libertad Act Title III Cuba Lawsuit

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

Central Santa Lucia, L.C., Plaintiff, v. Expedia Group, Inc., Defendant.  
C.A. No. 22-00367-JLH

Cross & Simon, LLC (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields LLC (plaintiff)
Ballard Spahr LLP (defendant)

DEFENDANT EXPEDIA GROUP, INC.’S RENEWED AND REVISED MOTION FOR SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO THE COURT’S INHERENT AUTHORITY AND MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1927 AND RULE 37(c)(2)

08/27/2025    NOTICE of Withdrawal of 279 MOTION for Sanctions, by Expedia Group, Inc. (Moskow-Schnoll, Beth) Modified on 8/27/2025 (ceg).
08/26/2025    ORDER REGARDING POST-TRIAL BRIEFING. (*See Order for details). Signed by Judge Jennifer L. Hall on 8/26/2025. (ceg) 
08/26/2025    JUDGMENT FOLLOWING JURY VERDICT. Signed by Judge Jennifer L. Hall on 8/26/2025. (ceg) 
08/25/2025    MOTION for Sanctions - filed by Expedia Group, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I)(Moskow-Schnoll, Beth) 

Excerpt

"From the beginning, this lawsuit was a fraud. It was a fraud jointly and intentionally perpetrated by plaintiff Central Santa Lucia L.C. (“CSL”) and its lawyers. The purpose of this fraud was to use a knowingly false allegation and the threat of multi-billion-dollar statutory damages to extract a settlement from defendant Expedia Group. Although this fraud ultimately failed, it was costly. To date, Expedia Group has incurred more than $1.5 million in fees and expenses defending this fraudulent case. And it is entitled to be made whole. Expedia Group therefore renews its previously filed motion for sanctions under Rule 11, through which it seeks the reasonable attorneys’ fees and other expenses it incurred defending this case. Additionally, and to the extent necessary, Expedia Group moves for (A) sanctions against CSL’s attorneys pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Court’s inherent authority; (B) sanctions against CSL pursuant to the Court’s inherent authority; and (C) sanctions against CSL under Rule 37(c)(2) for failing to admit that the three assignment of rights documents at issue (the “Assignment Documents”) were backdated."

Link To 23-Page Court Filing In PDF Format
Link To Notice Of Withdrawal of D.I. 279, Expedia Group, Inc.'s Motion for Sanctions

Link To Expedia Prevails In Cuba Libertad Act Lawsuit Filed In Delaware After Loss In Lawsuit Filed In Florida Aug 27, 2025

DOJ Supports Exxon Mobil In U.S. Supreme Court Case Against Cuba Companies. Now, Both Plaintiffs Before SCOTUS Have Trump-Vance Administration Support.

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Exxon Mobil Corporation, Petitioner v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba), et al. 
Docketed: December 31, 2024
Linked with: 24A330
Lower Ct: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Case Numbers: (21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020)
Decision Date: July 30, 2024 

Excerpts: 

QUESTION PRESENTED 

Whether Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. 6021 et seq., which creates for U.S. victims of unlawful expropriation by the Cuban government a damages action against those who traffic in the expropriated property, permits suit against Cuban agencies or instrumentalities, or whether such claims are barred by foreign sovereign immunity unless they also satisfy an exception codified in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. 1330, 1391(f ), 1441(d), 1602 et seq. 

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES 

This brief is submitted in response to the Court’s order inviting the Solicitor General to express the views of the United States. In the view of the United States, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.  

INTRODUCTION 

The United States has compelling foreign-policy interests in ensuring that U.S. nationals whose assets were illegally expropriated by Fidel Castro’s communist regime receive recompense and in preventing the Cuban government from further benefiting from its wrongdoing.  In the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. 6021 et seq., Congress provided a vital mechanism to impose accountability on the Cuban government by authorizing private parties to bring suits against “any person” who traffics in property confiscated by the Cuban government, 22 U.S.C. 

This Court should grant review and hold that Title III suits against Cuban agencies and instrumentalities can proceed without having to additionally satisfy one of the enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity under the FSIA. The D.C. Circuit incorrectly superimposed the FSIA’s general framework on a narrow, Cuba-focused statute that clearly abrogates Cuban agencies’ and instrumentalities’ immunity. That erroneous holding impedes private suits against Cuban agencies and instrumentalities and stymies important foreign-policy interests in holding the Cuban government accountable for continuing to benefit from its illegal expropriations. Review is especially warranted now, during a window when the President has allowed Title III suits to proceed, and at a time when the United States believes that such suits could meaningfully contribute to American foreign-policy objectives involving Cuba. 

Link To 31-Page Document In PDF Format

Link: U.S. Supreme Court: Trump-Vance Administration Supports Libertad Act Cuba Lawsuit Against U.S. Cruise Lines; Says 11th Circuit Court Of Appeals Was Wrong. Will DOJ Support Exxon-Mobil Lawsuit Too? Aug 27, 2025

U.S. Supreme Court: Trump-Vance Administration Supports Libertad Act Cuba Lawsuit Against U.S. Cruise Lines; Says 11th Circuit Court Of Appeals Was Wrong. Will DOJ Support Exxon-Mobil Lawsuit Too?

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Excerpts:

“(I) QUESTION PRESENTED: Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. 6021 et seq., creates for United States victims of unlawful expropriation by the Cuban Government a damages action against those who traffic in the expropriated property.  The question presented is whether the right of action is limited to property in which the plaintiff would have had an interest at the time of the trafficking had the expropriation not occurred.

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES: This brief is submitted in response to the Court’s order inviting the Solicitor General to express the views of the United States. In the view of the United States, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

INTRODUCTION- This case involves a significant United States foreign-policy interest: encouraging private actions against the Cuban regime and those who enrich it by trafficking in property that the Castro regime illegally expropriated from Americans. Congress authorized private plaintiffs to bring such suits in Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. 6021 et seq., by creating a cause of action for “any United States national who owns the claim to [confiscated] property” to seek money damages from “any person” who “traffics in” such property. 22 U.S.C. 6082(a)(1)(A). Such suits promote justice for American victims, impose accountability on the Cuban government, deter private actors from collaborating with that government to exploit expropriated property, deprive the Cuban government of funds that undermine the United States’ longstanding embargo of Cuba, and increase economic pressure to achieve democratic reforms in Cuba.”

“Especially if the Court grants the pending petition for a writ of certiorari in Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba), No. 24-699, the Court should also grant review in this case. Doing so would allow the Court to conclusively resolve two of the most pressing Title III issues at a time when they matter to plaintiffs and U.S. foreign policy. And this case itself is important. It is a bellwether for future Title III cases— petitioner was the first Title III plaintiff to win a final judgment, and it obtained an approximately $440 million award. See p. 11, supra. The case involves serious allegations of trafficking, which the district court found convincing on the summary judgment record. See pp. 10-11, supra.”

LINK TO 29-PAGE DOCUMENT IN PDF FORMAT

Link: U.S. Supreme Court Requests Trump-Vance Administration Opinion On Libertad Act Title III Exxon Mobil Corporation Lawsuit Against Cuba Companies May 06, 2025

Link: Libertad Act Lawsuit Filing Statistics

Expedia Prevails In Cuba Libertad Act Lawsuit Filed In Delaware After Loss In Lawsuit Filed In Florida

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CENTRAL SANTA LUCIA, L.C., PLAINTIFF, V. EXPEDIA GROUP, INC., DEFENDANT. (1:22-CV-00367; Delaware District)

Cross & Simon, LLC (plaintiff)
Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP (plaintiff)
Fields LLC (plaintiff)
Ballard Spahr LLP (defendant)

08/26/2025- ORDER REGARDING POST-TRIAL BRIEFING. (*See Order for details). Signed by Judge Jennifer L. Hall on 8/26/2025. (ceg)

08/26/2025- JUDGMENT FOLLOWING JURY VERDICT. Signed by Judge Jennifer L. Hall on 8/26/2025. (ceg)

08/25/2025- MOTION for Sanctions - filed by Expedia Group, Inc.. (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order, # 2 Exhibit A, # 3 Exhibit B, # 4 Exhibit C, # 5 Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit E, # 7 Exhibit F, # 8 Exhibit G, # 9 Exhibit H, # 10 Exhibit I)(Moskow-Schnoll, Beth)

Link To Judgement Following Jury Verdict 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
CENTRAL SANTA LUCIA, L.C., Plaintiff, v. EXPEDIA GROUP, INC., Defendant, C.A. No. 22-cv-367-JLH

JUDGMENT FOLLOWING JURY VERDICT

WHEREAS, Plaintiff Central Santa Lucia, L.C. brought this lawsuit against Defendant Expedia Group, Inc. alleging that Defendant violated Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6021, et seq., effective March 12, 1996 (the “Helms-Burton Act” or “Act”) (D.I. 1); WHEREAS, to prevail in its lawsuit against Defendant, Plaintiff must prove (among other things) that it owns a claim to confiscated property, that it acquired ownership of that claim before March 12, 1996, and that Defendant knowingly and intentionally trafficked in that property; WHEREAS, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b), the Court bifurcated and held a separate trial on the issue of whether Plaintiff acquired ownership of its alleged claim to the property before March 12, 1996 (D.I. 150; D.I. 155; D.I. 202 at 3:17–20); WHEREAS, Plaintiff asserted that it acquired ownership of its alleged claim to the property from 13 individuals on March 7, 1996, through three written Assignment of Rights documents; WHEREAS, a trial commenced on July 29, 2025, and the jury rendered a unanimous verdict on July 30, 2025, finding that Plaintiff had not demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it acquired ownership of its alleged claim to the property via written assignment; NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that judgment is entered in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff on Plaintiff’s claim under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, to the extent Plaintiff contends that it acquired its claim to the property at issue through written assignment. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that this JUDGMENT shall have the effect of denying all oral and written motions made by the parties during the trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), without prejudice to, and subject to, such motions to be renewed as post-trial motions. This JUDGMENT is entered subject to the parties’ post-trial motions and briefing on the issue of equitable assignment.  This JUDGMENT serves to trigger the time for filing post-trial motions on the issue that was decided by the jury, as well as other post-trial matters such as sanctions and requests for expert fees pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4)(E). Consistent with D. Del. L.R. 54.1(a), the deadline for the prevailing party to file a bill of costs shall be within 14 days after the time for appeal has expired or within 14 days after issuance of the mandate from the appellate court. IT SO ORDERED this 26 th day of August, 2025.

Updates For United States Airline Services To Cuba- Decreasing By 20%

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The Sun (26 August 2025): American issues defiant pledge as major airlines to cut flights to Caribbean hotspot in days. One airline has ended its sole US route to the Caribbean getaway.  AMERICAN Airlines execs appear to have sent a defiant message when it comes to flights to a Caribbean paradise - while other major carriers are set to make sweeping changes to schedules.  United and Southwest officials have taken steps to cut certain services and travelers will be impacted in days.

Travelers who fly with United are unable to book flights linking Houston, Texas, and Havana, Cuba, after September 1.  That’s because United chiefs have decided to suspend the route.  In July, United officials confirmed to the U.S. Sun that the decision was made due to demand.  But, United wasn’t the only airline to shake-up their schedules.

Chiefs at Southwest have decided to cut one of its daily return services that link Havana and Tampa, Florida. This change will come into force on September 4.  Currently, the low-cost carrier offers two return services between the cities.  But, American Airlines appears to have taken a different stance.  Papers, which have been seen by The U.S. Sun and filed to the Department of Transportation, reveal American Airlines has no plans to exit the Cuban market.  The carrier made a pledge as it asked DOT chiefs to move a temporary dormancy waiver to cover the winter season.  In the documents, airline officials alluded to challenges linked to passenger demand.  

United Airlines Suspends Houston to Havana Flights: What Travelers Need to Know.  They explained the waiver would help the carrier deploy aircraft more efficiently.  If granted, a number of American Airlines services would be impacted.  It would impact three of the carrier’s eight daily Miami-Havana round-trips that are scheduled for Mondays, Thursday, Fridays and Sundays.  And, four of the carrier’s eight daily round-trips between the two cities on Tuesday and Wednesdays would be affected. 

Daily round-trips between Miami and Santiago De Cuba would also be impacted if the waiver comes into force.  The waiver request includes one of the carrier’s two round-trips between Miami and Santa Clara.  American officials say they would look to restart services should it be in the carrier's interests.  Routes would only be suspended until March 28, 2026, according to the documents.  Delta is the other airline that offers services between the US and Cuba.  Last month, a source told The U.S. Sun airline bosses look at the market when making decisions on routes.  Delta has a twice-daily year round service between Miami and Havana. 

Aviaciononline (26 August 2025): During September 2025, the scheduled air connection between the United States and Cuba registers a 20% decrease compared to August—an expected decline considering the end of the summer period—with three U.S. airlines operating a total of 91 weekly flights. This offer represents a seat capacity of 13,965 per week to connect both countries.  However, in the year-over-year comparison between September 2025 and September 2024, a 21% fall in the number of frequencies and a 16.1% decrease in seat supply is also recorded. 

Detailed Operations Analysis
The air market between the two countries is distributed as follows:
Breakdown by airline (weekly flights and seats per direction):

American Airlines: 70 flights and 10,500 seats.
Delta Air Lines: 14 flights and 2,240 seats.
Southwest Airlines: 7 flights and 1,225 seats.

Details of operated routes:

American Airlines: 70 flights and 10,500 seats.
Delta Air Lines: 14 flights and 2,240 seats.
Southwest Airlines: 7 flights and 1,225 seats.

Details of operated routes:

American Airlines: Camagüey (CMW) - Miami (MIA): 7 flights and 896 seats.  Havana (HAV) - Miami (MIA): 39 flights and 6,224 seats.  Holguín (HOG) - Miami (MIA): 7 flights and 896 seats.  Santa Clara (SNU) - Miami (MIA): 7 flights and 1,204 seats.  Santiago de Cuba (SCU) - Miami (MIA): 5 flights and 640 seats.  Varadero (VRA) - Miami (MIA): 5 flights and 640 seats.
Delta Air Lines: Havana (HAV) - Miami (MIA): 14 flights and 2,240 seats.
Southwest Airlines: Havana (HAV) - Tampa (TPA): 7 flights and 1,225 seats.

In the consolidated total for the month, American Airlines will have a total (round-trip) offering of 89,664 seats, Delta Air Lines will have 19,200 seats, and Southwest Airlines will have 11,550 seats.

Government Of Canada To Canadians Thinking About Visiting Cuba: "Exercise A High Degree Of Caution Due To Shortages Of Basic Necessities Including Food, Medicine And Fuel."

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Cuba travel advice- Exercise a high degree of caution (with regional advisories)
Link: https://travel.gc.ca/destinations/cuba

Risk levels- Cuba - Exercise a high degree of caution

Exercise a high degree of caution in Cuba due to shortages of basic necessities including food, medicine and fuel.

Excerpts 

Outbreak Monitoring- Hepatitis A in Cuba.  There have been reported cases of hepatitis A in return travellers from Cuba.  Hepatitis A is a liver disease caused by the hepatitis A virus. It is most commonly spread when someone eats food or drinks water that contains the virus.  The best way to prevent hepatitis A is to get vaccinated. Discuss the benefits of getting vaccinated with a health care provider before you travel.  In addition to vaccination, you can reduce your risk of getting hepatitis A by taking the following precautions: Wash your hands often, especially before preparing or eating food.  Take food and water precautions, such as: avoiding ice cubes in drinks; peeling your own raw fruit and vegetables; drinking water from a safe supply, such as bottled or boiled water; eating only foods that are well-cooked unless you have prepared them yourself; Practise safer sex methods. 

Crime- Petty crime- Petty crime, such as pickpocketing and bag snatching, occurs.  Theft generally occurs in crowded places such as: tourist areas, markets, public buses, night clubs, beaches.  It can also occur in isolated areas.  Cuba has a cash-based economy. You may need to carry large amounts of cash to make larger purchases, but doing so could make you a target for theft or robbery. You should avoid showing large amounts of cash in public.  Theft from hotel rooms, particularly in private accommodations (“casas particulares”), and from cars, is common.  Always keep your personal belongings, including your passport and other travel documents, in a secure place.  Do not pack valuables in your checked luggage.  Avoid showing signs of affluence.  Keep electronic devices out of sight.  Keep a digital and a hard copy of your identification and travel documents.  Never leave belongings unattended in a vehicle, even in the trunk.   

Violent crime- Incidents of violent crime are not frequent, but assaults may occur. They mainly occur during a burglary or robbery.  Stay in accommodations with good security.  Keep your windows and doors locked at all times.  If you’re threatened by robbers, stay calm and do not resist 

Sexual assault- Incidents of sexual assault against Canadian women have occurred, including at beach resorts.  If you’re a victim of a sexual assault, you should report it immediately to the nearest Government of Canada office. You should file a report with the Cuban authorities and ensure that local police provide you with proof of complaint (“comprobante de denuncia”) confirming that a report has been filed. A criminal investigation will not be possible if no formal complaint is made to Cuban authorities before you depart the country.  Police officers may only speak Spanish.  Avoid secluded areas, even on resorts and hotel grounds.  Exercise caution when dealing with strangers or recent acquaintances.  Avoid taking public transportation or walking alone at night. 

Fraud- Overcharging- Some businesses, including taxis and classic car rentals, may try to charge exorbitant prices.  Always confirm the price before ordering or purchasing a good or service.  Do not leave an open tab.  Avoid giving your credit card to bar or restaurant staff.  Check the accuracy of your bill before paying.  Scams- Some hustlers specialize in defrauding tourists, sometimes using threats or violence. Most of them speak some English or French and go out of their way to appear friendly. They may offer to serve as guides or facilitate the purchase of cigars.  Fraudulent tour agents and taxi drivers also operate throughout the country, including at Havana’s international airport. Thefts of luggage from taxi trunks have occurred.  In bars, sex workers, including minors, may be very persistent and intrusive with tourists who refuse their advances. Foreigners, including Canadians, have been victims of theft after engaging in sexual relations, and some of them have faced child sex accusations.  Only use reputable tour operators and registered taxis.  Avoid independent street vendors.  Be wary of strangers who seem too friendly.

Power outages- Cuba experienced nationwide power outages in 2024. The electrical system is vulnerable and outages can occur suddenly. Scheduled power cuts regularly take place to conserve power, particularly outside Havana, and can last many hours.  Most large hotels and resorts use generators during power outages.  Monitor local media for the latest information.  Try to keep your phone charged.  Plan accordingly.  Shortages.  Cuba faces chronic and severe shortages of ‎basic necessities, including: food, bottled water, public water supply, medication, fuel, hard currency.  Fuel shortages affect a wide range of services. Travelling across the island is extremely challenging. Public transportation services, including taxis, are often disrupted, leaving tourists with few options to travel. Some travellers have been temporarily stranded with a rental car. There are often long line-ups at gas stations that have led to altercations.  Intermittent shortages of tap water provided by municipalities occur, including in Havana. Water shortages have affected resorts in the past. 

Spiked food, drinks and other items-  Never leave your food or drinks unattended or in the care of strangers. Avoid accepting snacks, beverages, gum or cigarettes from new acquaintances, as these items may contain drugs that could put you at risk of sexual assault and robbery. 

Telecommunications- The telecommunications network in Cuba is poor. Connections are unreliable and may be intermittent.  Canadian cell phones may not work, even in large cities. Internet access is limited across the island.  Local authorities control telecommunications. They may block access, including to social media, in case of civil unrest or before demonstrations.  Do not rely on your cell phone for emergencies, especially outside major cities.  Subscribe to and install a VPN service before leaving Canada 

Online transactions- Online banking may be challenging in Cuba. Most Cuban websites are unsecure. Many are inaccessible from outside of Cuba.  If you plan to book online, you should confirm that your hotel accepts online reservations and payments.

Potential Triple Play? Carney, Diaz-Canel, Trump Deal. U.S. Secretary Of Defense Hegseth Wants Cobalt. Cuba Has It. Settling One Libertad Act Issue. And Opening Doors?

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Opportunity For Canada, Cuba, United States To Settle Libertad Act Grievance? 

U.S. Secretary Of Defense Pete Hegseth Wants 5 Million Pounds Of Cobalt.   

There Is Plenty Available Ninety-Three Miles South Of Florida.    

The Republic Of Cuba Has Cobalt Reserves Estimated At 1.1 Billion Pounds.  Fourth-Largest In The World. 

Cuba Nearer Than Current Sources Norway, Canada, Finland, Japan, Madagascar. 

Stating the obvious, the following transaction outline is remote from existing reality; perhaps even reaching the level of outlandish.   

However, the outlandish is not an orphan to country changes in government-to-government bilateral relationships.  So, might the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2018- ) have an opportunity for a trilateral commercial, diplomatic, and financial triple play? 

He will find the terms of the transaction to be difficult to digest, but the result could be a lessening and/or removal of some of the most onerous commercial, economic, and financial policies and regulations in place by the United States.  Likely not the removal of statutes, but what is available to the executive branch.   

That result could not only serve to resurrect all or part of the Republic of Cuba-United States bilateral relationship, but could also materially impact positively the Republic of Cuba’s bilateral relationships with the governments of countries who are creditors and companies within those countries who are creditors. 

An opportunity for an alignment of interests, even for (initially) one transaction, Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada (2025- ), Miguel Diaz-Canel, President of the Republic of Cuba, and Donald Trump, President of the United States (2017-2021 and 2025-2029). 

The Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029) has authorized the United States Department of Defense (DOD) to direct the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Strategic Materials Contracting Directorate to contract for the delivery of 5,000,000 pounds of 99.9% pure cobalt. 

The Republic of Cuba has the fourth-largest known reserves of cobalt.  Toronto, Canada-based Sherritt International Corporation (2024 revenue approximately US$417 million) is the partner in the joint venture mining for nickel and cobalt in the Republic of Cuba. 

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury would need to issue a license authorizing any financial transaction.  The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce would need to issue a license for the importation of any product.  The United States Department of State would need to rescind a 1994 Libertad Act Title IV determination (see further below).  Sherritt International Corporation would need to resolve any Libertad Act Title III issues with the individual/company that has evidence of “trafficking” in property for which restitution from appropriation has not been made to the original owners of the property.  Management of Sherritt International Corporation, company shareholders, institutions providing financial services to the company may embrace an opportunity to enhance shareholder value.  

The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Strategic Materials Contracting Directorate is seeking information on how an interested contractor could supply cobalt for a DLA Strategic Materials acquisition for addition of material into the National Defense Stockpile. For the submitted responses, please indicate whether the response is for cobalt.  

  • Proposed Buy: Cobalt metal (99.9% pure or higher) – approximately 2,500 short tons (5,000,000 lbs.).  Proposed Delivery Period: September 2025 to September 2033. 

  • The DLA wants offers for alloy-grade cobalt supplies from only three producers: units of Vale SA in Canada, Sumitomo Metal Mining Co. in Japan, and Glencore Plc’s Nikkelverk plant in Norway with proposals for fixed prices for five years.  

  • Link To Tender: SAM.gov

  • Link To Tender In PDF Format

“In 2024, United States imported US$384 million of Cobalt, being the 589th most imported product (out of 1,227) in United States.  In 2024, the main origins of United States' Cobalt imports were: Norway (US$84.8 million), Canada (US$73.9 million), Japan (US$52.6 million), Madagascar (US$47.5 million), and United Kingdom (US$44.9 million).  The fastest growing origins for Cobalt imports in United States between 2023 and 2024 were: Madagascar (US$14.9 million), France (US$4.65 million), and Indonesia (US$3.59 million).” 

Bloomberg: For many years, the DLA was a seller rather than a buyer of cobalt, as budget cuts in the 1990s and 2000s led it to sell off what had once been a giant stockpile of the metal built up during the Cold War.  For many years, the DLA was a seller rather than a buyer of cobalt, as budget cuts in the 1990s and 2000s led it to sell off what had once been a giant stockpile of the metal built up during the Cold War.  In recent years, however, securing supply chains for metals like cobalt has become a political priority, as officials seek to reduce reliance on China.  Beijing dominates processing of cobalt and other battery metals, and has built up a significant state stockpile of its own through the National Food and Strategic Reserves Administration, more commonly known as the State Reserve Bureau.  In recent years, however, securing supply chains for metals like cobalt has become a political priority, as officials seek to reduce reliance on China.  Beijing dominates processing of cobalt and other battery metals, and has built up a significant state stockpile of its own through the National Food and Strategic Reserves Administration, more commonly known as the State Reserve Bureau.” 

Libertad Act 

The Trump-Vance Administration (2017-2021) made operational Title III and further implemented Title IV of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”). 

Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.  Link To Title III Filed Lawsuit Statistics   

  • There is not a lawsuit filed against Sherritt International Corporation in United States Federal District Court using provisions of the Libertad Act.   

Title IV restricts entry into the United States by individuals (and immediate family members) who have connectivity to unresolved certified claims or non-certified claims.  One Canada-based company and one Spain-based company are currently known to be subject to this provision based upon a certified claim and non-certified claim. 

  • Since 1996, some directors and officers of Sherritt International Corporation, and immediate family members, have been blocked from entering the United States do to company operations in the Republic of Cuba on property potentially subject to Title III of the Libertad Act.  

Sherritt International Corporation “is a world leader in using hydrometallurgical processes to mine and refine nickel and cobalt – metals deemed critical for the energy transition. Sherritt’s Moa Joint Venture has an estimated mine life of approximately 25 years and is advancing an expansion program focused on increasing annual mixed sulphide precipitate production by approximately 20% of contained nickel and cobalt. The Corporation’s Power division, through its ownership in Energas S.A., is the largest independent energy producer in Cuba with installed electrical generating capacity of 506 MW, representing approximately 10% of the national electrical generating capacity in Cuba. The Energas facilities are comprised of two combined cycle plants that produce low-cost electricity from one of the lowest carbon emitting sources of power in Cuba. Sherritt’s common shares are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbol “S”.” 

“Sherritt manages its metals, power, and oil and gas operations through different legal structures including 100%-owned subsidiaries, joint arrangements and production-sharing contracts. With the exception of the Moa Joint Venture, which Sherritt operates jointly with its partner, Sherritt is the operator of these assets.”  

“COBALT 

In Q2 2025, Argus Chemical Grade cobalt price closed at US$17.50/lb, unchanged from Q1 2025. The average cobalt price increased to US$17.50/lb during the quarter from US$12.77/lb in Q1 2025.  Refined cobalt prices have surged since February, driven by the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”)’s unexpected four-month export ban, which was extended in June by an additional three months to September 2025. The move reversed prior negative market sentiment, pushing prices up over 50%. A potential shift to a quota system is being considered as the DRC seeks to support prices by limiting exports and strengthening artisanal mining working conditions. While government officials have expressed a commitment to maintaining a balanced market, and any further measures such as additional controls or quotas would continue to offer price support, a sustained recovery is likely to be gradual amid intrinsic oversupply.   

Despite global headwinds, battery adoption is expanding across consumer electronics, with rising capacities driven by AI-related power needs (2). China's EV market remains strong, supported by affordability, policy incentives, and resilient consumer demand, although lithium-ion-phosphate (“LFP”) batteries, which contain no nickel or cobalt, are a growing portion of this market. Europe is projected to see 15% EV growth in 2025, while the U.S. is expected to grow by 6%. However, tariffs, rising costs, and the phase-out of tax credits could weigh on overall EV demand and consequently cobalt demand. Similar “tariff regions” in supply chains could develop for cobalt following the G7 pronouncements in June on critical minerals supply.  

Cash in Cuba is denominated in Cuban pesos (“CUP”) and not exchangeable into other currencies unless sufficient foreign currency reserves exist in Cuba and is primarily held by Energas for use locally by the joint operation. To facilitate the conversion of CUP to Canadian dollars, the Corporation has in place the Moa Swap, which facilitates the payment of the Canadian equivalent of approximately US$50.0 million annually from the Moa JV to Energas, which Energas uses to facilitate foreign currency payments in support of the business and to pay dividends to the Corporation in Canada. In addition, the Corporation has in place the Cobalt Swap under which the Corporation receives finished cobalt and cash in Canadian dollars from the Moa JV as repayment of the GNC receivable. Energas, in turn, pays an equivalent amount to GNC in CUP under the Energas payable. The Moa JV is not directly exposed to significant risk related to the CUP, as it receives major foreign currencies from the sale of nickel and cobalt to customers outside of Cuba. 

RISKS RELATED TO SHERRITT’S OPERATIONS IN CUBA 

The Corporation directly or indirectly holds significant interests in mining, metals processing and the generation of electricity in Cuba. The operations of the Cuban businesses and the ability of the Cuban Government to fulfil payment obligations to the Corporation, as well as the provision of goods and services to the Cuban businesses may be affected by economic and other pressures on Cuba. Additionally, the continued general economic decline in Cuba could have an impact on the Corporation and the Cuban businesses. Risks include, but are not limited to, fluctuations in official or convertible currency exchange rates, access to foreign currency, repatriation of foreign currency, and high rates of inflation. In addition, Cuba has experienced increased hardships as a result of the impact of COVID-19 and continued U.S. sanctions, impacting the country’s tourism and other industries, hampering the country’s foreign currency liquidity and resulting in prolonged border closures, fuel, food and medicine shortages, electricity outages, skilled worker retention and shortages, and sporadic civil demonstrations. The first President Trump administration increased its sanctions against Cuba and its trading partners and these measures had an adverse impact on Cuba and its economy, as well as its ability to conduct international trade. In addition, with resulting additional adverse impacts, on January 12, 2021, that administration designated Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. While the now former U.S. administration of President Biden announced on January 14, 2025 that it would remove Cuba from the State Sponsor of Terrorism list, this decision was revoked by President Trump a few days later, on January 20, 2025, the first day of his second administration. On June 30, 2025, the Trump administration released a National Security Presidential Memorandum (“NSPM”) reaffirming its hardline stance towards Cuba, outlining a strengthened sanctions framework aimed at curbing Cuba’s access to international financing and restricting entities engaging in trade or investment in Cuban state-run industries. These measures that require further implementation from the U.S. administration signal a continuation of the administration’s policy to isolate Cuba economically and politically and may escalate the risks related to Sherritt’s operations in Cuba. Changes in regulations and political attitudes are beyond the control of Sherritt and may adversely affect its business. Operations may be affected in varying degrees by such factors as Cuban Government regulations with respect to currency conversion, repatriation of foreign currency, production, project approval and execution, price controls, import and export controls, income taxes or reinvestment credits, expropriation of property, environmental legislation, land use, water use and mine and plant safety. Cuba may also be adversely impacted by risks associated with the imposition by other countries globally of additional economic restrictions or sanctions, or the indirect impact on Cuba of sanctions imposed on other countries (such as Russia and Belarus, for example) that could have a material adverse effect on Cuba or on Sherritt’s ability to operate in Cuba.  Sherritt is entitled to the benefit of certain assurances received from the Government of Cuba and certain agencies of the Government of Cuba that protect it in many circumstances from adverse changes in law, although such changes remain beyond the control of the Corporation and the effect of any such changes cannot be accurately predicted.  For further information on the risks related to Sherritt’s operations in Cuba, refer to the Corporation’s 2024 Annual Information Form. 

RISKS RELATED TO U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARDS CUBA 

The United States has maintained a comprehensive embargo against Cuba since the early 1960s, and the enactment in 1996 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act (commonly known as the “Helms-Burton Act”) extended the reach of the U.S. embargo.  The U.S. Embargo In its current form, apart from the Helms-Burton Act, the embargo applies to most transactions or dealings directly or indirectly involving Cuba, its government, Cuban entities, goods derived from Cuban-origin, and Cuban nationals, and it bars all persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States from participating or facilitating in such transactions or dealings unless authorized under general or specific licenses issued by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (“U.S. Treasury”). Persons “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” include U.S. citizens and U.S. lawful permanent residents, regardless of where they reside or by whom they are employed; legal entities organized under U.S. laws; and entities wherever located that are owned or controlled by any of the foregoing; as well as individuals and entities located in the United States. The embargo also targets transactions or dealings directly or indirectly involving entities deemed to be owned or controlled by Cuba, including entities owned or controlled by the Cuban government, by entities organized under the laws of Cuba, or by Cuban nationals. Additionally, the embargo applies to persons and entities designated by the U.S. Treasury as specially designated nationals (“SDNs”) pursuant to the U.S. embargo against Cuba. The three entities constituting the Moa Joint Venture in which Sherritt holds an indirect 50% interest have been designated as SDNs by the U.S. Treasury. Sherritt, however, is not an SDN. The U.S. embargo generally prohibits persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States from engaging in transactions or dealings involving the Cuban-related businesses of the Corporation and may in certain circumstances restrict the ability of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. from engaging in transactions with Sherritt more generally. Furthermore, goods, technology and software (“items”) that are subject to U.S. jurisdictions, including U.S.-origin items, non-U.S. items that include more than 10% U.S.-origin content by value, and certain non-U.S. direct products of specified U.S. technology or software, cannot under U.S. law be exported, re-exported, or otherwise supplied to Cuba or used in the Corporation’s operations in Cuba. Additionally, the U.S. embargo generally prohibits imports into the United States of Cuban-origin goods, goods located in or transported from or through Cuba, or foreign goods made or derived, in whole or in part, from goods derived from Cuban-origin, including Cuban nickel and cobalt.  In 1992, Canada issued an order pursuant to the Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act (Canada) to block the application of the U.S. embargo under Canadian law to Canadian subsidiaries of U.S. entities. However, the U.S. embargo limits Sherritt’s access to U.S. capital, financing sources, customers, and suppliers. Persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States are advised to consult their independent advisors before acquiring common shares of Sherritt.” 

Links To Related Analyses 

Will Cuba See Another Mineral Export Become Less Valuable As Battery Technology Develops? While Diaz-Canel Administration Continues To Strangle Re-Emerging Private Sector. November 07, 2024 

Hesitant To Engage With Cuba? Read Second Paragraph Of Forward-Looking Statements In Sherritt International Corporation's Cuba Impact Statement. Cringeworthy For Legal Counsel October 29, 2024 

Government Of Cuba Revenues, Shareholders In Canada's Sherritt International Corporation Will Suffer From Low Nickel, Cobalt, Lithium Prices Expected In 2024. Cuba Consistently Owes Sherritt Money. December 29, 2023 

Cuba Has Nickel And Cobalt. Vehicle Electric Batteries Use Nickel And Cobalt. Cuba Should Benefit.  September 25, 2021   

Cuba Owes Partner Canada's Sherritt International Corporation Tens Of Millions Of US Dollars. But, Both Cuba & Patient Company (And Shareholders) Anticipate Profitable Role With Electric Vehicles.  July 03, 2021   

Media References 

Bloomberg (7 November 2024): The world’s No. 1 cobalt miner is sounding the alarm over the rapidly shrinking role of the metal in the energy transition. The reason is the adoption of cobalt-free lithium iron phosphate, or LFP, batteries gaining momentum in recent years because they are cheaper to manufacture. Chinese company CMOC’s bearish view of the market comes amid a glut of the metal that’s been largely created by its expansion of two huge copper-cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 

London, United Kingdom-based NS Energy: Cuba- 500,000 tonnes: Around 7% of the world’s cobalt reserves are based in Cuba, estimated by the United States Geological Survey (USGS) at 500,000 tonnes.  The country ranks fifth among the world’s largest cobalt-producing countries, with national output in 2020 of around 3,600 tonnes.  Most of Cuba’s cobalt reserves are based in the east of the island in the Moa region, and are primarily extracted alongside nickel, which is a major mining business in Cuba.  A joint venture between Canadian miner Sherritt International and General Nickel Company of Cuba produces the metal via open pit mining at deposits in Moa. 

Financial Times
London, United Kingdom
20 July 2018 

Panasonic cuts ties with supplier over Cuban cobalt fears
Japanese group concerned materials in its batteries for Tesla could fall foul of US sanctions

Panasonic has suspended ties with a Canadian supplier amid concerns that Cuban cobalt, a target of US sanctions, was used in batteries it supplied for Tesla’s electric vehicles.  

The Japanese battery supplier said on Friday it did not know how much Cuban cobalt was ultimately used in the lithium ion batteries it supplied to the US market for Tesla “due to commingling of sources by its suppliers in several phases of manufacturing processes”.

The company declined to identify its Canadian supplier but a person with knowledge of Panasonic’s supply chain identified the company as Sherritt International. The Canadian company produces cobalt at the Moa mine in Cuba through a joint venture with the Cuban state-owned General Nickel Company. Sherritt declined to comment.  

Panasonic said the suspension of ties was a precautionary measure following guidance from the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control over the scope of the US ban on Cuban-origin imports, which dates back to 1960. Tesla said it had been informed by Panasonic that a small portion of Model S and Model X batteries may contain trace amounts of cobalt from Sherritt. Only some vehicles produced after February 2018 are affected, and there is no impact on battery cells produced at its gigafactory in Nevada, including for its mass-market Model 3 cars. Panasonic’s move, which was first reported by Reuters, comes as Tesla and other carmakers scramble to secure supplies for an ambitious rollout of electric cars.  

The price of cobalt, more than half of which comes from the Democratic Republic of Congo, has more than doubled over the past year. It will be increasingly difficult for carmakers to meet their targets without using more cobalt from the DRC, according to Gavin Montgomery, an analyst at consultancy Wood Mackenzie in London. “To reach these kinds of aspirations in terms of gigafactory volumes [of Tesla batteries], it’s going to be a struggle using existing mines or feedstocks,” Mr Montgomery said. “Everyone is going to have to rely on the DRC for cobalt one way or the other.” One consultant who works closely with big companies throughout the electric vehicle supply chain said that it was “surprising” that Panasonic had only now realised that its batteries may contain Cuban cobalt, but added that Sherritt was not a major supplier to the company.  

About 4 per cent of global cobalt mined production came from Cuba last year, according to Darton Commodities. Another Tokyo-based expert in the EV supply chain, who is a specialist in cobalt, said that while Japanese companies did not normally use Cuban cobalt — and it was in any case a small component of the Japanese EV supply chain — some certainly did so. Caspar Rawles, a London-based analyst at Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, said Panasonic would probably be able to tap into its wide range of suppliers and internal stocks to plug the gap from the suspended Sherritt supply.  

“Negotiation season for long-term raw material supply contracts is just around the corner and Panasonic can replace inventory in this period to meet the needs of their Tesla obligations, so it is less likely that they will need to source additional material from the spot market,” Mr Rawles said. The supply issue came to light as both Tesla and Panasonic, its exclusive battery supplier, are working to develop cobalt-free batteries to cut their reliance on the metal.  

Yoshio Ito, the head of Panasonic’s automotive business, recently said it would aim to halve the use of cobalt for the type of automotive batteries used for Tesla’s EVs in two to three years. “We have already achieved this at the research and development level,” Mr Ito told reporters in Tokyo. He declined to provide a timeline for the mass production of such batteries, saying safety and quality assurances would take time. In a statement on Friday, Tesla reiterated that the company was “aiming to achieve close to zero usage of cobalt in the near future”.

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Member Of United States House Of Representatives "Demands" Investigation Of South Florida Companies Exporting Products And Providing Services To Cuba

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“WASHINGTON, D.C. (21 August 2025) – Today, Congresswoman María Elvira Salazar (FL-27) sent a letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent demanding an investigation into companies in South Florida that may be attempting to evade U.S. sanctions on the Cuban communist regime.

"My constituents want their government to look into this flaunting of the law." said Rep. Salazar. “We cannot permit possible accomplices of tyranny to enrich themselves at the expense of the Cuban people’s struggle for freedom. Every dollar that slips through sanctions undermines U.S. policy and strengthens the hand of oppressors in Havana." 

Background

In Cuba’s totalitarian system, nothing enters or leaves the island without the regime taking its cut. U.S. law strictly prohibits American tourism and commercial dealings with the dictatorship. Recent complains indicate that some newly established companies in South Florida may be using services such as “tourism packages,” “logistics,” door-to-door shipping, and car sales as potential vehicles to sidestep sanctions. If confirmed, these activities would directly undermine U.S. policy designed to cut off resources to the regime.

Reports also suggest that some of the companies’ founders may be linked to individuals close to the Cuban regime. For example, Jorge Javier Rodríguez Cabrera, recently detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, was identified as a close associate of one of Raúl Castro’s grandchildren. These developments raise serious concerns about whether such businesses are being used, knowingly or unknowingly, to provide the dictatorship with a financial lifeline it does not deserve.

The Congresswoman has urged the administration to fully investigate these companies and take appropriate enforcement action if violations are confirmed. 

You can read the full letter here.”

What Do Beijing, Hanoi, Minsk, Moscow Have In Common? Collective Private Disdain With Increasing Public Seepage Toward Havana.

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What Do Beijing, Hanoi, Minsk, Moscow Have In Common?  Collective Private Disdain With Increasing Public Seepage Toward Havana.

A visit to four capitals during the last two months reveals an inescapably and more so tragic consistency- political leadership, both appointed and elected, and company leadership, privately-owned, publicly-owned, and government-operated, view the commercial, economic, financial, political, and societal leadership of the government of the Republic of Cuba with derision, disappointment, disgust, and disdain. 

Individual comments (abbreviated) from Beijing (People’s Republic of China), Hanoi (Socialist Republic of Vietnam), Minsk (Republic of Belarus), and Moscow (Russian Federation): “Sick of them…  They do nothing to help themselves…  Only complain and beg for assistance…  Of utmost concern, some of them genuinely believe that we like them…  We can barely tolerate them…  Whenever a pending delegation from Havana, it’s a collective eyeroll throughout the building…  They have no dignity…  Seeking 180-day and 360-day payment terms is not a confidence builder… Always some convoluted payment scheme… Blaming United States for everything gets old quickly- like a baby’s diaper… A business transaction means we sell, and they buy, or we buy, and they sell; problem is they never provide a simple transaction.  It’s always convoluted- and means we will likely never get paid- unless our government bails them out.  They think Fidel still lives and that we care.”   

One country official with considerable postings in the United States, offered a theatre-goer observation: “The Cubans are like Willy Loman in [the play] Death of a Salesman and any of the real estate salesmen characters in [the play] Glengarry Glen Ross.  They are always waiting for the next moment, the next deal; when they will be solvent.  Just give them another year to pay, another US$100 million and they can turn everything around.  We know how both plays ended.” 

With the announcement of a delegation arriving from the Republic of Cuba there is the same anticipatory perspectives commonplace throughout offices in Beijing, Hanoi, Minsk, and Moscow.   

The almost identical responses could come from a cellular device’s predictive typing feature.  Protocol officials could also reach out to ChatGPT and its use artificial intelligence to find the same result.  Another begging tour is about to begin where the beggar will not offer anything to help it transition from begging to giving, a strategy to transition from survival to prosperity.  And, the host country will probably have to pay for the expenses and the jet fuel of the Venezuela-registered aircraft transporting the delegation.  

There are two faces- the one on display when heads of state meet, ministers of foreign affairs meet, when delegations meet.  These smiling faces thinly project like an inexpensive veneer, profiles of comradery, cooperation, defense, forgiveness, friendship, opportunity, partnership, solidarity, and support. 

The other face manifests itself when doors are closed and the subject becomes repayment of debts, refusal by the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2018- ) to implement- and then retain changes to policies, regulations, and statutes impacting direct foreign investment (DFI), banking, and the re-emerging private sector.  This not-so-smiling face is represented by the words bewilderment, deadbeat, disgust, frustration, embarrassment, and lack of self-respect. 

The most dramatic recent moment of seepage of the private into public was during the 18 June 2025 to 21 June 2025 annual St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF).  Public statements from officials of the government of the Russian Federation:   

  • “First challenge is the 20% interest rate [for loans] in Russia, so [Russian Federation-based] investors have an issue… In Cuba, the United States Dollar exchange rate has an official rate of 25 Pesos and a real [market] rate of 125 Pesos [18 June 2025 actual unofficial rate 378 Pesos].  We advise clients to use market rates.  No ownership rights is another put off for investors.  Investors are afraid because they don't know if they will be able to repatriate their money.” 

  • “We love each other, we praise each other.  We need to be realistic.  Rather than saying something, need to do something.” 

  • “… need to focus on entrepreneurs and developing entrepreneurs with Russia.” 

During [Fidel] Castro-[Raul] Castro Administration (1976-2008), there was a belief that the worst punishment to be inflicted upon the Republic of Cuba was to ignore it.  Being irrelevant for President Castro was a sentence, brief or enduring, that he could not accept.  When he believed irrelevance was creeping too near to Havana’s waterfront, he would unleash oratory and implement decisions returning both him and the archipelago to the front pages of newspapers throughout the world.  He is dead now.  He took his skill set with him.  If he left instructions, his successors have not found them and if they have them have been incapable of following them. 

One critical element to the strategies of President Fidel Castro was in his engagement with the United States business community to view everything as a challenge.   

If there was a proposal from the United States private sector and his team (or bureaucrats within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Foreign Trade) argued that it was a trojan horse for destabilization, or a sophisticated (or not) exercise crafted in offices at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Langley, Virginia, and/or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in Washington DC., President Castro would respond, to paraphrase- “OK, let’s say all of you are correct.  Then take what they are hoping to achieve and turn it to our advantage.”   

That’s precisely the reasoning President Castro approved the request for Westport, Connecticut-based PWN Exhibicon International LLC to organize (under a license from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury) the U.S. Food & Agribusiness Exhibition held at the Palacio de Convenciones de la Habana (Pabexpo) in the city of Havana, Republic of Cuba, from 26 September 2002 through 30 September 2002.  That gathering brought to Havana 923 representatives of United States-based companies.  President Castro hosted them at a gala dinner. 

Today in Havana, officials demonstrate a genetically incapacity of seeing anything crafted in Virginia or Washington or New York as a challenge to embrace.  They search for a lantern, find one, rub it intensely, make a wish, and wait for an answer- which never arrives.  Logic would suggest seeking a new lantern.   

Today, the Republic of Cuba is irrelevant and there is no one in Havana who demonstrates a formidable desire to alter that trajectory. 

Until the government of the Republic of Cuba institutionalizes and maintains commercial, economic, and financial policies, regulations, rules, and statutes, it will never capitalize from any of them. 

The government reflects a man-child who stubbornly maintaining a position, invoking a tantrum at the thought of change, with a result where everyone believes it a chronically-underperforming deadbeat dad. 

Success will not derive from admitting mistakes and then seeking only solutions which are designed to make what had not worked somehow work rather than seeking fresh solutions and changing what has only survived due to other people- taxpayers in other countries, paying for it.  

Manuel Marrero Cruz, Prime Minister of the Republic of Cuba, acknowledged “internal difficulties, mistakes, and deficiencies… does not mean that we fold our arms or that we attribute all problems to the blockade [embargo].”  This is not the first occasion for an official of the government of the Republic of Cuba to issue such a statement.  History strongly suggests that the statement will be followed by another statement. 

In May 2022, the Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025) authorized the first direct investment and direct financing into a privately-owned company owned by a Republic of Cuba national and located in the Republic of Cuba.  This decision was designed to shift the arrival of funds from unofficial channels to a formal and transparent process- and demonstrably increasing the engagement by the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba with sources of capital located in the United States.  

The expectation was for the government of the Republic of Cuba to immediately, or at least soon thereafter, issue the regulations required so the funds would be delivered.  Thus far, more than three years later, those regulations have yet to be published.  Absent regulations, sources of capital in every country are subjected to the same foundational restriction- no legal framework to deliver direct investment and direct financing into a privately-owned company located in the Republic of Cuba.  That restriction impacts Belarus, China, Russia, Spain, Vietnam, among other countries.  So much for the government of the Republic of Cuba for embracing change- particularly change that would enable it to pay what it owes.       

For the United States business community, the last years of sustained optimism reflected by senior-level executives traveling regularly to the Republic of Cuba, those same senior-level executives eager to be interviewed by media, using their general aviation aircraft when permitted, was the period 1994 through 2008 during the [Fidel] Castro-[Raul] Castro Administration (1976-2008). 

The interest has continued to decline, albeit on a gradual downward trajectory, during the [Raul] Castro-Machado Ventura Administration (2006-2018), with an uptick from 2015 and 2016, and then accelerated its decline during the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2018- ) which coincided with the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021).   

Neither the Castro-Machado Ventura Administration nor Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration embraced fully commercial opportunities authorized during the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) and during the Biden-Harris Administration.  There were lasting and consequential consequences for that resistance.   

Welcome to the Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029).   

Link: Paris Club Of Creditor Nations Reported To Propose New Repayment Schedule For Cuba Which Has Not Maintained A Previous 76% Write-Off From 2015. August 31, 2023 

Link: Cuba Reported In New Agreement With Paris Club "Group Of Creditors Of Cuba" To Restructure Defaulted Payment Terms. Previously Forgave 75% Of Debt. Officials Expect Further Defaults. October 21, 2021

Link To Complete Analysis In PDF Format

GAESA Papers, If True, Create Questions For Companies, Governments, Taxpayers (Fortunately Not U.S. Taxpayers).  Has Cuba Lied About Its Ability To Pay What It Owes?

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GAESA Papers, If True, Create Questions For Companies, Governments, Taxpayers (Fortunately Not United States Taxpayers).   

Has Cuba Lied About Its Ability To Pay What It Owes?  

Accountants, analysts, economists, and executives who believe genuine the financial statements for Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA) published by The Miami Herald have questions.  Among those questions:  

  • What do the financial statements represent?   

  • Are they illustrative of a complex and necessary commercial structure?  

  • Are they illustrative of a pathological determination to deceive, disguise value, and avoid paying what the government of the Republic of Cuba and Republic of Cuba government-operated companies owe to governments and to companies?   

What is true- the credibility of statements by officials of the government of the Republic of Cuba and executives of Republic of Cuba government-operated companies are in question, particularly to those governments (and their taxpayers) owed substantial and long overdue monies.   

For executives and owners and shareholders of companies who routinely provide to Republic of Cuba government-operated companies payment terms of 180-days, 360-days, and longer, they now have more questions than they usually have relating to monies owed.  

According to documents published by The Miami Herald, in March 2024, GAESA had US$14.467 billion deposited in unidentified financial institutions, representing approximately 76% of its liquidity.  GAESA reported 2024 first quarter net profits of approximately US$2.1 billion compared with US$7.2 billion during the first eight months of 2023. 

For creditors of the government of the Republic of Cuba, for creditors of Republic of Cuba government-operated companies, and for management of Republic of Cuba government-operated companies who informed by the Central Bank of the Republic of Cuba that there are no monies to pay what is owed, the publication of the GAESA Papers results in many questions.  Two in particular:   

  • Have successive governments of the Republic of Cuba lied to those to whom it owes?   

  • Does the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2018- ) control the resources of GAESA? 

A significant note:  Since December 2001, within provisions of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA), United States-based agricultural commodity exporters and food product exporters have received on a cash-in-advance basis required by the statute approximately US$8 billion in payments from Republic of Cuba government-operated entities.

Link: U.S. Ag/Food Exports Increased 10% In May 2025; Up 15.5% Year-To-Year; First Export Of Enzymes (US$13,498.00); US$12.1 Million In Used Vehicles August 08, 2025 

  • Shareholders of Toronto, Canada-based Sherritt International Corporation which reports accounts receivable of approximately US$100 million from Republic of Cuba government-operated entities have questions. 

  • Shareholders in Palma de Mallorca, Spain-based Melia Hotels International S.A., with 2,338 rooms under management in the Republic of Cuba have questions.  From 1 January 2025 through 30 June 2025, the company reported 927 rooms disaffiliated.  The company has thirty-three properties under management with two in the pipeline.  Maintenance on properties owned by Republic of Cuba government-operated companies continue to be delayed and service quality continues absent consistency. 

  • Taxpayers in Spain have questions about the decision by the government of Spain to implement a debt conversion program valued at approximately US$400 million in place of monies owed to the government of Spain (taxpayers) and to Spain-based companies by the government of the Republic of Cuba and Republic of Cuba government-operated companies.   

The government of the Republic of Cuba has not adhered to agreed upon payments amounting to billions of dollars despite repeated debt rescheduling including to Canada, China, Japan, Mexico, Russia, and Vietnam.  Non-Republic of Cuba-based companies are owed hundreds of millions of dollars with Republic of Cuba government-operated companies continuing to seek repayment discounts and repayment rescheduling.  

Link: Cuba Reported In New Agreement With Paris Club "Group Of Creditors Of Cuba" To Restructure Defaulted Payment Terms. Previously Forgave 75% Of Debt. Officials Expect Further Defaults. October 21, 2021 

Link: Paris Club Of Creditor Nations Reported To Propose New Repayment Schedule For Cuba Which Has Not Maintained A Previous 76% Write-Off From 2015. August 31, 2023

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT