President Trump Has Carrots & Sticks To Influence Cuba. Making It Better? He Gets To Correct What Biden And Obama Could Not And Did Not Make Happen. And Time For Our Man In Havana.

Trump-Vance Administration Has Carrots And Sticks To Influence Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration  

Making It Better? President Trump Can Correct What President Obama Failed To Understand And Force Government Of Cuba To Implement What President Biden Could Not 

“The Lord [President] giveth, and the Lord [President][can] taketh away.” 

Libertad Act Permits President Trump Elasticity For Carrots 

President Trump Should Appoint An Ambassador 

Donald Trump, President of the United States (2017-2021 and 2025-2029), has featured elasticity as a hallmark, perhaps even trademark of his style of governance.  This is particularly true in his management of bilateral relationships with governments- both allies and foes.  He defines and redefines in real time similar to Artificial Intelligence (AI) algorithms. 

There are carrots and sticks available to the Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029) for deployment to influence and impact the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2019- ) in the Republic of Cuba.  

Important for United States-based companies that a United States Embassy to have an ambassador extraordinaire and plenipotentiary.  In this instance, an individual in the Republic of Cuba who is the personal representative of the president of the United States.  President Trump can do what his most recent two predecessors did not do.  The United States Senate will confirm his nominee.   

Installing a United States Ambassador to the Republic of Cuba is an important operational tool for the Trump-Vance Administration to manage the bilateral relationship with the United States.  The presence of an ambassador elevates the on-the-ground connectivity with citizens of the Republic of Cuba.  For the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba, interacting with an ambassador projects gravitas that a Charge d’Affaires does not possess.  An ambassador visiting the team at a privately-owned company is a big deal- this is the representative of the president.  It gets attention.

A bank-shot result could be support by other governments for those carrots and sticks, particularly those with commercial, economic, financial, military, political, and societal connectivity with the government of the Republic of Cuba and its approximately ten million residents. 

• “The reason why Cuba is a disaster is because their economic system doesn’t work. It’s a nonsensical system and the people of Cuba are suffering because of the decisions, because of the unwillingness of the people who govern that country to make the changes that need to be made so they can join the 21st century.  You need to change the people in charge.  You need to change the system that runs the country, and you need to change the economic model that it’s following.  That’s the only way forward if Cuba wants a better future.”  Marco Rubio, United States Secretary of State 

For President Trump, the two carrots most attractive, most easily achievable, and most consequential are focused upon commerce.  

What makes two carrots politically catnip-like is the Trump-Vance Administration can correct initiatives the Obama-Biden Administration (2007-2017) and Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025) failed to either implement or have the government of the Republic of Cuba accept.

For the government of the Republic of Cuba, accepting the two carrots do not present an existential threat as each carrot has already been either partially authorized and implemented, or verbally accepted.  Each would require Havana to commercially dot the i and cross the t for statements already in the public domain.

The Obama-Biden Administration famously (more accurately, infamously) authorized United States-based financial institutions to have correspondent accounts with Republic of Cuba-based financial institutions, but refused to permit Republic of Cuba-based financial institutions to have accounts with United States-based financial institutions. 

The result continued a payment system which enables third-country financial institutions to receive a fee for each transaction from the United States to the Republic of Cuba and from the Republic of Cuba to the United States.

For perspective, since December 2001 when the first agricultural commodities were exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba using the cash-in-advance payment requirement of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, third-country financial institutions have received fees on more than US$8.3 billion.

Requiring the government of the Republic of Cuba to use correspondent accounts will result in transactions for United States-based companies that are more cost-effective, more efficient, and most importantly, more transparent as Republic of Cuba-based financial institutions are subject to United States-standard certified audits and requirements to implement and maintain Know Your Customer (KYC) procedures.

In 2022, the Biden-Harris Administration authorized United States-based companies to provide direct investment in and direct financing to privately-owned companies in the Republic of Cuba owned by Republic of Cuba nationals. 

This precedent-setting initiative, in response to entreaties from United States-based companies, had the potential to create the re-emerging private sector landscape in the Republic of Cuba embraced by the Trump-Vance Administration, and thus far visibly supported through its fuel export authorization.  Creating opportunities for United States-based companies to engage with the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba.

Unfortunately, nearing four years later, the government of the Republic of Cuba has not issued the regulations authorizing direct investment in and direct financing to privately-owned companies in the Republic of Cuba owned by a Republic of Cuba nationals.  The Trump-Vance Administration could condition further changes in policies and regulations focused upon the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba to the issuance of the regulations.

• “The Support for the Cuban People (SCP) License Exception, outlined in Section 740.21 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), is a key mechanism. Managed by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) within the Department of Commerce, it permits exporting non-controlled items (classified as EAR99) to Cuba for purposes like improving living conditions, supporting independent economic activity, strengthening civil society, and facilitating free information flow.  These licenses typically stipulate that exported goods must be designated for the Cuban people, cannot be re-exported, should not primarily generate income for the Cuban government, and cannot be sold directly to the government.”

• Sec. 109 of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 “[a]uthorizes the President to furnish assistance and other support for individuals and independent nongovernmental organizations to support democracy-building efforts for Cuba.”

Libertad Act Opportunities

The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 provides the Trump-Vance Administration with carrots and sticks to encourage the government of the Republic of Cuba to implement commercial, economic, financial, military, political, and societal changes and to re-engage with international financial institutions and regional political organizations.

While the statue text has requirements, it provides the executive branch with opportunities that should be attractive to the government of the Republic of Cuba.  Even if those opportunities are not received fulsomely in Havana, governments with connectivity to the Republic of Cuba, particularly those whose companies and taxpayers are owed substantial sums by the government of the Republic of Cuba and Republic of Cuba government-operated companies may become advocates and allies of the Trump-Vance Administration.  The message to Havana would be simple: Do what is necessary to pay what is owed.

President Trump has the authority to define and redefine “transition” relating to the government of the Republic of Cuba.  And if he does make a determination which commences certain changes to statutes, regulations, and policies relating to the Republic of Cuba, he can always reverse course. 

In some respects, providing the government of the Republic of Cuba with the taste of a deal could provide the type of flexibility preferred by President Trump- matching action with action and inaction with inaction; and preserving punishment: “the Lord [President] giveth, and the Lord [President] can] taketh away.”

• (Sec. 204) Authorizes the President to take steps to: (1) suspend the U.S. economic embargo and application of certain other action against Cuba upon determining to the appropriate congressional committees that a transition government is in power in Cuba;

The Trump-Vance Administration could also support the return of the government of the Republic of Cuba to programs managed by the World Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Finance Corporation (IFC), and membership in the Organization of American States (OAS).  Each opportunity would require the government of the Republic of Cuba to re-engage with accountability and transparency.

• Authorizes the Secretary to instruct the U.S. executive directors of the international financial institutions to support loans or other assistance to Cuba only if it will contribute to a stable foundation for a democratically-elected government there.

• (Sec. 104) Directs the Secretary to instruct the U.S. executive directors of the international financial institutions to oppose the admission of Cuba as a member of such institutions until the President determines that a democratically-elected government is in power in Cuba. Urges the President to support Cuba's application for membership in such institutions during the period that a transition government is in power, subject to the membership's taking effect after a democratically-elected government is in power.

• (Sec. 105) Urges the President to instruct the U.S. Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States (OAS) to oppose and vote against any termination of the suspension of Cuba from the OAS until the President determines that a democratically-elected government is in power there.

Libertad Act Text (italic and bold added)

Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 - Title I: Strengthening International Sanctions Against the Castro Government - Expresses the sense of the Congress that: (1) the acts of the Castro government, including systematic human rights violations, are a threat to international peace; (2) the President should instruct the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations to seek within the Security Council a mandatory international embargo against the Cuban Government; (3) efforts by any independent state of the former Soviet Union to make operational any nuclear facility in Cuba, and any continuation by such state of intelligence activities from Cuba targeted at the United States and its citizens, will have a detrimental impact on U.S. assistance to such state; and (4) the completion of any nuclear facility, or the political manipulation of the desire of Cubans to escape that results in mass migration to the United States, will be considered an act of aggression against the United States which will be met with an appropriate response.

(Sec. 102) Reaffirms a provision of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 that states that the President should encourage foreign countries to restrict trade and credit relations with Cuba. Urges the President to take steps to apply sanctions described by such Act against countries assisting Cuba. 

Requires the President to instruct the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General to enforce the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.

Amends the Trading with the Enemy Act to repeal the exemption from its civil penalties for news gathering, research, export and import of informational materials, certain educational or religious activities, and certain activities of human rights organizations.

Expresses the sense of the Congress that the President should instruct the Secretary of State and the Attorney General to enforce existing regulations that deny visas to Cuban Government employees or Cuban members of the Communist Party of Cuba.

Amends the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, with respect to sanctions against a country that provides assistance to Cuba, to include as such assistance any exchange, reduction, or forgiveness of Cuban debt owed to a country in return for a grant of an equity interest in a property, investment, or operation of the Cuban Government or a Cuban national (debt-for-equity swap).

Declares that nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize investment (including donations and loans) by any U.S. person in the domestic telecommunications network in Cuba. Requires the President to report semiannually to the Congress with respect to payments made to Cuba by any U.S. person as a result of the provision of telecommunications services.

(Sec. 103) Prohibits any U.S. national, permanent resident alien, or U.S. agency from knowingly extending any loan or other financing to any person in order to finance transactions involving property confiscated by the Cuban Government, the claim to which is owned by a U.S. national. Excepts from this prohibition any financing by the owner of the claim for a transaction permitted by U.S. law. Authorizes the President to terminate such prohibition upon: (1) installation of a transition government in Cuba; or (2) termination of the economic embargo of Cuba. Sets forth penalties for violation of such prohibition.

(Sec. 104) Directs the Secretary to instruct the U.S. executive directors of the international financial institutions to oppose the admission of Cuba as a member of such institutions until the President determines that a democratically-elected government is in power in Cuba. Urges the President to support Cuba's application for membership in such institutions during the period that a transition government is in power, subject to the membership's taking effect after a democratically-elected government is in power.

Authorizes the Secretary to instruct the U.S. executive directors of the international financial institutions to support loans or other assistance to Cuba only if it will contribute to a stable foundation for a democratically-elected government there. Requires the Secretary to withhold U.S. payments for specified portions of the increase in their capital stock from institutions that approve assistance to Cuba over U.S. opposition.

(Sec. 105) Urges the President to instruct the U.S. Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States (OAS) to oppose and vote against any termination of the suspension of Cuba from the OAS until the President determines that a democratically-elected government is in power there.

(Sec. 106) Directs the President to report to the appropriate congressional committees on progress towards the withdrawal of personnel of any independent state of the former Soviet Union from the Cienfuegos nuclear facility.

Amends the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to make ineligible for assistance (except assistance under the secondary school exchange program administered by the United States Information Agency (USIA)) any independent state that is providing assistance for, or engaging in nonmarket based trade with, Cuba.

Expresses strong disapproval of Russia's extension of credits equivalent to $200 million in support of the intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba.

Directs the President to withhold from assistance provided for an independent state of the former Soviet Union an amount equal to the assistance and credits provided by such state in support of intelligence facilities in Cuba, including the one at Lourdes. Authorizes the President to waive the requirement to withhold such assistance if specified conditions are met, including certification that the Russian Government is not sharing with the Cuban Government intelligence data collected at Lourdes.

Requires the President to report to the appropriate congressional committees on the intelligence activities of Russia in Cuba.

(Sec. 107) Requires the Director of the USIA to convert television broadcasting to Cuba under the Television Marti Service to ultra high frequency (UHF) broadcasting. Repeals the Television Broadcasting to Cuba Act and the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act upon the election of a democratically-elected government in Cuba.

(Sec. 108) Directs the President to report annually to the appropriate congressional committees on commerce with, and assistance to, Cuba from other foreign countries.

(Sec. 109) Authorizes the President to furnish assistance and other support for individuals and independent nongovernmental organizations to support democracy-building efforts for Cuba.

Directs the President to take steps to encourage the OAS to create a special emergency fund for the purpose of deploying human rights observers, election support, and election observation in Cuba. Urges the President to instruct the U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS to encourage other OAS member states to join in calling for the Cuban Government to allow the immediate deployment of independent OAS human rights monitors throughout Cuba and on-site visits to Cuba by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Urges the President to provide not less than $5 million of the U.S. voluntary contribution to the OAS solely for the purposes of the special fund. Requires the President to ensure that no assistance be provided to the Cuban Government.(Sec. 110) Declares that the Congress notes: (1) the prohibition on the entry of, and dealings outside the United States in, Cuban-origin merchandise; (2) that the U.S. accession to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) does not alter the U.S. sanctions against Cuba; and (3) that the Food Security Act of 1985 requires the President not to allocate any of the sugar import quota to a country that is a net importer of sugar unless that country can verify to the President that it does not import Cuban sugar for re- export to the United States.

(Sec. 111) Directs the President to withhold the allocation of assistance, with specified exceptions, for any country in an amount equal to the sum of assistance and credits, if any, provided by such country in support of the completion of the Cuban nuclear facility at Juragua, near Cienfuegos, Cuba. 

(Sec. 112) Expresses the sense of the Congress with respect to conditions for the reinstitution of general licenses for family remittances and travel to Cuba. 

(Sec. 113) Directs the President to instruct all U.S. Government officials who engage in official contacts with the Cuban Government to raise on a regular basis the extradition of or rendering to the United States all persons residing in Cuba who are sought by the U.S. Department of Justice for crimes committed in the United States. 

(Sec. 114) Authorizes the President to establish an exchange of news bureaus between the United States and Cuba if certain conditions exist. 

(Sec. 115) Declares that nothing in this Act prohibits any lawfully authorized investigation, protective, or intelligence activity of a U.S. law enforcement agency or intelligence agency. 

(Sec. 116) Condemns the act of terrorism by the Castro Regime in shooting down the Brothers to the Rescue aircraft on February 24, 1996. Extends Congress' condolences to the victims' families. Urges the President to seek an indictment in the International Court of Justice for this act of terrorism by Fidel Castro. 

Title II: Assistance to a Free and Independent Cuba - Requires the President to develop a plan for providing economic assistance to Cuba at such time that a transition government or democratically- elected government is in power. Limits assistance for a transition government to humanitarian assistance, assistance essential to the successful transition to democracy, and military adjustment assistance. Expands assistance to include development and agricultural assistance and export financing (as well as other specified assistance) when a democratically-elected government is in power. 

(Sec. 202) Requires the President to take steps to obtain the agreement of other countries, international financial institutions, and multilateral organizations to provide comparable assistance to Cuba. Requires the President, upon transmittal to specified congressional committees of a determination that a democratically- elected government is in power, to report on: (1) Cuban acts, policies, and practices which constitute barriers to, or distortions of, U.S. trade or foreign direct investment with Cuba; (2) U.S. policy objectives regarding trade relations with a democratically-elected government in Cuba; (3) specific U.S. trade negotiating objectives with Cuba, including specific objectives of NAFTA; and (4) proposed actions to be undertaken to achieve such policies and objectives. 

(Sec. 203) Requires the President, upon determining that a democratically-elected government is in power in Cuba, to designate a United States-Cuba Council to: (1) ensure coordination between the U.S. Government and the private sector in responding to change and promoting market-based development in Cuba; and (2) establish periodic meetings between the U.S. and Cuban private sectors for the purpose of facilitating bilateral trade. 

Requires the President, once he has sent the Congress a determination that a transition or a democratically-elected government is in power in Cuba, to report to appropriate congressional committees on the assistance provided to Cuba. 

(Sec. 204) Authorizes the President to take steps to: (1) suspend the U.S. economic embargo and application of certain other action against Cuba upon determining to the appropriate congressional committees that a transition government is in power in Cuba; and (2) terminate the embargo when a democratically-elected government is installed. Declares that any suspension or termination of the embargo shall cease to be effective upon enactment of a joint resolution disapproving such action. 

(Sec. 205) Sets forth conditions under which a government in Cuba will be considered transitional or democratically-elected. 

(Sec. 207) Directs the Secretary of State to report to appropriate congressional committees an assessment with respect to settlement of outstanding U.S. claims to confiscated property in Cuba. Expresses the sense of the Congress that the satisfactory resolution of such property claims by Cuba remains a condition for the resumption of economic and diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba. 

Title III: Protection of Property Rights of United States Nationals - Makes any person that traffics in property confiscated by the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959, liable for money damages to any U.S. national who owns the claim to such property. Grants U.S. district courts jurisdiction over such actions where the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000. 

(Sec. 303) Requires district courts to accept as conclusive proof of ownership a certification of a claim to ownership that has been made by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission pursuant to the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949. 

Amends such Act to authorize district courts, for fact-finding purposes, to refer to the Commission questions of the amount and ownership of a claim by a U.S. national resulting from the confiscation of property by Cuba, whether or not the U.S. national qualified as such at the time of the confiscation. 

(Sec. 304) Bars certain ineligible U.S. nationals (including eligible nationals who fail to file timely claims), or Cuban nationals, from having a claim to or participating in the compensation proceeds or nonmonetary compensation paid or allocated to a U.S. national by virtue of a claim certified by the Commission.

 (Sec. 305) Sets forth a two year statute of limitations for an action under this title. 

Title IV: Exclusion of Certain Aliens - Directs the Secretary of State to deny a visa to, and the Attorney General to exclude from the United States, aliens (including their spouses, minor children, or agents) involved in the confiscation of property, or the trafficking in confiscated property, owned by a U.S. national. Provides for a case-by-case waiver of this exclusion for medical reasons or for purposes of litigation of a claim.

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

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Why Former OFAC Investigator Misleads “Not A Close Call” About What U.S. Companies Can Do In Cuba? Why Would Member Of The U.S. Congress Deny Reality Of His District?

Why Former OFAC Investigator Misleads “Not A Close Call” About What United States Companies Can Do In Cuba?

Why Would Member Of The United States Congress Deny Reality Of His District?

Astonishing for a partner in a law firm who is a former sanctions investigator Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury to share misleading statements about authorization for United States-based companies to provide direct investment into privately-owned companies owned by Republic of Cuba nationals residing in the Republic of Cuba.

Astonishing too for a member of the United States House of Representatives in the United States Congress to deny reality about unofficially-delivered direct investment into and unofficially-authorized direct financing to privately-owned companies owned by Republic of Cuba nationals residing in the Republic of Cuba.  It’s been a reality for nearly thirty years.

The goal of the United States business community is to shift from what is unofficial, thus unauthorized, to official, thus authorized and transparent.  The focus today must be toward the government of the Republic of Cuba since the United States government did its part- nearing four years ago.

• “It’s kabuki theater.  They’re [government of the Republic of Cuba] signaling to the U.S. government.  They’re not signaling to potential investors in Miami because they know- I know that they know- that those investments are not allowed under U.S. law… U.S. law is no where near authorizing those investments.  I mean, it’s just not even- it’s not a close call.  The Executive Branch is very limited in what it can do.”  Jeremy Paner, a former sanctions investigator at the OFAC

On 10 March 2022, the Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025) instructed the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury to issue a license authorizing the first direct investment in and direct financing to a privately-owned company owned by a Republic of Cuba national and located in the Republic of Cuba. 

• Link: Biden-Harris Administration Approves First Equity Investment Since 1960 In A Private Cuban Company May 10, 2022 

• Link: With U.S. Government Authorization For First Direct Equity Investment Into A Private Company In Cuba, Here Is Important Context And Details.  About The Parties; About The Message. May 16, 2022  

“The Support for the Cuban People (SCP) License Exception (Section 740.21 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR)) is managed by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) within the Department of Commerce.  Exporting non-controlled items (classified as EAR99) to the Republic of Cuba for purposes including improving living conditions, supporting independent economic activity, strengthening civil society, and facilitating free information flow.  The licenses usually stipulate exported goods must be designated for the Republic of Cuba nationals, cannot be re-exported, should not primarily generate income for the government of the Republic of Cuba, and cannot be sold directly to the government of the Republic of Cuba or to Republic of Cuba government-operated entities.

In 2021, the first micro, small, and medium-size enterprises (MSME’s) were authorized by the government of the Republic of Cuba.  Severely limited self-employment was authorized in the mid-1990’s and then expanded further in 2010.  There are today a reported approximately 10,000 MSMEs operating in the Republic of Cuba.

Since 2022, when the first license was issued by Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce for the export of vehicles to Republic of Cuba nationals and to private companies in the Republic of Cuba, the cumulative export value of the initiatives in place during the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017), Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021), Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025), and Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029) exceeds US$394 million of which electric and gasoline-powered new and used vehicles, bicycles, trucks, motorcycles and mopeds, and parts, exceeds US$227 million (Year 2025: US$149,413,031.00; Year 2024: US$67,241,234.00; Year 2023: US$10,546,419.00; Year 2022: US$89,848.00), and purchases (equipment and products) for use by the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba driving the growth.

“If you’re crazy, go ahead, invest in Cuba… There is NOTHING the regime has that the United States wants.  There will be ZERO investment from the US unless there is MAJOR political change on the island.”  Carlos Gemenez, United States House of Representatives (R- 28th Florida) 

• Link: 2025 Report: US$490 Million Is 3rd Highest To Cuba Since 2001; US$173.6 Million (See List) In PYME/Cuban Citizen Exports Including Vehicles- US$148.3 Million. Donations Up 116.7% To US$147 Million Feb 26, 2026

2025 was the third-highest US Dollar value in exports since the first Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000 deliveries in December 2001. 

United States agricultural commodity and food product exports in 2025 were US$490,111,943.00 compared to US$433,662,216.00 in 2024 representing an 13.0% increase year-to-year.   

For 2025, the Republic of Cuba ranked 49th of 222 global agricultural commodity and food product export markets for United States-based companies.

Since the first exports using TSREEA, more than US$8.3 billion has been received by United States-based companies, on a cash-in-advance basis as required by the TSREEA. 

As to the legitimacy of the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba, the Trump-Vance Administration delivered critically-timed messages to owners and employees of privately-owned companies located in the Republic of Cuba and to management of United States-based companies.

The OFAC authorization for the export of fuels from the United States to the Republic of Cuba was issued as a general license.  Meaning no application is required.  The transactions are based upon the honor system.  The requirements are published by the OFAC, and both the United States-based exporter and Republic of Cuba-based importer must voluntarily adhere to those requirements. 

By issuing a general license, the message to the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba was they are legitimate, they are relevant, the United States government wants to support them, and the government of the Republic of Cuba should not constrain them. 

By issuing a general license, the message to United States-based companies was similar- the United States government recognizes the legitimacy of the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba, supports engagement with it, and trusts United States-companies to adhere to the requirements.  The trust component is critical because it further normalizes the transaction process- which means an increase in interest.

Link To Complete Analysis In PDF Format

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More Untruths? Will NBC’s Meet The Press Interview With Deputy Foreign Minister Of Cuba Be An Unhelpful Repeat Of NBC News Interview With Deputy Prime Minister Of Cuba?

More Untruths? Will NBC’s Meet The Press Interview With Deputy Foreign Minister Of Cuba Be A Repeat Of NBC News Interview With Deputy Prime Minister Of Cuba?  

Both Have Been Untruthful When Discussing The Realities Of United States Private Sector Commercial Engagement With Cuba- Government And Re-Emerging Private Sector 

On 10 March 2022, the Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025) authorized the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury to issue a license authorizing the first direct investment in and direct financing to a privately-owned company owned by a Republic of Cuba national and located in the Republic of Cuba. 

Nearing four years later, the government of the Republic of Cuba has yet to publish regulations (basically a single Know Your Customer (KYC) document to be filed with a Republic of Cuba-based financial institution) which would permit the delivery of that direct investment and direct financing while maintaining, wrongly, the United States Government does not permit direct investment and direct financing.   

The delay not only impacts direct investment and direct financing into the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba, which is sourced from the United States, but sourcing from all countries, including Canada, China, European Union, Mexico, Russia, and Vietnam.  For many years, capital for use by the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba has arrived informally, absent official authorization.   

In a recent televised interview with NBC News, Pérez-Oliva Fraga, Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Cuba, said “Cuba is open to having a fluid commercial relationship with U.S. companies and also with Cubans residing in the United States and their descendants.  This extends beyond the commercial sphere.  It also applies to investments- not only small investments, but also large investments, particularly in infrastructure.  The blockade deprives us of access to financing, access to technology, access to markets, and in recent years, it has specifically been aimed at depriving our country of access to fuel.”  

He was not truthful.  He knew he was not truthful. 

• Link: Four Years Late: Do Not Get Orgasmic About Cuba Government Private Sector Announcements March 16, 2026

• Link: Cuba Government Delaying Private Company Investment/Financing Regulations Is Costing Earning Potential For U.S. And Other Country Sources. Success Should Not Be Feared. September 25, 2023 

• Link: Now The Hard Part For Cuba: Implementing Quickly Transparent, Equal-For-All, MSME Investment & Financing Regulations. No Limitations. No Selectivity. No Orwellian Process. August 04, 2022  

• Link: Biden-Harris Administration Approves First Equity Investment Since 1960 In A Private Cuban Company May 10, 2022 

• Link: With U.S. Government Authorization For First Direct Equity Investment Into A Private Company In Cuba, Here Is Important Context And Details.  About The Parties; About The Message. May 16, 2022   

In a recent interview with Thomson Reuters, Carlos Fernández de Cossío, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba “But he did say there were plenty of topics of mutual interest, including trade between the two countries that has been severed by the comprehensive U.S. economic embargo against Cuba.  He also mentioned longstanding economic compensation that each country ⁠seeks. Cuba ​has claims against the United States for damages caused by the embargo, while there ​are 5,913 claims from Americans whose properties were nationalized in Cuba after the 1959 revolution that brought Fidel Castro to power.  “These are very complex issues that can be discussed, but ​they require dialogue.  They require sitting down and are legitimate matters.”  

He was not truthful.  He knew he was not truthful. 

• Link: Why Is Cuba Deputy Foreign Minister Lying, Misleading, And Misstating Commercial Relationship With U.S.? Isn’t He Supposed To Encourage, Nurture, And Support It? November 24, 2024 

• Link: 2025 Report: US$490 Million Is 3rd Highest To Cuba Since 2001; US$173.6 Million (See List) In PYME/Cuban Citizen Exports Including Vehicles- US$148.3 Million. Donations Up 116.7% To US$147 Million Feb 26, 2026  

United States agricultural commodity and food product exports in 2025 were US$490,111,943.00 compared to US$433,662,216.00 in 2024 representing an 13.0% increase year-to-year. The year 2025 represents the third-highest US Dollar value in exports since the first TSREEA exports in December 2001. 

Since 2022, when the first license was issued by Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce for the export of vehicles to Republic of Cuba nationals and to private companies in the Republic of Cuba, the cumulative export value of the initiatives in place during the Obama-Biden Administration, Trump-Pence Administration, Biden-Harris Administration, and Trump-Vance Administration exceeds US$394 million of which electric and gasoline-powered new and used vehicles, bicycles, trucks, motorcycles and mopeds, and parts, exceeds US$227 million (Year 2025: US$149,413,031.00; Year 2024: US$67,241,234.00; Year 2023: US$10,546,419.00; Year 2022: US$89,848.00), and purchases (equipment and products) for use by the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba driving the growth. 

• Link: Mr. de Cossio At MINREX In Cuba Not Quite Accurate With His Comments About Biden-Harris Administration Efforts With MSMEs And Remittances  December 20, 2022  

• Link: Sorry, Cuba Deputy Foreign Minister- Chewing Gum Is Candy And Candy Is Exported From U.S. To Cuba- Along With Sugar, Chocolate, Puddings, Cookies, Waffles, Ice Cream, Peanut Butter, Tequila, Pet Food November 26, 2024 

• Link: Why Is Cuba Deputy Foreign Minister Lying, Misleading, And Misstating Commercial Relationship With U.S.? Isn’t He Supposed To Encourage, Nurture, And Support It? November 24, 2024 

• Link: Cuba: Acknowledging Impact Was Not Necessarily A Shrewd Political Statement. For Biden Administration, If It's Working, Why Change It? For Plaintiffs, Libertad Act Doing What It Was Designed To Do. October 03, 2023 

• Link: Misunderstanding? Cuba Government: Cuban-Americans' PYME Financing, Yes.  PYME Investment, Yes.  PYME Ownership, No.  PMYE Need For Direct Banking With United States, Not Necessary. September 29, 2023 

• Link: Cuba Minister Of Foreign Affairs Said That Only U.S. Vessels Are Permitted For U.S. Exports To Cuba. That Was Inaccurate. August 23, 2023 

• Link: Biden Administration Believes Important To Discuss Immigration With Cuba. Should Also Discuss Engagement With Private Sector, Expanding Commerce, Settlement Of Certified Claims. April 19, 2022 

Certified Claims 

Mr. de Cossio shared the government of the Republic of Cuba has claims against the government of the United States.  He conflates assets expropriated without compensation from United States citizens- companies and individuals, with the internal impact of financial decisions adopted by successive governments of the Republic of Cuba.  One issue has is not connected with the other issue. 

Absent resolving the 5,913 certified claims, the government of the Republic of Cuba will continue constrained- and now increasingly so given the focus by the Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029) with attracting direct foreign investment, export opportunities, and import opportunities.  The United States Government will not entertain claims of economic harm presented by the government of the Republic of Cuba. 

The Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2019- ) needs to focus upon what is doable rather than what may satisfy the aspirational and the inspirational.  There was an opportunity to engage about settling the certified claims during the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) and Biden-Harris Administration.  Neither Havana nor Washington DC did anything. 

There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC) and have not been resolved for nearing sixty years (some assets were officially confiscated in the 1960’s, some in the 1970’s and some in the 1990’s).  The USFCSC permitted simple interest (not compound interest) of 6% per annum (approximately US$114,132,137.10); with the approximate current value of the 5,913 certified claims is approximately US$9.2 billion.  

The first asset (along with 382 enterprises the same day) to be expropriated by the Republic of Cuba was an oil refinery on 6 August 1960 owned by White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation (USFCSC: CU-1331/CU-1332/CU-1333 valued at US$56,196,422.73).  

From the certified claim filed by Texaco: “The Cuban corporation was intervened on June 29, 1960, pursuant to Resolution 188 of June 28, 1960, under Law 635 of 1959.  Resolution 188 was promulgated by the Government of Cuba when the Cuban corporation assertedly refused to refine certain crude oil as assertedly provided under a 1938 law pertaining to combustible materials.  Subsequently, this Cuban firm was listed as nationalized in Resolution 19 of August 6, 1960, pursuant to Cuban Law 851.  The Commission finds, however, that the Cuban corporation was effectively intervened within the meaning of Title V of the Act by the Government of Cuba on June 29, 1960.” 

The largest certified claim (Cuban Electric Company) valued at US$267,568,413.62 is controlled by Boca Raton, Florida-based Office Depot, Inc.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International; the certified claim also includes land adjacent to the Jose Marti International Airport in Havana, Republic of Cuba.  The third-largest certified claim valued at US$97,373,414.72 is controlled by New York, New York-based North American Sugar Industries, Inc.  The smallest certified claim is by Sara W. Fishman in the amount of US$1.00 with reference to the Cuban-Venezuelan Oil Voting Trust. 

The two (2) largest certified claims total US$449,377,207.76, representing 24% of the total value of the certified claims.  Thirty (30) certified claimants hold 56% of the total value of the certified claims.  This concentration of value creates an efficient pathway towards a settlement.   

Link To Libertad Act Title III Filing Statistics

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

For Oil From Iran, OFAC General License U Does Not Leave Open Intrepretation For Including Cuba As Did Russia General License 134

United States Department of the Treasury
Washington DC
20 March 2026

GENERAL LICENSE U
Authorizing the Delivery and Sale of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products of Iranian-Origin Loaded on Vessels as of March 20, 2026

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), all transactions prohibited by the above-listed authorities that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the sale, delivery, or offloading of crude oil or petroleum products of Iranian origin loaded on any vessel, including vessels blocked under the above-listed authorities, on or before 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 20, 2026 are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, April 19, 2026.

Note 1 to paragraph (a). Transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the sale, delivery, or offloading of such crude oil or petroleum products include transactions for the safe docking and anchoring of vessels carrying such crude oil or petroleum products; the preservation of the health or safety of the crew of any such vessel; emergency repairs or environmental mitigation or protection activities relating to any such vessel; and services such as vessel management, crewing, bunkering, piloting, registration, flagging, insurance, classification, and salvage. Iranian-origin crude oil and petroleum products subject to this general license include those produced by entities sanctioned under the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 560, Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 561, or the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594. 

Note 2 to paragraph (a). Transactions authorized by this general license include the importation into the United States of crude oil and petroleum products of Iranian origin, where such importation is ordinarily incident and necessary to the sale, delivery, or offloading of such crude oil or petroleum products authorized by this general license.  (b) This general license does not authorize: (1) Any transaction involving a person located in or organized under the laws of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Cuba, the Covered Regions of Ukraine, as defined by E.O. 14065, the Crimea Region of Ukraine, as defined by E.O. 13685, or any entity that is owned or controlled by or in a joint venture with such persons; or (2) Any other transactions or activities prohibited by any other Executive order or by any part of 31 CFR chapter V not referenced in this general license.

Link To Related Analyses

Six Days After Question To OFAC, General License 134 Amended To 134a: Adding No Russian Oil For Cuba Mar 20, 2026

Might New OFAC General License 134 Open Door (A Crack) For Russian Oil Exports To Cuba Until 11 April 2026? Mar 13, 2026

Six Days After Question To OFAC, General License 134 Amended To 134a: Adding No Russian Oil For Cuba

On 13 March 2026, the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council submitted a question to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury:

“Does OFAC General License Number 134 issued on 12 March 2026 apply to oil sourced from the Russian Federation which was loaded onto a vessel prior to 12 March 2026 for which the destination is the Republic of Cuba?”

 12 March 2026- GENERAL LICENSE 134

Authorizing the Delivery and Sale of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products of Russian Federation Origin Loaded on Vessels as of March 12, 2026

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this general license, all transactions prohibited by the above-listed authorities that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the sale, delivery, or offloading of crude oil or petroleum products of Russian Federation origin loaded on any vessel, including vessels blocked under the above listed authorities, on or before 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 12, 2026 are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, April 11, 2026.

Note 1 to paragraph (a). Transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the sale, delivery, or offloading of such crude oil or petroleum products include transactions for the safe docking and anchoring of vessels carrying such crude oil or petroleum products; the preservation of the health or safety of the crew of any such vessel; emergency repairs or environmental mitigation or protection activities relating to any such vessel; and services such as vessel management, crewing, bunkering, piloting, registration, flagging, insurance, classification, and salvage. Russian Federation-origin crude oil and petroleum products subject to this general license include those produced by entities sanctioned under the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587, or the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 589. (b) This general license does not authorize any other transactions or activities prohibited by any other Executive order or by any part of 31 CFR chapter V not referenced in this general license, including any transaction or activity involving Iran, the Government of Iran, or Iranian-origin goods or services that is prohibited by the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR part 560), except as authorized by paragraph (a).

19 March 2026- GENERAL LICENSE 134A

Authorizing the Delivery and Sale of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products of Russian Federation Origin Loaded on Vessels as of March 12, 2026

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this general license, all transactions prohibited by the above-listed authorities that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the sale, delivery, or offloading of crude oil or petroleum products of Russian Federation origin loaded on any vessel, including vessels blocked under the above listed authorities, on or before 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 12, 2026 are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, April 11, 2026.

Note 1 to paragraph (a). Transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the sale, delivery, or offloading of such crude oil or petroleum products include transactions for the safe docking and anchoring of vessels carrying such crude oil or petroleum products; the preservation of the health or safety of the crew of any such vessel; emergency repairs or environmental mitigation or protection activities relating to any such vessel; and services such as vessel management, crewing, bunkering, piloting, registration, flagging, insurance, classification, and salvage. Russian Federation-origin crude oil and petroleum products subject to this general license include those produced by entities sanctioned under the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587, or the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 589. (b) This general license does not authorize: (1) Any transaction involving a person located in or organized under the laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Cuba, the Covered Regions of Ukraine, as defined by E.O. 14065, the Crimea Region of Ukraine, as defined by E.O. 13685, or any entity that is owned or controlled by or in a joint venture with such persons; or (2) Any other transactions or activities prohibited by any other Executive order or by any part of 31 CFR chapter V not referenced in this general license, including any transaction or activity involving Iran, the Government of Iran, or Iranian-origin goods or services that is prohibited by the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR part 560), except as authorized by paragraph (a). (c) Effective March 19, 2026, General License No. 134, dated March 12, 2026, is replaced and superseded in its entirety by this General License No. 134A.

Link To 134
Link To 134a

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Four Years Late: Do Not Get Orgasmic About Cuba Government Private Sector Announcements

Four Years Late: Do Not Get Orgasmic About Cuba Government Private Sector Announcements 

Is There Commitment? 

Demand Correspondent Banking Because It Would Require Transparency For Cuba Banks

Fact Check:  

Important not to get too orgasmic. 

• “Cuba is open to having a fluid commercial relationship with U.S. companies and also with Cubans residing in the United States and their descendants.  This extends beyond the commercial sphere.  It also applies to investments- not only small investments, but also large investments, particularly in infrastructure.  The blockade deprives us of access to financing, access to technology, access to markets, and in recent years, it has specifically been aimed at depriving our country of access to fuel.”  Pérez-Oliva Fraga, Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Cuba 

Reality will be painful… 

A reminder to the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2019- ) in Havana that since 1994 almost all of the first licenses issued by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce and Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury for Republic of Cuba-related commercial, economic, and financial initiatives originated from companies located outside of the State of Florida and from individuals not of Cuban descent.  “Cuban-Americans” made use of the effort and landscape created first primarily by others. 

On 10 March 2022 the Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025) directed the OFAC to issue the first license authorizing direct investment in and direct financing to a privately-owned company in the Republic of Cuba owned by a Republic of Cuba national. 

Yes, the government of the Republic of Cuba is only now authorizing what could have been implemented four years ago- and resulted in meaningful capital flows and direct foreign investment.  They refused. 

That refusal has for nearing four years also impacted direct investment and direct financing into the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba not only from the United States, but from all countries- including those the government of the Republic of Cuba professes to have connectivity- Canada, China, European Union members, Russia, Spain, Mexico, etc.  

The Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029) should “trump” the decision by the government of the Republic of Cuba. 

The “trump” card should be for the Trump-Vance Administration to require direct correspondent banking for all transactions into and out of a privately-owned company located in the Republic of Cuba.  This means Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions would need to establish correspondent accounts with United States-based financial institutions.  A requirement of would be Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions “open their books” to audits by United States-based accounting firms.   

The use of correspondent accounts rather than funds flowing through third countries would ensure a cost-effective, efficient, and transparent financial landscape. 

Links To Related Analyses 

Link: Biden-Harris Administration Re-Engagement With Cuba’s Re-Emerging Private Sector Brings Urgency To Re-Authorization Of Direct Correspondent Banking, U-Turn Transactions. One-Way Does Not Work.  October 06, 2022 

Link: Cuba Government Delaying Private Company Investment/Financing Regulations Is Costing Earning Potential For U.S. And Other Country Sources. Success Should Not Be Feared. September 25, 2023  

Link: Now The Hard Part For Cuba: Implementing Quickly Transparent, Equal-For-All, MSME Investment & Financing Regulations. No Limitations. No Selectivity. No Orwellian Process. August 04, 2022   

Link: Biden-Harris Administration Approves First Equity Investment Since 1960 In A Private Cuban Company May 10, 2022 

Link: With U.S. Government Authorization For First Direct Equity Investment Into A Private Company In Cuba, Here Is Important Context And Details.  About The Parties; About The Message. May 16, 2022   

Link: Mr. de Cossio At MINREX In Cuba Not Quite Accurate With His Comments About Biden-Harris Administration Efforts With MSMEs And Remittances  December 20, 2022  

Link: State Department, NSC, OFAC, BIS, USDA Don't Understand Requirements For Financial Plumbing To Function Efficiently.  They Excel In Creating, Maintaining, And Defending Clogs. May 16, 2023  

Link: Logic From U.S. Department Of State:  If We Permit It, Cuba Might Not Use It, So We Won’t Permit It.  And, Yes, No One Asked Cuba. And, No One Asked U.S. Banks, Companies.  May 01, 2023  

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

undark magazine

U.S. Embassy In Cuba May Reduce Operations Due To Energy Issues. U.S. Company Previously Offered EVs And EV Charging Stations. ASAP: U.S. Companies Need BIS, OFAC, OLA, FAS, FCSC, DOJ In Havana

United States Company Offered Biden-Harris Administration Free EV Chargers For United States Embassy And Ambassador’s Residence In Havana And Availability Of Electric Vehicles 

United States Department Of State Refused- Preferred To Rent China-Built Vehicles From Cuba Government-Operated Company  

BIS, FAS, DOJ, OLA, And OFAC Representatives Need To Be Pre-Positioned In Havana 

The United States Department of State confirms energy availability is impacting operations of the United States Embassy, United States Consulate, and Ambassador’s Residence in Havana, Republic of Cuba. 

Associated Press
New York, New York
13 March 2026

• “The U.S. State Department has weighed potentially drawing down staffing at the U.S. Embassy in Havana as the fuel shortages caused by the American blockade could affect day-to-day diplomatic operations, according to three U.S. officials.  The officials stressed that there is still time to solve the problem and that the embassy and the State Department were looking at potential solutions, including possibly importing fuel from private sources if the Cubans allow it.  A reduction in staffing at the embassy in Havana would likely lead to a U.S. demand for a similar reduction in staffing at the Cuban embassy in Washington, the officials said.” 

With the Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029) re-engaging with the government of the Republic of Cuba and re-engaging with citizens of the Republic of Cuba, essential for United States-based companies and United States-based entrepreneurs to have available to them a robust senior-level agency and department representation in place as soon as possible at the United States Embassy in Havana and United States Consulate in Havana.   

Since focus will include re-engagement commercially, economically, and financially, with the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba, essential for personnel representing the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) of the United States Department of Justice (representing the interests of the 5,911 certified claimants), Office of the Legal Advisor (OLA) of the United States Department of State (to support FCSC), and Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) of the United States Department of Agriculture.   

In 2025, total exports (sold and donated) from the United States to the Republic of Cuba were approximately US$810.6 million.  That value placed the Republic of Cuba easily among the top 40% of United States product export markets.  For agricultural commodity exports and food product exports, the Republic of Cuba ranked 49th of 222 United States export markets.  Since December 2001, the total agricultural commodity and food product exports to the Republic of Cuba exceed US$8.2 billion on a cash-in-advance payment basis as required by the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000. 

• 2025 Report: US$490 Million Is 3rd Highest To Cuba Since 2001; US$173.6 Million (See List) In PYME/Cuban Citizen Exports Including Vehicles- US$148.3 Million. Donations Up 116.7% To US$147 Million February 26, 2026 

EV Decision 

Had the Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025) chose differently relating to electric vehicles for use by the United States Embassy in Havana, part of the energy issue(s) encountered today by Trump-Vance Administration would have been mitigated. 

A Maryland-based company repeatedly offered to provide and install solar-powered electric vehicle charging stations at the embassy and ambassador’s residence at no cost to United States taxpayers.  In addition, as the company had a license from the BIS to export electric vehicles from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, the company offered to deliver (lease, rent, sale) electric vehicles to augment the existing gasoline/diesel vehicle fleet.  The company received the following initial response: 

• 3 December 2021: United States Department of State: “The Biden Administration has clearly articulated the United States’ goal to accelerate and deploy electric vehicles and charging stations, create good-paying, union jobs, and enable a clean transportation future to combat climate change.  However, the United States Embassy in Cuba does not operate any electric vehicles nor has any solar power charging stations at our Embassy compound or residences in Havana.  At this time, it would be unlikely that the United States Embassy consider importing one or more electric vehicles for use in Cuba in the near future due to impediments in the electrical infrastructure and lack of trained mechanics on the island to service electric vehicles.”    

On 17 November 2022, the Biden-Harris Administration approved a license application submitted on 22 October 2022 by Columbia, Maryland-based Premier Automotive Export, Ltd. (PAE) to the BIS to export electric vehicles and chargers to republic of cuba nationals with the “ULTIMATE CONSIGNEE: Privately owned companies in the Republic of Cuba owned by Cuba Nationals.”  The BIS license is valid until 30 November 2026.  PAE received six BIS licenses since 2017 including the first BIS license to export an electric vehicle to an embassy located in the Republic of Cuba.       

• 8 May 2023: United States Department of State: “The Embassy is facing an emergency fuel crisis and is renting various electric vehicles from a local car rental agency until the crisis subsides.  There are no American made electric vehicles available to rent in Cuba.”   

• 9 May 2023: United States Department of State: “As noted in our previous response, the Embassy is facing an emergency fuel crisis and has taken temporary measures to ensure continuity of operations.  Because of the fluid situation regarding fuel, the details you request change on a daily basis.  The rental agency is not listed on the Cuba Restricted List.  There is nothing more to share at this time.”  

• 22 May 2023: To AP from United States Department of State: “There is a fuel crisis currently in Cuba.  In order to maintain operations, the U.S. Embassy in Havana rented numerous electric cars that are available for rent in Havana.  They will continue to do so until the crisis abates.  There are no American-made electric cars in Cuba available for rent.   The U.S. Embassy Havana currently does not operate any electric vehicles in its motor pool in Havana. All Department of State vehicles have a lifecycle and the Embassy is currently in the process of transitioning a large percentage of its vehicles to American-made electric vehicles and expects to have that process completed sometime in 2024. The vehicle needs of Embassy Havana vary daily as does the availability of various models of electric rental vehicles, their cost, and the Embassy offices which  are in need of a vehicle.” 

Link: AP and NBC News Also Want To Know Why U.S. Embassy In Havana Is Renting Electric Vehicles Made In China May 22, 2023 

United States Department of State
Washington DC
22 May 2023

Briefing With Matthew Miller, Spokesperson 

MR. MILLER: Matt, you want to close us off?\

QUESTION (Matt Lee, Associated Press):  Yeah, I just – and these will be extremely brief because I think you’ll only have a five-second answer for both.  One, do you know anything about the U.S. embassy in Cuba renting Cuban Government EV cars that are made by China?

MR MILLER:  I do not.   As I think you —

QUESTION:  Okay.  Could you —

MR MILLER:  As you seemed to anticipate.

QUESTION:  Could you – yeah.  Well, I just heard about it, so I didn’t think you would have anything, but I wanted to get it out there on the record.

MR MILLER:  Thank you.

QUESTION:  Can you – could you – or maybe not you, someone look into this and find out if it’s true and what the deal is?  I mean, it might be completely innocent.

Subsequent statement delivered later on 22 May 2023 to AP from the United States Department of State: “There is a fuel crisis currently in Cuba.  In order to maintain operations, the U.S. Embassy in Havana rented numerous electric cars that are available for rent in Havana.  They will continue to do so until the crisis abates.  There are no American-made electric cars in Cuba available for rent.   The U.S. Embassy Havana currently does not operate any electric vehicles in its motor pool in Havana. All Department of State vehicles have a lifecycle and the Embassy is currently in the process of transitioning a large percentage of its vehicles to American-made electric vehicles and expects to have that process completed sometime in 2024. The vehicle needs of Embassy Havana vary daily as does the availability of various models of electric rental vehicles, their cost, and the Embassy offices which  are in need of a vehicle.”

QUESTION (Andrea Mitchell, NBC News):  Can I just – can I just follow up on something that Matt had asked?

MR MILLER:  What – yeah.

QUESTION:  There was apparently a license, an export license, issued more than a year ago to a Maryland-based company to export an electric car and a charger to the embassy, and that four were supposed to be sent, and for some reason, apparently, Brian Nichols did not approve that. So —

MR MILLER:  I will say I’m not aware of these reports, and I think I will make it a practice not to comment on things that broke while I was at this podium that I have not had a chance to look into.

QUESTION:  Understood. 

Links To Related Analyses 

BIS "Returned Without Action" License Application To Donate EV Chargers To U.S. Embassy In Havana Because "Ultimate Consignee" Cancelled Transaction March 07, 2022 

Surprise Decision: Biden-Harris Administration Renews Trump-Pence Administration License To Export EVs To Embassies In Cuba. Company Offers To Donate EV Chargers To U.S. Embassy/Ambassador Residence January 25, 2022 

Why Is U.S. Embassy In Havana Renting Chinese-Built Electric Vehicles From A Cuba Government Company Rather Than Renting EVs From A U.S. Company? Company Offered To Donate Chargers. Rebuffed. May 22, 2023 

Is EV Data Really SCI? If U.S. Department Of State Wants U.S. Companies To Shift From Incredulousness To Embracing, Then Be Practical And Transparent Rather Than Secretive And Woefully Unprepared May 29, 2023

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Might New OFAC General License 134 Open Door (A Crack) For Russian Oil Exports To Cuba Until 11 April 2026?

On 29 January 2026, Donald Trump, President of the United States (2027-2021, 2025-2029), signed Executive Order 14380 which authorized and “imposes a new tariff system that allows the United States to impose additional tariffs on imports from any country that directly or indirectly provides oil to Cuba.” 

To date, there are no announcements from the United States Department of State, United States Department of the Treasury, or United States Department of Commerce that a tariff was imposed on a country specifically for an oil transaction relating to the government of the Republic of Cuba.   

On 12 March 2026, to mitigate global commodity price fluctuations since the 28 February 2026 attack upon the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the armed forces of the United States, the Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029) authorized the purchase of oil sourced from the Russian Federation which was loaded onto vessels prior to 12 March 2026.  The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury reported the purchase authorization will remain in force until 11 April 2026. 

Question: Given no country is specifically sanctioned by provisions of Executive Order 14380 for engaging in oil-related transactions with the government of the Republic of Cuba and certain oil sourced from the Russian Federation may now until 11 April 2026 be purchased absent Trump-Vance Administration sanctions, could (and would) a government or company deliver oil to the government of the Republic of Cuba? 

Might the government of the Russian Federation seek to use OFAC General License 134 for oil in vessels prior to 12 March 2026, using vessels registered within the Russian Federation, and vessels insured by Russian Federation-based companies to deliver oil to the Republic of Cuba- whether the end-user is the government of the Republic of Cuba, a Republic of Cuba government-operated company(s), or one of the re-emerging private companies located in the Republic of Cuba. 

If the end-user is the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba, the government of the Russian Federation could provide substantial long-term payment terms, which might be an inducement to the Trump-Vance Administration to authorize the transaction.

United States Department of the Treasury
Washington DC
13 March 2026

Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587; Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 589; Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 560; Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 544; Iranian Financial Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 561; Iranian Sector and Human Rights Abuses Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 562; Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 594; Executive Order 13876 of June 24, 2019 (“Imposing Sanctions With Respect to Iran”);

Executive Order 13902 of January 10, 2020 (“Imposing Sanctions With Respect to Additional Sectors of Iran”); Executive Order 13949 of September 21, 2020 (“Blocking Property of Certain Persons with Respect to the Conventional Arms Activities of Iran”) 

GENERAL LICENSE 134 

Authorizing the Delivery and Sale of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products of Russian Federation Origin Loaded on Vessels as of March 12, 2026 

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this general license, all transactions prohibited by the above-listed authorities that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the sale, delivery, or offloading of crude oil or petroleum products of Russian Federation origin loaded on any vessel, including vessels blocked under the above listed authorities, on or before 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, March 12, 2026 are authorized through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, April 11, 2026.  Note 1 to paragraph (a). Transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to the sale, delivery, or offloading of such crude oil or petroleum products include transactions for the safe docking and anchoring of vessels carrying such crude oil or petroleum products; the preservation of the health or safety of the crew of any such vessel; emergency repairs or environmental mitigation or protection activities relating to any such vessel; and services such as vessel management, crewing, bunkering, piloting, registration, flagging, insurance, classification, and salvage. Russian Federation-origin crude oil and petroleum products subject to this general license include those produced by entities sanctioned under the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 587, or the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations, 31 CFR part 589.  (b) This general license does not authorize any other transactions or activities prohibited by any other Executive order or by any part of 31 CFR chapter V not referenced in this general license, including any transaction or activity involving Iran, the Government of Iran, or Iranian-origin goods or services that is prohibited by the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR part 560), except as authorized by paragraph (a). 

Link: https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/935191/download?inline

The White House
Washington DC
29 January 2026 

CONFRONTING THE CUBAN REGIME: Today, President Donald J. Trump signed an Executive Order declaring a national emergency and establishing a process to impose tariffs on goods from countries that sell or otherwise provide oil to Cuba, protecting U.S. national security and foreign policy from the Cuban regime’s malign actions and policies.  The Order imposes a new tariff system that allows the United States to impose additional tariffs on imports from any country that directly or indirectly provides oil to Cuba.  The Order authorizes the Secretary of State and Secretary of Commerce to take all necessary actions, including issuing rules and guidance, to implement the tariff system and related measures.  The President may modify the Order if Cuba or affected countries take significant steps to address the threat or align with U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. 

• Link: https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2026/01/addressing-threats-to-the-united-states-by-the-government-of-cuba/ 

• Link: https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/02/03/2026-02250/addressing-threats-to-the-united-states-by-the-government-of-cuba

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Revisionism: In USA Today Cuba Interview, Biden Administration White House And State Department Official "Forgets" Opposing Critical Private Sector Banking Need

Embracing Revisionism 

Biden-Harris Administration White House And State Department Official Forgets His Lack Of Support For Critical U.S. Company And Cuba Private Sector Engagement Issue 

If He Was Not An Advocate, He Was An Obstacle 

Make Sense? Moving More Than US$8.2 Billion Through Third Country Banks- Where They Take A Fee For Every Transaction 

Remember NSC From Obama-Biden Administration: “We’ve gone as far as we can go.” 

Nothing For 5,911 Certified Claimants- The Embargo Began Because Of Them 

Good News: Trump-Vance Administration Which Is Robust With Private Sector Experience Appreciates Tools Required For Re-Engagement By United States-Based Companies: Direct Correspondent Banking 

USA Today
Washington DC
6 March 2026

“Eric Jacobstein, former deputy assistant secretary of state for western hemisphere affairs in the Biden administration [2023-2025; and 2022-2023 as special advisor to the vice president for the western hemisphere and national security council director for Central America and Cuba], traveled to the island repeatedly to meet with Cuban entrepreneurs and encourage them to connect with U.S. businesses.  For Trump’s strategy to take root, Cuba’s private sector will need increased help from American businesses, particularly the banking sector, he said.  “It's critical to engage this independent Cuban private sector,” Jacobstein said. “They're independent, they're entrepreneurial … It's a group that has embraced capitalism within a failing communist system.”  Link To Article: Inside Trump's plan to win Cuba with American oil 

Mr. Jacobstein met with owners of the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba to encourage them to connect with United States-based companies.  News flash- they did not need convincing.  Engaging with those who agree with you is no diplomatic feat.   

Who did need convincing? The government of the Republic of Cuba.  Why did Mr. Jacobstein not meet “repeatedly” with senior-level officials of the government of the Republic of Cuba to encourage them to issue the regulations to authorize direct investment in and direct financing to privately-owned companies located in the Republic of Cuba?  The investment and financing were authorized on 10 March 2022 by the Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025).  And, what about meeting with officials of the government of the Republic of Cuba to advocate for a settlement of the 5,911 claims certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) within the United States Department of Justice?  There is no record of efforts by Mr. Jacobstein to advocate directly to those who were decisionmakers. 

• Link: Cuba Government Delaying Private Company Investment/Financing Regulations Is Costing Earning Potential For U.S. And Other Country Sources. Success Should Not Be Feared. September 25, 2023 

• Link: Now The Hard Part For Cuba: Implementing Quickly Transparent, Equal-For-All, MSME Investment & Financing Regulations. No Limitations. No Selectivity. No Orwellian Process. August 04, 2022  

• Link: Biden-Harris Administration Approves First Equity Investment Since 1960 In A Private Cuban Company May 10, 2022 

• Link: With U.S. Government Authorization For First Direct Equity Investment Into A Private Company In Cuba, Here Is Important Context And Details.  About The Parties; About The Message. May 16, 2022  

• Link: Mr. de Cossio At MINREX In Cuba Not Quite Accurate With His Comments About Biden-Harris Administration Efforts With MSMEs And Remittances  December 20, 2022 

Mr. Jacobstein was never employed in the private sector according to his LinkedIn profile.  He could not and would not appreciate the burdensome, cost-ineffective, and unnecessary costs with moving funds for commercial purposes through third countries- meaning a triangle.  Rather than a cost-effective, efficient, secure, timely, and transparent moving of funds for commercial purposes directly, meaning a straight line. 

• Link: State Department, NSC, OFAC, BIS, USDA Don't Understand Requirements For Financial Plumbing To Function Efficiently.  They Excel In Creating, Maintaining, And Defending Clogs. May 16, 2023 

• Link: Logic From U.S. Department Of State:  If We Permit It, Cuba Might Not Use It, So We Won’t Permit It.  And, Yes, No One Asked Cuba. And, No One Asked U.S. Banks, Companies.  May 01, 2023 

When described as advocating for the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba to “connect with” United States-based companies and stressing the importance of the “banking sector” Mr. Jacobstein has conveniently forgotten his remark to representatives of United States-based companies. 

The Biden-Harris Administration did authorize private companies located in the Republic of Cuba to establish accounts with United States-based financial institutions.  That was important.  However, that did not address the critical problem- moving money. 

During his tenure, Mr. Jacobstein did not indicate support for correcting a mistake by the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017).  Its failure to authorize direct correspondent banking for authorized commercial transactions from the United States to the Republic of Cuba and from the Republic of Cuba to the United States. 

• Infamously, Mark Feierstein, Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the National Security Council from 2015 to 2017 during the Obama-Biden Administration, said to representatives of United States-based companies, “We’ve gone as far as we can go” when asked to support direct correspondent banking.  While simultaneously seeking re-engagement, the most important protocol required for commerce was ignored.  The government of the Republic of Cuba was not required to permit widespread on-the-ground opportunities for United States-based companies to employee thousands of Republic of Cuba nationals.  Mr. Feierstein presided over a tepid landscape and what would be a roadmap for the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) to roll-up some of the most visible examples of United States-based company presence in the Republic of Cuba. 

The Obama-Biden Administration authorized United States-based financial institutions to establish correspondent accounts with Republic of Cuba-based financial institutions, including those operated by the government of the Republic of Cuba. 

Inexplicably, at the direction of the National Security Council (NSC) at The White House, Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions were not permitted to have correspondent accounts with United States-based financial institutions.  One such financial institution was vetted and approved for a United States-based financial institution to maintain a correspondent account.  The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury did not approve the Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institution to maintain a correspondent account with the United States-based financial institution. 

• Link: Biden-Harris Administration Re-Engagement With Cuba’s Re-Emerging Private Sector Brings Urgency To Re-Authorization Of Direct Correspondent Banking, U-Turn Transactions. One-Way Does Not Work.  October 06, 2022 

• Link: Remittances To Cuba Mentioned 16 Times In 14 Pages Of New OFAC Regulations: Biden, Blinken, Sullivan, Nichols, Gonzalez, Yellen Defend 3rd-Country Banks Taking Percentage Of Every Dollar To/From Cuba June 13, 2022 

Thus, absent bilateral correspondent accounts, funds for authorized financial transactions continued then and continue now to move through third countries.   

The result is third country financial institutions receiving a fee for every United States Dollar transaction using a financial institution.   

For perspective, since December 2001 when the first agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba were re-authorized within provisions of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, more than US$8.2 billion in authorized commercial payments have moved from the Republic of Cuba to United States-based companies through third country financial institutions- and a fee is paid each time.  

Every United States Dollar to a third-country financial institution is a burdensome and unnecessary fee to United States-based companies and one less United States Dollar directed to additional product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba. 

Continuation of the indirect payment process is partly a legacy of Mr. Jacobstein. 

Was Mr. Jacostein, along with his colleagues, incapable of understanding direct correspondent banking or did not care enough to want to learn of its importance because of his and their lack of private sector experience?  Why ignore an essential component for the movement of global capital investment- efficient, cost-effective funds transfers.  

For United States-based companies and financial institutions, Mr. Jacobstein should have been an advocate rather than in impediment.   

Eric Jacobstein 
Deputy Assistant Secretary For Central America
Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs 
United States Department of State
Washington DC

Eric Jacobstein currently serves as a Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (June 2023 to January 2025) covering Central America, Cuba and regional migration. He previously served at the White House as the Special Advisor to the Vice President for the Western Hemisphere and as National Security Council Director for Central America and Cuba (February 2022 to June 2023). In 2021, Mr. Jacobstein joined the Biden-Harris Administration as a Senior Advisor in the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean and as Staff Director of the Northern Triangle Task Force. Before that, Mr. Jacobstein worked in the United States Congress for 15 years, including as a Senior Policy Advisor on the House Committee on Foreign Affairs managing the Western Hemisphere portfolio for Chairman Eliot Engel and Committee Democrats. In this role, he was the lead Democratic advisor handling issues related to Latin America and the Caribbean in the House of Representatives. Mr. Jacobstein also served as the Staff Director of the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control working for Senator Dianne Feinstein. In addition, he has worked for the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Representative Jim Kolbe and the Inter-American Dialogue. He holds a M.A. in Latin American Studies from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and a B.A. in Political Science from Haverford College. 

5,911 Certified Claimants 

Neither the Obama-Biden Administration, the Trump-Pence Administration, nor the Biden-Harris Administration focused upon seeking a settlement with the government of the Republic of Cuba on behalf of the 5,911 United States-based companies with claims certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) within the United States Department of Justice in Washington DC.  The value of the certified claims at date of certification was US$1,902,202,284.95 with simple interest of 6% annually permitted, with the current estimated value at approximately US$9.2 billion. 

The “embargo” commenced in 1960 during the Eisenhower-Nixon Administration (1953-1961) and was a direct result of the seizure of an asset owned by a United States-based company.  Ending the “embargo” should require first a settlement on behalf of the 5,911 certified claimants. 

The first asset (along with 382 enterprises the same day) to be expropriated by the Republic of Cuba was an oil refinery on 6 August 1960 owned by White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation (USFCSC: CU-1331/CU-1332/CU-1333 valued at US$56,196,422.73).  

• Link: Cuba Could Resolve Western Union's Certified Claim By Waiving Four Months Of Electronic Remittance Transfer Fees. Biden Administration Should Support And Negotiate Certified Claims Settlement. September 17, 2021 

• Link: Lawsuit filing statistics for Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”). 

The Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029) has an opportunity to complete what the Obama-Biden Administration, Trump-Pence Administration, and Biden-Harris Administration partially succeeded in doing- secure the viability of the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba.  Specifically, to provide them with access to the same business operational tools commonplace in other countries.   

These tools include in Havana- implementing regulations permitting direct investment and direct financing into private companies, and requesting Republic of Cuba-government-operated financial institutions to seek correspondent accounts with United States-based financial institutions. 

Those tools include in Washington DC- permitting Republic of Cuba-based financial institutions to have correspondent accounts with United States-based financial institutions. 

If companies are unable to move funds cost-effectively (particularly for small values), efficiently, and transparently, then all other authorizations become more about optics than performance.

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Missing From Shield Of The Americas Summit Are President Trump's Two Works-In-Progress And Three Heads Of State Who Could Influence One Of Them To Do What President Trump Wants It To Do

This morning, Donald Trump, President of the United States (2017-2021 and 2025-2029), will host at his property in Doral, Florida, the Shield of the Americas Summit for heads of state and heads of government from selected countries. 

The heads of state representing his two most visible works-in-progress, one more advanced than the other, will not be participating: Delcy Rodriguez, Interim President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (2026- ), and Miguel Diaz-Canel, President of the Republic of Cuba (2019- ). 

Unknown is will President Trump use the forum to seek from those in the room with him support for his efforts to re-engage commercially, economically, financially, and politically with the government of the Republic of Cuba.  If he does, there is then the question as to what leverage they have in Havana and if they have leverage in Havana, to what level will they agree to use it. 

Three heads of state who might have the most expansive leverage in Havana will not be participating in the Shield of the Americas Summit.   

They represent the largest by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and population, Brazil, and second-largest by GDP and population, Mexico, and the fourth-largest by GDP, and third-largest by population, Colombia. 

• “On March 7, 2026, Secretary of State Marco Rubio will join President Donald J. Trump at the Shield of the Americas Summit in Doral, Florida. The United States will welcome our strongest likeminded allies in our hemisphere to promote freedom, security, and prosperity in our region. This historic coalition of nations will work together to advance strategies that stop foreign interference in our hemisphere, criminal and narco-terrorist gangs and cartels, and illegal and mass immigration.” United States Department of State 

Expected to participate: Argentine Republic President Javier Milei; Bolivian President Rodrigo Paz Pereira; Chile President-elect José Antonio Kast; Costa Rican President Rodrigo Chaves Robles; Dominican Republic President Luis Abinader; Ecuadorian Constitutional President Daniel Noboa; El Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele; Guyanese President Mohamed Irfaan Ali; Honduran President Nasry "Tito" Asfura; Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino Quintero; Paraguayan President Santiago Peña; Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar. 

Links To Related Analyses 

Trump Administration Opens Diplomatic Door To Cuba: First, Change The Economy. Second, Invite U.S. Companies. Third, For Now, Type Of Government Not Important- Just Make It Work Like China, Vietnam Feb 15, 2026

Trump’s Message To Cuba To “Make A Deal” May Not Be A Bad Deal For Cuba. Witkoff And Kushner Add Another Assignment. 23 February 2026 Is Consequential. January 14, 2026

With New BIS Guidance For Fuel, Gas, Petroleum Product Exports To Cuba, Trump Administration Confirms There Is A Private Sector In Cuba And U.S. Companies May Engage. Members Of Congress Not Pleased. Feb 25, 2026

President Trump Interested In "Friendly Takeover" Of Cuba Rather Than "Hostile Takeover" Of Cuba. What About Plebiscite? Feb 28, 2026

At CARICOM Meeting, U.S. Secretary Of State Rubio Discusses Cuba- Engagment Remains Focused First On Commercial, Economic, Financial Changes In Cuba Feb 26, 2026

2025 Report: US$490 Million Is 3rd Highest To Cuba Since 2001; US$173.6 Million (See List) In PYME/Cuban Citizen Exports Including Vehicles- US$148.3 Million. Donations Up 116.7% To US$147 Million Feb 26, 2026

At SPIEF’25 Russia-Cuba Dialogue, One Side Talks Dreams, Other Talks Reality. “Reliable Partner”- “Science Fiction” Or Reality? Russia Says Entrepreneurs Important. Cuba Not So Enthusiastic June 19, 2025  

Cuba Good News? “[A]chieving this depends a lot on the performance of the business system” Said President Diaz-Canel. Can He Deliver? Does He Want To Deliver? Will Washington Accept The Effort? Mar 3, 2026

Trump Administration Executive Order On Changes To Tariffs To Comply With SCOTUS Decision Feb 25, 2026

OFAC To Implement "Favorable Licensing Policy" For Licenses To Export Oil From Venezuela To Cuba Private Companies And Cuban Citizens Feb 25, 2026

Transcripts And Recordings Of SCOTUS Libertad Act Title III Arguments: Havana Docks And Exxon Mobil Feb 18, 2026

Background 

On 10 May 2022, the Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025) authorized the first direct investment and the first direct financing into a privately-owned company located in the Republic of Cuba owned by a Republic of Cuba national.  The expectation was the government of the Republic of Cuba would quickly embrace the opportunity for engagement.   

• Link: Biden-Harris Administration Approves First Equity Investment Since 1960 In A Private Cuban Company May 10, 2022 

• Link: With U.S. Government Authorization For First Direct Equity Investment Into A Private Company In Cuba, Here Is Important Context And Details.  About The Parties; About The Message. May 16, 2022 

• Link: Now The Hard Part For Cuba: Implementing Quickly Transparent, Equal-For-All, MSME Investment & Financing Regulations. No Limitations. No Selectivity. No Orwellian Process. August 04, 2022 

Nearing four years later, the government of the Republic of Cuba has not issued the necessary guidance and regulations.   

The Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2019- ) in the Republic of Cuba is not for some in the Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029) the problem.  The problem is the manner the government of the Republic of Cuba uses its chosen political system to manage its economy.  

Policies, regulations, and statutes implemented by the government of the United States do impact negatively the commercial, economic, and financial functionality of the government of the Republic of Cuba.    

• Link: 2025 Report: US$490 Million Is 3rd Highest To Cuba Since 2001; US$173.6 Million (See List) In PYME/Cuban Citizen Exports Including Vehicles- US$148.3 Million. Donations Up 116.7% To US$147 Million Feb 26, 2026  

Ironically, some of the policies, regulations, and statutes if accepted by the government of the Republic of Cuba could strengthen the government of the Republic of Cuba by providing additional capital, additional markets, and additional bilateral political connectivity.  

Within those policies, regulations, and statutes are opportunities the government of the Republic of Cuba has avoided which have contributed to the corrosion and decay of the commercial, economic, and financial infrastructure in the Republic of Cuba.  

The Trump-Vance Administration will permit the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration to implement changes to commercial, economic, and financial infrastructure while maintaining most political infrastructure.    

However, the infrastructure needs to transition quickly from what did not work in the second half of the twentieth century to what can work in the beginning of the second quarter of the twenty-first century.   

Cigar Emporium aruba

BIS Update Prohibits Use Of Cuba Government Banks For Gas And Petroleum Product Transactions With Re-Emerging Private Sector. Third-Country Banks Permitted.

United States Department of Commerce
Washington DC
4 March 2026

Exports of U.S.-Origin Gas and Petroleum Products to Cuba

BIS has issued updated guidance on the availability of EAR License Exception Support for the Cuban People (SCP) for exports and reexports of U.S.-origin gas and other petroleum products to eligible Cuban private sector entities and to individual Cuban consumers. Under this guidance, certain transactions meeting the terms of License Exception SCP may be authorized without a license, including exports for private sector economic activities and those sold directly to individuals for personal or family use. License applications involving U.S.-origin gas and petroleum products that otherwise qualify for SCP, will be returned without action with direction to use the license exception. Exporters are responsible for ensuring that all SCP conditions are met and should carefully review § 740.21 before proceeding. 

SCP Gas/Petroleum FAQ
Cuba Export Control Guidance

BIS determination to suspend the availability of License Exception SCP under § 740.21(b)(1) for any export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) involving a Cuban owned bank

• There are longstanding and documented issues of diversion and fees associated with Cuban banks. The Cuban banks form the basis of the regime’s financial infrastructure, and many are designated on the Cuba Restricted List due to being under the control of, or acting for or on behalf of, the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or personnel. It is well established that it is not the policy of the United States to permit transactions that significantly benefit the Cuban government or its designated military institutions.

• Accordingly, transactions involving the deposit of foreign funds into Cuban government banks, including those on the Cuba Restricted List or associated with the military and intelligence services, may serve to primarily generate revenue for or contribute to the operation of the Cuban state.

• Taking these considerations above into account and the need to protect U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, BIS has determined that there is an unacceptable risk that transactions involving Cuban banks may primarily benefit the Cuban government, contrary to the purpose of License Exception SCP of supporting independent economic activity in Cuba.

• Pursuant to § 740.2(b) of the EAR, which specifies that “all License Exceptions are subject to revision, suspension, or revocation, in whole or in part, without notice to protect U.S. national security or foreign policy interests,” BIS is informing all exporters, reexporters, and transferors that License Exception Support for the Cuban People (SCP), § 740.21(b)(1), is suspended as of March 4, 2026, for any export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) involving the deposit of foreign funds into a Cuban owned bank.

• This BIS suspension does not apply to exports, reexports, or transfers (in-country) that do not involve Cuban banks, e.g., involving third country banks or other financial payment systems that do not involve the deposit of foreign funds into Cuban banks. This BIS suspension also does not apply to any export or reexport that was en route aboard a carrier to a port of export or reexport on March 4, 2026, pursuant to actual orders for export or reexport to Cuba, provided that the export or reexport is completed no later than April 3, 2026. 

Updated Guidance Regarding Available EAR License Exceptions for Exports of Gas and Petroleum Products to Cuban Private Sector Entities and Activities

• The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has been receiving questions from potential exporters on the EAR requirements and potential EAR authorizations that may be available to authorize exports of gas and petroleum products and reexports of U.S.-origin gas and petroleum products for private sector use, including for addressing humanitarian needs in Cuba.

• In general, a license is required to export and reexport gas and other petroleum products that are subject to the EAR to Cuba pursuant to § 746.2(a). However, as with any export or reexport that is subject to a license requirement, the exporter or reexporter should first evaluate whether a license exception is available to authorize the export or reexport.

• In particular, exporters and reexporters of gas and petroleum products subject to the EAR to the Cuban private sector should review the general restrictions under § 740.2 and § 740.21. As explained below, gas and other petroleum products exported and reexported to Cuban private sector entities or individuals for personal use (or their fa may be authorized under License Exception SCP.

• Exporters and reexporters are advised that if a license application is submitted to BIS that otherwise meets the terms and conditions of License Exception SCP, those applications will be returned without action (RWA’d) by BIS with a direction to the applicant to export or reexport the items pursuant to License Exception SCP.

• BIS provides the following FAQ to further assist public understanding:

Q.1: Would License Exception Support for the Cuban People (SCP) (§ 740.21 of the EAR) allow an exporter or reexporter to export or reexport gas and other petroleum products to Cuban private sector entities for private sector use, or directly to individual Cubans for their personal or family use?

A.1: Yes, provided that all the applicable terms and conditions of License Exception SCP are met. Specifically, there are two authorizing paragraphs under License Exception SCP under paragraph (b) (Improving living conditions and supporting independent economic activity), which may be available to authorize these types of exports and reexports of gas and other petroleum products to Cuba. License Exception SCP provides a general authorization for exports under certain applicable conditions, as explained below, and does not contain any specific limitations on applicability based on quantity or value of the items, or exporter or reexporter.

§ 740.21(b)(1). Exports to private sector for private sector use. 

If the gas and other petroleum products are being exported (or reexported) for use by the Cuban private sector for private sector use, then paragraph (b)(1) of License Exception SCP, which authorizes items for use by the Cuban private sector for private sector economic activities, may be available to authorize these types of exports and reexports. To qualify, exports must be both (1) for use by the Cuban private sector, and (2) for private sector economic activities, including those addressing humanitarian needs in Cuba. Per § 740.21(b)(1)(i) and (ii), License Exception SCP does not apply to any transactions, whether to Cuban private sector entities or otherwise, which primarily generate revenue for the state; or contribute to the operation of the state, including through the construction or renovation of state-owned buildings.

§ 740.21(b)(2). Exports sold directly to individuals in Cuba for their personal use.

If the gas and other petroleum products are sold directly to individuals in Cuba for their personal use, then paragraph (b)(2) of SCP, which authorizes items sold directly to individuals in Cuba for their personal use (or their immediate family's personal use), may be available to authorize exports and reexports of such products. Paragraph (b)(2) does not require the products to be exported or reexported directly to the individuals; however, the products must ultimately be destined for these eligible end users (and/or their families) for their personal use. This authorization applies only if the gas or other petroleum products are sold directly to individual Cubans for their personal use or the use of their immediate family. It does not apply if any of the products are sold or transferred to proscribed persons or entities in Cuba, including employees of the Ministry of Defense or Ministry of the Interior, senior officials of certain Cuban government organizations, labor unions, and other Cuban government affiliated organizations, including entities listed on the U.S. State Department’s Cuba Restricted List, see 31 CFR 515.209.

Note: Exporters and reexporters are responsible for ensuring that all of the applicable terms and conditions of License Exception SCP are met. Please review EAR § 740.21 -- License Exception Support for Cuban People (SCP) -- carefully to ensure that your transaction meets all the criteria for use of the license exception. Exporters who are unable to determine if they can satisfy all terms and conditions of License Exception SCP should submit an application for an individual validated license.

Cuba Good News? “[A]chieving this depends a lot on the performance of the business system” Said President Diaz-Canel. Can He Deliver? Does He Want To Deliver? Will Washington Accept The Effort?

“achieving this depends a lot on the performance of the business system” Miguel Diaz-Canel, President of the Republic of Cuba (2019- ) 

From 10 May 2022
Good News: President Miguel Diaz-Canel Publicly Recognizing The Problem
Bad News: His Track Record For Solving The Problem Has Been Dismal

Granma
Havana, Republic of Cuba
2 March 2026

emphasis added 

“"We must focus immediately on implementing the most urgent and necessary transformations to the economic and social model," stated Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and President of the Republic, during his address to the Council of Ministers.

The president added that these transformations "are fundamentally related to business autonomy; municipal autonomy; the resizing of the state apparatus, the government, and institutions; national food production, with municipal balance sheets; the shift in the energy matrix, which includes not only renewable sources but also everything related to domestic crude oil; exports, linking them to the flexibilities approved for foreign direct investment; leveraging economic partnerships between the state and private sectors, especially at the municipal level; and promoting business with Cubans residing abroad." 

All of this, the Head of State added, must contribute to the macroeconomic stabilization of the country, to increasing foreign exchange earnings, and to developing national production, with an emphasis on food. 

At the meeting of the highest governing body on the Island, which is led by Prime Minister Manuel Marrero Cruz every month from the Palace of the Revolution and via videoconference with all the provinces, the president stressed that "achieving this depends a lot on the performance of the business system, and also on the behavior of the municipalities." 

Businesses, he said, must be prepared to use all the powers that have been granted. Many measures regarding business autonomy have been approved, but they are not yet being utilized; some are even unknown, he noted. 

Díaz-Canel added that "municipalities must prepare themselves, as these processes we are opening will increasingly be implemented there." 

"Municipalities must manage foreign direct investment; municipalities must manage their own closed-loop systems in foreign currency; municipalities must manage economic partnerships between the state and non-state sectors; municipalities must design and propose their local production systems; and they must manage investments from Cubans residing abroad," he explained. 

We must prepare ourselves, he said, so that together we can contribute to national production, together we can boost food production, together we can contribute to macroeconomic stabilization, together we can contribute more foreign exchange earnings to the country, more exports, better use of productive capacities, the realization of the change in the energy matrix, and an adequate relationship between the state and non-state sectors. 

The Cuban President called on the members of the Council of Ministers to work intensively, intelligently, with oversight, deeper analysis, high standards, and discipline, leveraging potential and questioning anything that isn't progressing.” 

Link (3/3/26)- CONSEJO DE ESTADO: Decreto-Ley 114/2025 “De la asociación entre entidades empresariales estatales y no estatales” (GOC-2026-215-O24).  MINISTERIO: Ministerio de Economia y Planificación Resolución 8/2026 “Procedimiento para la evaluación y aprobación de la asociación entre entidades empresariales estatales y no estatales” (GOC-2026-216-O24)

Background 

On 10 May 2022, the Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025) authorized the first direct investment and the first direct financing into a privately-owned company located in the Republic of Cuba owned by a Republic of Cuba national.  The expectation was the government of the Republic of Cuba would quickly embrace the opportunity for engagement.   

• Link: Biden-Harris Administration Approves First Equity Investment Since 1960 In A Private Cuban Company May 10, 2022 

• Link: With U.S. Government Authorization For First Direct Equity Investment Into A Private Company In Cuba, Here Is Important Context And Details.  About The Parties; About The Message. May 16, 2022 

• Link: Now The Hard Part For Cuba: Implementing Quickly Transparent, Equal-For-All, MSME Investment & Financing Regulations. No Limitations. No Selectivity. No Orwellian Process. August 04, 2022 

Nearing four years later, the government of the Republic of Cuba has not issued the necessary guidance and regulations.   

What is required? One page to be filed by the Republic of Cuba-based company with its Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institution; similar to a Know Your Customer (KYC) form, authorizing officially the direct investment and direct financing.    

• “A KYC form is a mandatory document used by financial institutions, banks, and businesses to verify a client's identity, address, and legitimacy.  It requires personal details (name, DOB), contact information, and government-issued documents (passport, driver's license, etc.) to prevent fraud, money laundering, and illegal activities.” 

The lack of guidance and regulations from the government of the Republic of Cuba has also impacted sources of capital from every other country- including those with whom the government of the Republic of Cuba embraces- China and Russia, along with the twenty-seven-member country Brussels, Belgium-based European Union (EU) among others.  

The Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2019- ) in the Republic of Cuba is not for some in the Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029) the problem.  The problem is the manner the government of the Republic of Cuba uses its chosen political system to manage its economy.  

Policies, regulations, and statutes implemented by the government of the United States do impact negatively the commercial, economic, and financial functionality of the government of the Republic of Cuba.    

• Link: 2025 Report: US$490 Million Is 3rd Highest To Cuba Since 2001; US$173.6 Million (See List) In PYME/Cuban Citizen Exports Including Vehicles- US$148.3 Million. Donations Up 116.7% To US$147 Million Feb 26, 2026  

Ironically, some of the policies, regulations, and statutes if accepted by the government of the Republic of Cuba could strengthen the government of the Republic of Cuba by providing additional capital, additional markets, and additional bilateral political connectivity.  

Within those policies, regulations, and statutes are opportunities the government of the Republic of Cuba has avoided which have contributed to the corrosion and decay of the commercial, economic, and financial infrastructure in the Republic of Cuba.  

The Trump-Vance Administration will permit the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration to implement changes to commercial, economic, and financial infrastructure while maintaining most political infrastructure.    

However, the infrastructure needs to transition quickly from what did not work in the second half of the twentieth century to what can work in the beginning of the second quarter of the twenty-first century.   

To date, successive governments in the Republic of Cuba embrace private sector-related formulas guaranteeing failure.   

The government of the Republic of Cuba must, and quickly, adopt and adapt to formulas targeting the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba which transition systemically from a focus on surviving to a focus on thriving.  

Links To Related Analyses  

• Biden-Harris Administration Approves First Equity Investment Since 1960 In A Private Cuban Company May 10, 2022 

• With U.S. Government Authorization For First Direct Equity Investment Into A Private Company In Cuba, Here Is Important Context And Details.  About The Parties; About The Message. May 16, 2022 

• Now The Hard Part For Cuba: Implementing Quickly Transparent, Equal-For-All, MSME Investment & Financing Regulations. No Limitations. No Selectivity. No Orwellian Process. August 04, 2022 

• Cuba Government Delaying Private Company Investment/Financing Regulations Is Costing Earning Potential For U.S. And Other Country Sources. Success Should Not Be Feared. September 25, 2023 

• Trump’s Message To Cuba To “Make A Deal” May Not Be A Bad Deal For Cuba. Witkoff And Kushner Add Another Assignment. 23 February 2026 Is Consequential. Jan 14, 2026   

• At SPIEF’25 Russia-Cuba Dialogue, One Side Talks Dreams, Other Talks Reality. “Reliable Partner”- “Science Fiction” Or Reality? Russia Says Entrepreneurs Important. Cuba Not So Enthusiastic June 19, 2025  

• Trump Administration Opens Diplomatic Door To Cuba: First, Change The Economy. Second, Invite U.S. Companies. Third, For Now, Type Of Government Not Important- Just Make It Work Like China, Vietnam Feb 15, 2026 

• Trump’s Message To Cuba To “Make A Deal” May Not Be A Bad Deal For Cuba. Witkoff And Kushner Add Another Assignment. 23 February 2026 Is Consequential. January 14, 2026

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

President Trump Interested In "Friendly Takeover" Of Cuba Rather Than "Hostile Takeover" Of Cuba. What About Plebiscite?

The White House
Washington DC
27 February 2026

Donald Trump, President of the United States (2017-2021, 2025-2029)

“The Cuban government is talking with us.” 

“They have no money.  They have no anything right now.  But they’re talking to us, and maybe we’ll have a friendly takeover of Cuba.”

“We could very well end up having a friendly takeover of Cuba.”

“is, to put it mildly, a failed nation” 

“they want our help.”

“We’ve had a lot of years of dealing with Cuba.  I’ve been hearing about Cuba since I’m a little boy.  But they’re in big trouble.” 

“I think (is) very positive for the people that were expelled, or worse, from Cuba and live here.” 

2025 Report: US$490 Million Is 3rd Highest To Cuba Since 2001; US$173.6 Million (See List) In PYME/Cuban Citizen Exports Including Vehicles- US$148.3 Million. Donations Up 116.7% To US$147 Million

NOTE: The total value of all exports in 2025 from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products paid and products donated, was US$810,776,711.00

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
March 2025

December 2025 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increase 10.8% -
Year-To-Year Increase 13.0%
46th Of 222 December 2025 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
For 2025 Cuba Ranked 49th Of 222 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets – 2
2025 Was Third-Highest Export Value Since First Exports In 2001
Re-Emerging Private Sector Exports Continue To Increase - 3
December 2025 CDA Healthcare Product Exports US$98,824.00 - 6
December 2025 Humanitarian Donations US$16,034,654.00 – 7
2025 Humanitarian Donations- US$147,027,544.00- 7
U.S. Port Export Data- 20

DECEMBER 2025 AG/FOOD EXPORTS TO CUBA INCREASE 10.8%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in December 2025 were US$46,221,085.00 compared to US$41,700,049.00 in December 2024 and US$45,229,570.00 in December 2023.  

US$490,111,943.00 for 2025 compared to US$433,662,216.00 in 2024 representing an 13.0% increase year-to-year. The year 2025 represents the third-highest US Dollar value in exports since the first TSREEA exports in December 2001.

Since 2022, when the first BIS license was issued for the export of vehicles to Republic of Cuba nationals and to private companies in the Republic of Cuba, the cumulative export value of the initiatives in place during the Obama-Biden Administration, Trump-Pence Administration, Biden-Harris Administration, and Trump-Vance Administration exceeds US$394 million of which electric and gasoline-powered new and used vehicles, bicycles, trucks, motorcycles and mopeds, and parts, exceeds US$227 million (Year 2025: US$149,413,031.00; Year 2024: US$67,241,234.00; Year 2023: US$10,546,419.00; Year 2022: US$89,848.00), and purchases (equipment and products) for use by the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba driving the growth.

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, and United States Department of State.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA, CDA, and other regulations, specifically including products exported from the United States to the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba.

The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

LINK TO COMPLETE REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

LINK TO U.S. PORT EXPORT DATA

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2025 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2024 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2023 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

McGraw Center For Business Journalism

At CARICOM Meeting, U.S. Secretary Of State Rubio Discusses Cuba- Engagement Remains Focused First On Commercial, Economic, Financial Changes In Cuba

United States Department of State
Washington DC
25 February 2026

Frigate Bay, Saint Kitts and Nevis
St. Kitts Marriott Beach Resort

Secretary of State Marco Rubio Remarks to Press

QUESTION:  Can I ask you about the oil announcement today by the Treasury Department about Venezuelan oil to Cuba that for humanitarian reasons – for private companies?  Is this a shift in policy?  What is the motivation?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  No, it’s always been legal to sell to the private sector in Cuba, okay?  These are – these would not be sales to the government.  These would not be sales to the military-owned GAESA, the company.  These would be sales to a very small private sector that exists in Cuba, and that’s always been legal.  I mean, there are people that have a license to do that now.  This would just expand to the numbers that could do it.  Again, it would go to the private sector.  The private sector in Cuba is quite small.  It exists, but it’s small.  And it certainly in and of itself does not have the capacity to deal with the scale and scope of the challenges they’re facing. 

But if the Cuban economy were a functioning economy, it would have a much larger private sector.  And so what’s clear is that – and I would say this, that the people of Cuba are suffering today.  They’ve been suffering for a long time.  They’re suffering now, perhaps more than at any time in recent memory, perhaps in the history since 1959.  This is the worst economic climate that Cuba has faced, and it is the authorities there in that government who are responsible for that.  They are the ones that have made decisions that have left Cuba vulnerable to the situation they’re now in. 

Understand that Cuba has largely survived on the basis of subsidies.  The Soviet Union gave them free things.  When the Soviet Union collapsed, they went into a special period which was disastrous for them.  And then along came Hugo Chávez and bailed them out for a long time.  When that sort of died off a little bit, the Maduro regime was providing them fuel – or they were providing them actually crude oil.  Some percentage of that was refined and used domestically, and a large percentage of that never even made it to Cuba.  It was sold in the open market for cash to fund the regime and to fund the military-owned company. 

So the reason why Cuba’s electricity grid was already in collapse – before Maduro was captured it was already in collapse – the reason why things are as bad as they are is because they have an economic model that does not exist, that does not work.  It doesn’t exist anywhere in the world.  It is not functional.  And the only way Cuba is going to have a better future is if it has a different economic model.  Now, if you go back to President Trump’s 2017 or 2018 executive orders on a new policy in Cuba, that policy was entirely designed in many ways to put the private sector and individual private Cubans – not affiliated with the government, not affiliated with the military – in a privileged position. 

The reason why those industries have not flourished in Cuba is because the regime has not allowed them to flourish.  So now that they’re in a crisis, there is an opportunity for them to import fuel – in small quantities, granted – through a private sector.  If we catch the private sector there playing games and diverting it to the regime or to the military company, if we find that they’re moving that stuff around in ways that violate the spirit and the scope of these permissions, those licenses will be canceled. 

But it’s the same reason why we’ve provided humanitarian assistance.  We’ve provided humanitarian assistance in Cuba in the aftermath of the hurricane; we provided it through the Catholic Church, not through the government.  And we’re prepared to do something similar when it comes to fuel through the private sector, the small private sector.  But that alone will not solve Cuba’s very dramatic problems that have been caused by 60-some-odd years of mismanagement, ineptitude, and a failed economic model. 

QUESTION:  Mr. Secretary, can you confirm or comment on reports that you’ve spoken with Raúl Castro’s grandson?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  I won’t comment on any conversations we’ve had.  Suffice it to say that the United States is always prepared for – prepared to talk to officials from any government that have information to share with us or viewpoints they want to share with the United States, and that’s my job to do that.  So whether it’s someone in Cuba or potentially one day someone in North Korea or right now in Iran, we are always open to listen.  That’s different from a negotiation obviously, but we’re prepared to listen to viewpoints that other people say. 

Cuba is a country located 90 miles off the coast of the United States.  It has a very severe and catastrophic economic crisis on its hands.  And if someone in their system has information to share with us about changes they’re open to making or moves they’re prepared to accept, we would certainly listen to that.  And I would probably do that not in a setting in front of the media because I think it would be more productive that way, but ultimately actions will be important in something like that.

QUESTION:  I mean, can they negotiate a new system in Cuba?  I mean, are you hopeful that there might be reformists inside who could have (inaudible)?

SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, I mean, the status quo is unsustainable.  I had – we had a meeting here today with all the leaders of CARICOM, and it was one of the points I raised, and I think virtually everyone in the room agreed that Cuba’s status quo is unacceptable.  Cuba needs to change.  It needs to change.  And it doesn’t have to change all at once.  It doesn’t have to change from one day to the next.  Everyone is mature and realistic here.  We’re seeing that process play out, for example, in Venezuela.  Many in the – many of the countries represented at the CARICOM conference today were themselves countries that went through transitions at some point in their history.

But Cuba needs to change.  It needs to change dramatically because it is the only chance that it has to improve the quality of life for its people and not lose 15 percent of its population since 2021.  Fifteen percent of the people of Cuba have left since 2021.  That is not a system that’s working.  That’s a system that’s in collapse, and they need to make dramatic reforms.  And if they want to make those dramatic reforms that open the space for both economic and eventually political freedom for the people of Cuba, obviously the United States would love to see that.  We’d be helpful.  If they decide they’re going to dig in and just continue forward, then I think they’re going to continue to experience failure and the people of the country are going to continue to suffer.  It’ll be the regime’s fault.

QUESTION:  To come back to Cuba, some of the countries you met today have raised concerns about spillover and instability caused by the humanitarian crisis there.  Is the move today on oil sales a sort of recognition that the humanitarian crisis is getting out of hand, that the U.S. blocking oil shipments —

SECRETARY RUBIO:  No – I mean, no, first of all, forget about today.  The humanitarian crisis is getting out of hand because the Cubans don’t know how to run an economy.  They’re incompetent.  They have a military-controlled holding company named GAESA which controls 40 percent of their GDP, and none of the money that that company has generated flows to the coffers of the government.  None of that money goes to schools.  None of that money goes to roads.  None of that money goes to feeding the population.  You have a country that has fertile farmland that imports sugar.  This was one of the world’s leading exporters of sugar; now they import sugar.  They import almost all their food.  They – it’s a dysfunction.  It’s just not even an economy.  It’s a total dysfunction.  That’s their fault.

As far as spillover effect, they’re not more concerned than we are.  We’re 90 miles away, and the U.S. has experienced mass migration from Cuba in the past, certainly in the early ’90s with the rafter crisis, but as recently as 2021 and ’22 we were having people show up in the Florida Keys and stranded in the Bahamas.  So we don’t want to see it, either.  And ultimately, as far as the move today with oil, this is existing – the law allows us to do business like fuel and even telecommunications with the Cuban private sector.  The problem is the Cuban private sector is very small.  If they want to open the gates and allow the Cuban private sector – independent of the military, independent of the government – to grow, that solution is there.

What the Cuban people should know is this: that if they are hungry and they are suffering, it’s not because we’re not prepared to help them.  We are.  It’s that the people standing in the way of us helping them is the regime, is the Communist Party. That’s who’s standing in the way.  If they move out of the way, we’re more than happy to work with individual Cubans so they can have an opportunity to feed their families and build their economy.  But we are not the impediment.  They are.

Politico Canada

“CUBA — Oil and food.  That’s what Cuba’s ambassador to Canada says his country needs to survive the stepped-up American pressure under President DONALD TRUMP to break the back of Cuba’s government.  — Rock and a hard place: But RODRIGO MALMIERCA DÍAZ told the House of Commons foreign affairs committee on Tuesday that he gets the realpolitik countries like Canada are facing.  “I understand that many friends of Cuba are trying to be, maybe discreet, about their positions. They don't want to create more trouble with the U.S. than they already have.”  — Please help, anyway: “Without energy, every aspect of life in the country is affected,” the envoy said, pointing to food distribution, public health, transportation and education.”  

Trump Administration Executive Order On Changes To Tariffs To Comply With SCOTUS Decision

In the Supreme Court of the United States 
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. V.O.S. SELECTIONS, INC., ET AL. ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 

1. Whether the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), Pub. L. No. 95-223, Tit. II, 91 Stat. 1626, authorizes the tariffs imposed by President Trump pursuant to the national emergencies declared or con-tinued in Proclamation 10,886 and Executive Orders 14,157, 14,193, 14,194, 14,195, and 14,257, as amended.  2. If IEEPA authorizes the tariffs, whether the statute unconstitutionally delegates legislative authority to the President.

Link To SCOTUS Filing

Federal Register/Vol. 91, No. 37
Wednesday, February 25, 2026
Presidential Documents
Executive Order 14389 of February 20, 2026

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 604 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2483), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, it is hereby ordered: 

Section 1. Background. In Executive Order 14193 of February 1, 2025 (Imposing Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border), as amended; Executive Order 14194 of February 1, 2025 (Imposing Duties To Address the Situation at Our Southern Border), as amended; Executive Order 14195 of February 1, 2025 (Imposing Duties To Address the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the People’s Republic of China), as amended; Executive Order 14245 of March 24, 2025 (Imposing Tariffs on Countries Importing Venezuelan Oil); Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025 (Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff To Rectify Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits), as amended; Executive Order 14323 of July 30, 2025 (Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Brazil), as amended; Executive Order 14329 of August 6, 2025 (Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of the Russian Federation), as amended; Executive Order 14380 of January 29, 2026 (Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Cuba); and Executive Order 14382 of February 6, 2026 (Addressing Threats to the United States by the Government of Iran), I declared or described national emergencies with respect to unusual and extraordinary threats to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States and took actions to deal with those threats, including by imposing, pursuant to IEEPA, additional ad valorem duties on certain imports of certain foreign trading partners. 

In light of recent events, the additional ad valorem duties imposed pursuant to IEEPA in Executive Order 14193, as amended; Executive Order 14194, as amended; Executive Order 14195, as amended; Executive Order 14245; Executive Order 14257, as amended; Executive Order 14323, as amended; Executive Order 14329, as amended; Executive Order 14380; and Executive Order 14382 shall no longer be in effect and, as soon as practicable, shall no longer be collected. All other actions, including any other action taken to address the national emergencies declared or described in Executive Order 14193, Executive Order 14194, Executive Order 14195, Executive Order 14245, Executive Order 14257, Executive Order 14323, Executive Order 14329, Executive Order 14380, and Executive Order 14382, that do not impose additional ad valorem duties under IEEPA or involve steps necessary to implement the imposition of additional ad valorem duties imposed under IEEPA shall not be affected by this order. The national emergencies declared or described in Executive Order 14193, Executive Order 14194, Executive Order 14195, Executive Order 14245, Executive Order 14257, Executive Order 14323, Executive Order 14329, Executive Order 14380, and Executive Order 14382 or subsequent orders remain in effect and shall not be affected by this order. 

Sec. 2. Implementation. (a) To effectuate the terminations of the actions described in section 1 of this order, the head of each executive department and agency (agency) is authorized to and shall take all appropriate steps to end the additional ad valorem duties imposed under IEEPA in Executive Order 14193, as amended; Executive Order 14194, as amended; Executive Order 14195, as amended; Executive Order 14245; Executive Order 14257, as amended; Executive Order 14323, as amended; Executive Order 14329, as amended; Executive Order 14380; and Executive Order 14382. The head of each agency shall immediately begin taking steps to effectuate this order and, as soon as practicable, terminate the collection of the additional ad valorem duties described in section 1 of this order. The head of each agency may, consistent with applicable law, including section 301 of title 3, United States Code, redelegate the authority to take such appropriate steps within the agency.  (b) The Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the United States Trade Representative, as appropriate and in consultation with the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Chair of the United States International Trade Commission, and any other senior official they deem appropriate, shall determine whether modifications to the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States are necessary to effectuate this order and may make such modifications through notice in the Federal Register.  (c) The Executive Order of February 20, 2026 (Continuing the Suspension of Duty-Free De Minimis Treatment for All Countries), and the Proclamation of February 20, 2026 (Imposing a Temporary Import Surcharge to Address Fundamental International Payments Problems), are unaffected by this order.  (d) This order affects only the additional ad valorem duties imposed under IEEPA pursuant to the Executive Orders described in section 1 of this order. This order does not affect any other duties, including duties imposed under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, 19 U.S.C. 1862, and section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, 19 U.S.C. 2411. 

Sec. 3. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect: (i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or (ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals. (b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.  (c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person. (d) The costs for publication of this order shall be borne by the Department of Homeland Security.

Donald J. Trump

OFAC To Implement "Favorable Licensing Policy" For Licenses To Export Oil From Venezuela To Cuba Private Companies And Cuban Citizens

United States Department of the Treasury
Washington DC
25 February 2026

Issuance of Venezuela-related Frequently Asked Question

The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is publishing one new, Venezuela-related Frequently Asked Question (FAQ 1238), pertaining to the resale of Venezuelan origin oil to Cuba. 

Venezuela Sanctions

1238. Would OFAC approve the resale of Venezuelan origin oil to Cuba?

Answer

In accordance with the United States' support and solidarity for the Cuban people, OFAC would implement a favorable licensing policy toward specific license applications seeking authorization for the resale of Venezuelan origin oil for use in Cuba. To qualify for this favorable licensing policy, the requested transactions would need to be consistent with the terms and conditions of Venezuela General License (GL) 46A, though applicants need not necessarily have an established U.S. entity and the limitations in GL 46A with respect to Cuba would not apply. This favorable licensing policy is directed towards transactions that support the Cuban people, including the Cuban private sector (e.g., exports for commercial and humanitarian use in Cuba). Consistent with applicable U.S. law and policy, transactions involving, or for the benefit, of any persons or entities associated with the Cuban military, intelligence services, or other government institutions, including entities listed on the U.S. State Department's Cuba Restricted List, see 31 C.F.R. § 515.209, would not be covered by this favorable licensing policy.

As a reminder, the U.S. Department of Commerce primarily regulates the export or reexport of U.S.-origin oil to Cuba, as well as all other items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR, 15 C.F.R. parts 730-774). Treasury's Cuban Assets Control Regulations generally authorize U.S. persons to engage in transactions ordinarily incident to the export of oil from the United States to Cuba, or the reexport of U.S.-origin oil from a third country to Cuba, where that export or reexport has been authorized by the Commerce Department. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.533(a). This authorization applies to transactions covered by applicable Commerce Department license exceptions, including License Exception Support for the Cuban People (SCP), 15 C.F.R. § 740.21, which authorizes exports and reexports of gas and other petroleum products to improve living conditions and support independent economic activity. In other words, U.S.-origin oil exports, as well as other gas and petroleum products covered by License Exception SCP, do not require separate OFAC authorizations. Exporters and reexporters are responsible for reviewing current Commerce Department guidance, see here, and ensuring that any transaction undertaken pursuant to License Exception SCP or any other license exception meet all applicable terms and conditions.

See FAQ 1226 for the definition of "Venezuelan-origin oil," which includes petroleum products.

Date Released
February 25, 2026

With New BIS Guidance For Fuel, Gas, Petroleum Product Exports To Cuba, Trump Administration Confirms There Is A Private Sector In Cuba And U.S. Companies May Engage. Members Of Congress Not Pleased.

United States Department of Commerce
Washington DC
24 February 2026

Exports of U.S.-Origin Gas and Petroleum Products to Cuba 

BIS has issued updated guidance on the availability of EAR License Exception Support for the Cuban People (SCP) for exports and reexports of U.S.-origin gas and other petroleum products to eligible Cuban private sector entities and to individual Cuban consumers. Under this guidance, certain transactions meeting the terms of License Exception SCP may be authorized without a license, including exports for private sector economic activities and those sold directly to individuals for personal or family use. License applications involving U.S.-origin gas and petroleum products that otherwise qualify for SCP, will be returned without action with direction to use the license exception. Exporters are responsible for ensuring that all SCP conditions are met and should carefully review § 740.21 before proceeding. 

LINK: SCP Gas/Petroleum FAQ
LINK: Cuba Export Control Guidance

Updated Guidance Regarding Available EAR License Exceptions for Exports of U.S. origin gas and petroleum products to Cuban Private Sector Entities and Activities  

The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) has been receiving questions from potential exporters on the EAR requirements and potential EAR authorizations that may be available to authorize exports and reexports of U.S. origin gas and petroleum products for private sector use, including for addressing humanitarian needs in Cuba.

• In general, a license is required to export and reexport gas and other petroleum products that are subject to the EAR to Cuba pursuant to § 746.2(a). However, as with any export or reexport that is subject to a license requirement, the exporter or reexporter should first evaluate whether a license exception is available to authorize the export or reexport.

• In particular, exporters and reexporters of gas and petroleum products to the Cuban private sector should review the general restrictions under § 740.2 and § 740.21 License Exception Support for the Cuban People (SCP). As explained below, gas and other petroleum products exported and reexported to Cuban private sector entities or individuals for personal use may be authorized under License Exception SCP.

• Exporters and reexporters are advised that if a license application is submitted to BIS that otherwise meets the terms and conditions of License Exception SCP, those applications will be returned without action (RWA’d) by BIS with a direction to the applicant to export or reexport the items pursuant to License Exception SCP. 

• BIS provides the following FAQ to further assist public understanding:

Q.1: Would License Exception Support for the Cuban People (SCP) (§ 740.21 of the EAR) allow an exporter or reexporter to export or reexport gas and other petroleum products to Cuban private sector entities for private sector use, or directly to individual Cubans for their personal or family use?

A.1: Yes, provided that all the applicable terms and conditions of License Exception SCP are met. Specifically, there are two authorizing paragraphs under License Exception SCP under paragraph (b) (Improving living conditions and supporting independent economic activity), which may be available to authorize these types of exports and reexports of gas and other petroleum products to Cuba. License Exception SCP provides a general authorization for exports under certain applicable conditions, as explained below, and does not contain any specific limitations on applicability based on quantity, or value of the items, or exporter or reexporter.

§ 740.21(b)(1).

Exports to private sector for private sector use.  If the gas and other petroleum products are being exported for use by the Cuban private sector for private sector use, then paragraph (b)(1) of License Exception SCP, which authorizes items for use by the Cuban private sector for private sector economic activities, may be available to authorize these types of exports and reexports.  To qualify, exports must be both (1) for use by the Cuban private sector, (2) for private sector economic activities, including those addressing humanitarian needs in Cuba. Per §740.21(b)(1)(i) and (ii), License Exception SCP does not apply to any transactions, whether to Cuban private sector entities or otherwise, which primarily generate revenue for the state; or contribute to the operation of the state, including through the construction or renovation of state-owned buildings.

§ 740.21(b)(2).

Exports sold directly to individuals in Cuba for their personal use. If the gas and other petroleum products are sold directly to individuals in Cuba for their personal use, then paragraph (b)(2) of SCP, which authorizes items sold directly to individuals in Cuba for their personal use or their immediate family's personal use, may be available to authorize exports and reexports of gas and other petroleum products.  Paragraph (b)(2) does not require the gas and other petroleum products to be exported or reexported directly; the gas and other petroleum products must ultimately be destined for these eligible end users and their families for their personal use.  This authorization applies only if the gas or other petroleum products are sold directly to individual Cubans for their personal use or the use of their immediate family. It does not aapply if any of the products are sold or transferred to proscribed persons or entities in Cuba, including employees of the Ministry of Defense or Ministry of the Interior, senior officials of certain Cuban government organizations, labor unions, and other Cuban government affiliated organizations, including entities listed on the U.S. State Department’s Cuba Restricted List, see 31 CFR 515.209.

Note: Exporters and reexporters are responsible for ensuring that all of the applicable terms and conditions of License Exception SCP are met. Please review EAR § 740.21 --License Exception Support for Cuban People (SCP) -- carefully to ensure that your transaction meets all the criteria for use of the license exception.

Links To Related Analyses 

Trump Administration Opens Diplomatic Door To Cuba: First, Change The Economy. Second, Invite U.S. Companies. Third, For Now, Type Of Government Not Important- Just Make It Work Like China, Vietnam Feb 15, 2026

Trump’s Message To Cuba To “Make A Deal” May Not Be A Bad Deal For Cuba. Witkoff And Kushner Add Another Assignment. 23 February 2026 Is Consequential. January 14, 2026

Biden-Harris Administration Approves First Equity Investment Since 1960 In A Private Cuban Company May 10, 2022

With U.S. Government Authorization For First Direct Equity Investment Into A Private Company In Cuba, Here Is Important Context And Details.  About The Parties; About The Message. May 16, 2022

Now The Hard Part For Cuba: Implementing Quickly Transparent, Equal-For-All, MSME Investment & Financing Regulations. No Limitations. No Selectivity. No Orwellian Process. August 04, 2022

Cuba Government Delaying Private Company Investment/Financing Regulations Is Costing Earning Potential For U.S. And Other Country Sources. Success Should Not Be Feared. September 25, 2023

Transcripts And Recordings Of SCOTUS Libertad Act Title III Arguments: Havana Docks And Exxon Mobil

Link To Recording Of Oral Arguments- Havana Docks

Link To Transcript Of Oral Arguments- Havana Docks

Link To Recording Of Oral Arguments- Exxon Mobil

Link To Transcript Of Oral Arguments- Exxon Mobil

Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 2025
HEARING LIST
For the Session Beginning February 23, 2026
(The Court convenes at 10 a.m.; afternoon arguments begin at 1 p.m.)

Justices of the Supreme Court:
Hon. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.
Hon. Clarence Thomas Hon. Neil M. Gorsuch
Hon. Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Hon. Brett M. Kavanaugh
Hon. Sonia Sotomayor Hon. Amy Coney Barrett
Hon. Elena Kagan Hon. Ketanji Brown Jackson

Officers of the Court:
Scott S. Harris, Clerk
Rebecca Womeldorf, Reporter of Decisions
Gail A. Curley, Marshal
David S. Mao, Librarian

HEARING LIST
Monday, February 23, 2026

No. 24–983. Havana Docks Corporation v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., et al.
Certiorari to the C. A. 11th Circuit.
For petitioner: Richard D. Klingler, Washington, D. C.; and Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)  For respondents: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.  (1 hour for argument.) 

No. 24–699. Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba), et al.
Certiorari to the C. A. District of Columbia Circuit.
For petitioner: Morgan L. Ratner, Washington, D. C.; and Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)  For respondents: Jules L. Lobel, Pittsburgh, Pa.  (1 hour for argument.)

24-983 HAVANA DOCKS CORP. V. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES
DECISION BELOW: 119 F.4th 1276
CERT. GRANTED 10/3/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED: The LIBERTAD Act is an essential pillar of United States foreign policy toward Cuba's hostile and anti-American regime. Title III of that Act creates a private right of action for United States nationals who have a claim to property confiscated by that regime against persons who traffic in that property. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1). The Act specifies that such trafficking "undermines the foreign policy of the United States" by, among other things, "provid[ing] badly needed financial benefit" to the Cuban regime. Id. § 6081(6).  The question presented here applies in every case brought under Title III, and will determine whether that provision continues to advance U.S. foreign policy toward Cuba: whether a plaintiff must prove that the defendant trafficked in property confiscated by the Cuban government as to which the plaintiff owns a claim (as the statute requires), or instead that the defendant trafficked in property that the plaintiff would have continued to own at the time of trafficking in a counterfactual world "as if there had been no expropriation" (as the divided Eleventh Circuit panel held below).  LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 23-10151, 23-10171

24-699 EXXON MOBIL CORP. V. CORPORACION CIMEX
DECISION BELOW: 111 F.4th 12
CERT. GRANTED 10/3/2025
QUESTION PRESENTED: In 1960, the Cuban government confiscated the property of American nationals and transferred it to state-owned enterprises. After years without a diplomatic resolution, Congress enacted the Helms-Burton Act, which created a damages action for American nationals against "any person ... that traffics in" such confiscated property. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1). The Act defines "person" to include "any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state," id. § 6023(11), and expressly contemplates "judgment[s] against an agency or instrumentality of the Cuban Government," id. § 6082(d). The question presented is: Whether the Helms-Burton Act abrogates foreign sovereign immunity in cases against Cuban instrumentalities, or whether parties proceeding under that Act must also satisfy an exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.  LOWER COURT CASE NUMBER: 21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020