The New York Times: "As Trump Toughens Rules on Cuba’s Economy, Hotel Chains Pull Out"

The New York Times
New York, New York
4 June 2026

As Trump Toughens Rules on Cuba’s Economy, Hotel Chains Pull Out
The Trump administration’s efforts to tighten the economic noose on Cuba appear to be working, as more international firms announced they would leave the island.

The Catedral in Havana is one of 15 hotels in Cuba run by the Spanish firm, Meliá.Credit...Yamil Lage/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

By Frances Robles
Reporting from Florida

The Trump administration’s campaign to force Cuba’s economic unraveling achieved key gains this week, when three international hotel chains and a bank that processes Visa and Mastercard transactions withdrew business from the communist nation to avoid violating new U.S. regulations.

Foreign businesses have until Friday to pull out of any venture in Cuba run by the Cuban military conglomerate that controls about half the nation’s economy. On Thursday, the U.S. government announced that it was imposing sanctions on another swath of Cuban officials and entities, including the armed forces.

Business leaders whose companies stay in Cuba risk losing their visa to travel to the United States and having their assets frozen. The companies themselves could also face sanctions, such as losing access to American banks.

The increasing exodus of businesses from Cuba will lead to increased unemployment and fewer financial resources for Cuba’s government, aggravating an increasingly untenable economic crisis.

While the United States has long prohibited most American companies from trading with Cuba, these new regulations, called “secondary sanctions,” are a major escalation, because they target foreign companies and financial institutions.

Cuba’s Central Bank announced Wednesday that a bank that processes Visa and Mastercard transactions had withdrawn to comply with a recent executive order from the White House that threatened sanctions against foreign companies doing business in Cuba.

People lining up outside a bank in Havana on Wednesday.Credit...Yamil Lage/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

The Cuban government, which did not name the bank, called the decision part of President Trump’s “strategy to strangle the Cuban people.”

The Spanish hotel operator Iberostar said it would end its partnership to run 12 hotels for Gaviota, Cuba’s tourism company, which is part of the Business Administration Group, a military conglomerate known by its Spanish acronym, GAESA.

Another Spanish firm, Meliá, said it would withdraw from its partnership running 15 Cuban hotels. Blue Diamond, a Canadian company that ran dozens of hotels in Cuba, also announced that it was pulling out.

Citing an announcement from the company, news reports said the Indonesian chain Archipelago International had also closed shop. The website for the company’s Aston Hotels in Cuba showed they were “no longer available for accommodation.”

The proposed U.S. sanctions are part of a series of stringent measures by the Trump administration designed to cripple Cuba’s economy and force economic and political change.

Mr. Trump on Thursday told reporters in Washington that Cuba had “sort of collapsed.”  Repeating a statement he had made in the past, he said he would “handle” Cuba as soon as his administration moves on from the conflict with Iran. “As soon as that’s done, on our way back, we’ll just make a little brief stop,” the president said without providing specific details.

Mr. Trump’s tightening vise on Cuba, including an effective oil blockade, is worsening a humanitarian crisis, leaving millions of people enduring extended power outages and struggling to find food and gasoline.

The U.S. State Department said on Thursday that it was adding five more Cuban officials and five entities to a list of sanctioned people and companies, including President Miguel Díaz-Canel and his family. 

Vast neighborhood groups organized by the government, called the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution and known for spying on local residents, were also targeted, as was Cuba’s gold mining venture.

“The entities and individuals designated today direct or fund the regime and its efforts to mobilize its radical revolutionary movements in the United States and around the world,” Secretary of State Marco Rubio said in a statement.

Two major shipping companies, one German and the other French, had already announced plans to cease operations in Cuba.

The United Nations’ World Food Program was forced to put off plans to purchase nearly 3,000 tons of food for Cuba “because we cannot find a shipping solution to bring it to Cuba,” said Etienne Labande, the agency’s Cuba country director.  The World Food Program, which was helping supply provisions for Cuba’s subsided food rations, is also trying to find other ways to pay for fuel it used to buy from private companies, because it can no longer pay with Visa or Mastercard, he said.

San Lazaro Avenue in Havana during a blackout last month.Credit...Norlys Perez/Reuters

The Trump administration’s sanctions against foreign companies, announced in May, largely targeted GAESA, the military conglomerate that operates everything from retail businesses to the tourism industry.

GAESA was born out of Cuba’s economic crisis in the 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union, which had been the island nation’s main benefactor.

The U.S. State Department, relying on media reports suggesting GAESA was sitting on enormous piles of cash even as the nation suffers, said the moves would deprive Cuba’s military “access to illicit assets.”

The Cuban government did not respond to a request for comment, but released a scathing statement denouncing the Trump administration.

The U.S. government, the statement said, had “once again acted with premeditated intent in its eagerness to manufacture pretexts to discredit the Cuban Revolution, its historic leadership, its current leaders, and, in doing so, confuse both our people and international public opinion.”

Mr. Díaz-Canel said on social media that GAESA was not “a path to enrichment for a few.’’

“On the contrary, it is one of the many examples that, along our path, has allowed us to resist the permanent aggression of the United States government.”

Seth Eisen, a spokesman for Mastercard, said the decision to withdraw had not been made by Mastercard.

The bank that had managed the company’s transactions decided to limit operations in Cuba, and without the foreign financial partner, Mastercards will not work to make purchases in Cuba, he said.

Visa, Iberostar and Blue Diamond did not respond to a request for comment. Meliá, in a statement, said its decision to leave Cuba “was made out of a deep sense of corporate responsibility,” but that the impact of its decision was limited because most of its hotels were already closed.

Cuba’s tourism sector has largely collapsed. In January, the Trump administration blocked fuel deliveries to Cuba, which limited the availability of jet fuel and led several airlines to cancel service.

A nearly empty street in Playa Larga, Cienaga de Zapata, Cuba, in April. Tourism in Cuba has largely come to a halt.Credit...Norlys Perez/Reuters

“The reach of these sanctions was much wider and stronger, especially among the hotel chains,” said Paolo Spadoni, a political economist at Augusta University in Georgia who studies Cuba’s tourism industry.

He noted that not all of Cuba’s hotels are run by the military conglomerate, and the Spanish hotel companies were continuing to operate hotels run by Cuban entities not tied to GAESA and not targeted with sanctions.

John S. Kavulich, president of the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, said the latest measures could lead the Cuban military conglomerate to dismantle its operations to comply with the new rules.

“In the last 30 days, there has been more commercial, economic and financial destruction in Cuba than in any period since 1959,” Mr. Kavulich said, referring to the year of the Cuban revolution that eventually ushered in Communist rule.

The U.S. administration, he said, “achieved so much without firing a shot or one boot on the ground.”

The State Department acknowledged that the withdrawal of the hotel firms was precisely what the measures were intended to accomplish.

“Our sanctions are deliberately targeted to prevent the Cuban military and security services from profiting off international investment in Cuba to fund their continued oppression of the Cuban people and threat to U.S. national security,” the State Department said in a statement provided to The New York Times.

“Companies choosing to exit the Cuban market are making a prudent decision to comply with U.S. law and avoid enriching a regime that routinely violates fundamental human rights.”

OFAC: "Cuba Designations; Issuance of Cuba-related Frequently Asked Question"

United States Department of the Treasury
Washington DC
4 June 2026

Cuba Designations; Issuance of Cuba-related Frequently Asked Question


The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is issuing one new Cuba-related Frequently Asked Question, FAQ 1258.

Additionally, OFAC has updated the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List.
Specially Designated Nationals List Updates

The following individuals have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

ANIDO CUESTA, Manuel, Madrid, Spain; DOB 03 Nov 1994; POB Holguin, Cuba; nationality Cuba; Gender Male (individual) [CUBA-EO14404] (Linked To: CUESTA PERAZA, Lis). 

CASTRO CALIS, Raul Alejandro, Havana, Cuba; DOB 16 May 1995; nationality Cuba; Gender Male (individual) [CUBA-EO14404] (Linked To: CASTRO ESPIN, Alejandro). 

CASTRO ESPIN, Alejandro (a.k.a. "El Tuerto"), Cuba; DOB 1965; nationality Cuba; Gender Male (individual) [CUBA-EO14404]. 

CUESTA PERAZA, Lis, Cuba; DOB 28 Mar 1971; POB Holguin, Cuba; nationality Cuba; Gender Female (individual) [CUBA-EO14404] (Linked To: DIAZ-CANEL BERMUDEZ, Miguel). 

DIAZ-CANEL BERMUDEZ, Miguel, Cuba; DOB 20 Apr 1960; POB Santa Clara, Cuba; nationality Cuba; Gender Male (individual) [CUBA-EO14404].

The following entities have been added to OFAC's SDN List:

AMISTUR CUBA SA, Calle 13 #504 e/ D y E, Vedado, Havana, Cuba; Organization Established Date 19 Jan 1996; Organization Type: Travel agency activities [CUBA-EO14404] (Linked To: CUBAN INSTITUTE OF FRIENDSHIP WITH THE PEOPLES). 

COMMITTEES FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION (a.k.a. COMITES DE DEFENSA DE LA REVOLUCION; a.k.a. "CDR"), Linea Avenue, Havana, Cuba; Organization Established Date 28 Sep 1960; Organization Type: Public order and safety activities [CUBA-EO14404]. 

CUBAN INSTITUTE OF FRIENDSHIP WITH THE PEOPLES (a.k.a. INSTITUTO CUBANO DE AMISTAD CON LOS PUEBLOS; a.k.a. "ICAP"), Calle 17 No. 301 e/ H e I, Vedado, Havana, Cuba; Organization Established Date 30 Dec 1960; Entity Code 652 (Cuba) [CUBA-EO14404]. 

MINERA LA VICTORIA SA (a.k.a. "MLV"), Office 123, First Floor, Third Avenue Between 76 and 78, Beijing Building, Miramar Business Center, Playa, Havana 11300, Cuba; Organization Established Date 14 Aug 2020; Organization Type: Mining of other non-ferrous metal ores [CUBA-EO14404]. 

MINISTRY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF CUBA (a.k.a. MINISTERIO DE LAS FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS; a.k.a. "MINFAR"), Independence Avenue, Sierra Maestra Building, Plaza of the Revolution Municipality, Havana, Cuba; Organization Established Date 16 Oct 1959; Target Type Government Entity [CUBA-EO14404].

1258. I am a non-U.S. person, what is my exposure to sanctions risk for transacting with entities owned by Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA), the Cuban Ministry of the Interior (MININT), or the Cuban Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR), including their subsidiaries listed on the Cuba Restricted List (CRL)? 

As of June 4, 2026, GAESA, MININT, and MINFAR are all blocked pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14404. These three entities are also blocked pursuant to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), and MININT is also blocked pursuant to the Global Magnitsky sanctions program under E.O. 13818, as of January 2021. Non-U.S. persons, including foreign financial institutions, are exposed to sanctions risk for engaging in transactions with persons designated under E.O. 14404. Sanctions risk also extends to transactions with any entity in which GAESA, MININT, or MINFAR own, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest. Many of the entities listed on the CRL are 50 percent or more owned by one of these three entities and therefore present the same sanctions risk. In addition, any non-blocked CRL entity may become the subject of future sanctions actions. Consequently, persons transacting with any entity on the CRL may run the risk of themselves being sanctioned by the U.S. government.

Non-U.S. persons should consider conducting enhanced due diligence to inform a risk-based approach to transactions with GAESA, MININT, MINFAR, or any entity in which they own, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest. As part of such due diligence, non-U.S. persons are encouraged to consult all available sources to inform their independent assessment regarding the network of entities under GAESA, MININT, and MINFAR, including trusted sources provided by the U.S. government, such as the CRL.  Released on Jun 04, 2026 

U.S. Department Of State: Fact Sheet For "Sanctions on Cuban Actors Responsible for Subversive Anti-American Activities" 

United States Department of State
Washington DC
4 June 2026

Sanctions on Cuban Actors Responsible for Subversive Anti-American Activities Fact Sheet
 

Today, the Department of State is designating five entities and five individuals as part of the Trump Administration’s comprehensive push to end the Cuban regime’s decades-long campaign of political, ideological, and institutional warfare against the United States and to hold accountable those who sustain its operations and profit from the Cuban people’s oppression. 

The Cuban regime continues to demonstrate that it prioritizes the exportation of radical left-wing violence through its malign influence networks and the enrichment of the regime over the well-being of the Cuban people.  These sanctions are designed to hold international actors supporting the Cuban regime accountable.  Foreign banks and companies providing services to those designated are at risk of sanctions and should freeze those activities. The Trump Administration will continue to target the Cuban regime’s subversive network, those who enable its subversive operations, and those who profit while the Cuban people suffer. 

All Department of State targets designated today have been designated pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14404, which authorizes sanctions on persons determined to meet specified criteria related to repression in Cuba and threats to U.S. national security and foreign policy.   

Taking Action Against the Cuban Regime 

The following entities associated with developing, implementing, and funding the Cuban regime’s violent revolutionary network are being designated:  

Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba  (MINFAR)
MINFAR is being designated pursuant to Sec. 2(a)(i)(F) of E.O. 14404 for being a political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the Government of Cuba.  MINFAR is the government ministry in charge of the Cuban military. 
Cuban Institute of Friendship with the Peoples (ICAP)
ICAP is being designated pursuant to Sec. 2(a)(i)(F) of E.O. 14404 for being a political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the Government of Cuba.  ICAP is a Cuban organization founded by Fidel Castro in 1960 that supports Cuban intelligence and counterintelligence activities. 
Amistur Cuba SA
Amistur Cuba SA is being designated pursuant to Sec. 2 (a)(i)(B) of E.O. 14404 for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, ICAP, an entity designated pursuant to E.O. 14404 for being a political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the Government of Cuba.   
Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR)
CDR is being designated pursuant to Sec. 2 (a)(i)(B) of E.O. 14404 for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Government of Cuba.  CDR is under the direction of the MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OF CUBA, which was previously designated for being a political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the Government of Cuba, and is a fundamental pillar of Cuba’s state oppressive security apparatus. 

The following regime-aligned elites and their family members are being designated: 
Miguel Diaz-Canel Bermudez (DIAZ-CANEL)
DIAZ-CANEL is being designated pursuant to Sec. 2 (a)(i)(E) of E.O. 14404 for being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of the Government of Cuba.  DIAZ-CANEL is the President of Cuba.
Lis Cuesta Peraza
LIS CUESTA PERAZA is being designated pursuant to Sec. 2(a)(i)(I) of E.O. 14404 for being an adult family member of a person designated pursuant to this order.  LIS CUESTA PERAZA is the spouse of DIAZ-CANEL.  
Manuel Anido Cuesta
MANUEL ANIDO CUESTA is being designated pursuant to Sec. 2(a)(i)(I) of E.O. 14404 for being an adult family member of a person designated pursuant to this order.  MANUEL ANIDO CUESTA is LIS CUESTA PERAZA’s son and DIAZ-CANEL’s stepson.  
Alejandro Castro Espin
ALEJANDRO CASTRO ESPIN is being designated pursuant to Sec. 2(a)(i)(B) of E.O. 14404 for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Government of Cuba.  ALEJANDRO CASTRO ESPIN is the former head of the Cuban intelligence services and the son of Raul Modesto Castro Ruz.   
Raul Alejandro Castro Calis
RAUL ALEJANDRO CASTRO CALIS is being designated pursuant to Sec. 2(a)(i)(I) of E.O. 14404 for being an adult family member of a person designated pursuant to this order.  RAUL ALEJANDRO CASTRO CALIS is the son of ALEJANDRO CASTRO ESPIN. 
Depriving Revenue to the Cuban Regime 
The following entity, responsible for generating revenue for the Cuban regime, is being designated pursuant to Sec. 2(a)(i)(A) of E.O. 14404 for operating in or having operated in the metals and mining sector of the Cuban economy: 
Minera la Victoria SA
MINERA LA VICTORIA S.A., which is a Cuban gold mining joint venture created by Australia-based entity Antilles Gold Ltd and Cuban SOE Geominera SA.  

Sanctions Implications

As a result of today’s sanctions-related actions, and in accordance with Executive Order 14404 of May 1, 2026, “Imposing Sanctions on Those Responsible for Repression in Cuba and for Threats to U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy,” all property and interests in property of the designated persons described above that are in the United States or in possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).  Additionally, all entities that are owned individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. 

All transactions and dealings by U.S. persons or persons within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons are prohibited unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or exempt.  These prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person and the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.  Foreign persons that engage in transactions with persons designated pursuant to E.O. 14404—or that operate in the energy, defense and related materiel, metals and mining, financial services, or security sector of the Cuban economy, as identified in E.O. 14404— are themselves at risk of sanctions.  Non-U.S. persons, including foreign financial institutions, should proceed with caution in any dealings with a party sanctioned under this authority.  Actions to return assets to a sanctioned party or transfer them to another jurisdiction for potential use by the target could expose non-U.S. persons to significant sanctions risk.  All property and interests in property of persons that are blocked pursuant to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) continue to be blocked.  The CACR prohibits persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction from dealing in property in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest, unless authorized or exempt. 

The power and integrity of U.S. government sanctions derive not only from the U.S. government’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law.  The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior.    

Petitions for removal from the SDN List may be sent to: OFAC.Reconsideration@treasury.gov.  Petitioners may also refer to the Department of State’s Delisting Guidance page. 

U.S. Department Of State: "Sanctions on Cuban Military Instrumentalities & Other Actors Responsible for Subversive Anti-American Activities"

United States Department of State
Washington DC
4 June 2026

Sanctions on Cuban Military Instrumentalities & Other Actors Responsible for Subversive Anti-American Activities

For nearly seven decades, the Communist Cuban regime has waged a continuous campaign of political, ideological, and institutional warfare against the United States.  Tragically, the Cuban people are the hostages of a brutal and repressive government which disregards their safety and prosperity to advance the Castro regime’s true purpose:  serving as an outpost for our adversaries and exporting radical left-wing violence and terror across our hemisphere.   

Today, pursuant to President Trump’s Executive Order (E.O.) 14404 of May 1, 2026, “Imposing Sanctions on Those Responsible for Repression in Cuba and for Threats to United States National Security and Foreign Policy,” I am designating five Cuban entities and five individuals who sustain the regime’s malicious campaign to subvert and destabilize U.S. national security. 

These sanctions target the Cuban regime’s wide-ranging and violent radical action network and the actors who implement and fund it.  Beginning with Fidel Castro’s program to globalize the so-called Marxist “revolution,” Havana has served as a forward operating base for global irregular warfare against U.S. interests, recruiting, training, and equipping violent left-wing militants across our region – including Marxist terrorist groups in the United States – with the ultimate goal of undermining U.S. national security.  

The entities and individuals designated today direct or fund the regime and its efforts to mobilize its radical revolutionary movements in the United States and around the world.  These targets include President of Cuba Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermudez, Castro family member and representative Alejandro Castro Espín, and members of their networks who advance the regime’s threats to U.S. national security.  

I am also continuing to crack down on the military cartel that has consolidated all economic power in Cuba for the benefit of a small circle of regime elites and their overseas hidden bank accounts.  While I have already designated Grupo de Administración Empresarial (GAESA), the primary holding company for the military’s strangle-hold on the economy, today I am sanctioning the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba (MINFAR).  As a result, MINFAR’s majority holdings and subsidiaries, many of which are identified on the Department of State’s Cuba Restricted List (CRL), are considered blocked.  Anyone dealing with entities owned 50 percent or more by GAESA, MINFAR, or the previously designated Ministry of the Interior risk exposure to potential U.S. sanctions action.  I am also designating a Cuban government gold mining joint venture that continues to enrich the Cuban military and elite at the expense of its people.  

The Department’s actions are being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14404, which authorizes sweeping sanctions on Cuba, including persons who support the Cuban regime’s security apparatus and those responsible for repression in Cuba and threats to U.S. national security.  These actions also further both E.O. 14380, “Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba” and National Security Presidential Memorandum 5 (NSPM-5), which direct the Executive Branch to improve human rights, encourage the rule of law, foster free markets and free enterprise, and promote democracy in Cuba.  For more information on today’s action, please see the Department of State’s Fact Sheet

At SPIEF 2026, Deputy Prime Minister Of Russia Talks Expansion And Projects. Same Message As At 2025 SPIEF. How Did That Work Out During The Last Twelve Months?

Despite external pressure, Russian companies continue to expand their presence in Cuba and are ready to invest in long-term projects.  Russia can offer solutions in the areas of digital services, cybersecurity, telemedicine, and business automation... about 90 Russian companies are interested in supplying meat, dairy, and fish products.”  Dmitry Chernyshenko, Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation (4 June 2026) 

According to Deputy Prime Minister Chernyshenko, exports from the Russian Federation to the Republic of Cuba increased 20% in 2025 from 2024.  Unsaid if importers in the Republic of Cuba had paid or maintained payment agreements for the products.  

Quotes from Oscar Perez-Oliva Fraga, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Trade and Investment, of the Republic of Cuba, during the Russia-Cuba Business Dialogue at the 2025 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) the Russia-Cuba Business Dialogue:   

  • “To pay off our debts, we need to produce and develop entrepreneurship. And in this regard, we will, of course, cooperate with Russian entrepreneurs.  We are already implementing this decision and have made significant efforts to develop this area.  Therefore, please continue to trust Cuba, and we will certainly fulfill all our obligations.”  

  • “We can also cooperate in industry and transportation.  A project was recently launched where Russian cars were assembled in Cuba, and this is, of course, beneficial for both sides.”  

  • “Russia is under a ton of Western sanctions.  And we're seeing fascist, Russophobic attitudes.  Sanctions against Cuba are only getting stronger, so we're all going through tough times.”  

  • “Today is a real turning point in our relations.  In the coming months of this year, I believe many projects will be implemented, and we will prove that doing business in Cuba is entirely possible and can be very successful.” 

Link: At SPIEF’25 Russia-Cuba Dialogue, One Side Talks Dreams, Other Talks Reality. “Reliable Partner”- “Science Fiction” Or Reality? Russia Says Entrepreneurs Important. Cuba Not So Enthusiastic June 19, 2025 

Deputy Prime Minister Fraga and Ernesto Rodriguez Hernandez, First Deputy Minister of Communications of the Republic of Cuba, are participating in the 2026 SPIEF.  

A scheduled Russia-Cuba Business Dialogue disappeared from the official SPIEF schedule.   

Deputy Prime Minister Fraga is now one of seven (7) speakers during a seventy-five (75) minute Russia-Latin America Business Dialogue.   

First Deputy Minister Rodriguez is participating as one of nine speakers on the panel, Technologies Shaping the Future Turnkey Digital Sovereignty: Mutually Beneficial Prospects.  

Thus far in 2026, despite rhetoric professing the opposite, the government of the Russian Federation has remained reticent to provide consistent and meaningful commercial, economic, energy, financial, military, and political support to the government of the Republic of Cuba.

New Executive Order Victims: MasterCard and Visa Branded Cards No Longer Valid In Cuba

Foreign bank suspends Visa and Mastercard transactions in Cuba as of June 6th due to U.S. measures
3 June 2026
Radio Habana Cuba


On June 2nd, a communication was received from the foreign bank that processes transactions in Cuba using VISA and MASTERCARD cards, announcing the suspension of its relationship with FINCIMEX S.A.  This suspension is directly related to Executive Order No. 14404 of May 1st, issued by U.S. President Donald Trump, as part of his strategy to economically strangle the Cuban people.  As a result of this decision, Cuba is unable to receive income from the sale of goods and services through internationally recognized cards such as VISA and MASTERCARD.  The foreign bank announced that, as of June 6th, the date the measure imposed by the United States takes effect, it becomes illegal and impossible to continue executing agreements with the Cuban entity.  The established payment methods for foreign currency transactions in the country remain in place: Cash,100% Cuban prepaid cards: Clásica and Tropical,International cards: Mir and UnionPay

(Information from the Central Bank of Cuba)
[ SOURCE: CUBA DEBATE ]

At SPIEF 2026, There Is A Russia-Cuba Business Dialogue. But, Not On The Official Program And Not At The Venue.

Although remaining unpublished on the official schedule for the annual St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) from 3 June 2026 to 6 June 2026, the Russia-Cuba Business Dialogue was held at 8:00 am on 4 June 2026 at St. Petersburg State University. Presiding, as he did at SPIEF 2025, was Mr. Azer Talibov, Chairman of the Russia-Cuba Business Council.

Oscar Perez-Oliva Fraga, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment of the Republic of Cuba, who participated in SPIEF 2025, and Ernesto Rodriguez Hernandez, First Deputy Minister of Communications of the Republic of Cuba, are the only officials of the government of the Republic of Cuba publicly identified on the program for SPIEF 2026.

A scheduled Russia-Cuba Business Dialogue disappeared from the official SPIEF 2026 schedule. 

Deputy Prime Minister Fraga is now one of seven (7) speakers during a seventy-five (75) minute Russia-Latin America Business Dialogue.  The speaker list is in alphabetical order, so the deputy prime minister is listed last- symbolically reinforcing his significance 

First Deputy Minister Rodriguez is one of nine speakers on the panel, Technologies Shaping the Future Turnkey Digital Sovereignty: Mutually Beneficial Prospects

Thus far in 2026, despite rhetoric professing the opposite, the government of the Russian Federation has remained reticent to provide consistent and meaningful commercial, economic, energy, financial, military, and political support to the government of the Republic of Cuba.

For Cuba, 5 June 2026 Is 21st Century D-Day. President Trump Hitting G7 Members Canada, France, Germany.  And, A Particular Favorite G7 Guest, G20 Member, And NATO Member Spain

For Cuba, 5 June 2026 Is 21st Century D-Day

President Trump Hitting G7 Members Canada, France, Germany.  And, A Particular Favorite G7 Guest, G20 Member, And NATO Member Spain

GAESA Could Dissolve, Restructure Into Employee-Owned Companies.  It is Too Toxic Now.

Deputy Prime Minister Of Cuba Participating At SPIEF This Week.  Host Not Providing The Welcome He Would Have Preferred

The approximately ten million inhabitants of the Republic of Cuba, located on an 800-mile long archipelago approximately ninety-three miles from Key West, Florida, are most certainly continuing to deconstruct a statement by Donald Trump, President of the United States (2017-2021 and 2025-2029): “Life is a gimmick, if you think about it, right?

The Cambridge Dictionary defines gimmick as “something that is not serious or of real value that is used to attract people's attention or interest temporarily.”

President Trump said previously that he could have the “honor of taking” the Republic of Cuba and “do anything I want with it.”  Now, there is an added context- the gimmick, an added layer to the enigma defining Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029) plan(s) for the Republic of Cuba- its citizens, its government, its military and, most importantly, its future.

During the last six months, the plan(s) has been defined by incrementalism and innuendo.  Slowly increasing pressure within the Republic of Cuba and from outside of the Republic of Cuba.  Increasing pressure upon companies, financial institutions, and governments which engage with the Republic of Cuba. 

Cocoon the innuendo with layers of doubt, secrecy, and suspicion.  Lastly, put a date out there and see if the desired results can be achieved absent “boots on the ground” or firing a shot.

Thus far, whatever its call-sign, however it is defined, the Trump-Vance Administration decisions impact upon the government of the Republic of Cuba have been enormous and unprecedented. 

The abduction and extraction in January 2026 of Nicolas Maduro, President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (2013-2025), created a political bank-shot impacting the Republic of Cuba with speed and depth unseen during the sixty-six years that defines the 1959 Revolution.  From the perspective of Havana, the trajectory toward change is unwelcome.  It is also inescapable.

6 June 1945 is known as “D-Day” to identify the moment during World War II (1939-1945) when the Allied Forces crossed the English Channel to invade Normandy, France.

Operation Overlord defined the Battle of Normandy and originally was scheduled for 5 June 1945.  Fog, storms, and winds caused the twenty-four-hour delay.

The Trump-Vance Administration in Washington DC has determined that 5 June 2026 is D-Day for the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2019- ) in Havana, Republic of Cuba. 

For the government of the Republic of Cuba, D-Day is defined as Decision Day where some of the decisions are, for now, in their control.  Other decisions will be implemented by the government of the United States which is serving-up globally the commercial version of an “offer they can’t refuse.”

That offer continues to ricochet throughout the world, but specifically targeting some of the twenty-seven (27) country members of the Brussels, Belgium-based European Union (EU). 

A primary target is Spain which may have forty (40) companies and financial institutions disengage from connectivity with the Republic of Cuba.

From the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury:

  • “1254. On May 7, 2026, the Department of State designated the Cuban entity Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA) pursuant to E.O. 14404.  Are foreign persons, including foreign financial institutions (FFIs), subject to sanctions risk for transacting with GAESA? 

  • Generally, yes, but the U.S. government does not intend to target foreign persons, including FFIs, pursuant to E.O. 14404 for engaging in transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to the wind down of transactions involving GAESA, or any entity in which GAESA owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, through June 5, 2026.  However, non-U.S. persons, including FFIs, should proceed with caution in any dealings with a party sanctioned under this authority.  Actions to return assets to a sanctioned party or transfer them to another jurisdiction for potential use by the target could expose non-U.S. persons to significant sanctions risk.  Foreign persons unable to wind down transactions involving GAESA, or any entity in which GAESA owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest, before June 5, 2026, are encouraged to contact the OFAC Compliance Hotline.” 

Should be no surprise when GAESA restructures, perhaps dissolves and its subsidiaries privatize where management and employees gain ownership.  GAESA is far too toxic for companies and financial institutions.  

The toxicity will metastasize and taint other Republic of Cuba government-operated companies due to a lack of transparency by the government of the Republic of Cuba.  Proving a Republic of Cuba government-operated company has no connectivity with GAESA, directly or indirectly, will be striving for near the impossible. 

That the Republic of Cuba marketplace is not essential to any company- for exports, for imports, or for services; is not essential as a political interlocutor with meaningful influence to determine outcomes; and has billions of United States Dollars in unpaid debts to companies and governments throughout the world, provides Havana with few opportunities to bargain with Washington DC. 

Thus far, Republic of Cuba-related decisions in 2026 by the Trump-Vance Administration have impacted most visibly companies in Canada (including Toronto, Canada-based Sherritt International Corporation and Toronto, Canada-based Blue Diamond Resorts/Royalton International), France (including Marseille, France-based CMA CGM), and Germany (including Hamburg, Germany-based Hapag-Lloyd AG). 

Spain is often a guest at G7 Leaders’ Summits.  Thus far in 2026, impacted companies include: Palma de Mallorca, Spain-based Iberostar Hoteles & Apartamentos S.L. which has two properties in Miami, Florida; Madrid, Spain-based Alto Cedro Bank; Sabadell, Spain-based Banco Sabadell which has a branch at One Rockefeller Plaza in New York, New York; and Palma de Mallorca, Spain-based Melia Hotels International S.A. which has the largest number of properties under management in the Republic of Cuba and has two properties in New York, New York. 

Jakarta, Indonesia-based Archipelago International Hotels has withdrawn from the Republic of Cuba.  Prabowo Subianto, President of the Republic of Indonesia, embraces connectivity with the Trump-Vance Administration.  President Subianto is a member of the Board of Peace created by President Trump. 

Coincidently, Canada, France, and Germany are members of the Group of Seven Industrialized Nations (G7).  The Trump-Vance Administration has non-Republic of Cuba-related issues with the government of each including defense spending, military base usage, and trade agreements. 

  • G7: (2014-Present) United States, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada, and European Commission (president) and European Council (president).  The Russian Federation (2025 GDP ranks 8th) was excluded in 2014 due to its military actions (annexation) of the Crimean Peninsula in Ukraine.  NOTE: Spain is often a guest at G7 Leaders’ Summits despite ranking 12th in 2025 GDP. 

  • The 2026 G7 Leaders’ Summit is scheduled for 15 June 2026 to 17 June 2026 in Évian-les-Bains, France.  The host is Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic of France (2017-2027). 

President Trump said to Volodymyr Zelensky, President of Ukraine (2019-2024; term extended due to imposition of martial law in 2022), that the government of Ukraine did not have “the cards” in its dealings with Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation (2000-2008 and 2012-2030). 

For the government of the Republic of Cuba, President Trump believes Miguel Diaz-Canel, President of the Republic of Cuba (2019-2028), not only hasn’t the cards, but he also hasn’t even a deck of cards from which to draw. 

Some members of the Trump-Vance Administration view efforts targeting the government of the Republic of Cuba for commercial, economic, financial, military, political, and societal change similar in context to the 6 June 1945 Order of the Day from Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force (1943-1945).  Replacing German with the Republic of Cuba, replacing Nazi with Communist, and replacing Europe with the Republic of Cuba.  

·       Excerpt: “You are about to embark upon the Great Crusade, toward which we have striven these many months.  The eyes of the world are upon you.  The hopes and prayers of liberty-loving people everywhere march with you.  In company with our brave Allies and brothers-in-arms on other Fronts, you will bring about the destruction of the German war machine, the elimination of Nazi tyranny over the oppressed peoples of Europe, and security for ourselves in a free world.” 

Oscar Perez-Oliva Fraga, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment of the Republic of Cuba, is the only official of the government of the Republic of Cuba identified as participating in the annual St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) from 3 June 2026 to 6 June 2026.  He also participated in 2025.  On 1 June 2026, the SPIEF program added one other official from the government of the Republic of Cuba: Ernesto Rodriguez Hernandez, First Deputy Minister of Communications of the Republic of Cuba, participating as one of nine speakers on the panel, Technologies Shaping the Future Turnkey Digital Sovereignty: Mutually Beneficial Prospects

A scheduled Russia-Cuba Business Dialogue disappeared from the official SPIEF schedule.  Deputy Prime Minister Fraga is now one of seven (7) speakers during a seventy-five (75) minute Russia-Latin America Business Dialogue.  The speaker list is in alphabetical order, so the deputy prime minister is listed last- symbolically reinforcing his significance 

  • Thus far in 2026, despite rhetoric professing the opposite, the government of the Russian Federation has remained reticent to provide consistent and meaningful commercial, economic, energy, financial, military, and political support to the government of the Republic of Cuba.

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

SPIEF 2026 Included Russia-Cuba Business Dialogue, Until It Did Not. Now DPM One Of Seven Speakers In 75-Minute Russia-Latin America Business Dialogue. Ignominious Moment?

SPIEF 2026 Included Russia-Cuba Business Dialogue, Until It Did Not

What Happened?  No Comment

From A Bilateral Dialogue To One Of Seven Speakers In Seventy-Five Minutes

Speaker List Is In Alphabetical Order, So Deputy Prime Minister Listed Last- Symbolically Reinforcing His Significance

An Ignominious Moment?

Thus far in 2026, despite official rhetoric professing the opposite, the government of the Russian Federation has remained reticent to provide consistent and meaningful commercial, economic, energy, financial, military, and political support to the government of the Republic of Cuba.

The government of the Russian Federation has neither taken nor implemented decisions to confront the Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029) in terms of attempting and then succeeding with sustained deliveries of products or services to the Republic of Cuba either by vessel or aircraft.

The official rhetoric of the government of the Russian Federation combined with the historical relationship between the U.S.S.R. and the Republic of Cuba and subsequently between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Cuba suggested a more robust response to the acute issues impacting the Republic of Cuba. 

Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation (2000-2008 and 2012-2030), has decided that the Republic of Cuba is not worth a confrontation with Donald Trump, President of the United States (2017-2021 and 2025-2029).  The Republic of Cuba is a political commodity whose value continues to decrease.

Other countries with which the government of the Republic of Cuba has engaged during the last decades have not responded robustly to the acute issues impacting the Republic of Cuba.  The governments of Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Iran, Mexico, North Korea, Spain, and Vietnam among others have not provided assistance whereby the impact is meaningful and sustainable for the Republic of Cuba’s current population of approximately ten (10) million, which continues to decrease due to departures and lower birth rates.  

TASS- HAVANA, 10 April 2026: “The format of the Cuban delegation's participation in the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) is being worked out, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov said in response to a question from TASS.  “The format of Cubans’ participation in the SPIEF is being worked out,” he said.  “It's too early to talk about final decisions, but I'm sure the level should be solid.””

Oscar Perez-Oliva Fraga, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment of the Republic of Cuba, was until 1 June 2026 the only official of the government of the Republic of Cuba identified as participating in the annual St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) from 3 June 2026 to 6 June 2026.  He also participated in 2025.  On 1 June 2026, the SPIEF program added one other official from the government of the Republic of Cuba: Ernesto Rodriguez Hernandez, First Deputy Minister of Communications of the Republic of Cuba, participating as one of nine speakers on the panel, Technologies Shaping the Future Turnkey Digital Sovereignty: Mutually Beneficial Prospects.

Quotes from Deputy Prime Minister Fraga during the Russia-Cuba Business Dialogue on 18 June 2025:  

  • “To pay off our debts, we need to produce and develop entrepreneurship. And in this regard, we will, of course, cooperate with Russian entrepreneurs.  We are already implementing this decision and have made significant efforts to develop this area.  Therefore, please continue to trust Cuba, and we will certainly fulfill all our obligations.” 

  • “We can also cooperate in industry and transportation.  A project was recently launched where Russian cars were assembled in Cuba, and this is, of course, beneficial for both sides.” 

  • “Russia is under a ton of Western sanctions.  And we're seeing fascist, Russophobic attitudes.  Sanctions against Cuba are only getting stronger, so we're all going through tough times.” 

  • “Today is a real turning point in our relations.  In the coming months of this year, I believe many projects will be implemented, and we will prove that doing business in Cuba is entirely possible and can be very successful.”

Until last week, the following was in the official SPEIF 2026 program:

3 June 2026
17:15–18:30
Business Dialogue
Russia-Cuba

“Cuba is a reliable foreign policy partner and a priority ally of Russia in Latin America.  The two countries maintain aligned positions on a wide range of global agenda, which is particularly significant amid rising tensions across many regions of the world.  The level of trade and economic cooperation reflects the strong foundation of their political relationship.  How can business and government jointly address global challenges and build effective bridges between the two countries?  Which key issues require priority attention in the near term?”

The currently available official program for SPIEF 2026 does not include a Russia-Cuba Business Dialogue.  Deputy Prime Minister Fraga is listed as one of seven (7) speakers in this one hour and fifteen-minute session:

3 June 2026
17:00–18:15
Business Dialogue
Russia-Latin America

“Interregional ties are playing an increasingly important role today amidst growing geopolitical instability. Such ties serve as a tool that complements traditional diplomacy and interstate relations and makes foreign policy more attuned to real-world needs.  Today, St. Petersburg is one of the leaders in terms of fostering international cooperation with the nations of Latin America.  The city’s vast potential in such sectors as industry, port infrastructure, trade, transport, healthcare, and culture creates ample opportunities to intensify the international dialogue with its counterparts across Latin America.  What do these bridges of cooperation between Russia’s northern capital and the countries of Latin America look like?  How does St. Petersburg’s experience help reinforce the ties between Russia and Latin America?  What new mechanisms and instruments for bilateral relations can St. Petersburg offer its Latin American partners?

Moderator:
• Sergey Brilev, President, The Global Energy Association

Speakers:
• Carmen Caballero, President, ProColombia
• Luis Alfredo Fratti Silveira, Minister of Livestock, Agriculture and Fisheries of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay
• Eugene Grigoriev, Member of the Government of St. Petersburg – Chairman of the Committee on External Relations of St. Petersburg
• Dmitry Khandoga, Head of Department, Gazprom; General Director, Gazprom Export
• Sergey Machekhin, Deputy General Director for Project Engineering, Sustainable Development and International Cooperation, RusHydro
• Igor Maksimtsev, Rector, Saint Petersburg State University of Economics; Honorary Consul of the Republic of Chile in Saint Petersburg
Oscar Perez-Oliva Fraga, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment of the Republic of Cuba

Front row participants:
• Alexander Shchetinin, Director of the Latin American Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
• Andrey Zhukovsky, Leading Researcher, Institute of Regional Economy and Interbudgetary Relations, Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation”

4 June 2026
09:00–10:15
Technologies Shaping the Future Turnkey Digital Sovereignty: Mutually Beneficial Prospects
 

Russia rightfully ranks among the top three countries in the world with genuine digital sovereignty. Despite facing over 30,000 sanctions, Russia has confidently shown the world that it is capable of independently meeting its own digital needs, ranging from applications to infrastructure. Russia has shed its dependence on foreign IT solutions and no longer fears the threat of suddenly having its access to services cut off. The country’s unique experience is actively generating interest among nations of the Global South, which currently find themselves facing a difficult choice. On one side they have well established Western corporations with their world-renowned ecosystems, while on the other is China’s Digital Silk Road, which offers relatively affordable products and infrastructure. Russia’s pragmatic approach is appealing because it does the best job of fully taking into account the specific national regulatory, cultural, and historical features of individual countries and regions. Russia offers turnkey digital sovereignty solutions with comprehensive assistance in building entire independent digital ecosystems, formulating national strategies, establishing regulatory frameworks, setting standards, developing soft law instruments, and, of course, training specialists from partner nations. How can we transform Russia’s experience from a concept of survival into a model of equitable technological partnership that is capable of bolstering the digital independence of friendly nations? 
Moderator:

Moderator:
• Vadim Glushchenko, Director, Center for Global IT-Cooperation

Speakers: 
• Andrey Bezrukov, President, Technological Sovereignty Export Association; Professor at the Department of Applied Analysis of International Problems, MGIMO University 
• Alexey Borodin, Director General, Regional Commonwealth in the Field of Communications 
• Maxim Filippov, Deputy General Director, Positive Technologies 
• Pavel Gontarev, General Director, VK Tech 
• Darii Khalitov, Deputy President, Chairman of the Board, Rostelecom 
• Cristina Amor Maclang, Co-Founder, Secretary General, International Digital Economies Association (IDEA); Convenor, Digital Pilipinas (online) 
• Kirill Menshov, Senior Vice President, Head of Technology Block, Sberbank 
• Alexey Raikevich, General Director, GLONASS 
• Ernesto Rodriguez Hernandez, First Deputy Minister of Communications of the Republic of Cuba

From the government of the Russian Federation: “The St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) is a unique event in the world of business and economics. SPIEF has been held since 1997, and since 2006, it has been held under the auspices of the President of the Russian Federation, who has also attended each event.”

SPIEF is where President Putin seeks to demonstrate the Russian Federation remains a global player and countries want to engage with it.  SPIEF is signage: The Russian Federation is open for business and business is good.  

However, President Putin has delivered a different message to Miguel Diaz-Canel, President of the Republic of Cuba (2019-2028) and to the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2019-2028). 

If the Republic of Cuba is a historical, necessary, and strategic relationship, then why is the defense of that relationship by the government of the Russian Federation so brittle and absent of resolve?   

Because the government of the Republic of Cuba continues to avoid implementing decisions that would foster its attractiveness rather than continue to embrace anachronistic ideals that depend solely upon the resources of others to function.

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Legislation Introduced To Amend Cuba Libertad Act To Expand Who Can Sue. What Appellate Court Judge Said "despite a very clear intent, [Congress] drafts poorly. That is what I think happened here."

Harold Rogers (R- 5th District Kentucky) is Chairman of the Commerce, Justice, Science, And Related Agencies Subcommittee of the United States House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations

  • “Serving Kentucky’s 5th Congressional District since 1981, Hal Rogers has been elected to 23 consecutive terms representing the people of southern and eastern Kentucky. On September 2, 2021, he made history as the longest-serving Member of Congress from Kentucky. On March 18, 2022, he became Dean of the U.S. House of Representatives, as the longest-serving Member in the House.” 

2nd Session of the 119th United States Congress

H. R. 8845 [Report No. 119–652]

https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/8845/text

Making appropriations for the Departments of Commerce and Justice, Science, and Related Agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2027, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
May 15, 2026 

Mr. Rogers of Kentucky, from the Committee on Appropriations, reported the following bill; which was committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

A BILL

Making appropriations for the Departments of Commerce and Justice, Science, and Related Agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2027, and for other purposes.  Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the following sums are appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the Departments of Commerce and Justice, Science, and Related Agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2027, and for other purposes, namely:

Sec. 570.

(a) None of the funds made available by this Act may be used to facilitate, permit, license, or promote exports to the Cuban military or intelligence service or to any officer of the Cuban military or intelligence service, or an immediate family member thereof or any agency or entity owned or partially owned or operated on behalf of the previously listed.  (b) This section does not apply to exports of goods permitted under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.).  (c) In this section— (1) the term “Cuban military or intelligence service” includes the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, and the Ministry of the Interior, of Cuba, and any subsidiary of either such Ministry; and (2) the term “immediate family member” means a spouse, sibling, son, daughter, parent, grandparent, grandchild, aunt, uncle, niece, or nephew.

Sec. 582. 

(a) Section 302(a)(4)(B) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 6082(a)(4)(B)) is amended by striking ‘‘acquires ownership’’ and all that follows and inserting the following: ‘‘acquires ownership of such claim— “(i) before March 12, 1996; or “(ii) as a successor in interest who did not acquire the property, or claim to the property, in exchange for value or consideration.”.  

(b) Section 4 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 6023) is amended— (1) by redesignating paragraphs (13), (14), and (15) as paragraphs (14), (15), and (16), respectively; and (2) by inserting after paragraph (12) the following:

“(13) SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST.—The term ‘successor in interest’ means any person who: “(1) inherits or has inherited, in whole or in part, a claim or an interest in a claim to confiscated property; or “(2) follows another person in ownership or control of property or a claim to property and who retains the same rights as the original owner to the property.”.

(c) Section 306(c)(1)(A) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 6085(c)(1)(A)) is amended by striking “no person” and inserting “except as provided by section 302(a)(4)(B), no person”.

(d) The amendments made by subsections (a), (b), and (c) shall apply to—(1) any action initiated after the date of the enactment of this Act; (2) any action pending in any court as of such date of enactment, including any action pending on appeal or otherwise; (3) any action for which the time to file an appeal has not expired; or (4) any action that has been dismissed or adversely adjudicated by any court because of a judicial interpretation of section 302(a) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 6082(a)) that conflicts with the amendment to paragraph (4)(B) of such section as made by subsection (a).

(e) In the case of any action under section 302 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 U.S.C. 6082), in which an opinion was issued prior to the effective date of this section, such action may be refiled and decided as though this section were in effect as of the date of the enactment of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996.

(f) Section 305 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (22 USC §6084) is repealed.

Link: 11th Circuit Upholds Dismissal Of One Libertad Act Cuba Lawsuit Against Cruise Lines. Significantly, One Justice Sends Message To U.S. Congress And Opens Door For Revising Law To Help Plaintiffs November 23, 2022

U.S. Supreme Court Rules 8-1 For Plaintiff, Havana Docks Corporation, In US$440 Million Lawsuit Against Four Cruise Lines

United States Supreme Court
Washington DC
21 May 2026

We conclude that the cruise lines used confiscated property to which Havana Docks owns the claim.  Because the Court of Appeals concluded otherwise, it did not reach the cruise lines’ remaining arguments against liability.  Those arguments are not before us and we do not address them.  Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  It is so ordered.

33 5/21/26 24-983 Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. T 608/1

LINK To Opinion

Case now expected to return first to Appellate Court and the probably to District Court.

Due To Trump Administration Cuba-Related Executive Orders And SDN List Additions, Canada's Sherritt International Corporation May Sell 55% To U.S. Company

TORONTO – Sherritt International Corporation (“Sherritt” or the “Corporation“) (TSX:S) is providing a further update to its news release issued on May 19, 2026.

Sherritt has entered into a non-binding term sheet with Gillon Capital, LLC (“Gillon Capital“) with respect to a proposed private placement (the “Private Placement“) of a common share purchase warrant (the “Warrant“). The Warrant is exercisable for up to that number of common shares of the Corporation (each, a “Common Share“) such that, immediately upon exercise in full of the Warrant, Gillon Capital would own 55% of the Common Shares then issued and outstanding. The Warrant will be exercisable at a price to be agreed by the parties for a period ending nine months from the Closing Date, subject to satisfaction of certain conditions precedent, including compliance with the Corporation’s existing contractual arrangements and debt agreements. Given the current circumstances of the Corporation, management expects that such exercise price will be at a discount to the closing price of the Common Shares on May 15, 2026.

The Private Placement remains subject to the execution of definitive documentation and the transaction is expected to be subject to the satisfaction of customary conditions and the receipt of all required regulatory approvals, including approval of the Toronto Stock Exchange. There can be no assurance that the Private Placement will be completed, completed on the terms described above, or completed in a timely manner.

In connection with the Private Placement, Sherritt has engaged constructively with the United States Department of State, which has confirmed that the Department of State and Department of Treasury do not object to Gillon Capital’s engagement in negotiations with the Corporation and, based on the information provided to date, do not consider such negotiations to be contrary to U.S. law. Any subsequent transaction will be subject to approval of the Department of State and Department of Treasury.

The Corporation will continue to provide information on material developments to its shareholders and other stakeholders.

About Sherritt

Sherritt is a world leader in using hydrometallurgical processes to mine and refine nickel and cobalt – metals deemed critical for the energy transition. Leveraging its technical expertise and decades of experience in critical minerals processing, Sherritt is committed to expanding domestic refining capacity and reducing reliance on foreign sources. The Corporation operates a strategically important refinery in Alberta, Canada, recognized as the only significant cobalt refinery and one of just three nickel refineries in North America.

Sherritt’s common shares are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbol “S”.

Forward-Looking Statements

Certain statements and other information included in this press release may constitute “forward -looking information” or “forward-looking statements” (collectively, “forward-looking statements”) under applicable securities laws (such statements are often accompanied by words such as “anticipate”, “forecast”, “expect”, “believe”, “may”, “will”, “should”, “estimate”, “intend” or other similar words).

All statements in this press release, other than those relating to historical information, are forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements in this press release include, without limitation, statements regarding the proposed Private Placement, including the completion and timing thereof, the terms on which it may be completed and the receipt of all required approvals.

The Corporation cautions readers of this press release not to place undue reliance on any forward-looking statement as a number of factors could cause actual future results, conditions, actions or events to differ materially from the targets, expectations, estimates or intentions expressed in the forward-looking statements. Such factors include, without limitation, continued risks related to Sherritt’s operations in Cuba and future actions taken by the U.S. government toward Cuba, including with respect to the Executive Order; level of liquidity of Sherritt, including access to capital and financing; the risk to or loss of Sherritt’s entitlements to future distributions (including pursuant to the Cobalt Swap) from the Moa JV; the inability of the Corporation to comply with debt restrictions and covenants; the inability of the Corporation to comply with the listing requirements of the Toronto Stock Exchange or another recognized stock exchange; uncertainty in the ability of the Corporation to enforce legal rights in foreign jurisdictions including as it relates to the intended outcome of dissolving and surrendering the Corporation’s interests in Cuba; uncertainty regarding the interpretation and/or application of the applicable laws in foreign jurisdictions; tax risks, including as it relates to the dissolution and surrender of the Corporation’s interests in Cuba and implementation of related steps; political, economic and other risks of foreign operations; security market fluctuations and price volatility; risks related to environmental liabilities including liability for reclamation costs, tailings facility failures and toxic gas releases; compliance with applicable environment, health and safety legislation and other associated matters; risks associated with governmental regulations regarding climate change and greenhouse gas emissions; risks relating to community relations; maintaining social license to grow and operate; risks associated with the operation of large projects generally; the ability to replace depleted mineral reserves; risks associated with the Corporation’s joint venture partners; risks associated with mining, processing and refining activities; reliance on key personnel and skilled workers; risks related to the Corporation’s corporate structure; foreign exchange and pricing risks; credit risks; future market access; interest rate changes; risks in obtaining insurance; uncertainties in labour relations; legal contingencies; risks related to the Corporation’s accounting policies; uncertainty in the ability of the Corporation to obtain government permits; failure to comply with, or changes to, applicable government regulations. The key risks and uncertainties should be considered in conjunction with the risk factors described in the Corporation’s other documents filed with the Canadian securities authorities, including without limitation the “Managing Risk” section of the Management’s Discussion and Analysis for the three months and year ended December 31, 2025 and the Annual Information Form of the Corporation dated March 23, 2026 for the period ending December 31, 2025, which is available on SEDAR+ at www.sedarplus.ca. The forward-looking information and statements contained in this press release are made as of the date hereof and the Corporation undertakes no obligation to update publicly or revise any oral or written forward-looking information or statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as required by applicable securities laws. The forward-looking information and statements contained herein are expressly qualified in their entirety by this cautionary statement.

CU-2619: MOA Bay Mining Company, Improved Real Property, Oriente, Republic of Cuba, US$88,349,000.00.  Link To Claim Filing In PDF Format 

Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy: A further example of the accounting and legal complexities that will be involved in Cuban settlements is the case of Moa Bay Mining Company, which claimed $88.3 million in confiscation losses. The company was wholly owned by Freeport Nickel Company, a subsidiary of Freeport Sulphur Corporation. Freeport Sulphur merged with McMoRan Oil & Gas, LLC in 1998 but remained a wholly owned subsidiary of the successor company McMoRan Exploration Co. (“McMoRan”). In 2002, McMoRan sold Freeport to a 50–50 joint venture between IMC Global Inc.—the world’s largest purchaser and user of sulphur—and Savage Industries Inc., a major materials management and transportation systems company.  The possible compensation for Moa Bay’s Cuban assets should be of interest to IMC and Savage, as the current value of the confiscated nickel and cobalt mines is estimated at $5–7 billion. Since 1990, Canada’s Sherritt International has invested over half a billion dollars in Freeport’s former mines under a joint venture with the Cuban government, and China is negotiating a similar joint venture. Cuban nickel is considered to be Class II with an average 90 percent nickel plus content. Holguín Province, where the Moa Bay mines are located, is estimated to contain 34 percent of the world’s known reserves of nickel, or some 800 million tons of proven nickel plus cobalt reserves, and another 2.2 billion tons of probable reserves.

Libertad Act 

The Trump Administration has made operational Title III and further implemented Title IV of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”).   

Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.   

Title IV restricts entry into the United States by individuals who have connectivity to unresolved certified claims or non-certified claims.  One Canada-based company and one Spain-based company are currently known to be subject to this provision based upon a certified claim and non-certified claim. 

Suspension History 

Title III was suspended every six months since the Libertad Act was enacted in 1996- by President William J. Clinton (1993-2001), President George W. Bush (2001-2009), President Barack H. Obama (2009-2017), and through the first two years of President Donald J. Trump (2017-2021).  President Joseph Biden (2021-2025) suspended again on 14 January 2025.  On 20 January 2025, President Donald J. Trump (2025-2029) reversed the suspension.   

  • On 16 January 2019, The Honorable Mike Pompeo, United States Secretary of State, reported a suspension for forty-five (45) days. 

  • On 4 March 2019, Secretary Pompeo reported a suspension for thirty (30) days. 

  • On 3 April 2019, Secretary Pompeo reported a further suspension for fourteen (14) days through 1 May 2019. 

  • On 17 April 2019, the Trump Administration reported that it would no longer suspend Title III. 

  • On 2 May 2019, certified claimants and non-certified claimants were permitted to file lawsuits in United States courts. 

Certified Claims Background 

There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC) and have not been resolved for nearing sixty years (some assets were officially confiscated in the 1960’s, some in the 1970’s and some in the 1990’s).  The USFCSC permitted simple interest (not compound interest) of 6% per annum (approximately US$114,132,137.10); with the approximate current value of the 5,913 certified claims is approximately US$9.2 billion.  

The first asset (along with 382 enterprises the same day) to be expropriated by the Republic of Cuba was an oil refinery on 6 August 1960 owned by White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation (USFCSC: CU-1331/CU-1332/CU-1333 valued at US$56,196,422.73).  

From the certified claim filed by Texaco: “The Cuban corporation was intervened on June 29, 1960, pursuant to Resolution 188 of June 28, 1960, under Law 635 of 1959.  Resolution 188 was promulgated by the Government of Cuba when the Cuban corporation assertedly refused to refine certain crude oil as assertedly provided under a 1938 law pertaining to combustible materials.  Subsequently, this Cuban firm was listed as nationalized in Resolution 19 of August 6, 1960, pursuant to Cuban Law 851.  The Commission finds, however, that the Cuban corporation was effectively intervened within the meaning of Title V of the Act by the Government of Cuba on June 29, 1960.” 

The largest certified claim (Cuban Electric Company) valued at US$267,568,413.62 is controlled by Boca Raton, Florida-based Office Depot, Inc.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International; the certified claim also includes land adjacent to the Jose Marti International Airport in Havana, Republic of Cuba.  The third-largest certified claim valued at US$97,373,414.72 is controlled by New York, New York-based North American Sugar Industries, Inc.  The smallest certified claim is by Sara W. Fishman in the amount of US$1.00 with reference to the Cuban-Venezuelan Oil Voting Trust. 

The two (2) largest certified claims total US$449,377,207.76, representing 24% of the total value of the certified claims.  Thirty (30) certified claimants hold 56% of the total value of the certified claims.  This concentration of value creates an efficient pathway towards a settlement.   

Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 requires that an asset had a value of US$50,000.00 when expropriated by the Republic of Cuba without compensation to the original owner.  Of the 5,913 certified claims, 913, or 15%, are valued at US$50,000.00 or more.   

The ITT Corporation Agreement 

In July 1997, then-New York City, New York-based ITT Corporation and then-Amsterdam, the Netherlands-based STET International Netherlands N.V. signed an agreement whereby STET International Netherlands N.V. would pay approximately US$25 million to ITT Corporation for a ten-year right (after which the agreement could be renewed and was renewed) to use assets (telephone facilities and telephone equipment) within the Republic of Cuba upon which ITT Corporation has a certified claim valued at approximately US$130.8 million.  ETECSA, which is now wholly-owned by the government of the Republic of Cuba, was a joint venture controlled by the Ministry of Information and Communications of the Republic of Cuba within which Amsterdam, the Netherlands-based Telecom Italia International N.V. (formerly Stet International Netherlands N.V.), a subsidiary of Rome, Italy-based Telecom Italia S.p.A. was a shareholder.  Telecom Italia S.p.A., was at one time a subsidiary of Ivrea, Italy-based Olivetti S.p.A.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International. 

U.S. Control For Canada's Sherritt And Cuba's Nickel/Cobalt? Ray Washburne, First Trump Administration OPIC President & CEO And Current Chairman Of Sunoco LLC Making An Offer?

DiscoveryAlert.com
By Muflih Hidayat

Sherritt Cuba Mining Deal: Ex-Trump Adviser’s Bold 2026 Bid
When Political Capital Becomes Mining Capital: The Sherritt Cuba Deal Explained


Few industries illustrate the intersection of geopolitics and commodity markets as vividly as mining in sanctioned jurisdictions. The Sherritt Cuba mining business ex-Trump adviser transaction now taking shape represents one of the most unusual episodes in modern mining history. For decades, Western companies operating in countries subject to US sanctions have constructed elaborate corporate architectures, navigated shifting diplomatic winds, and absorbed significant financial penalties to maintain access to mineral deposits that are simply too strategically valuable to abandon.

Understanding Sherritt's Cuban Operations and Why They Matter

To understand what is currently at stake, it is essential to first appreciate the depth of Sherritt International's Cuban footprint. The Toronto-headquartered company has spent roughly three decades building one of the most geopolitically exposed mining portfolios in the Western Hemisphere, centred on Cuba's Moa district, which hosts one of the most significant laterite nickel-cobalt deposits outside of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The core of Sherritt's Cuba business revolves around three interlocking asset positions: Asset Ownership Structure Primary Output

Moa Joint Venture 50% (alongside Cuban state partner) Nickel and cobalt
Energas One-third interest Natural gas and independent power generation
Downstream Refining Integrated processing capacity Finished nickel and cobalt metal products

What makes this portfolio simultaneously valuable and problematic is a single, decades-old carve-out: the United States market remains entirely inaccessible to Sherritt's products, a direct consequence of the sanctions framework that has governed US-Cuba relations since the 1960s. This restriction has shaped every financing decision, every offtake arrangement, and every capital raise Sherritt has executed in its Cuban business life.

The Geological Case for Moa's Strategic Importance

The Moa nickel-cobalt laterite deposit deserves particular attention from a geological perspective. Laterite deposits form through long-term tropical weathering of ultramafic rocks, typically peridotite or serpentinite, producing surface and near-surface concentrations of nickel and cobalt in oxidised mineral forms. The Moa district's ore is primarily processed through High Pressure Acid Leach (HPAL) technology, an energy-intensive hydrometallurgical method that dissolves nickel and cobalt from the ore under high temperature and pressure conditions using concentrated sulfuric acid.

HPAL is the preferred processing route for laterite ores globally because it achieves high recovery rates, typically in the range of 85-90% for nickel and 75-80% for cobalt, but it demands enormous energy inputs at the processing plant level. This technical dependency on consistent, high-volume electricity supply is precisely why Cuba's ongoing energy crisis has been so damaging to Sherritt's operational throughput. The Moa facility requires approximately 120 megawatts of consistent electrical supply to maintain full processing capacity, a level of demand that Cuba's chronically unstable national grid has increasingly struggled to provide.

From a battery metals supply chain perspective, Cuba's cobalt output carries particular strategic weight. Cobalt is a critical cathode material in lithium-ion battery chemistries used across the electric vehicle sector. Furthermore, the critical minerals demand driving the global energy transition has intensified scrutiny of every significant non-African cobalt source, and Cuba represents one of the very few available to Western battery manufacturers seeking geographic supply diversification.

Cuba's Energy Crisis and Its Cascading Impact on Moa

Cuba's deteriorating energy infrastructure has created a compounding operational challenge for Sherritt that extends well beyond simple power interruptions. Fuel supply constraints have forced repeated reductions in HPAL plant throughput, affecting both nickel and cobalt recovery volumes. The island's petroleum supply situation, which worsened significantly after 2019 and has continued to deteriorate through the mid-2020s, has created cascading disruptions across Cuba's entire industrial sector.

Sherritt's response to these challenges has included energy efficiency investments and partial operational deferrals, but the fundamental constraint — inadequate and unreliable electricity supply at the Moa site — cannot be resolved through operational adjustments alone. This context matters enormously when assessing the Gillon Capital transaction, because any new controlling shareholder would inherit not just the legal sanctions exposure but also an operationally constrained asset in a jurisdiction where the host government itself is struggling to maintain basic infrastructure.

The Helms-Burton Act: A 1990s Law With 2026 Consequences

The legal architecture that has defined Sherritt's relationship with the United States market traces back to a piece of 1996 legislation that codified decades of Cuban embargo policy into federal statute. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act, universally known as the Helms-Burton Act, was enacted in February 1996 and represented one of the most aggressive extraterritorial applications of US sanctions law in history.

The legislation operates through several mechanisms, but the most consequential for foreign mining companies is Title III, which grants US nationals the right to pursue civil litigation in US federal courts against any foreign person or entity that knowingly traffics in property confiscated by the Cuban government after January 1, 1959. For Sherritt, whose Cuban operations sit directly on assets that fall squarely within this definition, the exposure has been real and persistent.

The practical consequences for Sherritt over the decades have included: Permanent exclusion from US capital markets and US dollar financing channels:

Inability to engage with US-listed institutional investors in the company's equity; Individual executives historically being barred from entering the United States; Restriction from selling nickel and cobalt products to US-based buyers; Severely limited access to US banking relationships and clearing systems

The Helms-Burton Act's Title III provision enables US nationals to pursue civil legal action against foreign companies operating on formerly American-owned Cuban assets, a mechanism that has placed Sherritt under persistent legal and financial pressure since the late 1990s. The Trump administration's decision in 2019 to activate Title III after years of presidential waivers significantly escalated this exposure.

Sherritt's historical response to this environment involved constructing an offshore subsidiary architecture using entities registered in Barbados, which served as legal intermediaries between the Toronto-listed parent and the Cuban operating entities. However, this buffer has become increasingly inadequate as US sanctions enforcement has grown more sophisticated and aggressive. The critical minerals tariff landscape has, in addition, layered further complexity onto the already strained compliance environment.

The Executive Order That Triggered Corporate Collapse

In May 2026, President Trump signed an executive order that fundamentally altered the sanctions calculus for Sherritt. Unlike the Helms-Burton framework, which targeted companies based on their historical engagement with confiscated properties, the new order broadened punitive reach to a wider class of foreign corporate actors conducting any form of business in Cuba, extending the sanctions perimeter in ways that made Sherritt's existing offshore structures legally untenable.

The immediate corporate fallout was severe: Three board members resigned in rapid succession, reflecting the depth of concern about personal liability exposure; The Chief Financial Officer departed the company, removing a key financial leadership figure at a moment of acute crisis; Sherritt's share price, already trading at penny stock levels, collapsed sharply following the announcement; Management announced plans to relinquish its 50% stake in the Moa Joint Venture and surrender the Energas interest entirely; Then, within days of announcing a full withdrawal, Sherritt reversed course. The company disclosed it was evaluating what it described as a potential value-preserving opportunity, language that foreshadowed the Gillon Capital transaction now under negotiation.

The logic of reversal is instructive. Outright abandonment of assets in a sanctioned jurisdiction is not as simple as it sounds. Cuban state partners hold co-ownership positions that complicate unilateral exit. Furthermore, a structured ownership transfer to a party with US political connectivity offered a potentially cleaner pathway than unilateral dissolution, particularly if that transfer could be structured with explicit non-objection from US regulatory authorities.

Ray Washburne and the Political Calculus of Gillon Capital

The identity of the acquiring party is arguably the most unusual element of this transaction. Ray Washburne is a Texas-based real estate executive whose public profile was significantly elevated during the first Trump administration, when his government roles placed him at the intersection of US development finance and executive branch intelligence advisory functions.

Role Appointing Authority Institutional Significance
Head, Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) President Trump, 2017 Oversaw US government development finance and political risk insurance globally, Member, Presidential Intelligence Advisory Board President Trump Senior advisory role with direct access to intelligence community briefings

Washburne operates through Gillon Capital LLC, a family office investment vehicle through which he has structured the proposed Sherritt transaction.

The OPIC connection deserves particular attention because it is not merely biographical colour. OPIC, now restructured as the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), exists precisely to deploy capital into politically complex, high-risk jurisdictions where conventional private capital is reluctant to operate. Its toolset includes political risk insurance, loan guarantees, and equity co-investments specifically designed for environments characterised by sovereign instability, sanctions risk, and state-partner complexity.

An executive with institutional knowledge of OPIC's operational frameworks would possess unusually relevant expertise for navigating exactly the kind of environment that defines the Sherritt Cuba mining business ex-Trump adviser transaction. Consequently, this is not incidental — the situation combines sovereign co-ownership dynamics, active sanctions exposure, and operational risk in a politically closed economy in ways that mirror the types of transactions OPIC was specifically built to evaluate.

Deal Structure: How the Warrant-Based Transaction Works

The mechanics of the proposed transaction reflect a sophisticated approach to managing regulatory and valuation uncertainty. Rather than a straightforward share acquisition, the deal is structured around a warrant-based private placement, a mechanism that has specific advantages in the current context.

The key structural parameters disclosed by Sherritt include: Instrument: Warrant-based private placement (not direct share purchase); Target ownership: Gillon Capital would acquire sufficient common shares to reach 55% of Sherritt on a fully exercised basis; Exercise price: Expected to be set at a discount to Sherritt's May 15, 2026 closing price; Market reaction: Sherritt shares rose approximately 9% in early New York trading following the announcement.

The warrant structure serves several functions simultaneously. First, it allows Gillon Capital to stage its economic commitment, preserving optionality if regulatory conditions shift. Second, it allows the transaction to proceed without requiring immediate full payment, giving both parties time to navigate the regulatory engagement process. Third, the discount to the May 15 closing price provides Gillon Capital a margin of safety given the share price volatility that preceded and followed the executive order shock.

What US Government Non-Objection Actually Means

Sherritt confirmed that it has engaged constructively with the US Department of State, which confirmed no objections to Gillon Capital's engagement. Both the Department of State and the Department of Treasury have indicated they do not view the current negotiations as contrary to US law.

A statement of non-objection from the State Department and Treasury is not a formal sanctions licence or legal clearance. It represents a preliminary signal that the transaction structure, as currently described, does not appear to conflict with existing US sanctions regulations. The distinction matters significantly for ongoing due diligence and deal execution risk assessment.

The critical regulatory institution in this context is the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) at the US Treasury, which administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions. The non-objection signals from State and Treasury suggest preliminary regulatory alignment, not a concluded compliance determination. The broader geopolitical mining landscape in 2025 and 2026 has, however, shown that such preliminary alignments can shift rapidly as political priorities evolve.

Precedents: When Political Ownership Restructuring Has Been Used Before

The Sherritt situation is unusual but not entirely without precedent. Several historical cases illustrate how ownership restructuring has been deployed as a mechanism to resolve sanctions complications in extractive industries:

Rusal and EN+ (2018-2019): Following OFAC sanctions on Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska, the world's second-largest aluminium producer underwent a complex ownership restructuring specifically designed to dilute Deripaska's control below sanctionable ownership thresholds. The restructuring ultimately achieved sanctions removal through negotiated equity dilution.

Vedanta and Zambia Copper (2023): Government-driven restructuring of a major copper producer in a politically sensitive African jurisdiction demonstrated how sovereign co-ownership dynamics can reshape foreign-controlled mining ventures under pressure, with the host state ultimately exercising disproportionate influence over the outcome.

Turquoise Hill and the Oyu Tolgoi Structure: The lengthy dispute between Rio Tinto, Turquoise Hill, and the Mongolian government over the Oyu Tolgoi copper-gold mine illustrated how minority sovereign partners can exercise veto power over operational and ownership decisions far beyond what their equity percentage would suggest, particularly when the host state views the asset as nationally strategic.

The lesson across all three cases is consistent: the legal mechanics of ownership transfer are secondary to the willingness of the host sovereign to accept the new ownership configuration. In the Sherritt context, this means Cuban state acceptance of US-connected controlling ownership is the most important variable in the entire transaction.

Key Risks That Could Prevent Deal Completion

Investors and observers evaluating this transaction should weigh a differentiated risk matrix rather than treating US regulatory non-objection as the primary variable:

Risk Category Description Assessment
Cuban state consent The Cuban government may resist or complicate foreign ownership restructuring involving US-connected parties Structurally complex, no clear precedent
US policy reversal Sanctions posture shifts before warrants are exercised Medium, dependent on Trump administration policy continuity
Operational deterioration Continued fuel constraints reduce asset value before deal closes Medium-High given existing trajectory
Helms-Burton third-party claims Independent claimants may pursue Title III litigation regardless of ownership change Medium, structurally independent of transaction
Warrant pricing disputes Share price movements may create disagreements over exercise price calculations Lower probability but possible

The Cuban sovereign partner dynamic deserves emphasis because it is the risk that receives the least analytical attention relative to its actual importance. Cuba accepting a US-connected entity as the controlling shareholder of its primary foreign mining partner would represent a geopolitically extraordinary decision. Whether the Cuban government views the Gillon Capital transaction as acceptable pragmatism or unacceptable encroachment will likely prove more determinative than any US regulatory outcome.

Battery Metals Implications: What a Sherritt Ownership Change Means for Supply Chains

Beyond the corporate drama, the Sherritt situation carries genuine implications for global battery metals supply chains. Cuba's Moa district is one of the Western Hemisphere's most significant sources of Class I nickel and cobalt, and the trajectory of its ownership matters to anyone tracking critical mineral supply diversification. In addition, global cobalt production remains heavily concentrated in the Democratic Republic of Congo, making alternative sources like Moa strategically significant.

If the Gillon Capital transaction closes and a US-connected controlling owner stabilises Sherritt's Cuban operations, several supply chain dynamics could shift: Previously inaccessible US capital markets could potentially become available for operational investment, addressing the chronic undercapitalisation that has contributed to production declines; Technology partnerships with US-based engineering and process improvement companies, currently restricted by sanctions, could theoretically become accessible; Offtake arrangements with US battery manufacturers or their supply chain partners might become structurally possible for the first time; Cuban cobalt would gain a clearer pathway toward qualifying as a non-DRC source for Western battery manufacturers seeking to reduce supply chain concentration.

However, Cuban state co-ownership of the Moa Joint Venture means none of these potential changes flow automatically from a Sherritt-level ownership restructuring. Every material operational change would still require Cuban state partner engagement and approval.

Three Scenarios for Sherritt's Future

Scenario 1: Deal Closes, US-Connected Ownership Stabilises Operations. Gillon Capital exercises its warrants, acquires 55% control, and leverages Washington relationships to negotiate a durable operating framework. Cuban state partners accept the new configuration on pragmatic economic grounds. Moa output stabilises as capital access improves and operational investment resumes.

Scenario 2: Deal Stalls, Exit Planning Resumes. Regulatory complications, Cuban sovereign resistance, or warrant pricing disputes prevent deal closure. Sherritt reverts to its original exit strategy, triggering renewed share price pressure and potential asset write-downs in a jurisdiction where recovery of asset value through conventional legal mechanisms is structurally improbable.

Scenario 3: Partial Transaction, Hybrid Ownership Emerges. Warrants are partially exercised, creating a minority US-connected position without full control transfer. This hybrid outcome preserves optionality for all parties while leaving the fundamental sanctions exposure unresolved and creating a structurally ambiguous arrangement that satisfies neither the US regulatory agenda nor the Cuban state's interest in a stable, committed foreign partner.

The trade war impacts of 2025 have, furthermore, demonstrated that geopolitically motivated corporate restructurings are increasingly common in extractive industries, as companies seek to reposition assets along politically acceptable ownership lines. The Sherritt Cuba mining business ex-Trump adviser deal is, in many respects, a product of this broader realignment.

This unique situation is examined in further detail by the Financial Post, which has tracked the evolving sanctions calculus and corporate response throughout 2026.

The Sherritt-Gillon Capital transaction is less a conventional mining acquisition and more a geopolitical arbitrage attempt- an effort to use political connectivity to transform what has been an intractable sanctions problem into a manageable regulatory relationship. Whether that transformation proves achievable depends as much on calculations being made in Havana as on signals emanating from Washington.

CU-2619: MOA Bay Mining Company, Improved Real Property, Oriente, Republic of Cuba, US$88,349,000.00.  Link To Claim Filing In PDF Format 

Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy: A further example of the accounting and legal complexities that will be involved in Cuban settlements is the case of Moa Bay Mining Company, which claimed $88.3 million in confiscation losses. The company was wholly owned by Freeport Nickel Company, a subsidiary of Freeport Sulphur Corporation. Freeport Sulphur merged with McMoRan Oil & Gas, LLC in 1998 but remained a wholly owned subsidiary of the successor company McMoRan Exploration Co. (“McMoRan”). In 2002, McMoRan sold Freeport to a 50–50 joint venture between IMC Global Inc.—the world’s largest purchaser and user of sulphur—and Savage Industries Inc., a major materials management and transportation systems company.  The possible compensation for Moa Bay’s Cuban assets should be of interest to IMC and Savage, as the current value of the confiscated nickel and cobalt mines is estimated at $5–7 billion. Since 1990, Canada’s Sherritt International has invested over half a billion dollars in Freeport’s former mines under a joint venture with the Cuban government, and China is negotiating a similar joint venture. Cuban nickel is considered to be Class II with an average 90 percent nickel plus content. Holguín Province, where the Moa Bay mines are located, is estimated to contain 34 percent of the world’s known reserves of nickel, or some 800 million tons of proven nickel plus cobalt reserves, and another 2.2 billion tons of probable reserves.

Libertad Act 

The Trump Administration has made operational Title III and further implemented Title IV of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”).   

Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.   

Title IV restricts entry into the United States by individuals who have connectivity to unresolved certified claims or non-certified claims.  One Canada-based company and one Spain-based company are currently known to be subject to this provision based upon a certified claim and non-certified claim. 

Suspension History 

Title III was suspended every six months since the Libertad Act was enacted in 1996- by President William J. Clinton (1993-2001), President George W. Bush (2001-2009), President Barack H. Obama (2009-2017), and through the first two years of President Donald J. Trump (2017-2021).  President Joseph Biden (2021-2025) suspended again on 14 January 2025.  On 20 January 2025, President Donald J. Trump (2025-2029) reversed the suspension.   

  • On 16 January 2019, The Honorable Mike Pompeo, United States Secretary of State, reported a suspension for forty-five (45) days. 

  • On 4 March 2019, Secretary Pompeo reported a suspension for thirty (30) days. 

  • On 3 April 2019, Secretary Pompeo reported a further suspension for fourteen (14) days through 1 May 2019. 

  • On 17 April 2019, the Trump Administration reported that it would no longer suspend Title III. 

  • On 2 May 2019, certified claimants and non-certified claimants were permitted to file lawsuits in United States courts. 

Certified Claims Background 

There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC) and have not been resolved for nearing sixty years (some assets were officially confiscated in the 1960’s, some in the 1970’s and some in the 1990’s).  The USFCSC permitted simple interest (not compound interest) of 6% per annum (approximately US$114,132,137.10); with the approximate current value of the 5,913 certified claims is approximately US$9.2 billion.  

The first asset (along with 382 enterprises the same day) to be expropriated by the Republic of Cuba was an oil refinery on 6 August 1960 owned by White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation (USFCSC: CU-1331/CU-1332/CU-1333 valued at US$56,196,422.73).  

From the certified claim filed by Texaco: “The Cuban corporation was intervened on June 29, 1960, pursuant to Resolution 188 of June 28, 1960, under Law 635 of 1959.  Resolution 188 was promulgated by the Government of Cuba when the Cuban corporation assertedly refused to refine certain crude oil as assertedly provided under a 1938 law pertaining to combustible materials.  Subsequently, this Cuban firm was listed as nationalized in Resolution 19 of August 6, 1960, pursuant to Cuban Law 851.  The Commission finds, however, that the Cuban corporation was effectively intervened within the meaning of Title V of the Act by the Government of Cuba on June 29, 1960.” 

The largest certified claim (Cuban Electric Company) valued at US$267,568,413.62 is controlled by Boca Raton, Florida-based Office Depot, Inc.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International; the certified claim also includes land adjacent to the Jose Marti International Airport in Havana, Republic of Cuba.  The third-largest certified claim valued at US$97,373,414.72 is controlled by New York, New York-based North American Sugar Industries, Inc.  The smallest certified claim is by Sara W. Fishman in the amount of US$1.00 with reference to the Cuban-Venezuelan Oil Voting Trust. 

The two (2) largest certified claims total US$449,377,207.76, representing 24% of the total value of the certified claims.  Thirty (30) certified claimants hold 56% of the total value of the certified claims.  This concentration of value creates an efficient pathway towards a settlement.   

Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 requires that an asset had a value of US$50,000.00 when expropriated by the Republic of Cuba without compensation to the original owner.  Of the 5,913 certified claims, 913, or 15%, are valued at US$50,000.00 or more.   

The ITT Corporation Agreement 

In July 1997, then-New York City, New York-based ITT Corporation and then-Amsterdam, the Netherlands-based STET International Netherlands N.V. signed an agreement whereby STET International Netherlands N.V. would pay approximately US$25 million to ITT Corporation for a ten-year right (after which the agreement could be renewed and was renewed) to use assets (telephone facilities and telephone equipment) within the Republic of Cuba upon which ITT Corporation has a certified claim valued at approximately US$130.8 million.  ETECSA, which is now wholly-owned by the government of the Republic of Cuba, was a joint venture controlled by the Ministry of Information and Communications of the Republic of Cuba within which Amsterdam, the Netherlands-based Telecom Italia International N.V. (formerly Stet International Netherlands N.V.), a subsidiary of Rome, Italy-based Telecom Italia S.p.A. was a shareholder.  Telecom Italia S.p.A., was at one time a subsidiary of Ivrea, Italy-based Olivetti S.p.A.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International. 

In 632-Word Statement For Cuba Independence Day, President Trump Uses Words: Economy- Once, Financial- Twice, Own- Once, Profit- Once, Prosperity- Twice

Today, we commemorate Cuban Independence Day—the 124th anniversary of a once free nation’s birth, forged through sacrifice, courage, and an unbreakable desire for liberty.  Like the American patriots who cast off tyrannical rule 250 years ago, Cuba’s founding generation rose against the Spanish Empire’s subjugation to claim the same birthright our citizens enjoy today:  the right of a free people to govern themselves.  Their journey echoes our own, and their dream of freedom remains as vital today as it was when they first dared to fight for it.

Across generations, the Cuban people have demonstrated an unyielding devotion to the cause of freedom and a resilience of spirit that no regime—past or present—has been able to extinguish.  On May 20, 1902, that defiant vision was realized when the Republic of Cuba was established, marking the beginning of self-government for our island neighbors.  The Cuban people’s love of liberty, ingenuity, hard work, and great faith in God carried them through the first half of the 20th century—and to this day, these time-honored values continue to live on in their hearts.

The regime in Havana today is the direct betrayal of the nation their founding patriots bled and died for.  For nearly seven decades, the island’s communist government has violently dismantled political freedom, denied its people fair elections, viciously silenced dissent, and strangled the Cuban economy into a state of collapse.  While the people suffer, the regime’s kleptocratic elite have hoarded the island’s remaining resources for themselves and their lavish lifestyle.  In the way of all radical leftist ideologies, the regime has quashed any hope of prosperity, banished the notion of human dignity, and starved the hopes and dreams of its people.  Its military leaders have demonstrated zero care for ensuring the prosperity of the Cuban people, channeling their attention instead only towards maintaining control and the regime’s raison detre of violently exporting communism and despotism abroad. 

As President, I am taking decisive action on behalf of this long-suffering corner of our hemisphere, and to address threats to our national security emanating from the region.  Under my leadership, our Nation is severing the financial lifelines that, for too long, have sustained brutal regimes across Central and South America and funded their trans-national criminal and terrorist operations that threaten the United States.  In January, our Nation’s incredible Armed Forces carried out one of the boldest, most impressive special operations in generations—the capture and extradition of the Venezuelan narcoterrorist, Nicolas Maduro.  The indictment and removal of Maduro sent a clear message to his socialist allies in Havana: this is our Hemisphere and those that destabilize it and threaten the United States will face consequences. 

Following the Maduro raid, I have enacted powerful new sanctions on Cuba’s military and intelligence apparatus, and those who provide it with material and financial support, depriving the regime of resources and its elites from the opportunity to profit from the people’s suffering. My commitment is ironclad:  America will not tolerate a rogue state harboring hostile foreign military, intelligence and terror operations just ninety miles from the American homeland, and we will not rest until the people of Cuba once again have the freedom their forefathers fought so valiantly to establish over 100 years ago.

On this Cuban Independence Day, our Republic stands in solidarity with the Cuban people and with the millions of Cuban-Americans who have so profoundly enriched the life of our Nation.  Many of them came to these shores with nothing, built extraordinary lives, and embraced with their whole hearts the constitutional way of life that makes America the greatest country on earth.  Today, we salute them and remember all those who have sacrificed for a free Cuba, and we look with confidence toward a new Golden Age for the island and its people.

In 766-Word Statement, Secretary Rubio Mentioned: Bank- Twice, Business- Four Times, Company Three Times, And Own- Six Times. That Is A Message To United States Companies

Marco Rubio, United States Secretary of State
Washington DC

Secretary Rubio’s Message to the Cuban People on Their Independence Day
May 20, 2026


Today, Secretary of State Marco Rubio delivered a video message to the people of Cuba, reaffirming the unwavering support of the United States for the Cuban people in their pursuit of freedom, dignity, and self-determination.  In his remarks, Secretary Rubio addressed the continued suffering endured by the Cuban people after 67 years of tyranny, censorship, and human rights abuses by the illegitimate regime.  A courtesy translation of the Secretary’s video message is below..  

TRANSLATED TRANSCRIPT 

On a day like today, in 1902, the Cuban flag flew for the first time over an independent country. But I know that today, you, who call the island your home, are going through unimaginable hardships. Today I want to share with you the truth about the reason for your suffering. And I want to tell you what we, in the U.S., are offering to help you not only alleviate the current crisis, but also to build a better future. 

The reason you are forced to survive 22 hours a day without electricity is not due to an oil “blockade” by the U.S. As you know, better than anyone, you have been suffering from blackouts for years. 

The real reason you don’t have electricity, fuel, or food is because those who control your country have plundered billions of dollars, but nothing has been used to help the people. 

Thirty years ago, Raúl Castro founded a company called GAESA. This company is owned and operated by the Armed Forces, and has revenues three times greater than your current government’s budget. Today, while you suffer, these businessmen have $18 billion dollars in assets and control 70% of Cuba’s economy. They profit from hotels, construction, banks, stores and even from the money your relatives send you from the U.S. everything, everything passes through their hands. From those remittances they retain a percentage, but from GAESA’s profits nothing reaches you. 

Instead of using the money to buy oil, like all other countries in the world, they depended on free oil from Hugo Chávez and Maduro to keep the money. But now that the free oil has stopped coming, they buy fuel for their generators and their vehicles while the people are asked to sacrifice. 

Instead of using the money to maintain and modernize the damaged power plants, they use the money to build more hotels for foreigners and to send their relatives to live in luxury in Madrid and even here in the United States. 

Today, Cuba is not controlled by any “revolution.” Cuba is controlled by GAESA. A “state within the state” that is accountable to no one and hoards the profits from its businesses for the benefit of a small elite. And the only role played by the so-called “government” is to demand that you continue making “sacrifices” and repressing anyone who dares to complain. 

President Trump is offering a new relationship between the U.S. and Cuba. But it must be directly with you, the Cuban people, not with GAESA. 

First, we are offering $100 million dollars in food and medicine for you, the people. But they must be distributed directly to the Cuban people by the Catholic Church or other trusted charitable groups. Not stolen by GAESA to sell in one of their stores. 

But, the Cuban people are not interested in permanent charity. You want the opportunity to live in your own country the way your relatives live in the U.S. or in other countries of the world. 

Today, from media to entertainment, from the private sector to politics, and from music to sports, Cubans have reached the top of virtually ALL industries, in all countries, except one… Cuba. 

Today in Cuba, only those close to the GAESA elite or who are part of it can have profitable businesses. 

But President Trump is offering a new path between the U.S. and a new Cuba. 

A new Cuba where you, the ordinary Cuban, and not just GAESA, can own a gas station or a clothing store, or a restaurant. 

A new Cuba where you, and not just GAESA, can open a bank or have a construction company. 

A new Cuba where you, and not just the Communist Party of Cuba, can own a television station or a newspaper. 

A new Cuba where you can complain about a failing system, without fear of going to jail or being forced to leave your island. 

And a new Cuba where you have a real opportunity to choose who governs your country and vote to replace them if they are not doing a good job. 

This is not impossible. All of this exists in the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and even just 90 miles away, in Florida. If owning your own business and having the right to vote is possible around Cuba, why is it not possible for you in Cuba? 

In the U.S. we are ready to open a new chapter in the relationship between our people and our countries. 

And, currently, the only thing standing in the way of a better future are those who control your country. 

Canada's Sherritt International Corporation Pauses "Dissolution And Disclaimer Steps" For Its Assets And Operations In Cuba. Potential Title III Settlement?

TORONTO – Sherritt International Corporation (“Sherritt” or the “Corporation“) (TSX:S) is providing an update further to its news release on May 15, 2026. As described in such news release, the Corporation is seeking to take the necessary and most appropriate actions to definitively address the practical effect of the U.S. administration’s May 1, 2026 Executive Order expanding sanctions against Cuba (the “Executive Order“).

Following further and ongoing consultation with advisors, stakeholders and relevant governmental authorities, and in light of additional information currently available to the Corporation, Sherritt is no longer proceeding with the dissolution and disclaimer steps relating to its interests in Cuba as described in the May 15th news release, including the dissolution of the joint venture with General Nickel Company S.A. of Cuba, and will not proceed with its application to the Alberta Court of King’s Bench.

Sherritt is maintaining its suspension of direct participation in joint venture activities in Cuba and will continue to work with stakeholders and advisors to implement appropriate steps to address the Executive Order as soon as practicable, including through ongoing positive engagement with relevant governmental authorities. Sherritt has also been presented on a preliminary basis with a potential value preserving opportunity that the Corporation is working closely with its advisors to evaluate. There can be no assurance however that any such steps or transaction will be achieved or achieved in a timely manner. In addition, the timing, structure and terms of any such steps or transaction are complex and not yet final.

While the Corporation continues to actively consider and engage with stakeholders to address the Executive Order, unless and until these matters are resolved, Sherritt faces a number of acute operational, financial and legal difficulties including the ability to comply with its debt covenants.

The Corporation will continue to provide information on material developments to its shareholders and other stakeholders.

About Sherritt

Sherritt is a world leader in using hydrometallurgical processes to mine and refine nickel and cobalt – metals deemed critical for the energy transition. Leveraging its technical expertise and decades of experience in critical minerals processing, Sherritt is committed to expanding domestic refining capacity and reducing reliance on foreign sources. The Corporation operates a strategically important refinery in Alberta, Canada, recognized as the only significant cobalt refinery and one of just three nickel refineries in North America.  Sherritt’s common shares are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbol “S”.

Forward-Looking Statements

Certain statements and other information included in this press release may constitute “forward -looking information” or “forward-looking statements” (collectively, “forward-looking statements”) under applicable securities laws (such statements are often accompanied by words such as “anticipate”, “forecast”, “expect”, “believe”, “may”, “will”, “should”, “estimate”, “intend” or other similar words). All statements in this press release, other than those relating to historical information, are forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements in this press release include, without limitation, statements regarding the impact of the Executive Order on the Corporation and the Corporation’s plans with respect to its Cuban interests, including any potential transaction.

The Corporation cautions readers of this press release not to place undue reliance on any forward-looking statement as a number of factors could cause actual future results, conditions, actions or events to differ materially from the targets, expectations, estimates or intentions expressed in the forward-looking statements. Such factors include, without limitation, continued risks related to Sherritt’s operations in Cuba and future actions taken by the U.S. government toward Cuba, including with respect to the Executive Order; level of liquidity of Sherritt, including access to capital and financing; the risk to or loss of Sherritt’s entitlements to future distributions (including pursuant to the Cobalt Swap) from the Moa JV; the inability of the Corporation to comply with debt restrictions and covenants; the inability of the Corporation to comply with the listing requirements of the Toronto Stock Exchange or another recognized stock exchange; uncertainty in the ability of the Corporation to enforce legal rights in foreign jurisdictions including as it relates to the intended outcome of dissolving and surrendering the Corporation’s interests in Cuba; uncertainty regarding the interpretation and/or application of the applicable laws in foreign jurisdictions; tax risks, including as it relates to the dissolution and surrender of the Corporation’s interests in Cuba and implementation of related steps; political, economic and other risks of foreign operations; security market fluctuations and price volatility; risks related to environmental liabilities including liability for reclamation costs, tailings facility failures and toxic gas releases; compliance with applicable environment, health and safety legislation and other associated matters; risks associated with governmental regulations regarding climate change and greenhouse gas emissions; risks relating to community relations; maintaining social license to grow and operate; risks associated with the operation of large projects generally; the ability to replace depleted mineral reserves; risks associated with the Corporation’s joint venture partners; risks associated with mining, processing and refining activities; reliance on key personnel and skilled workers; risks related to the Corporation’s corporate structure; foreign exchange and pricing risks; credit risks; future market access; interest rate changes; risks in obtaining insurance; uncertainties in labour relations; legal contingencies; risks related to the Corporation’s accounting policies; uncertainty in the ability of the Corporation to obtain government permits; failure to comply with, or changes to, applicable government regulations. The key risks and uncertainties should be considered in conjunction with the risk factors described in the Corporation’s other documents filed with the Canadian securities authorities, including without limitation the “Managing Risk” section of the Management’s Discussion and Analysis for the three months and year ended December 31, 2025 and the Annual Information Form of the Corporation dated March 23, 2026 for the period ending December 31, 2025, which is available on SEDAR+ at www.sedarplus.ca. The forward-looking information and statements contained in this press release are made as of the date hereof and the Corporation undertakes no obligation to update publicly or revise any oral or written forward-looking information or statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as required by applicable securities laws. The forward-looking information and statements contained herein are expressly qualified in their entirety by this cautionary statement.

Libertad Act Permits Private Settlements By Claimants With Trafficker

CU-2619: MOA Bay Mining Company, Improved Real Property, Oriente, Republic of Cuba, US$88,349,000.00.  Link To Claim Filing In PDF Format 

Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy: A further example of the accounting and legal complexities that will be involved in Cuban settlements is the case of Moa Bay Mining Company, which claimed $88.3 million in confiscation losses. The company was wholly owned by Freeport Nickel Company, a subsidiary of Freeport Sulphur Corporation. Freeport Sulphur merged with McMoRan Oil & Gas, LLC in 1998 but remained a wholly owned subsidiary of the successor company McMoRan Exploration Co. (“McMoRan”). In 2002, McMoRan sold Freeport to a 50–50 joint venture between IMC Global Inc.—the world’s largest purchaser and user of sulphur—and Savage Industries Inc., a major materials management and transportation systems company.  The possible compensation for Moa Bay’s Cuban assets should be of interest to IMC and Savage, as the current value of the confiscated nickel and cobalt mines is estimated at $5–7 billion. Since 1990, Canada’s Sherritt International has invested over half a billion dollars in Freeport’s former mines under a joint venture with the Cuban government, and China is negotiating a similar joint venture. Cuban nickel is considered to be Class II with an average 90 percent nickel plus content. Holguín Province, where the Moa Bay mines are located, is estimated to contain 34 percent of the world’s known reserves of nickel, or some 800 million tons of proven nickel plus cobalt reserves, and another 2.2 billion tons of probable reserves.

Potential Option For Sherritt International Corporation 

The Trump Administration has made operational Title III and further implemented Title IV of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”).   

Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.   

Title IV restricts entry into the United States by individuals who have connectivity to unresolved certified claims or non-certified claims.  One Canada-based company and one Spain-based company are currently known to be subject to this provision based upon a certified claim and non-certified claim. 

Suspension History 

Title III was suspended every six months since the Libertad Act was enacted in 1996- by President William J. Clinton (1993-2001), President George W. Bush (2001-2009), President Barack H. Obama (2009-2017), and through the first two years of President Donald J. Trump (2017-2021).  President Joseph Biden (2021-2025) suspended again on 14 January 2025.  On 20 January 2025, President Donald J. Trump (2025-2029) reversed the suspension.   

  • On 16 January 2019, The Honorable Mike Pompeo, United States Secretary of State, reported a suspension for forty-five (45) days. 

  • On 4 March 2019, Secretary Pompeo reported a suspension for thirty (30) days. 

  • On 3 April 2019, Secretary Pompeo reported a further suspension for fourteen (14) days through 1 May 2019. 

  • On 17 April 2019, the Trump Administration reported that it would no longer suspend Title III. 

  • On 2 May 2019, certified claimants and non-certified claimants were permitted to file lawsuits in United States courts. 

Certified Claims Background 

There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC) and have not been resolved for nearing sixty years (some assets were officially confiscated in the 1960’s, some in the 1970’s and some in the 1990’s).  The USFCSC permitted simple interest (not compound interest) of 6% per annum (approximately US$114,132,137.10); with the approximate current value of the 5,913 certified claims is approximately US$9.2 billion.  

The first asset (along with 382 enterprises the same day) to be expropriated by the Republic of Cuba was an oil refinery on 6 August 1960 owned by White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation (USFCSC: CU-1331/CU-1332/CU-1333 valued at US$56,196,422.73).  

From the certified claim filed by Texaco: “The Cuban corporation was intervened on June 29, 1960, pursuant to Resolution 188 of June 28, 1960, under Law 635 of 1959.  Resolution 188 was promulgated by the Government of Cuba when the Cuban corporation assertedly refused to refine certain crude oil as assertedly provided under a 1938 law pertaining to combustible materials.  Subsequently, this Cuban firm was listed as nationalized in Resolution 19 of August 6, 1960, pursuant to Cuban Law 851.  The Commission finds, however, that the Cuban corporation was effectively intervened within the meaning of Title V of the Act by the Government of Cuba on June 29, 1960.” 

The largest certified claim (Cuban Electric Company) valued at US$267,568,413.62 is controlled by Boca Raton, Florida-based Office Depot, Inc.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International; the certified claim also includes land adjacent to the Jose Marti International Airport in Havana, Republic of Cuba.  The third-largest certified claim valued at US$97,373,414.72 is controlled by New York, New York-based North American Sugar Industries, Inc.  The smallest certified claim is by Sara W. Fishman in the amount of US$1.00 with reference to the Cuban-Venezuelan Oil Voting Trust. 

The two (2) largest certified claims total US$449,377,207.76, representing 24% of the total value of the certified claims.  Thirty (30) certified claimants hold 56% of the total value of the certified claims.  This concentration of value creates an efficient pathway towards a settlement.   

Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 requires that an asset had a value of US$50,000.00 when expropriated by the Republic of Cuba without compensation to the original owner.  Of the 5,913 certified claims, 913, or 15%, are valued at US$50,000.00 or more.   

The ITT Corporation Agreement 

In July 1997, then-New York City, New York-based ITT Corporation and then-Amsterdam, the Netherlands-based STET International Netherlands N.V. signed an agreement whereby STET International Netherlands N.V. would pay approximately US$25 million to ITT Corporation for a ten-year right (after which the agreement could be renewed and was renewed) to use assets (telephone facilities and telephone equipment) within the Republic of Cuba upon which ITT Corporation has a certified claim valued at approximately US$130.8 million.  ETECSA, which is now wholly-owned by the government of the Republic of Cuba, was a joint venture controlled by the Ministry of Information and Communications of the Republic of Cuba within which Amsterdam, the Netherlands-based Telecom Italia International N.V. (formerly Stet International Netherlands N.V.), a subsidiary of Rome, Italy-based Telecom Italia S.p.A. was a shareholder.  Telecom Italia S.p.A., was at one time a subsidiary of Ivrea, Italy-based Olivetti S.p.A.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International. 

U.S. Department Of State Sanctions Cuba Government Officials And Cuba Government Entities

Marco Rubio, Secretary of State
Further U.S. Sanctions on Cuban Regime Elites
May 18, 2026


The Trump Administration continues to take decisive action to protect U.S. national security and deprive Cuba’s communist regime and military of access to illicit assets.  Today, pursuant to President Trump’s Executive Order 14404 of May 1, 2026, “Imposing Sanctions on Those Responsible for Repression in Cuba and for Threats to United States National Security and Foreign Policy,” I designated 11 Cuban regime elites and three government organizations, including government officials and military figures associated with Cuba’s security apparatus, many of whom are responsible for or have been involved in repressing the Cuban people.   

These sanctions advance the Trump Administration’s comprehensive campaign to address the pressing national security threats posed by Cuba’s communist regime and to hold accountable both the regime and those who provide it material support.  Regime-aligned actors such as those designated today bear responsibility for the suffering of the Cuban people, the failing Cuban economy, and the exploitation of Cuba for foreign intelligence, military, and terror operations.  Today’s designations further restrict the Cuban regime’s ability to suppress the will of the Cuban people.  Additional sanctions actions can be expected in the following days and weeks.    

The Department’s action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14404, which authorizes sweeping sanctions on Cuba, including persons who support the Cuban regime’s security apparatus and those responsible for repression in Cuba and threats to U.S. national security. This action also furthers both Executive Order 14380, “Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba” and National Security Presidential Memorandum 5 (NSPM-5), which directs the Executive Branch to improve human rights, encourage the rule of law, foster free markets and free enterprise, and promote democracy in Cuba. See related Fact Sheet. 

Sanctions to Counter Threats Posed by the Cuban Regime Fact Sheet
Fact Sheet
May 18, 2026


Today, the Department of State is sanctioning 11 Cuban regime-aligned actors and three entities in furtherance of the Trump Administration’s comprehensive campaign to address the pressing national security threats posed by Cuba’s communist regime and hold accountable the regime and those who provide it material or financial support.     

For more than 60 years, the Cuban regime has prioritized its Communist ideology and personal wealth over the well-being of its own citizens while allowing for the exploitation of Cuba for foreign intelligence, military, and terror operations.  The United States will continue to take action to counter the Cuban regime, those furthering its goals, and those abroad enabling the elites to profit while the Cuban people suffer.  

Today, all Department of State targets are being sanctioned pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14404, which authorizes sanctions on persons determined to meet specified criteria related to repression in Cuba and threats to U.S. national security.   

Taking Action Against the Cuban Regime 

The Department of State is designating 11 regime-aligned elites associated with Cuba’s security apparatus, as well as three Cuban government bodies.  

The following entities are being designated pursuant to Section 2 (a)(i)(F) of E.O. 14404 for being a political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the Government of Cuba: 

The MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OF CUBA (MININT), which is an agency of the Government of Cuba responsible for Cuba’s internal security, to include controlling Cuba’s police, internal security forces, intelligence agencies, and the country’s prison system.  Today’s action expands upon MININT’s prior designation pursuant to E.O. 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act;  The POLICIA NACIONAL REVOLUCIONARIA (PNR), which is a police force under MININT accused of operating mobile prisons and violent suppression of protests.  Today’s action expands upon the PNR’s prior designation pursuant to E.O. 13818; and The DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE OF CUBA (DGI), which is the primary intelligence agency of the Government of Cuba under MININT. 

The following actors are being designated pursuant to Sec. 2 (a)(i)(E) of E.O. 14404 for being or having been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of the Government of Cuba or an entity whose property or interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14404: 

EDDY MANUEL SIERRA ARIAS (SIERRA), the Chief of the General Directorate of the PNR, which is being concurrently designated pursuant to E.O. 14404.  Today’s designation of SIERRA builds upon his prior designation pursuant to E.O. 13818; 
OSCAR ALEJANDRO CALLEJAS VALCARCE (CALLEJAS), the Chief of the Political Directorate of the concurrently designated MININT and the former Director of the also concurrently designated PNR.  Today’s designation of CALLEJAS expands upon his prior designation pursuant to E.O. 13818; ROSABEL GAMON VERDE, the Minister of Justice of Cuba; JOAQUIN QUINTAS SOLA, the Deputy Minister of Cuba’s Revolutionary Armed Forces; JUAN ESTEBAN LAZO HERNANDEZ, the President of Cuba’s National Assembly for People’s Power; VICENTE DE LA O LEVY, the Minister of Energy and Mines of Cuba; MAYRA AREVICH MARIN, the Minister of Communications of Cuba; JOSE MIGUEL GOMEZ DEL VALLIN, the Chief of Staff of Military Counterintelligence; RAUL VILLAR KESSELL, the Chief of the Central Army of Cuba; ROBERTO TOMAS MORALES OJEDA, a member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the Organization of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba; and EUGENIO ARMANDO RABILERO AGUILERA, the Chief of the Eastern Army of Cuba. 

Sanctions Implications  

As a result of today’s sanctions-related actions, and in accordance with Executive Order 14404 of May 1, 2026, “Imposing Sanctions on Those Responsible for Repression in Cuba and for Threats to U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy,” all property and interests in property of the designated persons described above that are in the United States or in possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).  Additionally, all entities that are owned individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. 


All transactions and dealings by U.S. persons or persons within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons are prohibited unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or exempt.  These prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person and the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.  Foreign persons that engage in transactions with persons designated pursuant to E.O. 14404 – or that operate in the energy, defense and related materiel, metals and mining, financial services, or security sector of the Cuban economy, as identified in E.O. 14404 – are themselves at risk of sanctions.  Non-U.S. persons, including foreign financial institutions, should proceed with caution in any dealings with a party sanctioned under this authority.  Actions to return assets to a sanctioned party or transfer them to another jurisdiction for potential use by the target could expose non-U.S. persons to significant sanctions risk.  All property and interests in property of persons that are blocked pursuant to the CACR continue to be blocked.  The CACR prohibits persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction from dealing in property in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest, unless authorized or exempt. 

The power and integrity of U.S. government sanctions derive not only from the U.S. government’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law.  The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior.    

Petitions for removal from the SDN List may be sent to:  OFAC.Reconsideration@treasury.gov.  Petitioners may also refer to the Department of State’s Delisting Guidance page.  

Unfolding Trump-Vance Administration Strategy For Cuba: Eleven Focuses. Do Not Be Shocked If President Diaz-Canel Of Cuba Visits The White House

NOTE: During briefings in South Florida on 6/7/8 May 2026, the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council shared verbally this bullet-point perspective about how the organization views the engagement unfolding by the Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029) and the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2019-2028).  The perspective is updated. 

Do Not Be Shocked If President Diaz-Canel Of Cuba Visits The White House 

Through Fourteen United States Presidential Administrations… With It End With Fifteenth? 

Defining “Transition” Provides President Trump With Elasticity- Unwelcomed For Some Stakeholders 

Impact Of Executive Orders 

Two SCOTUS Opinions 

Raul Castro Indictment Absent The Defendant 

G7 Trio In The Crosshairs: Presents For Carney, Macron, Merz, Sanchez 

5,913 Certified Claimants 

Nomination Of United States Ambassador To Cuba 

Returning Cubans To Cuba And Preventing Cubans From Illegally Entering United States 

President Trump’s Cuba Timeline Is Finish By 12:00 PM On Saturday, 20 January 2029 

In 1992, a diplomat assigned to the United States Interests Section in Havana, Republic of Cuba, shared what was described as a hypothetical statement for appreciating how Fidel Castro, President of the Republic of Cuba (1976-2008), viewed his political relationship with successive occupants of The White House.   

The diplomat created a statement to reflect President Castro.  I am prepared to let my people suffer.  Are you prepared to let my people suffer?  

The answer occupies the tipping point for individuals of Cuban descent residing in the United States.  How much suffering will they accept to be inflicted upon their acquaintances, colleagues, families, and friends?   

The “embargo” (executive orders, policies, regulations, and statutes) by the government of the United States upon the government of the Republic of Cuba commenced in 1960 during the Eisenhower-Nixon Administration (1953-1961).   

  • The trigger was the 1960 expropriation of an oil refinery owned by White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation (USFCSC: CU-1331/CU-1332/CU-1333 valued at US$56,196,422.73).  

It has continued thus far into fifteen (15) United States presidential administrations- eight (8) Republican and seven (7) Democrat.   

  • The “embargo” continued from the Eisenhower-Nixon Administration through the Kennedy-Johnson Administration (1961-1963), Johnson Administration (1963-1965), Johnson-Humphrey Administration (1965-1969), Nixon-Agnew-Ford Administration (1969-1974), Ford-Rockefeller Administration (1974-1977), Carter-Mondale Administration (1977-1981), Reagan-Bush Administration (1981-1989), Bush-Quayle Administration (1989-1993), Clinton-Gore Administration (1993-2001), Bush-Cheney Administration (2001-2009), Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017), Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021), Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025), and thus far continues through into Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029).   

Donald Trump, President of the United States (2017-2021 and 2025-2029), will focus upon being the occupant of the Oval Office who presides at the commercial, economic, financial, military, political, and societal re-engagement with the government of the Republic of Cuba where the dis-engagement began sixty-six years ago with Dwight Eisenhower, President of the United States (1953-1961).  

The coveted Nobel Peace Prize would certainly be within range and reach of President Trump should he preside during the “complete and total” commercial, economic, financial, military, political, and societal re-engagement with the citizens, government, and residents of the Republic of Cuba.    

Maximalist demands from Washington DC and maximalist demands from Havana will shift gradually to achievable, desirable, doable, implementable, and sustainable.  

No one will be entirely satisfied with the outcome, rather outcomes of the conversations, dialogue, discussions, and negotiations by Washington DC and Havana. 

Members of the United States Congress will need to accept and adapt to disappointment.  They will support President Trump regardless of the agreement(s) he endorses with the government of the Republic of Cuba.  Those agreements will be signed not with a regime, but with a government led by Miguel Diaz-Canel, President of the Republic of Cuba (2019-2028).  Members of the United States Congress will swallow hard.  They will be unable to default to a traditional ego-driven position of invincibility.   

Antagonizing President Trump with the message that he did not demand enough, do enough, and go far enough, is risky.  His response could well be- “OK, I will return Nicolas Maduro [President of Venezuela (2013-2026)], to Caracas, and you can have back Joe Biden [President of the United States (2021-2025)].  Is that what you want?  I have done what fourteen presidents could not do.”   

The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”) provides for the president of the United States to define and determine that a “transition government” is operational in the Republic of Cuba.  Individuals who serve in the current government are not prohibited from serving in a transitional government or democratic government. 

President Trump will be elastic in defining “transition” and to defining constraining provisions of the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, Libertad Act, and Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000.  

  • AUTHORIZATION. (1) IN GENERAL. The President shall develop a plan for providing economic assistance to Cuba at such time as the President determines that a transition government or a democratically elected government is in power. 

  • SEC. 204. TERMINATION OF THE ECONOMIC EMBARGO OF CUBA. (a) PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS. Upon submitting a determination to the appropriate congressional committees under section 203(c)(1) that a transition government in Cuba is in power, the President, after consultation with the Congress, is authorized to take steps to suspend the economic embargo of Cuba and to suspend the right of action created in section 302 with respect to actions thereafter filed against the Cuban Government, to the extent that such steps contribute to a stable foundation for a democratically elected government in Cuba. 

The Trump-Vance Administration will embark upon similar strategies used with the Syrian Arab Republic where some sanctions were removed/suspended for its transition government despite uncertainty as to the short-term, medium-term, and long-term trajectory.  President Trump deemed the risk worth the potential reward.  The decision also unlocked financing and investment from other countries. 

The government of the United States will provide incentives to the government of the Republic of Cuba as it currently inhabits the space.  The challenge will be creating incentives that the government of the Republic of Cuba will accept- and they will accept what they believe they can withstand. 

The government of the Republic of Cuba will need to continue the process of correlating the words of its political leadership with implementing policies, regulations, and statutes for transitioning the words into operational results. 

Impact Of Executive Orders 

The Republic of Cuba-focused Executive Orders (EOs) and Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN) designations issued by the Trump-Vance Administration are having a cumulative impact upon Cuba.  A boulder rolling downhill... picking up speed and creating havoc.   

  • Executive Order 14380 (29 January 2026)

  • Executive Order 14404 (1 May 2026)

  • United States Department of State Designations- SDN List (7 May 2026)

Companies dislike havoc and uncertainty- and the Executive Orders are designed to inflict both.   

A political python- strategy is to constrict until prey (government of the Republic of Cuba) relents.  However, significant thus far is the Trump-Vance Administration has not specifically sanctioned any company; the Republic of Cuba-based joint venture of Sherritt International Corporation was sanctioned.  No country has been sanctioned for exporting fuels to the Republic of Cuba.   

From the perspective of The White House, the approximately 4,326 words in the Executive Orders have been well worth the time to craft them and publish them.   

And which countries have thus been swept-into the Executive Order vortex? Canada, France, Germany, and Spain.... each of which has political leadership with whom President Trump has issues. 

The Executive Orders are written in a manner reflecting a scene in the 1978 motion picture, Animal House, when Dean Vernon Woermer is informed a fraternity is already on official probation, he responds “They are? Well, as of this moment, they're on double secret probation!” 

Provisions of the Trump-Vance Administration Executive Orders may be implemented without advance notification to a target party.  This double secret probation-like implementation further stokes uncertainty- which is precisely the objective. 

Opinions In Two Cases Before Supreme Court Of The United States (SCOTUS) 

The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) supports the plaintiffs in both cases.  If the SCOTUS rules in favor of the plaintiffs, the Trump-Vance Administration will view the results as additional tools to influence the behavior of the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration.  The decisions will negatively impact the Republic of Cuba by further creating reasons for companies and financial institutions to avoid connectivity with the Republic of Cuba.  If the SCOTUS rules in favor of the defendants or remands the cases for further consideration by lower courts, the Trump-Vance Administration will view the result as dissuasive because the result is continued uncertainty- which companies and financial institutions seek to avoid.  The government of the Republic of Cuba loses either way.  

Indictment Of Raul Castro, President Of The Republic Of Cuba (2008-2018) 

Raul Castro, ninety-four (94) years old (ninety-five in June 2026), was Minister of Defense of the Republic of Cuba (1959-2008) when on 24 February 1996 “two aircraft carrying members of the Brothers to the Rescue organization were shot down by an aircraft operated by the Cuban Revolutionary Air and Air Defense Force (DAAFAR).  Four people in the aircraft were killed: Carlos Costa, Armando Alejandre, Jr., Mario de la Peña, and Pablo Morales.” 

The Southern District of Florida is the likely venue for a federal indictment of Raul Castro given the victims were residents of the State of Florida and, most importantly, the political value of a grand jury indictment in a state with approximately 1.6 million residents with Republic of Cuba ancestry and a state whose voters continue to shift form the Democratic Party to the Republican Party. 

For many individuals of Cuban descent residing in Florida, Texas, California, New Jersey, and New York, an indictment of Raul Castro would be extracting revenge, though partial.   

Raul Castro will not be extradited from the Republic of Cuba to the United States.  There will be no televised perp walk.  Raul Castro will die in the Republic of Cuba and his ashes interred in the Santa Ifigenia Cemetery in Santiago de Cuba, alongside his brother, Fidel Castro, who died in 2016.   

The United States Department of Defense (War) will not engage in an operation to extract Raul Castro from the Republic of Cuba.  The Trump-Vance Administration will not condition its commercial, economic, financial, military, political, and societal re-engagement with the Republic of Cuba upon the extradition of Raul Castro.  They will ask, but they will not condition.  The indictment will therefore be performative because it has no expectation for a defendant in a courtroom in Miami, Florida.  

For President Trump, he will forcefully remind voters in the State of Florida that the Clinton-Gore Administration (1993-2001), Bush-Cheney Administration (2001-2009), Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017), Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021), and Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025) failed to bring an indictment against Raul CastroThe Trump-Vance Administration did what predecessors were too weak to do

G7 Leaders’ Summit From 15 June 2026 To 17 June 2026 In Évian-Les-Bains, France 

The G7 Leaders’ Summit is scheduled for 15 June 2026 to 17 June 2026 in Évian-les-Bains, France.  The host is Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic of France (2017-2027).  The G7 consists of countries based upon their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the type of political system- defined as democracies.  Media reporting that President Macron is considering inviting President Xi Jinping To The G7 Leaders’ Summit.  Unknown if Volodymyr Zelensky, President of Ukraine (2019-2024; term extended due to imposition of martial law in 2022), will participate.  

  • 2026 G7: (2014-Present) United States, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada, and European Commission (president) and European Council (president).  The Russian Federation (2025 GDP ranks 8th) was excluded in 2014 due to its military actions (annexation) of the Crimean Peninsula in Ukraine.  NOTE: Spain is a “permanent guest” at G7 Leaders’ Summits despite ranking 12th in 2025 GDP. 

The Republic of Cuba-related Executive Orders signed by President Trump thus far in 2026 have trapped like a spider web companies located in Canada, France, Germany, and Spain

This means non-Republic of Cuba-related issues President Trump has with the one head of state (France) and the three heads of government (Canada, Germany, Spain): Israel-United States-Iran War, Military Spending, NATO relationship, Russian Federation-Ukraine War, Sanctions, Taiwan, Trade Agreements, and Tariffs will have company- Republic of Cuba-related issues.   

Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada (2025- ), Friedrich Merz, Chancellor of Germany (2025- ), President Macron, and Pedro Sanchez, Prime Minister of Spain (2018- ), will need to decide upon the value of the Republic of Cuba to their respective governments, to their respective economies, to their respective companies and financial institutions, and collectively to the twenty-seven country members of the Brussels, Belgium-based European Union (EU). 

  • EU: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden.  

In financial distress is Toronto, Canada-based Sherritt International Corporation (2025 revenue approximately US$422 million) which in May 2026 announced it was severing connectivity with all operations (mining and energy) in the Republic of Cuba due to Executive Orders. 

During the Trump-Pence Administration (2021-2025), executives of Palma de Mallorca, Spain-based Meliá Hotels International, S.A. (2025 revenue approximately US$2.3 billion) were subject to Title IV of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”).  The company has also been a defendant in a Title III lawsuit.  

  • Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset. 

  • Title IV restricts entry into the United States by individuals who have connectivity to unresolved certified claims or non-certified claims.  One Canada-based company and one Spain-based company are currently known to be subject to this provision based upon a certified claim and non-certified claim. 

In May 2026, Hamburg, Germany-based Hapag-Lloyd AG (2025 revenue US$21 billion) suspends operations in the Republic of Cuba due to Executive Orders. 

In May 2026, Marseille, France-based- CMA CGM (2025 revenue US$55 billion) suspends operations in the Republic of Cuba due to Executive Orders. 

For President Trump, inflicting pain upon members of the G7 is a political version of a chocolate sundae with an extra cherry.  Cheeseburger with extra [French] fries.  Or, two Diet Cokes. 

The Trump-Vance Administration has added “GRUPO DE ADMINISTRACION EMPRESARIAL S.A. (GAESA), pursuant to section 2(a)(i)(A) of E.O. 14404, for operating or having operated in the financial services sector of the Cuban economy” as a Specially Designated National (SDN) by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury.    

Reported entities with connectivity to Melia Hotels International, S.A. include: Republic of Cuba government-operated Gaviota, Cubanacan, and Gran Caribe. 

“Below is the U.S. Department of State’s “Cuba Restricted List” of entities and subentities with which the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (31 CFR 515.209) generally prohibit direct financial transactions. These entities are under the control of, or acting for or on behalf of, the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel with which direct financial transactions would disproportionately benefit such services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba. All entities and subentities were listed effective February 6, 2025, unless otherwise indicated.”   

Some hotels in the Republic of Cuba managed by Melia Hotels International, S.A. are included in the Cuba Restricted List.  Other Republic of Cuba government-operated entities with connectivity to Melia Hotels International S.A. are on the Cuba Restricted List:  

CIMEX- Corporación CIMEX S.A.
GAESA- Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A.
Gaviota- Grupo de Turismo Gaviota
Gaviota Hoteles Cuba

Disposition Of The 5,913 Certified Claims 

The Trump-Vance Administration is focused upon resolving the issue of the certified claimants.  There is concern that President Trump could be introduced during a gathering at his Mar-a-Lago Club in Palm Beach, Florida, to a non-certified claimant, for example, an older woman who was a citizen of the Republic of Cuba and whose small business was expropriated.  Upon hearing the story, he would summon Marco Rubio, United States Secretary of State (2025- ), with the instruction to “put this number one on the list that I want from Cuba.  I want this lady’s business returned to her.”  With that, the interests of the 5,913 certified claimants become entangled with hundreds of thousands or millions of non-certified claims which should be solely the jurisdiction of the government of the Republic of Cuba and solely to be adjudicated by citizens of the Republic of Cuba with the government of the Republic of Cuba. 

Joining certified claimants with non-certified claimants will result in no settlement for either category. 

There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC) and have not been resolved for nearing sixty years (some assets were officially confiscated in the 1960’s, some in the 1970’s and some in the 1990’s).  The USFCSC permitted simple interest (not compound interest) of 6% per annum (approximately US$114,132,137.10); with the approximate current value of the 5,913 certified claims is approximately US$9.2 billion.  

The first asset (along with 382 enterprises the same day) to be expropriated by the Republic of Cuba was an oil refinery on 6 August 1960 owned by White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation (USFCSC: CU-1331/CU-1332/CU-1333 valued at US$56,196,422.73).  

From the certified claim filed by Texaco: “The Cuban corporation was intervened on June 29, 1960, pursuant to Resolution 188 of June 28, 1960, under Law 635 of 1959.  Resolution 188 was promulgated by the Government of Cuba when the Cuban corporation assertedly refused to refine certain crude oil as assertedly provided under a 1938 law pertaining to combustible materials.  Subsequently, this Cuban firm was listed as nationalized in Resolution 19 of August 6, 1960, pursuant to Cuban Law 851.  The Commission finds, however, that the Cuban corporation was effectively intervened within the meaning of Title V of the Act by the Government of Cuba on June 29, 1960.” 

The largest certified claim (Cuban Electric Company) valued at US$267,568,413.62 is controlled by Boca Raton, Florida-based Office Depot, Inc.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International; the certified claim also includes land adjacent to the Jose Marti International Airport in Havana, Republic of Cuba.  The third-largest certified claim valued at US$97,373,414.72 is controlled by New York, New York-based North American Sugar Industries, Inc.  The smallest certified claim is by Sara W. Fishman in the amount of US$1.00 with reference to the Cuban-Venezuelan Oil Voting Trust. 

The two (2) largest certified claims total US$449,377,207.76, representing 24% of the total value of the certified claims.  Thirty (30) certified claimants hold 56% of the total value of the certified claims.  This concentration of value creates an efficient pathway towards a settlement.   

Nomination Of United States Ambassador To The Republic Of Cuba 

During the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017), after the re-opening in 2015 of the United States Embassy in Havana, Republic of Cuba, there was an expectation for a nominee as the first United States Ambassador to the Republic of Cuba since Philip Bonsal, who departed in October 1960.  That did not happen. 

A United States ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary is the highest-ranking diplomatic official representing a country.  The individual is the official representative of the President of the United States. 

The Trump-Vance Administration will view the installation of an ambassador neither a badge of legitimacy nor a reward to the government of the Republic of Cuba. 

The presence of a United States ambassador will reinforce the strength of the government of the United States- and project a message to other countries that the Trump-Vance Administration will seek to expand, influence, and protect its self-defined interests throughout The Americas.  

Agreement On Return Of Republic Of Cuba Nationals 

The Trump-Vance Administration is neither concerned nor focused upon a potential 21st century version of what impacted the Carter-Mondale Administration (1977-1981) and Clinton-Gore Administration (1993-2001).  

  • In 1980, approximately 125,000 Republic of Cuba nationals arrived by vessels (primarily rafts) to the United States.   

  • In 1994, approximately 35,000 Republic of Cuba nationals arrived by vessels (primarily rafts) to the United States.

Mr. Stephen Miller, Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy and Homeland Security Advisor at The White House, will forgo concern as to political ramifications in the State of Florida for the Republican Party.  He will robustly direct the United States Department of Defense (War) to deploy the United States Navy and United States Coast Guard to the Atlantic Ocean and if necessary, into the Gulf of Mexico (America) for Operation Interdiction And Return Home.  All Republic of Cuba nationals will be returned, forcibly, if necessary, to the internationally recognized territory of the Republic of Cuba. 

The Trump-Vance Administration will not be cowered by the optics of hundreds, thousands, tens of thousands, or hundreds of thousands of Republic of Cuba nationals in makeshift vessels or more solid vessels attempting to traverse the ninety-three miles from the Port of Havana to the most southern portion of Key West, Florida. 

The Trump-Vance Administration will require the government of the Republic of Cuba to accept the return of Republic of Cuba nationals deemed deportable from the United States and to create multi-layered impediments to prevent unauthorized departures from the Republic of Cuba.   

President Diaz-Canel Visits The White House 

The bigger the deal, more likely the visit.  President Trump will savour politically the optics of President Diaz-Canel visiting The White House for a signing ceremony.  An opportunity to use the Presidential Sharpie will prove intoxicating. 

There is no record of a head of government of the Republic of Cuba or head of state of the Republic of Cuba visiting The White House.  President Trump is attracted to setting precedents. 

Benefiting the government of the Republic of Cuba is the affinity of President Trump for agreements reflecting simplicity (number of points and sheets of paper), flexibility, and often audacity.  Agreements are frequently staged- preliminary, intermediate, and then final.  Almost all require addendums.  Almost all are subject to revisions.  Measurability metrics often become fluid.  All of this means the process takes time.  Expanding time is a primary goal of the government of the Republic of Cuba.     

The Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration continues to evaluate how the Trump-Vance Administration engages with the Rodriguez Administration (2026- ) in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and with the Pezeshkian-Aref Administration (2024-2028) in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 

Officials within the Trump-Vance Administration continue to monitor President Trump to determine the parameters of his elasticity in defining “total and complete victory” with Venezuela and Iran as indicators for definitions relating to the Republic of Cuba. 

A fatal mistake to underappreciate the consistent desire by President Trump to correct what his predecessors in the Oval Office could not do, did not do, or would not do

Politically dangerous for anyone to seek to separate President Trump from his effort to bring finality to the sixty-seven-year estrangement between the government of the United States and the government of the Republic of Cuba. 

P.S. 2.63 waterfront acres in downtown Miami, Florida, is the location for the Donald J. Trump Presidential Library.  That is an incentive for the Trump-Vance Administration to have in place a sustainable re-engagement with the Republic of Cuba prior to 12:00 pm on Saturday, 20 January 2029, when President Trump departs The White House.

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT