Cuba Is Governance Example Of The Medical Term “Failure To Thrive”  United Nations Resolution Will Not Fix Cuba- Nor Force Others To Fix Cuba. Python Suffocating Re-Emerging Private Sector.

/

Cuba Is Governance Example Of The Medical Term “Failure To Thrive” 

A UNGA Resolution Will Not Fix Cuba- Nor Force Others To Fix Cuba 

Forcefully Embracing The Anachronistic Rather Than Chasing The Dynamic 

Cuba’s Government Decisions Resembling A Public Sector Python Suffocating Private Sector Prey- Excruciatingly Painful And Slow 

“Failure to Thrive” in older adults “may represent a final common pathway toward death unless interventions can reverse the course.”   

For a government, “Failure to Thrive” is defined as a pathway toward ruin where a government continues to repeat mistakes despite knowing in advance the outcome of those decisions.  Or worse- a failed state. 

For a government official in the city of Havana, Republic of Cuba, taking a sedative, falling asleep and hoping the morning brings news that 25 December 1991 was only a horrible nightmare is not an effective strategy for governance.  11,997 days ago, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) ceased to exist, and its fifteen republics became fifteen countries.  The U.S.S.R. was created on 30 December 1922. 

The government of the Republic of Cuba will find broad support this week for its resolution submitted annually to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) which criticizes policies, regulations, and statutes of the United States government which impact the Republic of Cuba. 

There will also be a less visible question each of the 193-member country delegations of the UNGA will discuss among themselves.   

That question is why does the government of the Republic of Cuba not avail itself, and actively so, to all of the commercial, cultural, economic, financial, and political opportunities for engagement with the United States which are specifically authorized by policies, regulations, and statutes as implemented by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, and United States Department of State? 

  • “The meaningful part of the relationship- the economic blockade and the aggression against the Cuban economy- has not changed” since the end of the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021).  “It has been faithfully applied by the Biden administration.”  Carlos Fernandez de Cossio, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba 

  • “Economic blockade means #Cuba can’t sell any product in the US or export any product to any company in any country that exports to the US.”  Senior Official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba.  Fact Check:  In 2016, coffee was first authorized for import to the United States.  Since 2016, healthcare products have been imported to the United States for evaluation.  In 2017, charcoal was first authorized for import to the United States.  New York, New York-based Nespresso USA Inc., a subsidiary of Lausanne, Switzerland-based Nestle S.A. (2023 revenue approximately US$105 billion) exports products to the United States and imports products from the Republic of Cuba. 

Most egregious remains the unwillingness of successive governments in the Republic of Cuba, beginning with the [Raul] Castro-Machado Ventura Administration (2006-2018) and continuing with the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2018- ) to embrace fully commercial opportunities authorized during the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) and continuing thus far through the Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025).   

Whereas the [Fidel] Castro-[Raul] Castro Administration (1976-2008) knew how to create and then use leverage, subsequent governments in the Republic of Cuba only knew and know how to abdicate the creation of and use of leverage.   

For example, when the Trade Sanctions Reform and Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000 was signed into law during the final months of the Clinton-Gore Administration (1993-2001), President Fidel Castro proclaimed that since the law required payment of cash in advance and did not permit payment terms or provision of financing, there would be no purchases of agricultural commodities or food products from United States-based companies.  However, sensing opportunities to create a commercial constituency throughout the United States, the first purchase of US$4.8 million in December 2001 described as a “one-off” due to the impact of a hurricane has since cumulatively totaled more than US$7.5 billion twenty-three years later with the Republic of Cuba ranking annually within the top sixty of two hundred and twenty United States agricultural commodity and food product export markets.  The Republic of Cuba has ranked as high as 25th.  The first export of corn from the United States was sourced from nine states, thus crystalizing what would become a substantive agriculturally based advocacy constituency.   

If the Castro-Machado Ventura Administration and then Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration permitted fully those commercial opportunities authorized during the Obama-Biden Administration and thus far during Biden-Harris Administration, the impact of decisions by the Trump-Pence Administration could have been mitigated.  Important to note that not all Obama-Biden Administration Republic of Cuba-focused decisions were halted or reversed by the Trump-Pence Administration.   

Had there been by 20 January 2017 hundreds of United States-based companies with operations throughout the Republic of Cuba employing tens of thousands of Republic of Cuba nationals, the Trump-Pence Administration may have been constricted in what it decided to excise from then-authorized policy and regulations relating to the Republic of Cuba.      

From 17 December 2014 to 20 January 2017 the government of the Republic of Cuba failed to authorize United States-based companies to create a presence that would be resistant to being rolled-up like a carpet.  What the government of the Republic of Cuba did authorize was not wide, was not deep.  There were no roots.  The marquee examples consisted of one hotel management contract and port calls for cruise ships.  All were easily cancelled- and they were.   

Hundreds of small, medium, and large United States-based accountancies, assemblers, law firms, manufacturers, retailers, service providers, and wholesalers were prepared to establish a presence within the Republic of Cuba.  They were rebuffed.  

Additionally, from 2015 there were United States-based companies engaging and re-engaging with the Republic of Cuba who had claims certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC). 

·       There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were certified by the USFCSC and have not been resolved for more than sixty years (some assets were officially confiscated in the 1960’s, some in the 1970’s and some in the 1990’s).  The USFCSC permitted simple interest (not compound interest) of 6% per annum (approximately US$114,132,137.10); with the approximate current value of the 5,913 certified claims is approximately US$10 billion.  

The government of the Republic of Cuba had opportunities to provide some certified claimants with full or partial settlements at little out-of-pocket cost to the government of the Republic of Cuba.   

During the Obama-Biden Administration, some of the most high-profile certified claimants had engaged or re-engaged with the Republic of Cuba marketplace.  The revenues earned in the Republic of Cuba by these claimants would have easily provided funding for not only the original value of the certified claim, but for the interest-compiling value of the certified claim.   

The decision by the government of the Republic of Cuba to ignore those entreaties was the commercial equivalent of self-flagellation.  The takeaway was then and remains today that the government of the Republic of Cuba would rather its people suffer.   

Had that small number of certified claimants settled their claims against the government of the Republic of Cuba, a result would have been a substantial increase in interest by United States-based companies.   

A settlement of certified claims would have also provided an opportunity landscape whereby United States-based companies could develop quickly a deep and wide presence not only throughout the Republic of Cuba, but throughout the economy of the Republic of Cuba. 

There is no minimizing the commercial, economic, and financial impairment to the Republic of Cuba since 1960 by policies, regulations, and statutes implemented by successive occupants of The White House.  Most, but not all the policies, regulations, and statutes implemented are designed to be coercive, even punitive. 

However, not all can be rationally viewed as without off-ramps.  These choices are not ideal from the perspective of successive administrations in the Republic of Cuba, but if engaged they would not singularly or collectively guarantee the demise of the political infrastructure within the country.  Managed improperly, there would continue suffering.  Managed with dexterity, there could be prosperity, depending of course upon one’s definition of prosperity.    

GlobalPost, Boston, Massachusetts, 4 October 2024: “Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel, meanwhile, is looking to China and Russia for help.  If the US won’t permit American companies to invest and operate in Cuba, Newsweek magazine reported, the Cuban government has little choice but to seek out other powerful patrons whose governments share its autocratic bent.  That is called “doubling down” in geopolitical parlance.” 

What GlobalPost reported is untrue.  What Newsweek was reported as writing was untrue.  On 10 May 2022, the Biden-Harris Administration instructed the OFAC to issue the first license authorizing direct investment in and direct financing to a privately-owned company located in the Republic of Cuba owned by a Republic of Cuba national.   

More than two years later, the government of the Republic of Cuba has yet to publish the regulations for delivering the investment and the financing.  The delay does not only impact investors in the United States, but in all countries.  The government of the Republic of Cuba is engaging in collective punishment of its entrepreneurs. 

And recently the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration prohibited privately-owned companies in the Republic of Cuba from maintaining commercial bank accounts in the United States- which was recently authorized by the Biden-Harris Administration. 

The government of the Republic of Cuba had means, motive, and opportunity during Obama-Biden Administration and continuing through the Biden-Harris Administration to create a commercial, economic, and financial landscape- both wide and deep throughout the country from Havana to Santiago de Cuba.  All three were painfully squandered. 

The Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration not only wants it both ways, it wants it all ways.  Embracing governments which are in conflict with the government of the United States and then seeking commercial, economic, financial, military, and political support from those governments.   

  • Simultaneously, the messaging from officials in Havana that the Republic of Cuba is “open for business” with United States companies and entrepreneurs.   

  • Simultaneously, continuing for more than two years its refusal to enact laws and regulations which would make transparent, which would create accountability, and permit direct investment in and direct financing to privately-owned companies in the Republic of Cuba, which the Biden-Harris Administration first authorized on 10 May 2022.   

In August 2024, the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration further restricted the re-emerging private sector by identifying one hundred and twenty-five sectors within which the re-emerging private sector is prohibited from operating in “forms of agriculture, manufacturing of pharmaceutical products, financial intermediation, trade, book editing and layout, television programming and broadcasting, telecommunications activities, forms of transportation and storage, defense, public security, and provision of social services.  While the goals of the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration may not be to deprive the re-emerging private sector of the oxygen required for not only sustainability, but for prosperity and expansion, the result of decisions by the government of the Republic of Cuba is likened to constricting the caloric intake of a child- the result is stunted growth, anemic functioning, and potentially death. 

The decisions by the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration resemble a public sector python suffocating its private sector prey… a slow and painful process for the prey. 

Because Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration continues to recoil from sustainable commercial, economic, financial, and political reforms, its options for survival narrow to seeking disguised charity from governments and organizations whose interests are unaligned with those of the United States.  Thus, China, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Turkiye, and Venezuela become, for the government of the Republic of Cuba, its personal United Nations.   

The Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration knows fully how these decisions reverberate throughout Washington DC and specifically in the State of Florida, home to the largest population of individuals of Cuban descent outside of the Republic of Cuba itself.  A reported one million Republic of Cuba nationals have departed the island during the last four years- approximately 10% of its population. 

On the one side of the “Pushmi-Pullyu” from the 1967 motion picture Doctor Doolittle is the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration continuing to publicly espouse for an improved commercial, economic, financial, and political relationship with the Biden-Harris Administration which will at 12:00 pm on 20 January 2025 transition to either the Harris-Walz Administration (2025-2029) or the Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029). 

On the other side of the “Pushmi-Pullyu” is the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration doing and saying about everything that might be included on a how-to list specifically drafted to antagonize The White House and the United States Congress. 

  • Engage and Support China, Iran, North Korea, Russia.  Check. 

  • Criticize Israel.  Check. 

  • Support (or not condemn) Hezbollah and Hamas.  Check. 

  • Not robustly support Ukraine.  Check. 

  • Permit Russian naval vessels to visit ports in the Republic of Cuba.  Check. 

  • Not enacting laws and publishing regulations which would respond positively to licenses issued by the OFAC authorizing direct investment in and direct financing to the re-emerging private sector in Cuba.  Check. 

  • Refusing to authorize private companies to have operating bank accounts in the United States.  Check.

  • Failing to embrace all the decisions by the Biden-Harris Administration which benefit the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba.  Check. 

When a resolution submitted annually to the UNGA receives a substantial number of votes for, with some voting against and some abstaining, but what the resolution calls for is ignored year after year, probably an indicator that a new approach is required.  

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

United Nations Vote This Week On Resolution Submitted Annually By Government Of Cuba About Relationship With The United States. Vote Outcome Certainty. Impact Not.

/

United Nations
New York, New York
29 October 2024
10:00 am to 13:00 pm
General Assembly Hall
29th Plenary Meeting

Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba - Item 38: Report of the Secretary-General (A/79/80); Draft resolution (A/79/L.6) 

  • Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba (A/79/80) 

  • Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba (A/79/L.6) 

Debate on the item.  

LINK To United Nations Schedule 

United Nations
New York, New York
30 October 2024
10:00 am to 13:00 pm
General Assembly Hall
30th Plenary Meeting

Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba - Item 38 : Report of the Secretary-General (A/79/80); Draft resolution (A/79/L.6) 

  • Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba (A/79/80)

  • Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba (A/79/L.6)  

Debate on the item (continued) and action on the draft resolution.  

LINK To United Nations Schedule 

Cuba Obtains "Partner" Status With BRICS. Cuba Does Not Bring Anything To BRICS Members. Cuba Wants Access To Funds From NDB.

/

Prensa Latina News Agency
Havana, Republic of Cuba
25 October 2024

“Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel today has highlighted his country's joining the BRICS+ as an associate member, which was approved at the group's 16th Summit held in Kazan, Russia.  

In his profile on X social media, the Head of State wrote: “Cuba is honored to join the Brics+ as a partner country, five letters and a great hope for the countries of the South, in the arduous path towards a more just, democratic, equitable and sustainable international order.” 

Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez also reaffirmed Cuba’s interest and commitment to work together with the members of this group in defense of multilateralism, peace, international law and the construction of a development and cooperation agenda that responds to the priorities of the South. 

The Caribbean nation was admitted as an associate member of the BRICS together with 12 other countries; these are Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.” 

BRIC/BRICS/BRICS+ 

BRIC was created in September 2006 and officially organized in June 2009 by the governments of Brazil, Russia, India, and China.   

In December 2010, the government of South Africa became a member; and BRIC became BRICS.   

In January 2024, the governments of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia became members of BRICS.  The government of Argentina was granted an invitation to membership in BRICS, but the invitation was declined in December 2023.   

In September 2024, the government of Turkiye applied for membership in BRICS. 

In October 2024, the governments of Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkiye, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam were granted “partner” status in BRICS.  

Government connectivity with BRICS is by consensus. 

New Development Bank (NDB)

The president of NDB is H.E. Mrs. Dilma Rousseff, President of Brasil (2011-2016) and chief of staff to President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva from 2005 to 2010. The NDB was created in 2014.

“The New Development Bank (NDB) is a multilateral development bank established by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) with the purpose of mobilising resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs).  Our strong mandate and potential put us in a unique position to contribute to global growth and development.”

Cruise Lines Win Most Arguments Before 11th Circuit Court Of Appeals. Does Havana Docks Corporation Seek En Banc Review, U.S. Supreme Court Review, Or Accept Decision?

/

Can Accept Decision, Appeal For En Banc Review- All Twelve Members Of The 11th Circuit Court Of Appeals, Or Can Seek Writ of Certiorari From The U.S. Supreme Court

No. 23-10171: HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee Cross Appellant, versus ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS, LTD., CARNIVAL CORPORATION, a foreign corporation doing business as Carnival Cruise Lines, MSC CRUISES S.A. CO., MSC CRUISES (USA), INC., et al., Defendants-Appellants Cross Appellees.

Excerpts

After a review of the record, and with the benefit of oral argument, we hold that Havana Docks’ limited property interest had expired, for purposes of Title III, at the time of the alleged trafficking by the cruise lines. We therefore set aside the judgments in favor of Havana Docks and remand for further proceedings as to its other claims against Carnival.

We affirm the district court’s ruling that Havana Docks is a U.S. national under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act but reverse the judgments in favor of Havana Docks and against the cruise lines for conduct taking place between 2016 and 2019. We remand for further proceedings as to the trafficking claims against Carnival based on conduct taking place from 1996 to 2001.

10/22/2024- Opinion issued by court as to Appellant RCL in 23-10151, Appellant-Cross Appellee RCL in 23-10171. Decision: Affirmed in part, Reversed in part, and Remanded. Opinion type: Published. Opinion method: Signed. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions. [23-10151, 23-10171]
10/22/2024- Judgment entered as to Appellant RCL in 23-10151, Appellant-Cross Appellee RCL in 23-10171. [23-10151, 23-10171]

Havana Docks Corporation v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. 23-10151; 1:19-cv-23590-BB; Court Opinion; 10-22-2024; Hon. Adalberto J. Jordan authoring; Hon. Andrew Lynn Brasher dissenting

Dissent Excerpts

In my view, there are three problems with this judicially created prove-a-counterfactual requirement. First, it is not supported by the statute’s text. The text of the statute says that the trafficking must occur when a plaintiff “owns the claim,” not when the plaintiff would have owned the property. Second, the majority is focused on the wrong confiscated property. Here, Havana Docks argues that the cruise lines trafficked by using the physical docks that the Cuban Government confiscated, not by using its concessionary interest in those docks. Third, this test effectively voids many of the property interests that are expressly protected by the statute. The statute was enacted in 1994 and it expressly protects interests that were contingent, future, and time limited when the underlying property was confiscated in 1959, but none of those interests are protectible under the majority’s rule. I’ll address each of these issues in turn.

Unless and until the property confiscation claims of U.S. nationals are paid, those claims continue to exist and are enforceable under the Helms-Burton Act. But the majority opinion’s interpretation means that the Act provides no remedy for U.S. nationals with property interests that were confiscated in 1959 but, absent confiscation, would have “expired” before the present day. It does so even though there is no textual support for that result and even though the Act expressly protects interests that were contingent or time-limited when they were confiscated. And it adopts that rule even though there is a perfectly rational alternative that better conforms to the Act—that the time-limited nature of an interest in confiscated property goes to the value of a claim, not to the claim’s existence.

I believe the district court correctly interpreted the Act in this respect, and I would go on to address the other issues in the appeal. Because the majority opinion instead reverses on this ground, I respectfully dissent.

LINK TO COMPLETE OPINION IN PDF FORMAT

The White House Answers Questions About Providing Assistance To Cuba- And Reinforces Cuba Is Victim Of Its Own Decisions.

/

The White House
Washington DC
21 October 2024

Briefing By Karine Jean-Pierre, Press Secretary

Q Thank you. I have a question about Cuba. There have been multiple power outages on the island in recent days. So, I was wondering: Is the White House monitoring the situation, particularly for signs of unrest? Thank you.

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: So, we are closely monitoring the blackouts on the island. And so, we are concerned about the potential humanitarian impacts on the Cuban people.  And like we have seen over the past few years, Cuba’s economic condition stemming from long-term mismanagement of its economic policy and resources has certainly increased the hardship of the people in Cuba.  And so — so — and so, certainly, just want to make clear that this is not — the U.S. is not to — is not to blame for the blackouts on the island or the overall energy situation in Cuba.  So, the Cuban — the Cuban government has not requested any assistance at this time, and so we will assess the appropriate next steps if they do request any assistance.  And so, a critical tenet of the Biden-Harris administration policy as it relates to — to — towards Cuba is to always advocate for the support of the Cuban people, and we’ve been always very clear about that. And so, we’ll continue.

Q — this is a hypothetical. But if the Cuban government were to request assistance, would the Biden-Harris administration be willing to provide it?

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: So, we’re going to — if that were to happen, we’re — certainly would assess the next best steps. I just — they have not. Again, it’s a hypothetical. And so, we’re going to assess what’s the next best step to do.

Thus Far In 2024, Cubans Imported More Than US$200,000.00 In Generators; More Than US$1 Million In Air Conditioners And Parts

/

January 2024 through August 2024 United States Exports To The Republic Of Cuba

Air Cond Mach, Wndw Wall Type,not Slf Cntd, Nesoi (no) Miami, FL- US$169,923.00

Air Cond Machs Not Incorporat A Refrig Unit, Nesoi (no) Miami, FL- US$48,600.00

Parts, Nesoi, Of Air Conditioning Machines (kg) Miami, FL- US$732,968.00

Refrig-freez Comb, Sep Ext Doors, Exc Compress Typ (no) Miami, FL- US$140,743.00

Refrigerators, Household,comp Typ,vol Lt 184 Liter (no) Miami, FL- US$24,050.00

Refrig, household, Comp Typ, Vol 382 Liters & Over (no) Houston-Galveston, TX- US$7,000.00

Refrigerators, Household, Absorption, Electrical (no) Miami, FL- US$7,790.00

Freezers, Chest Type, Capacity Not Exc 800 Liters (no) Miami, FL- US$15,220.00

Reciprocating Liquid Chilling Refrigerating Units (no) Miami, FL- US$25,930.00

Refrig/freezing Equip, Nesoi (no) Miami, FL- US$71,216.00

Dc Generators, Not Exceeding 750 W, Nesoi (no) Miami, FL- US$26,216.00

Ac Generators (alt) Gt 10000 Kva But Lt= 40000 Kva (no) Miami, FL- US$120,430.00

Ac Generators (alternators) Exceeding 40,000 Kva (no) Miami, FL- US$39,605.00

Generating Sets, Elc, Diesel, Lt= 75kva Output (no) Miami, FL- US$2,700.00

Electric Generating Sets Except Gas Turbines Nesoi (no) Miami, FL- US$64,200.00

Electric Rotary Converters (no) Miami, FL- US$5,080.00

Batteries, Lead-acid, Piston Engine, Nesoi (no) Miami, FL- US$47,134.00

Storage Battery Parts (except Lead-acid Type) (kg) Miami, FL- US$3,209.00

U.S. Department Of Commerce Seeking Comments On "Effectiveness of Licensing Procedures for the Export and Reexport of Agricultural Commodities to Cuba"

/

AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce.

ACTION: Request for comments.

SUMMARY: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is requesting public comments on the effectiveness of its licensing procedures as defined in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) for the export and reexport of agricultural commodities to Cuba. BIS will include a description of any comments it receives in its biennial report to Congress, as required by the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, as amended (TSRA).

DATES: Comments must be received by November 15, 2024.

ADDRESSES: Comments on this notice may be submitted by either of the following methods:

Electronic Submission: Submit all electronic public comments via the Federal rulemaking portal. Visit http://www.regulations.gov and type “BIS-2024-0049” in the search box to find this notice.

Mail: Submit written comments by mail or delivery to Regulatory Policy Division, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Room 2099B, 14th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20230. Refer to RIN 0694-XC108.  Comments sent by any other method, to any other address or individual, or received after the end of the comment period, may not be considered by BIS. All comments (including any personal identifying information) will be made public.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jerry Huang, Office of Nonproliferation and Foreign Policy Controls, Telephone: (202) 482-4252. Additional information on BIS procedures and previous biennial reports under TSRA is available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/​index.php/​policy-guidance/​country-guidance/​sanctioned-destinations/​13-policy-guidance/​country-guidance/​426-reports-to-congress. Copies of these materials may also be requested by contacting the Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant to section 906(a) of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA) (22 U.S.C. 7205(a)), the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) authorizes exports and reexports of agricultural commodities, as defined in part 772 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) (15 CFR parts 730-774), to Cuba. Requirements and procedures associated with such authorization are set forth in § 740.18 of the EAR (15 CFR 740.18). These are the only licensing procedures in the EAR currently in effect pursuant to the requirements of section 906(a) of TSRA. Under the provisions of section 906(c) of TSRA (22 U.S.C. 7205(c)), BIS must submit a biennial report to Congress on the operation of the licensing system implemented pursuant to section 906(a) for the preceding two-year period. This report must include the number and types of licenses applied for, the number and types of licenses approved, the average amount of time elapsed from the date of filing of a license application until the date of its approval, the extent to which the licensing procedures were effectively implemented, and a description of comments received from interested parties during a 30-day public comment period regarding the effectiveness of the licensing procedures. Consistent with TSRA's requirements, BIS is currently preparing a biennial report on the operation of the licensing system for the two-year period from October 1, 2022 through September 30, 2024.

Request for Comments

By this notice, BIS requests public comments on the effectiveness of the licensing procedures for the export and reexport of agricultural commodities to Cuba set forth under § 740.18 of the EAR. Parties submitting comments are asked to be as specific as possible. All comments received by the close of the comment period will be considered by BIS in developing the report to Congress. All comments will be publicly available. Any information that the commenter does not wish to be made available to the public should not be submitted to BIS.

Thea D. Rozman Kendler,
Assistant Secretary for Export Administration.
[FR Doc. 2024-23828 Filed 10-15-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-33-P

LINK TO COMPLETE PUBLICATION IN PDF FORMAT

LINK: U.S. Exports To Cuba Decrease, But Remain Up 20% Year-To-Year. Another US$8.7 In Vehicle Exports. Razors Too Oct 11, 2024

U.S. Exports To Cuba Decrease, But Remain Up 20% Year-To-Year. Another US$8.7 In Vehicle Exports. Razors Too

/

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
October 2024

August 2024 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Decrease 5.4% - 1
46th Of 222 August 2024 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Increase 20.0% - 2
Cuba Ranked 48th Of 222 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets - 2
August 2024 Healthcare Product Exports US$0.00 - 2
August 2024 Humanitarian Donations US$6,801,111.00 - 3
Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue To Increase - 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 19

AUGUST 2024 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA DECREASE 5.4% - Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in August 2024 were US$37,729,568.00 compared to US$39,913,983.00 August 2023 and US$29,383,675.00 August 2022. 

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA and CDA. The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

January 2024 through August 2024 TSREEA exports were US$279,815,521.00 compared to January 2023 through August 2023 TSREEA exports of US$232,487,373.00. Total TSREEA exports since first deliveries in December 2001 exceed US$7,526,148,914.00

Other products exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in August 2024 include: Turkey (US$176,682.00), Eggs, Chickpeas, Black Beans, Lentils, Safflower Oil, Human Blood (US$11,905.00), Handbags (US$9,749.00), Razors (US$17,160.00), Fork Lift (US$17,000.00), Ink Cartridges (US$7,587.00), Part of Cotton Gins (US$8,000.00), Used Vehicles (US$8,688,439.00).

Used Vehicle Exports January 2024 Through August 2024 Are US$38,752,488.00.

Truck Exports January 2024 Through August 2024 Are US$16,075,524.00

LINK TO COMPLETE REPORT

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2023 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

Cuba Included In U.S. Presidential Determination Regarding Trafficking In Persons

/

The White House
Washington DC
September 30, 2024

Presidential Determination
No. 2024-14        

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
 
SUBJECT: Presidential Determination with Respect to the Efforts of Foreign Governments Regarding Trafficking in Persons
 
Consistent with section 110 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107) (the "Act"), as amended, I hereby determine as follows:
 
As provided for in section 110(d)(1)(A)(i) of the Act, that the United States will not provide nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related assistance to the Governments of Burma and Iran for Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 until such governments comply with the Act's minimum standards or make significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with the minimum standards;
 
As provided for in section 110(d)(1)(A)(ii) of the Act, that the United States will not provide nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related assistance to, or allow funding for participation in educational and cultural exchange programs by officials or employees of, the Governments of Belarus, Cuba, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Eritrea, Macau (Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (PRC)), Nicaragua, the PRC, Russia, and Syria for FY 2025 until such governments comply with the Act's minimum standards or make significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with the minimum standards;
 
As provided for in section 110(d)(1)(B) of the Act, I hereby instruct the United States Executive Director of each multilateral development bank, as defined in the Act, and of the International Monetary Fund to vote against and use best efforts to deny any loan or other utilization of the funds of the respective institution (other than for humanitarian assistance; for trade‑related assistance; or for development assistance that directly addresses basic human needs, is not administered by the government of such country, and confers no benefit to that government) for the Governments of Belarus, Burma, Cuba, the DPRK, Eritrea, Iran, Macau (Special Administrative Region of the PRC), Nicaragua, the PRC, Russia, South Sudan, and Syria for FY 2025 until such governments comply with the Act's minimum standards or make significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with the minimum standards;
 
Consistent with section 110(d)(4) of the Act, I determine that the provision of all nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related foreign assistance programs, projects, activities, and funding for educational and cultural exchange programs described in sections 110(d)(1)(A) and 110(d)(1)(B) of the Act to Brunei, Djibouti, Papua New Guinea, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela would promote the purposes of the Act or is otherwise in the national interest of the United States;
 
Consistent with section 110(d)(4) of the Act, I determine that providing the assistance described in section 110(d)(1)(B) of the Act to Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Sudan would promote the purposes of the Act or is otherwise in the national interest of the United States;
 
Consistent with section 110(d)(4) of the Act, I determine that a partial waiver with respect to Belarus, Eritrea, Macau (Special Administrative Region of the PRC), the PRC, and Russia to allow funding for educational and cultural exchange programs described in section 110(d)(1)(A)(ii) of the Act would promote the purposes of the Act or is otherwise in the national interest of the United States;
 
Consistent with section 110(d)(4) of the Act, with respect to Afghanistan, I determine that a partial waiver of the restriction described in section 110(d)(1)(A)(i) of the Act to allow for Economic Support Fund and Global Health Programs (GHP) assistance would promote the purposes of the Act or is otherwise in the national interest of the United States;
 
Consistent with section 110(d)(4) of the Act, with respect to Cambodia, I determine that a partial waiver of the restriction described in section 110(d)(1)(A)(i) of the Act to allow for all assistance and programs other than education programs funded from Development Assistance (DA) would promote the purposes of the Act or is otherwise in the national interest of the United States;
 
Consistent with section 110(d)(4) of the Act, with respect to South Sudan, I determine that a partial waiver of the restriction described in section 110(d)(1)(A)(i) of the Act to allow for GHP assistance would promote the purposes of the Act or is otherwise in the national interest of the United States; and
 
Consistent with section 110(d)(4) of the Act, with respect to Sudan, I determine that a partial waiver of the restriction described in section 110(d)(1)(A)(i) of the Act to allow for DA and GHP assistance would promote the purposes of the Act or is otherwise in the national interest of the United States.
 
In addition, with respect to the Government of Sint Maarten, consistent with the United States Government's firm stand against human trafficking, and until such government takes steps consistent with compliance with the minimum standards of the Act or makes significant efforts to do so, I hereby:  (i) direct that executive departments and agencies shall not provide nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related foreign assistance, as described in section 110(d)(1)(A) of the Act, to the Government of Sint Maarten; (ii) instruct the United States Executive Director of each multilateral development bank, as defined in the Act, and of the International Monetary Fund to vote against and use best efforts to deny any loan or other utilization of the funds of the respective institution (other than for humanitarian assistance, for trade-related assistance, or for development assistance that directly addresses basic human needs, is not administered by such government, and confers no benefit to that government) to Sint Maarten, as described in section 110(d)(1)(B) of the Act; and (iii) direct that funding for participation by officials or employees of the Government of Sint Maarten in educational and cultural exchange programs shall continue to be permitted in FY 2025, consistent with the foreign policy and all applicable laws of the United States.
 
You are authorized and directed to submit this determination, the certification required by section 110(e) of the Act, and the Memorandum of Justification, on which I have relied, to the Congress, and to publish this determination in the Federal Register.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.

Cuba Foreign Minister In Interview Reinforces Reasons For Unease By U.S. Companies Toward Cuba- Despite Their Wanting To Support Re-Emerging Private Sector.

/

Newsweek
Washington DC
26 September 2024

Excerpts

In a wide-ranging interview conducted on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla outlined a troubling state of global affairs, exacerbated by international conflicts, climate change and economic uncertainty. And while the Cold War that once placed Cuba at the forefront of nuclear brinkmanship has long passed, he argued that the nation continued to directly suffer the effects of a U.S. sanctions campaign first launched more than six decades ago.

Eased under former President Barack Obama and subsequently harshened under former President Donald Trump, the U.S. embargo has largely held throughout the administration of President Joe Biden, who has opted to retain much of his predecessor's most restrictive measures. With Biden soon set to depart as a contentious U.S. election looms, Rodríguez Parrilla saw a missed opportunity to reset ties and attract U.S. investment in Cuba.

“We have been able to make progress in our developments thanks to the cultural, academic, scientific and economic relations that we keep with all the countries of the world. Western Europe and China are important economic partners of Cuba. The American businesspeople could also be the same if not for this policy. During better times, the American farmers have taken advantage of a license that had violated the internationally standard commercial rules, and it was possible for Cuba to import as much as $1 billion in foodstuffs. These figures today are very small. We could retake those figures if they happen to be mutually beneficial.”

LINK: U.S. Agricultural Commodity/Food Product Exports To Cuba Remain Up 25.7%. Vehicle (New, Used, Truck) Exports For 2024 Exceed US$36 Million. Tequila Exported In July 2024. September 05, 2024

“But the most interesting things is that almost half of the Americans visiting Cuba accommodate themselves at small hostels and resort to small private businesses. And this ban on individual travel has led to all these people going into bankruptcy. What could be the logic behind the fact that the U.S. government is taking steps damaging the emerging private sector in Cuba?”

“And, meanwhile, they publish measures that are inapplicable because the oppressive, intimidating effect of the blockade makes it impossible for the owners of small and medium enterprises in Cuba to open a bank account in the U.S.”

“U-turn operations [transactions in which U.S. banks can process U.S. dollar payments involving Cuba that begin and end outside of the U.S.] could not be done before, not even now, because of these measures. And thinking about the possibility of a small Cuban farmer to be able to export directly to the U.S., I mean, this does not happen anywhere in the world.”

”Earlier, you mentioned the need to find a more efficient economic model to adapt to Cuba's current reality and this includes the expansion of private initiatives as well as some recent social reforms, all of which may not be widely covered abroad. But at this challenging time for the Cuban economy, are these plans bearing fruit for the nation?”

“We hope so. It is a need for our economy, and they are part of the design of our model. And these are not overnight measures. They are the result of a previous process.  Curiously enough, very little attention was paid outside Cuba to the major development of agriculture production in the hands of private producers, and this has been so for decades. I'm referring to individual farmers or cooperatives. However, the medium and small enterprises have called great attention.”

“We do not have any legislation or any design for the creation of private small and medium sized enterprises, not even the creation of public small and medium sized enterprises. The entrepreneurial system in Cuba is unique. I mean, you do not legislate for public as separate from private enterprises. Some of the actions taken by the U.S. government intend to separate private small and medium sized enterprises from the rest of the Cuban economy and I don't think this will lead to any results.”

LINK: Biden-Harris Administration Approves First Equity Investment Since 1960 In A Private Cuban Company May 10, 2022 

LINK: With U.S. Government Authorization For First Direct Equity Investment Into A Private Company In Cuba, Here Is Important Context And Details.  About The Parties; About The Message. May 16, 2022      

LINK: Biden Administration Will Use Cuba's Authorization Of SMSE's As Means To Expand Support For Cuba Private Sector- U.S. Investments And Loans May Be Next June 02, 2021 

“It is, in fact, an international experience and there are very good examples in Cuba of the way in which either public or private small and medium sized enterprises have achieved very good results. For example, in the area of technology, in the development of software and applications, the Cuban biopharmaceutical industry or the genetic engineering industry are competitive in the world. They are among the best on the planet. They have produced some technologies that do not exist in the U.S. They manufactured better COVID vaccines as compared to the American vaccines, and this has been shown according to the immunization data.”

LINK: "Publication of New Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) on Basic Information and Updated FAQs on Cuba Sanctions" August 27, 2024 

LINK: Cuba Again Constricts Re-Emerging Private Sector Embracing "Can't Live With It, Can't Live Without It" Strategy. Another Opportunity For Biden-Harris Administration To Embrace "Crock Pot" Theory August 22, 2024 

LINK: For Cuba: Biden-Harris Administration Should Implement Crock Pot Theory And Quid Pro Quo With Quo Not Giving What Quid Wants. Jul 21, 2024

“There are small windows requiring specific licenses in order to carry out joint work on a couple of Cuban scientific results or technologies. It would be very possible to do that on a broader scale. But today the factor that determines the condition of the Cuban economy is the tightening of the blockade. This coincides over time.”

LINK TO COMPLETE ARTICLE

Cuba Government Describes Commercial, Economic, Financial Impact Of U.S. Policies, Regulations, And Statutes.

/

“Bruno Rodríguez: “The U.S. measures for Cuban entrepreneurs are inapplicable”  At the presentation of the report on the blockade, the foreign minister was skeptical about a possible benefit for this sector from Washington.” 

OnCuba News
13 September 2024

Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla called on the United States government to answer questions from Cuban entrepreneurs about the application of the measures announced by the Biden administration last May.

During the usual press conference that the Cuban Foreign Ministry (MINREX) calls every year to present its report on the impact of the blockade/embargo, before the vote in the UN on the issue, Rodríguez said that the possibility of opening bank accounts in dollars in the United States is inapplicable and so far no movement has occurred.  “They have not been applied because the oppressive and suffocating framework of the blockade prevents it. You have to be crazy to interact with Cuban entities under such oppressive circumstances. The risks for U.S. banks, for example, are very great,” said the minister.

The Foreign Ministry also questions how technology companies could discern between state-owned and private enterprises to offer Internet services that are currently blocked, another of the measures that the Biden administration announced in May.  It also recalled that non-immigrant visas are not yet being processed in Havana, which could benefit the exchange and search for supplies for private businesses in Cuba.  On the other hand, Rodríguez also considered that Washington’s announcements are unfeasible due to “the absurd and foolish intention to fragment the business system that is unique in the country” and that “a small private enterprise import, export, make international financial transactions and be abstained, that there be a glass wall that prevents it from interacting with the public sector of the economy.”

Cuban government estimates damages from U.S. embargo at 5 billion dollars in twelve months September 12, 2024

For the first time in the report on the blockade that Cuba presents to the United Nations every year, on September 29 and 30, the effects that the blockade causes specifically to the island’s private sector are collected.  In the text, the MINREX associates the economic losses of 685 MSMEs in 2023 with the effects of the U.S. sanctions.  Private businesses that benefit from visits by Americans to Cuba stopped receiving about $107 million in the last year, due to travel restrictions.  According to the Foreign Ministry, 163,455 citizens of that country arrived on the island between March 2023 and February 2024 and almost half stayed in private rental houses.   

“Most of the services Americans enjoy in Cuba are in the private sector,” said Rodríguez.  Bruno Rodríguez acknowledged that the economic crisis in Cuba is not exclusively due to U.S. sanctions, but insisted that it is its fundamental cause.  “Not all difficulties are due to the blockade. There are also structural problems, difficulties in economic management, but the fundamental and determining weight is the extreme and unprecedented intensification and hardening of the blockade since 2019,” he stated.  According to the foreign minister, the island faces social inequality, “distortions” in the economy, low income, crime, corruption, weakening of social policies, especially in health, education and the protection of low-income families.  However, he considered that the errors in the management of the economy are “involuntary”, while Washington’s sanctions policy is deliberate.  Cuban authorities estimate the impact of the blockade at around $5.056 billion, from March 1, 2023 to February 29, 2024. “Some $200 million more than in the same period of the previous year,” said the minister.

He stated that Cuba’s GDP in 2023 would have grown by 8% if the blockade did not exist, in contrast to the 1.9% drop that was reported.  According to government estimates, the blockade’s impact after more than 60 years of application amounts to more than $164.141 billion at current prices. 

Bruno Rodríguez said he feels confident that the international community will once again vote almost unanimously for the end of the blockade at the UN General Assembly at the end of the month.  “This will be the welcome for the next president of the United States,” said the minister, who urged the future head of the White House to make up for the damage caused to Cuba. 

He also stated that Biden has maintained Trump’s policy and that the possibility of easing sanctions, including removing the island from the list of State sponsors of terrorism, is in the hands of the Democrats. “He could do it tomorrow if he wanted to,” he said.  The island has suffered 1,064 actions of denial of services by foreign banks, due to being included in that list that harms, among other things, Cuba’s access to the international financial system.  Although the report presented includes one of the executive prerogatives that President Biden has to relax the application of the blockade — which could only be completely eliminated by Congress —, Rodríguez commented that under these circumstances, Cubans have the challenge of “overthrowing the blockade ourselves.” He thus hinted that, despite the impact of the sanctions on the island’s socioeconomic life, there is still room for maneuver.  

Blockade actions taken by the United States government between March 2023 and February 2024 (MINREX, July 2024) 

  • The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the Department of the Treasury announced a monetary settlement of $72,230.32 with Uphold HQ Inc. (“Uphold”), a money services company based in Larkspur, California, for apparent violations of the “sanctions” programs against Cuba, Iran and Venezuela. Transactions involving Cuba totaled 25, for a total of $142,683.74, between March 2017 and May 2022. 

  • April 6, 2023. Microsoft Corporation, based in Redmond, Washington, agreed to remit $2,980,265.86 to OFAC and $347,631 to the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the Department of Commerce, for violations of various U.S. coercive programs, including the one against Cuba. The total penalty amounted to $3,327,896. 54 of the 1,339 apparent violations were of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. 

  • May 1, 2023. Poloniex, LLC (“Poloniex”), headquartered in Delaware with its principal operations in Boston, Massachusetts, agreed to remit to OFAC $7,591,630 for violations of various U.S. coercive programs, including the one against Cuba. The agency’s statement said that the Poloniex trading platform apparently allowed clients located in “sanctioned” jurisdictions to engage in online transactions involving assets worth a combined $15,335,349. 

  • September 29, 2023. By presidential memorandum, President Joseph Biden extended for one more year the restrictions on granting federal funds for cultural and educational exchanges with Cuba, among other measures. This action resulted from Cuba’s arbitrary and unjustified permanence in Level 3 of the Department of State’s Annual Trafficking in Persons Report.  

  • November 6, 2023. OFAC announced through an official statement a monetary agreement with daVinci Payments (daVinci), a U.S. company that manages prepaid reward card programs, for apparent violations of several coercive programs, including the blockade laws against Cuba. DaVinci remitted $206,213 to the Treasury Department for apparently engaging between November 15, 2017, and July 27, 2022, in the exchange of reward cards from individuals in the sanctioned jurisdictions. 

  • February 21, 2024. U.S. President Joseph Biden issued a notification extending for one year the State of National Emergency related to Cuba, declared by President William Clinton on March 1, 1996 

Prerogatives of the President of the United States to modify the application of the blockade against Cuba (MINREX, July 2024) 

  • Among the modifications to the framework of the blockade that the President of the United States could make from his executive prerogatives, and through regulatory announcements from the Departments of State, Treasury and Commerce, are:

  • Remove Cuba from the State Department’s List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.

  • Reverse the policy of financial persecution against Cuba, including that related to fuel supplies to the country.

  • Suspend the possibility of filing lawsuits in U.S. courts against U.S. and third-country companies, under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act.

  • Modify the permissible limit of 10% of U.S. components in goods that Cuba can import from any country in the world.

  • Request the State and Treasury Departments to eliminate the inclusion of Cuban entities in other unilateral lists, such as the List of Restricted Cuban Entities, the List of Prohibited Accommodations, and the List of Specially Designated Nationals.

  • Instruct U.S. representatives in international financial institutions not to block the granting of credits or other financial facilities to Cuba.

  • Allow Cuban entities, including banks or companies, to open correspondent accounts in U.S. banks.

  • Authorize exports to Cuba of U.S. products for key branches of the economy such as mining, tourism or biotechnology.

  • Authorize the import by the U.S. of any merchandise manufactured or derived from products grown, produced, or manufactured in Cuba by state-owned enterprises (nickel, sugar, tobacco, rum or others).

  • Allow the export to Cuba of medical supplies and equipment that can be used in the manufacture of Cuban biotechnological products.

  • Make the licensing policy for investments by U.S. companies in Cuba more flexible.

  • Authorize U.S. citizens to receive medical treatment in Cuba.

  • Allow broader forms of collaboration for the development, marketing and supply of medicines and biomedical products of Cuban origin, for example, through direct investments by U.S. companies and joint ventures.

  • Allow sales of raw materials that Cuba needs to produce medicines for the Cuban population and that of other developing countries.

  • Authorize U.S. subsidiaries to do business with Cuba, which is not related to the import and export of goods to Cuba (prohibited by the Torricelli Act). 

Bruno Rodríguez, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba
United Nations General Assembly
28 September 2024

Excerpts 

“The United States government continues to clearly demonstrate its impossible but pernicious determination to determine and control the destiny of Cuba.  It is an old ambition anchored in the Monroe Doctrine, which defines the imperialist, dominant and hegemonic nature of U.S. policy towards Cuba and towards the region of Our America.  The economic, commercial and financial blockade is also political, technological and communicational.  It has been conceived as one of its main weapons of aggression to destroy the Cuban economy.  It seeks to prevent the country's financial income, cause the collapse of the economy and generate a situation of political and social instability.  The damage is visible and indisputable.  It has repercussions on the lives of all Cubans.  It is accompanied by the most ferocious campaign of disinformation and slander, by perennial attempts to interfere in our internal affairs and by the complicit tolerance of groups that organize violent and terrorist acts against Cuba from the territory of the United States.  These actions violate International Law.  They contravene the purposes and principles of this Organization and numerous resolutions adopted by the General Assembly.  The siege thus conceived has been reinforced by the inclusion of Cuba on the arbitrary list of countries that are supposedly sponsors of terrorism by the U.S. State Department.  This is a fraudulent designation, without moral authority or any international mandate.  By virtue of it, retaliatory actions against Cuba are unleashed, which, in an extraterritorial manner, go beyond the framework of the sovereign jurisdiction of the United States and are manifested in and against any country.”

U.S. Senator From Nevada Newest Co-Sponsor For Bacardi Trademark Legislation. Unlikely To Become Law In 2024... But In 2025?

/

S.746 - No Stolen Trademarks Honored in America Act (118th Congress)
Sponsor: Sen. Menendez, Robert [D-NJ] (Introduced 03/09/2023)
Has changes in: Committees
Committees: Senate - Senate Judiciary
Cosponsors: (1 new, 8 total)
Cosponsor: 09/25/2024: Sen. Rosen, Jacky [D-NV]
Official Title as Introduced: Official Title as Introduced: A bill to modify the prohibition on recognition by United States courts of certain rights relating to certain marks, trade names, or commercial names.

Cosponsors
Sen. Rosen, Jacky [D-NV]- 09/25/2024
Sen. Young, Todd [R-IN]*- 03/09/2023
Sen. Hirono, Mazie K. [D-HI]*- 03/09/2023
Sen. Marshall, Roger [R-KS]*- 03/09/2023
Sen. Tillis, Thomas [R-NC]*- 03/09/2023
Sen. Braun, Mike [R-IN]*- 03/09/2023
Sen. Cortez Masto, Catherine [D-NV]*- 03/09/2023
Sen. Rubio, Marco [R-FL]*- 03/09/2023

H.R. 1505 No Stolen Trademarks Honored in America Act of 2023

Cosponsors
Rep. Wasserman Schultz, Debbie [D-FL-25]*- 03/09/2023
Rep. Waltz, Michael [R-FL-6]- 03/14/2023
Rep. Salazar, Maria Elvira [R-FL-27]- 04/25/2023
Rep. Diaz-Balart, Mario [R-FL-26]- 04/25/2023
Rep. Rutherford, John H. [R-FL-5]- 05/11/2023
Rep. Gaetz, Matt [R-FL-1]- 05/16/2023
Rep. Green, Mark E. [R-TN-7]- 05/16/2023
Rep. Dunn, Neal P. [R-FL-2]- 05/16/2023
Rep. Reschenthaler, Guy [R-PA-14]- 05/16/2023
Rep. Lee, Laurel M. [R-FL-15]- 05/17/2023
Rep. Franklin, C. Scott [R-FL-18]- 05/17/2023
Rep. Gimenez, Carlos A. [R-FL-28]- 05/18/2023
Rep. Torres, Ritchie [D-NY-15]- 05/18/2023
Rep. Wilson, Frederica S. [D-FL-24]- 05/22/2023
Rep. Soto, Darren [D-FL-9]- 05/22/2023
Rep. Cline, Ben [R-VA-6]- 05/23/2023
Rep. Wild, Susan [D-PA-7]- 05/24/2023
Rep. Moskowitz, Jared [D-FL-23]- 07/18/2023

Links To Related Analyses

Bacardi Spent Approximately US$690,000.00 And 251 Days Later Its Cuba Trademark Legislation Moved From House To Senate- With No Objection. Where Were Pernod Ricard Lobbyists? NGO's? Members? December 07, 2023 

Eight Senators, Two Representatives Supporting Trademark Legislation To Benefit Bacardi. But, Does Legislation Help Resolve 5,913 Certified Claims Against Cuba? March 12, 2023

2024 Address By Minister Of Foreign Affairs To The United Nations General Assembly

/

Address by Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez
United Nations General Assembly
Saturday, September 28, 2024

Ms. President:
Mr. Secretary General:

Let me first reaffirm Cuba's solidarity and support for the brother and sister Palestinian people, victim of more than 75 years of colonial occupation, of flagrant violations of their legitimate rights as a nation, subjected to cruelty, aggression, collective punishment and apartheid.

In the last eleven months, the Israeli army has killed more than 40 thousand civilians. More children have died in this indiscriminate and disproportionate massacre than men and women.  They die with the complicity and weapons provided by the United States government, with the complicit silence of others.  We pay tribute to the more than 220 workers of this Organization, also murdered.

Cuba's position is clear and unequivocal.  President Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez has said, and I quote: "History will not forgive the indifferent.  And we will not be among them." It is a wound in the human conscience. The genocide against the Palestinian people must cease, unconditionally and without delay!

Israel, with the complicity of the United States, has placed the world before the imminent danger of a large-scale conflagration.  The irresponsible aggression against Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and the peoples of the Middle East will have consequences that are difficult to estimate. Excellencies:

Seventy-nine years after the founding of this Organization, the continuous violations of the Charter of the United Nations and International Law, the aggressions, the interference in the internal affairs of States, and the imposition of unilateral coercive measures for political ends, occur as daily events.

Aggressive military doctrines of domination, expansionism and supremacy, alarmingly undermine international Peace and Security. The danger of a nuclear holocaust is real and immediate.  For the ninth consecutive year, global military spending is increasing, reaching a record $2.44 trillion in 2023, including the development of nuclear weapons. It has been pushed back despite the enormous efforts of the States, Parties and Signatories of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and of clear-headed and broad sectors of international society. There will be no “peace without development” either.

Developed countries, inhabitants of the same planet, blindly refuse to invest even minimally in their own prosperity and security, and fail to meet their ever-insufficient commitments to Official Development Assistance.  This selfish figure, boastfully promised in 2023 and quickly forgotten, represents less than 0.37 percent of national income. The illusion of achieving the Sustainable Development Goals has vanished. According to Forbes, in the last four years alone, the combined wealth of the world's five richest people has grown by $423 billion, while five billion people remain in poverty. Oxfam estimates that the richest 1% have almost twice as much wealth as the rest of the world's population.  With a wealth tax on billionaires and multi-millionaires, two billion people could be lifted out of poverty. The crises are structural, determined by the imperialist system and the international order imposed on us.  No problem will be solved by undermining the intergovernmental nature of the United Nations, as some claim, or by weakening its essential role in promoting sustainable development for all.

Climate change is advancing inexorably.  It is an irrefutable fact. In July 2024, scientists announced that there had been 13 consecutive months of record-breaking temperature levels. If the irrational and unsustainable patterns of production and consumption of capitalism are not changed urgently and significantly, the increase in global average temperature will not be able to be contained to below 1.5 ◦C, with respect to pre-industrial levels. Responsibilities are shared, but differentiated; they are not the same for everyone, nor could they be fair. However, a positive step could be taken at the COP 29 Conference of the Parties in Azerbaijan and the adoption of the New Collective Financing Target.  The countries of the North would have another opportunity to begin to close the gap in climate financing. Those of us in the South would have to design a sufficient target that responds to the needs, with guarantees for development and social justice, in the face of the enormous obstacles and challenges we face. The solution will inevitably have to include the cancellation of the foreign debt, already paid several times over. Excellencies and Delegates:

All this confirms the 1992 thesis of President Fidel Castro Ruz: “An important biological species is at risk of disappearing…: human beings.” Only overcoming imperialism and capitalism can definitively save it, and in that process, the founding of a new international order. A fair and democratic international order, which guarantees peace and “the balance of the world,” the exercise of the right to development by all States; on conditions of sovereign equality, which broadens and strengthens the participation and representation of developing countries in the processes of governance, decision-making and policy formulation at the global level; provides for the common good and prosperity of all peoples, in harmony with nature and the sustainable management of natural resources, and ensures the exercise of all human rights for all people.

A new civilized coexistence among nations where solidarity, international cooperation, integration and the peaceful settlement of disputes prevail, as alternatives to the “philosophy of plunder,” war, the use or threat of use of force, aggression, occupation; to cultural, political, financial, technological and military domination and hegemony or any other manifestation that threatens the peace, independence and sovereignty of States.  An order without blockades or unilateral coercive measures, based on multilateralism and with full respect for the Charter of the United Nations and International Law. Ms. President:

The United States government continues to clearly demonstrate its impossible but pernicious determination to determine and control the destiny of Cuba.  It is an old ambition anchored in the Monroe Doctrine, which defines the imperialist, dominant and hegemonic nature of U.S. policy towards Cuba and towards the region of Our America. The economic, commercial and financial blockade is also political, technological and communicational. It has been conceived as one of its main weapons of aggression to destroy the Cuban economy.  It seeks to prevent the country's financial income, cause the collapse of the economy and generate a situation of political and social instability.  The damage is visible and indisputable.  It has repercussions on the lives of all Cubans. It is accompanied by the most ferocious campaign of disinformation and slander, by perennial attempts to interfere in our internal affairs and by the complicit tolerance of groups that organize violent and terrorist acts against Cuba from the territory of the United States. These actions violate International Law.  They contravene the purposes and principles of this Organization and numerous resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. The siege thus conceived has been reinforced by the inclusion of Cuba on the arbitrary list of countries that are supposedly sponsors of terrorism by the U.S. State Department. This is a fraudulent designation, without moral authority or any international mandate. By virtue of it, retaliatory actions against Cuba are unleashed, which, in an extraterritorial manner, go beyond the framework of the sovereign jurisdiction of the United States and are manifested in and against any country.

Last May, the State Department itself recognized that Cuba fully cooperates in the fight against terrorism.  This mere recognition of the truth, universally known, has not made the coercive measures of the blockade more flexible, but it does make Cuba's presence on this illegitimate list even more incongruous, confusing and unjustifiable. There will soon be new presidential elections in the United States, a matter that concerns only the Americans.  Only them, despite the nefarious and historical habit of the government of that country of interfering in the elections and internal affairs of all the Member States of the United Nations, even its allies. History has shown us that, regardless of the result of these elections, the anti-Cuban politicians and sectors that have made aggression against Cuba a lucrative business will continue to have a voice and influence.  They are those who have learned to manipulate the American political system based on a narrow and hostile agenda, very particular, only of interest to a small elite segment. They do not represent the will of the majority of the people of the United States, nor of the Cubans who live there. Whatever the electoral result, Cuba will continue to defend its sovereign right to independence and to build socialism, as we Cubans have decided, without foreign interference.  We will also continue to advocate for a respectful and constructive relationship with the United States. Ms. President:

In 2014, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) decided in Havana to proclaim our region a Zone of Peace.  That historic commitment gains greater validity every day. We defend peace and multilateralism against unilateral coercive measures that seriously harm Syria, Belarus, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran, Russia, Cuba and other nations. We strongly reject any attempt to undermine the legitimate constitutional order in our countries through coup methods.  This already happened in Bolivia in 2019 and on June 26th, and it is intended to happen again in Honduras.

We denounce the attempts to generate violence and destabilization in Venezuela.  We reiterate our firm support and solidarity with the Bolivarian, Chavista government and the civic-military union of the Venezuelan people, led by President Nicolás Maduro Moros.  The calls to ignore the election results are irresponsible and disrespectful of the popular will and its legitimate institutions. The destabilizing actions against the Government of Reconciliation and National Unity of Nicaragua must cease.  The brotherly people of Sandino will continue to have our full support. We reiterate our support for the legitimate right to self-determination and independence of Puerto Rico. The Caribbean countries deserve fair, special and differentiated treatment to face their challenges.  We support their fair claim for reparation for the damage caused by colonialism and slavery.

We welcome the efforts of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to find a sustainable solution to the dramatic situation in Haiti, which respects the independence and sovereignty of that sister nation. The international community has a historical debt to Haiti, protagonist of the first independence and anti-slavery revolution on the continent. We support the legitimate right of sovereignty of the Argentine people over the Malvinas, South Sandwich and South Georgia Islands and the surrounding maritime spaces. We reaffirm our support and commitment to the peace efforts in Colombia, to which Cuba will continue to contribute in every way possible in its capacity as Guarantor. Africa, the cradle of humanity, can always count on Cuba in its efforts to advance on its path to development. We reaffirm our unwavering solidarity with the Sahrawi people and the exercise of their self-determination.

Cuba expresses its firm rejection of actions aimed at harming the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the People's Republic of China, condemns interference in its internal affairs and reiterates its unwavering support for the principle of "One China" in accordance with the decision of this General Assembly in its historic resolution 2758, recognizing the People's Republic as the sole and legitimate representative of the Chinese people. We advocate a serious, constructive, realistic diplomatic solution through peaceful means to the current war in Ukraine in accordance with International Law that guarantees the security and sovereignty of all.  In this context, Cuba supports the joint proposal presented by China and Brazil for the political solution to this crisis.

Ms. President: Let us join forces to achieve the effectiveness of multilateral institutions and ensure that they respond to the interests of the humble, the poor, the needy and the exploited, who are the vast majority, on the basis of fair equality, the exercise of human rights by all human beings and respect for the sovereign rights of each nation. Thank you very much.

President Continues Trading With The Enemy Act Provisions Relating To Cuba

/

The White House
Washington DC
13 September 2024

Presidential Determination No. 2024–11 of September 13, 2024

Continuation of the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading With the Enemy Act

Memorandum for the Secretary of State [and] the Secretary of the Treasury

Under section 101(b) of Public Law 95–223 (91 Stat. 1625; 50 U.S.C. 4305 note), and a previous determination on September 13, 2023 (88 FR 64347, September 18, 2023), the exercise of certain authorities under the Trading With the Enemy Act is scheduled to expire on September 14, 2024. I hereby determine that the continuation of the exercise of those authorities with respect to Cuba for 1 year is in the national interest of the United States.Therefore, consistent with the authority vested in me by section 101(b) of Public Law 95–223, I continue for 1 year, until September 14, 2025, the exercise of those authorities with respect to Cuba, as implemented by the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 CFR part 515.  The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to publish this determination in the Federal Register.

LINK TO COMPLETE SIGNED TEXT IN PDF FORMAT

Organization Reports 14 U.S. Grain Companies Refused To Sell (At Market Price) Wheat Flour For To Cuba. Was Then Sourced And Exported From Turkiye To Cuba. Organization Refusing To Provide Details.

/

U.S. Organization Reports 14 U.S. Grain Companies Refused To Sell (At Market Price) Wheat Flour For Export To Cuba. Shipment Was Ultimately Reported As Sourced In And Exported From Turkiye To Cuba. 

Thus Far, U.S. Organization Will Not Disclose Identity Of Companies.

Other U.S. Organizations Have Purchased Agricultural Commodities For Export To The Republic Of Cuba And Reported No Issues With Identifying Sources.

US Exports To Cuba Decreased In June 2024 By 5.8%. Remain Up 31.4% Year-To-Year. Thus Far In 2024- US$31 Million In Vehicles. And, US$4,485.00 In Leaded Gasoline. List Of Everything! Aug 7, 2024

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2023 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

Peoples Dispatch
New York, New York
30 August 2024

Thousands of people in US send 800 tons of urgently needed flour to Cuba
US-based activists organized a massive flour distribution campaign to offset the effects of the deadly regime of US sanctions and the blockade against Cuba

On August 30, US-based activists delivered 800 tons of flour to Cuba via the “Let Cuba Live: Bread for our Neighbors” campaign. This campaign has been months in the making, with the US-based Peoples Forum raising hundreds of thousands in donations, and intends to offset the effects of the deadly regime of US sanctions and the blockade against Cuba. Over 1,300 people donated to the campaign.

“The concept of the campaign is simple: Cuba is our neighbor, and we can’t let our neighbors go hungry,” said Manolo De Los Santos, Executive Director of The People’s Forum. “This hunger is imposed directly by the White House, and Biden could end it right away by allowing Cuba to trade freely.”

Cuba is facing a significant food crisis due to the ongoing US economic war against the socialist island nation. Although, the US State Department claims that its blockade of Cuba exempts shipments of food, medicine, and other humanitarian goods. However, even US officials agree this does not reflect reality. As US Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack said back in March, “There’s a significant impediment to trade in Cuba because of [US] legislation that requires payment in advance in cash in US dollars which makes it very, very difficult for a lot of [agricultural] trade to take place.”

Campaign organizers themselves reported facing significant challenges in sourcing the bread for Cuba, despite receiving donations from thousands of people of conscience in the US.

“The campaign organizers reached out to 14 different grain producers in the US to purchase the massive order but received not a single positive response. In order to successfully complete the delivery, the grain had to be shipped from Turkey and suffered delays because of the US government’s policy of extreme and arbitrary harassment of Cuba’s foreign trade, which is meant to create desperation for the people of Cuba and has brutal consequences,” Bread for our Neighbors activists reported.

Peoples Forum
New York, New York
30 August 2024

”US$207,986.00 of US$400,000.00
1,358 Donors

What would you do if your neighbor was starving? This is not a hypothetical. Right now the U.S. government is deliberately starving the Cuban people 90 miles to our South. We all must act now.
A food crisis is unfolding on the island of an unprecedented scale. A country where hunger had been made a thing of the past is now running out of bread and other essential food items.

We are launching an emergency campaign — Let Cuba Live: Bread for Our Neighbors. Our goal is to send 800 tons of wheat flour to Cuba as legal humanitarian aid, so that millions of people have bread for a month. Can you join with thousands of others to make a donation, as you would for your neighbor next door?

We aren’t just trying to feed a family or a single block. We want to bring bread to whole provinces. A $100 donation gets us enough wheat flour to produce 70,000 bread rolls.

The U.S. could end this suffering quickly if it were to lift the blockade and remove Cuba from the “State Sponsors of Terrorism List,” which Trump absurdly imposed on the island five years ago. This has totally blocked Cuba from a broad range of financial and trade transactions and made it impossible to get international credits.

As an example: in the last three weeks we called 14 grain companies in the United States offering to pay market rate for grain to go to Cuba as urgent humanitarian aid. We haven’t received a single positive reply.

This cannot stand. All people of conscience in the United States have to speak up and take action to let Cuba live. We’ve all been outraged to see the urgent aid for Rafah blocked at the border, while famine stalks the Palestinian people. We can’t allow the same thing to happen directly to our south. Please make a donation today — give bread to our neighbor.

Once the wheat flour arrives in Cuba, it will be received and distributed by the Martin Luther King Jr Memorial Center in Havana, Cuba. The People's Forum will match all donations up $100,000.
Please make a donation today — give bread to our neighbor.

To donate by check:
Make check out to: The People's Forum
On memo line write: "Bread For Our Neighbors" (*do not write Cuba on the check!*)
Mail to:
The People's Forum
320 W 37th St
New York, NY 10018”

Agencia Cubana De Noticias (ACN)
Havana, Republic of Cuba
30 August 2024

HAVANA, Cuba, Aug 30 (ACN) Some 800 tons of wheat flour was donated to Cuba by the US organization The People's Forum, and according to Manolo de los Santos, its executive director, many hands from all over the world offered solidarity help to achieve it…. The young friend of the Island, based in New York, denounced the genocide that constitutes the blockade of the US government against Cuba, and gave as an example that for this donation they talked to 14 different companies in the US and none dared to sell that flour, they had to look for others as far away as Turkey, when it is only 90 miles away from Cuba, he said.

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

2024 U.S. Cane/Beet Sugar/Syrup/Artificial Honey Exports To Cuba January Through July Were US$1,033,615.00. Cuba Reportedly Allocating 90% Of Honey Production For Export Rather Than Domestic Market.

/

1701992020: Cane/beet Sug Ref/imp Sug Drawbk No Flv/clr Retail (kg)- US$179,307.00 

1701992040: Cane/beet Sug Ref/imp Sug Drawbk No Flv/clr/retail (kg)- US$3,008.00 

1701994000: Cane/beet Sugar, Solid, Refined, No Flv/clr, Nesoi (kg)- US$215,572.00 

1702905000: Sug/syrup Nt Flav/colr Nesoi; Artfl Honey; Caraml (kg)- US$635,728.00 

From www.cubaheadlines.com 

6 September 2024: Amid a severe food crisis, the Cuban government continues to prioritize honey exports, allocating 90% of the annual production to international markets. Traditionally one of the most valuable products in the Cuban agricultural sector, honey has been listed among the eight priority items in the Comprehensive Export Strategy for Goods and Services for the period 2019-2030. 

Despite production challenges such as shortages of inputs and fuel, as well as the devastating effects of drought and forest fires, beekeeping on the island has remained resilient. According to data from the National Office of Statistics and Information (ONEI), cited by Granma, Cuba managed to collect 9,200 tons of honey in 2022, although this volume was slightly lower than the previous year. By comparison, in 1962, the country achieved a record of more than 10,000 tons of honey produced. 

The export of honey generates significant revenue for the state-owned Cuban Beekeeping Company (APICUBA), part of the Agroforestry Business Group. Its general director, Lázaro Bruno García Castro, and the director of foreign trade, Ramón Hurtado Delgado, are well aware of the volume of business they manage. The Cuban people are not. 

In 2018, the export of Cuban honey to European countries such as Germany, France, and Spain generated around 18 million dollars. At that time, the average export price of Cuban honey was estimated to be 2,655 dollars per ton, with organic honey being particularly prestigious in international markets due to its high quality and distinctive flavor. 

Using these reference values (without considering market fluctuations, global inflation repercussions, and other factors), it is feasible that exporting 90% of the honey produced in Cuba could result in more than 22 million dollars for the state company's coffers. How much of this amount goes to the beekeepers? Once again, based on these relative values, honey production in Cuba would be sufficient to sell one kilogram of honey per year to each Cuban at a price of less than three dollars. Why doesn't the Cuban regime do this? One would have to ask the directors of APICUBA or the elusive Minister of Economy, Joaquín Alonso Vázquez. 

The emphasis on honey exports has sparked internal criticism due to the severe food shortages affecting the Cuban population. While the government celebrates production and export records, many Cuban families cannot access basic products like honey. This situation is exacerbated by inflation and widespread shortages that are suffocating Cubans.

Impact on Local Populations 

Granma, one of the provinces most affected by the crisis, has become one of the country's largest honey producers. In March 2022, beekeepers in this region achieved a monthly collection record of 220 tons, demonstrating the importance the government continues to place on this activity. However, the impact on the population remains limited, given that 90% of the production is destined for the external market. 

The stark contrast between massive honey exports and the internal food crisis highlights the contradictions of the Cuban economy. While the country positions itself as a competitive honey exporter, Cubans find themselves increasingly restricted in their access to basic foods. This situation raises serious questions about the government's priorities, which continue to focus on earning foreign currency through exports while the population suffers from the lack of essential products. 

At the end of December 2023, the Cuban regime claimed that Cuban rum, honey, and coffee captivated consumers in China, accessed through an online platform. In Cuban markets, there is no coffee or honey for the population, but the regime invests time, money, and resources in promoting the commercialization of its products across the globe. Meanwhile, the Cuban people go through their days without finding coffee, honey, or sugar to sweeten their lives. 

Key Questions About Cuba's Honey Export Strategy

The prioritization of honey exports by the Cuban government amid a severe food crisis has raised several important questions. Here, we address some of the most pressing inquiries. 

Why does the Cuban government prioritize honey exports despite the food crisis?

The Cuban government prioritizes honey exports as part of its strategy to generate foreign currency. Honey is one of the eight priority items in the Comprehensive Export Strategy for the period 2019-2030. 

How much revenue does honey export generate for Cuba?

In 2018, honey exports to European countries generated around 18 million dollars. With 90% of the annual production allocated to exports, it is estimated that this could bring in more than 22 million dollars annually. 

What are the main challenges facing honey production in Cuba?

Honey production in Cuba faces several challenges, including shortages of inputs and fuel, and the devastating effects of drought and forest fires. Despite these issues, beekeeping has remained resilient. 

Is honey available to the Cuban population?

Despite the significant production of honey, it is not readily available to the Cuban population. The majority of the honey produced is exported, leaving many Cuban families unable to access this basic product.

From CiberCuba

How Bad In Cuba? Donations From U.S. Through July 2024 Are US$38.9 Million. For All Of 2023, Donations Were US$36.5 Million.

/

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
September 2024

July 2024 Humanitarian Donations US$4,290,817.00

HUMANITARIAN DONATIONS- Donated items are neither included in Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSREEA) nor Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (CDA) calculations.  These items are generally delivered to the Republic of Cuba using air carriers or containers on vessels; do not include personal deliveries (by travelers on flights and through third countries). A meaningful quantity and U.S. Dollar value of items categorized as “humanitarian” are transported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba by passengers on authorized air carriers; thus, the information is not documented.

Donations (food, healthcare, clothing, reading materials, etc.)

2024    US$38,907,503.00
2023    US$36,563,551.00
2022    US$30,083,306.00
2021    US$11,074,090.00
2020    US$4,605,055.00
2019    US$7,150,989.00
2018    US$8,998,855.00
2017    US$6,122,601.00
2016    US$4,755,859.00
2015    US$4,619,588.00
2014    US$939,705.00

For Cuba: Government Regulations For Purchasing, Importing A Vehicle. Thus Far In 2024, US$36 Million In Vehicle Exports From United States To Cuba.

/

From www.cubaheadlines.com 

Among the new measures adopted by the Cuban government in the transportation sector is the authorization of vehicle sales between individuals and companies. Minister Eduardo Rodríguez Dávila highlighted during the Mesa Redonda on Tuesday that, until now, natural persons could transfer vehicle ownership among themselves, and legal entities could do the same, but legal entities couldn't transfer ownership to natural persons. 

"With the new decisions, ownership transfer is now permitted between all natural and legal persons. However, for legal entities that are state-owned or have state participation, transferring ownership to a natural person requires approval from the Council of Ministers," he stated. 

"For instance, a microenterprise can transfer ownership of a vehicle to a natural person, just like a religious organization, a foreign representative office in Cuba, or a branch," he elaborated. 

The procedure remains the same as the current one for ownership transfer between natural persons: before a notary public, paying the transaction value and the corresponding tax, all through the bank. The prohibition remains for foreign diplomatic legal entities to buy or sell a vehicle to a natural person. 

Rodríguez Dávila also mentioned that natural persons can acquire vehicles from authorized dealers in convertible currencies, like IMPEXPORT and CIMEX S.A. 

Vehicle Pricing and Importation

"The vehicles for sale come from imports and those that conclude their rental period in tourism. The sale prices are formed by market correlation among natural persons, with a margin ranging from 350% to 500%, of which 30% is the commercial margin of the dealer, and the rest forms a special tax. Although this tax is collected in USD or MLC, it is credited in national currency at a rate of 1x24 into a fund managed by the Ministry of Transportation," he explained. 

"For legal entities, the sale price is the acquisition or import cost, plus a commercial margin of up to 30%. Another tax is applied to the classes of motorcycles, cars, rural cars, and trucks, with rates of 100%, 150%, and 200%," he specified. 

This controversial topic has sparked criticism against the regime for the high prices of imported cars in Cuba, making it an almost impossible dream for highly qualified professionals in the country. 

The official also shared recent data on social media regarding vehicle import prices in Cuba, with infographics detailing how the government forms the prices of imported vehicles. He specified that they used a hypothetical value of 10,000 USD "to facilitate understanding." To determine the final price of the vehicles, the Supplier Price in Cuba, which is the initial value of the vehicle including freight and insurance, is considered. This base price in the infographic is 10,000 USD or euros. 

To this base price, Import Costs are added, which include tariffs, customs services, handling, and transportation of the vehicle, representing approximately 6% of the supplier price, equivalent to 600 USD or euros. The next component is the Commercial Margin Rate, a margin applied by the selling entity in Cuba. This margin can reach up to 20% of the base price, resulting in an increase of 2,120 USD or euros, bringing the dealer's sale price to 12,720 USD or euros. 

Additionally, a Special Tax by Segment or Range is applied, varying according to the type of vehicle. For high-end cars, this tax is 35%, equivalent to 4,452 USD or euros, while for other types of vehicles it can be 25% or 15%. The total amount payable by the buyer is determined by summing all these components. For example, a car, rural car, or truck has a final price of 15,900 USD or euros; a high-end car reaches 17,172 USD or euros; while vehicles of other classes like minibuses, motorcycles, or tricycles have prices ranging from 14,628 to 15,264 USD or euros. 

Cubans were unable to buy new and used motorcycles, cars, trucks, and minibuses until 2013, when Raúl Castro allowed the purchase of second-hand and new vehicles, but only through the government and with a 100% tax. Until then, interested parties needed the personal approval of the vice president of the country, commonly known as the "letter." 

In 2011, the regime authorized the sale of used cars between Cubans, but did not eliminate the requirement for the vice president's signature. Furthermore, new cars could not be purchased. 

Understanding Cuba's New Vehicle Sales Policy

Below are some frequently asked questions and answers regarding the recent changes in vehicle sales policy in Cuba. 

Can legal entities now sell vehicles to individuals in Cuba?

Yes, legal entities can now sell vehicles to individuals, but state-owned or state-participated entities need approval from the Council of Ministers for such transactions. 

Where can individuals purchase vehicles in Cuba?

Individuals can buy vehicles from authorized dealers such as IMPEXPORT and CIMEX S.A. in convertible currencies. 

What is the price formation for vehicles sold in Cuba?

The price includes the supplier price, import costs, a commercial margin of up to 30%, and a special tax by vehicle segment or range. This can add up to a final price significantly higher than the base price. 

From www.cubaheadlines.com 

The Minister of Transport, Eduardo Rodríguez Dávila, recently shared a series of updated figures on social media regarding the import prices of vehicles in Cuba. His post included two infographics detailing how the Cuban government sets the prices for imported cars. Rodríguez explained that they used a hypothetical value of $10,000 USD "to facilitate understanding." This contentious issue has sparked criticism against the regime due to the exorbitant prices of imported cars on the island, making it an unattainable dream for many highly qualified professionals in the country. 

Price Formation for Imported Vehicles

The process of determining the final price of vehicles in Cuba involves several components. First, the Supplier Price delivered in Cuba is considered, which is the initial value of the vehicle, including freight and insurance. This base price, as shown in the infographic, is $10,000 USD or euros.  To this base price, Import Costs are added, which include tariffs, customs services, handling, and transportation of the vehicle, representing approximately 6% of the supplier's price, equivalent to $600 USD or euros.  The next component is the Commercial Margin Rate, which is a margin applied by the selling entity in Cuba. This margin can reach up to 20% of the base price, resulting in an increase of $2,120 USD or euros, bringing the selling price of the dealer to $12,720 USD or euros.

United States Export Data (January 2024 Through July 2024)

8701210080 Rd Trctr For Semi-trls,comp-ign, Used (no)- US$220,000
8702400000 Public-trnsprt Typ Pasgnr Veh, Only Electric Motor (no)- US$37,000
8703210100 Pass Mtr Veh, Only Spark Ign Eng, Not Ov 1,000 cc (no)- US$11,920
8703230145 Vehicles,nesoi,new,eng (1500 - 3000 cc) Le 4cyl (no)- US$75,668
8703230160 Pass Veh,ov 4 N/o 6 Cyl,1500-3000cc (no)- US$27,179
8703230190 Used Vehicles, Only Sk Ig (1500-3000 cc), Nesoi (no)- US$30,064,049
8703240160 Pass Veh,only Spk Ign >6 Cyl,>3000cc,new (no)- US$109,500
8703240190 Pass Mtr Veh, Only Spark Ign, Gt 3000 cc, Used (no)-US$4,523,028
8703330185 Pass Veh,diesel,only Comp-ig, > 2,500 cc, Use, Nes (no)- US$9,748
8703600090 Pass Mtr Veh, Sp Ign/elec, Over 3000 cc, Used (no)- US$61,671
8703800000 Passenger Motor Vehicles Only Electrc Motor, Nesoi (no)- US$127,190
8704210100 Trucks, Nesoi, Diesel Eng, Gvw 5 Metric Tons & Und (no)- US$64,075
8704224120 Truck, Diesel Eng, Gvw (5 - 9 Metric Tons) (no)- US$134,564
8704224160 Truck, Diesel Eng,  Gvw (12 - 15 Metric Tons) (no)- US$63,000
8704230100 Truck, Diesel Eng, Gvw Gt 20 Metric Tons (no)- US$35,913
8704310120 Mot Veh For Trnsprt Of Goods, Gvw < 2.5 Met Tons (no)- US$123,028
8704310140 Mot Veh For Trnsprt Of Goods, (2.5-5) Metric Tons (no)- US$73,000
8704320110 Mot Veh For Trnsprt Of Goods, (5-9) Metric Tons (no)- US$43,100
8704410000 Trucks Gvw Lt=5 Tons W/ Diesel Eng And Elec Motor (no)- US$112,800
8704420080 Trucks Gvw (15-20)tons W/diesel Eng And Elec Motor (no)- US$35,200
8704430000 Trucks Gvw Gt 20 Tons W/ Diesel Eng And Elec Motor (no)- US$456,462
8704900100 Trucks/vehicles For The Transport Of Goods, Nesoi (no)- US$99,572
8705900000 Special Purpose Vehicles, Nesoi (no)- US$216,427
8707100020 Bodies For Passenger Autos Of Heading 8703 (no)- US$4,900
8708100010 Stampings Of Bumpers And Parts, Head 8701 To 8705 (no)- US$174,024
8708300050 Brakes And Servo-brakes,parts, Of 8701,8705 (no)- US$3,066
8708502150 Non-driving Axles And Parts For Tractors (no)-US$2,620
8708700050 Road Wheels And Prts For Veh Nesoi,of 8701,8705 (no)- US$85,110
8708998175 Parts And Acessories For Vhcls 8701 To 8705, Nesoi (no)- US$40,984
8709190030 Works Trucks, Exc Elec, Operator Ride,w/o Lift Eqp (no)- US$12,500
8711500000 Motorcycles, Cycl,excd 800 cc (no)- US$30,000
8714100090 Parts, Nesoi, Of Motorcycles (kg)- US$82,245
8716390090 Trailers And Semi-trailers, Nesoi, Tranprt Goods (no)- US$11,130
8716400000 Trailers And Semi-trailers, Nesoi (no)- US$10,000
8716900000 Parts,nesoi,of Trailers,semi-trailers;veh Nesoi (kg)- US$14,838

LINKS TO RELATED ANALYSES

LINK: Home Delivery For Electric Scooters To Cuba: As Biden-Harris Administration Expands U.S. Export Opportunities, A U.S. Company Responds Quickly To Customer Requests. Next Correspondent Banking? December 04, 2022  

LINK: Ten Months After Denial, Biden-Harris Administration Approves Exports Of Electric Motorcycles, Electric Scooters To Cuba Nationals And To Privately-Owned Companies In Cuba October 05, 2022 

LINK: Biden-Harris Administration Approves First Equity Investment Since 1960 In A Private Cuban Company May 10, 2022 

LINK: With U.S. Government Authorization For First Direct Equity Investment Into A Private Company In Cuba, Here Is Important Context And Details.  About The Parties; About The Message. May 16, 2022      

LINK: Biden Administration Will Use Cuba's Authorization Of SMSE's As Means To Expand Support For Cuba Private Sector- U.S. Investments And Loans May Be Next June 02, 2021 

U.S. Agricultural Commodity/Food Product Exports To Cuba Remain Up 25.7%. Vehicle (New, Used, Truck) Exports For 2024 Exceed US$36 Million. Tequila Exported In July 2024.

/

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
September 2024

July 2024 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Decrease 2.6% - 1
48th Of 222 July 2024 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Increase 25.7% - 2
Cuba Ranked 50th Of 222 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets - 2
July 2024 Healthcare Product Exports US$3,473.00 - 2
July 2024 Humanitarian Donations US$4,290,817.00 - 3
Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue To Increase - 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 19

JULY 2024 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA DECREASE 2.6% - Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in July 2024 were US$31,457,528.00 compared to US$32,313,837.00 in July 2023 and US$23,468,476.00 in July 2022. 

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA and CDA. The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

January 2024 through July 2024 TSREEA exports were US$242,085,953.00 compared to January 2023 through July 2023 TSREEA exports of US$192,573,390.00. Total TSREEA exports since first deliveries in December 2001 exceed US$7,488,419,346.00.

Other products exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in July 2024 include: Fresh Peaches, Spices, Rice (donated), Olive Oil, Tequila (US$4,338.00), Clothing (Trousers, Blouses, Underpants, Bathrobes), Food Grinder, Solar Cells, Used Vehicles (US$3,705,643.00).

Used Vehicle Exports January 2024 Through July 2024 Are US$34,587,077.00.

Truck Exports January 2024 Through July 2024 Are US$1,457,141.00.

LINK TO MONTHLY REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2023 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA