Cuba Sanctions & Remittances Topics Today At The White House And Department Of State Briefings

The White House
Washington DC
22 July 2021

Q Two, it's being reported that President Biden plans to impose sanctions on Cuban officials because of the attacks on protesters. Can you outline the administration's goals with regard to those sanctions?

MS. PSAKI: Sure. Well, I can confirm for all of you that there will be more from the Department of Treasury and the Department of State later this afternoon on sanctions. And the announcement will be coming from then -- from them. But I -- in terms of our approach to Cuba and what we're trying to accomplish, we have, of course, condemned mass detention, sham trials, and disappearances that are attempts to threaten the Cuban people into silence. We continue to call for swift -- the swift release of peaceful protesters who have unjustly been detained. We've made clear over the last week that addressing this moment was a priority for the administration and for President Biden, and that he has -- he had asked his team to look into a range of options that would both help the Cuban people, help provide humanitarian assistance, help look into addressing issues like the lack of Internet access, and that also sanctions authority was a part of those considerations. So this is an announcement that will be coming later this afternoon. I'd also note that we'll continue to engage closely and coordinate with our international partners, from the OAS to the U.N. and others, to collectively condemn the actions of the Cuban government.

United States Department of State
Washington DC
22 July 2021

Sanctioning Cuban Security Forces in Response to Violent Repression of Protests
Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State

Starting on July 11, tens of thousands of Cubans in dozens of cities and towns throughout their country took to the streets to peacefully demand respect for their fundamental freedoms and a better future. In response, the Cuban regime violently repressed the protests, arresting hundreds of demonstrators simply for exercising their human rights of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. The actions of Cuban security forces and violent mobs mobilized by Cuban Communist Party First Secretary Miguel Diaz-Canel lay bare the regime’s fear of its own people and unwillingness to meet their basic needs and aspirations.

Today, the United States is imposing sanctions on Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba Álvaro López Miera and the Cuban Ministry of the Interior’s Special National Brigade or “Boinas Negras” (Black Berets). López Miera and the Special National Brigade have been involved in suppressing the protests, including through physical violence and intimidation. We take this action pursuant to Executive Order 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. We stand with every Cuban seeking a government that respects the human rights and dignity of the Cuban people. We will continue to take action to promote accountability for the Cuban government’s human rights abuses, including through additional sanctions pursuant to Global Magnitsky, as appropriate.

United States Department of State
Washington DC
22 July 2021

MR PRICE: I expect you all have seen the statement from the President, the statement from Secretary Blinken, the statement from the Department of the Treasury, regarding our latest action to hold to account the Cuban regime for its abuses in the aftermath of the protests, the peaceful protests in Cuba. And so, with that, I have nothing but my eagerness and happiness to take your questions.
QUESTION: Okay. Well, let’s start with Cuba, then.
MR PRICE: Okay.
QUESTION: You designated one person and an entity that was already covered by Global Magnitsky sanctions that were imposed by the Trump administration in January. So, I don’t understand why you think that this is such a big deal.
MR PRICE: Well, Matt, let me first give you a bit of context to make sure this is understood in the right light. As we have said, since the onset of the peaceful protests across the island of Cuba, we will stand with the Cuban people, who are exercising their universal rights of peaceful protest, peaceful assembly, freedom of speech. We will look at additional ways we can support them. We have spoken to the formation of a remittance working group. We have spoken about the ways in which we are seeking to expand internet access so that the Cuban people can practice that freedom of expression and have the free flow of information to which they are entitled. We have spoken to our review of how we might augment our staffing at our embassy in Havana.
But we have also said that we are going to hold to account those Cuban individuals and entities responsible for the crackdown on this peaceful protest. And I said yesterday that the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control is exploring designating Cuban officials, Cuban entities, responsible for violence, repression, human rights violations against those who are perpetrating this in Cuba.
So, you are right; we designated through the Global Magnitsky sanctions regime one individual and one entity today. This I do not expect will be the sum total of our actions. We’re going to continue to review what more we can do not only to support the Cuban people, but also, again, importantly to hold to account those who would be so brazen in their efforts and attempts to violate the human rights of the Cuban people. So —
QUESTION: Okay. But I mean, the special brigade of the interior ministry was already covered by Global Magnitsky sanctions. So, you – so you’ve – you’ve added another designation on – I just don’t – the impact of this seems to me whatever the impact would have been – it seems to have been – it seems to be negligible, since they were already covered. So, I don’t quite understand how it is that you are presenting this as some grand new initiative to support the Cuban people, when in fact it’s simply adding another layer, which was really unnecessary, since they already were covered by the sanctions.
MR PRICE: I would make a couple points. Number one, the Global Magnitsky sanctions regime is an important tool we have that is applicable —
QUESTION: It is. But they were already under it.
MR PRICE: — that is – Alvaro Lopez Miera was?
QUESTION: No, I’m talking about the – that’s one person, okay, who most likely doesn’t have any assets or any dealings with American citizens.
MR PRICE: Just – just so – just so no —
QUESTION: So, let’s talk about what the real impact would be, would be if you designated the whole entity of the – a part of the interior ministry, like with the Iran sanctions, okay? That would have a much bigger impact, whatever that impact would be. But the fact of the matter is that they were already covered by Global Magnitsky sanctions. The exact same sanction, the exact same executive order was used to do this, and it doesn’t have any – it doesn’t do anything new.
MR PRICE: Just so we’re not having a conversation just with each other, let me just level set with everyone.
QUESTION: Well, I’ll be – I’m done after that.
MR PRICE: Well, so as Matt alluded to, we have imposed sanctions on the minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Cuba, Alvaro Lopez Miera, as well as the Ministry of the Interior’s Special National Brigade. These – this individual, this entity, we have targeted them as part of our effort – that is not over, to be sure – to hold to account those actors in Cuba who have been responsible for the crackdown, for the repression, for the human rights abuses on those in Cuba who are doing nothing more than exercising their universal rights.
Now, we obviously do have a well-developed sanctions regime in place that covers different elements and entities in Cuba. That said, the embargo and the other sanctions tools – they do have carveouts. They have carveouts for a number of reasons. It is absolutely true that by sanctioning this individual and this entity some of those carveouts are closed, that there will be repercussions and implications for this individual and this entity. And it’s an important signal of our determination to hold accountable those responsible for this.
QUESTION: Specifically what carveouts are closed in that case? What are they not going to get that they were getting before? Just to follow up on Matt’s question, what’s the practical impact of this, or is it largely symbolic?
MR PRICE: Well, there is an important messaging element to this. The Global Magnitsky regime is a valuable tool we have that, again, is not applicable solely in the context of Cuba but the world over, and we’ve used it to good effect, the world over. Now with the Global Magnitsky regime, there are a number of implications, some of which do apply to this individual and this entity, some of which may not, given the rather unique circumstances.
QUESTION: Like weapons, money, food? I mean —
MR PRICE: So, let me give you a couple examples. And now obviously we’re not able to detail specific holdings of entities or individuals, but under this regime all property, and interest in property, in any of the entities that are owned directly or indirectly or with other designated persons that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC, unless authorized otherwise. In addition, these persons and all property and interest in property of these persons are blocked pursuant to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. These prohibitions further include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
So, there are a number of implications. Some of this is highly technical, especially given the intersection with the broader sanctions tools we have applied in the context of Cuba. But this is a meaningful and important step.
QUESTION: I want to also ask you about remittances. Because the President said that he’s looking for ways to get remittances directly to the people, not to the regime, as well as looking at the internet being restored, if there was some technical way that that could be done. On remittances, I interviewed Marco Rubio today, and he said it’s just not possible, because – unless the regime changes its policy of requiring that all remittances be deposited in government banks, be converted into pesos, which are useless in terms of any value, even on the island, compared to dollars. So, he said there’s no point in trying to do that, unless the regime changes its policy.
MR PRICE: What the President said earlier this week is that the administration would form a remittance working group to study this very issue. It’s namely to identify the most effective way possible or potentially to get those remittances directly into the hands of the Cuban people. This is a concern we share. The – this administration shares this concern with many in Congress that remittances would find their way into Cuban Government coffers. This is precisely why we are looking closely at the issue, to determine tools, tactics, procedures that might be possible to allow us to push forward with our goals, and that is, in the first instance, supporting the Cuban people, providing them with the much-needed humanitarian relief that so, clearly, they are calling for and desperate for, without buttressing the regime.
So, this working group was just announced earlier this week. Don’t have any more updates to share, at this time. But this concern about funds potentially going into Cuban Government coffers, but also this ultimate objective, supporting the Cuban people, supporting their needs, supporting their aspirations – it’s also something we share with members of Congress, and so we’ll continue to work closely with them.
QUESTION: And anything – has anything been advanced on the internet?
MR PRICE: Well, this is also something that the President spoke to for the first time, at least in detail, this week. And what we said is that we will work closely with two entities, really – the private sector, as well as with Congress – to identify viable options to make the internet more accessible to the Cuban people. This is a goal that’s important, in its own right. Freedom of expression, the ability of people anywhere and everywhere to freely communicate is something the United States always stands for, always supports. But it’s especially important now because the Cuban regime, we have seen in recent days, has enacted these blackouts, these internet shutdowns, precisely in an effort to stifle the protest, to silence the Cuban people.
And, of course, this does nothing to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the Cuban people. This is a sign of a government that, in some ways, is scared of its own people. And so, it’s especially important to us, given the actions that the Cuban regime has undertaken in recent days, to explore again with Congress and the private sector ways we can support the ability of the Cuban people to do what people, the world over, are entitled to do: exercise their freedom of expression, to share ideas without these sort of technical impediments.
Yes.
QUESTION: Thanks. On the remittances, are you saying we will find a way to allow remittances and to get this money in the Cuban hands, or are you still saying that there is a chance that this won’t work and there is no way to make that money – doesn’t go in the regime coffers?
And also, on – on the embassy staffing, do you have any timing, any date for when it will happen? Will it happen in the next days or weeks or month?
MR PRICE: Well, on your first question, we’re forming a working group precisely to find out. We know that the underlying goal is something that certainly has the support of this administration; it has the support of other key stakeholders, including Congress, including many Americans, including Cuban Americans. And that is the objective of supporting the Cuban people, supporting their needs, also helping them to achieve their broader aspirations. We’re studying it because, again, we want to make sure or we want to test the proposition, I should say, that this is something we can do consistent with a countervailing priority, and that is to ensure that we don’t do anything that buttresses or strengthens the regime. So, we’re taking a close look at the issue. The – again, the working group was just announced this week, so as we have more details to share, we will.
Similarly, with our staffing plan for the embassy, we are – that plan was just announced this week. We’re taking a close look at a couple things: what our needs are, and what we could do with additional resources and additional people from our embassy in Havana, but also taking a close look at a number of factors, including the safety and security of people who may be going to Havana, some people who may be returning to Havana. That’s obviously a top priority for us around the world. It’s, as we talked about in this room the other day, certainly something we’re taking a close look at in the context of Cuba given one of the reasons for our drawdown in the first place.
So as soon as we have —
QUESTION: Is that a matter of weeks or a month?
MR PRICE: I wouldn’t want to put a timeframe on it. Obviously, the – our ability to engage directly with the Cuban people, to support the Cuban people, to hear directly from them, to engage in consular activity – it’s a priority for us. We’re working as fast as we can, but we are also doing it consistent with other priorities I laid out.
QUESTION: And deliver visa to Cuban people is one of the goals?
MR PRICE: I’m sorry?
QUESTION: To deliver visas to Cuban people is one of the goals?
MR PRICE: We are looking at a number of ways we might be able to support the Cuban people and to hold the regime to account. We’ve spoken to several of them, including the new designations today, but I wouldn’t want to get ahead of that.

United States Department of the Treasury
Washington DC
22 July 2021

SPECIALLY DESIGNATED NATIONALS LIST UPDATE

The following individual has been added to OFAC's SDN List: LOPEZ MIERA, Alvaro (Latin: LÓPEZ MIERA, Álvaro), Cuba; DOB 26 Dec 1943; POB Havana, Cuba; nationality Cuba; Gender Male (individual) [GLOMAG].

The following entity has been added to OFAC's SDN List: BRIGADA ESPECIAL NACIONAL DEL MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR, Cuba; Target Type Government Entity [GLOMAG].

Statement By U.S. Department Of The Treasury About Sanctions On Cuba

United States Department of the Treasury
Washington DC
22 July 2021

Treasury Sanctions Cuban Minister of Defense and Special Forces Brigade for Abuses Against Protestors

WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned one Cuban individual and one Cuban entity pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and targets perpetrators of serious human rights abuse and corruption around the world. Today’s action targets the Cuban Minister of Defense, ALVARO LOPEZ MIERA (LOPEZ MIERA), and the BRIGADA ESPECIAL NACIONAL DEL MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR (SNB) of the Cuban Ministry of the Interior (MININT) in connection with the repression of peaceful, pro-democratic protests in Cuba that began on July 11.

“The Cuban people are protesting for the fundamental and universal rights they deserve from their government,” said Secretary Janet L. Yellen. “Treasury will continue to enforce its Cuba-related sanctions, including those imposed today, to support the people of Cuba in their quest for democracy and relief from the Cuban regime.”

SANCTIONS ON CUBA

In addition to the sanctions imposed today under the Global Magnitsky program, OFAC continues to enforce the Cuba sanctions program, which is the most comprehensive sanctions program administered by OFAC. With exceptions to ensure that certain categories of economic activity are allowed that directly benefit the Cuban people, OFAC administers an economic embargo on Cuba that prohibits U.S. persons (and entities owned or controlled by U.S. persons) from engaging in transactions and providing services that may sustain the Cuban regime. In addition, all Cuban nationals are blocked — regardless of whether they appear on Treasury’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List). The Treasury Department will continue to enforce these prohibitions consistent with applicable statutes and regulations.

ABUSE AGAINST PROTESTORS IN CUBA

Cuba’s Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR), which is led by, LOPEZ MIERA, has played an integral role in the repression of ongoing protests in Cuba, in which Cuban citizens are calling for an end to the 62-year old regime and deteriorating living conditions across the island, as well as demanding access to basic goods and services and medical attention. MINFAR and the Cuban government’s security services have attacked protesters and arrested or disappeared over 100 protesters in an attempt to suppress these protests.

LOPEZ MIERA is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13818 for being a foreign person who is the leader or official of MINFAR, an entity that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, serious human rights abuse, relating to his tenure. MINFAR is blocked pursuant to OFAC’s Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 515 (CACR).

The SNB, also known as the Boinas Negras or Black Berets, is a special forces unit under the Cuban Ministry of the Interior (MININT), which was previously designated by OFAC under E.O. 13818 on January 15, 2021. During the July 2021 protests, the Cuban government deployed the SNB to suppress and attack protesters.

SNB is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13818 for being owned or controlled by, or for acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, MININT, which, as noted above, was previously designated by OFAC pursuant to the Global Magnitsky program for being a foreign person who is responsible for or complicit in, or having directly or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights abuse.

SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS

All property and interests in property of these persons that are blocked pursuant to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 515 (CACR), continue to be blocked. The CACR prohibits persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction from dealing in property in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest, unless authorized or exempt. Additionally, pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 583, all property and interests in property of the persons above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked, and all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons are prohibited unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or otherwise exempt. These prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any blocked person or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.

From The White House- "Biden-Harris Administration Measures On Cuba"

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
July 22, 2021

FACT SHEET:
Biden-Harris Administration Measures on Cuba
“The United States stands with the brave Cubans who have taken to the streets to oppose 62 years of repression under a communist regime.” – President Biden

The world watched on July 11 as tens of thousands of Cuban citizens marched in cities across Cuba to demand freedom from both the pandemic and from the decades of repression and economic suffering to which they have been subjected by Cuba's authoritarian regime. The United States stands with the Cuban people, and therefore addressing the moment and the ongoing situation in Cuba is a top priority for the Biden-Harris Administration. At President Biden’s direction, the United States is actively pursuing measures that will both support the Cuban people and hold the Cuban regime accountable.

Holding the Cuban Regime Accountable
On July 22, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned one Cuban individual and one Cuban entity for serious human rights abuse, pursuant to Executive Order 13818, which builds upon and implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and targets perpetrators of serious human rights abuse and corruption around the world. This action targets the Cuban Minister of Defense and the Brigada Especial Nacional del Ministerio del Interior of the Cuban Ministry of the Interior for their role in facilitating the repression of peaceful, pro-democratic protests in Cuba that began on July 11.

Engaging the International Community
The Administration remains deeply concerned about the welfare of the hundreds of protestors who have been unjustly detained and disappeared simply for demanding their most fundamental rights. The President continues to call for the swift release of those peaceful protestors who have been unjustly detained. The Administration is also actively engaged with the Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations, and our international partners to collectively condemn the violence and repression upon the Cuban people for demanding freedom.

Ensuring Cuban Citizens Have Internet Access
The Administration is actively collaborating with the private sector to identify creative ways to ensure that the Cuban people have safe and secure access to the free flow of information on the Internet. The President continues to call on Cuba’s leaders to reinstate and to maintain access to all Internet and telecommunications services for all people within its border, and condemns the use of partial or complete Internet shutdowns and network restrictions imposed by the Cuban Government, which restricts the exercise of human rights and disrupts access to essential services. The intentional blocking of access to the Internet should be strongly condemned by the international community.

Listening to Cuban American Leaders
The Administration has been consistent in its belief that Cuban-Americans are the best ambassadors for freedom and prosperity in Cuba. The Administration will continue to meet with Cuban American leaders and stakeholders as they work to help elevate the voices of demonstrators in Cuba, and provide their recommendations for how the U.S. government can help.

Reviewing the Remittances Policy
The Administration is focused on letting families support one another, by maximizing the flow of remittance payments to the Cuban people. This is a complex issue that requires a measured and thoughtful approach in coordination with experts that will help to inform the Administration’s policy. The Administration’s guiding principle is ensuring that funds, to the greatest extent possible, get to the Cuban people without a portion of the proceeds being siphoned off by the regime. The President remains concerned that remittances do not reach their intended recipients, including some of the most vulnerable populations on the island, and instead are being used as a stopgap to treat their government's failures.

Restaffing U.S. Embassy Havana
The Administration is working to enhance our ability to provide Consular services to the Cuban people given their dire circumstances under an oppressive authoritarian regime. The re-staffing of our Embassy in Havana will serve to enhance our diplomatic, civil society, and Consular service engagement all of which are part of our demonstrated effort to support the Cuban people and their desire for freedom. The Administration is also mindful of the fact that USG personnel have suffered grave injuries while posted to Cuba. Before augmenting our staff in Havana we must do our utmost to ensure that they can safely and securely serve in Cuba.

"Statement by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. on Continuing Crackdown in Cuba" & OFAC Sanction Updates

The White House
Washington DC
22 July 2021

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Statement by President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. on Continuing Crackdown in Cuba

I unequivocally condemn the mass detentions and sham trials that are unjustly sentencing to prison those who dared to speak out in an effort to intimidate and threaten the Cuban people into silence. The Cuban people have the same right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly as all people. The United States stands with the brave Cubans who have taken to the streets to oppose 62 years of repression under a communist regime.

Today, my Administration is imposing new sanctions targeting elements of the Cuban regime responsible for this crackdown—the head of the Cuban military and the division of the Cuban Ministry of the Interior driving the crackdown—to hold them accountable for their actions. This is just the beginning–the United States will continue to sanction individuals responsible for oppression of the Cuban people.

As we hold the Cuban regime accountable, our support for the Cuban people is unwavering and we are making sure Cuban Americans are a vital partner in our efforts to provide relief to suffering people on the Island. We are working with civil society organizations and the private sector to provide internet access to the Cuban people that circumvents the regime’s censorship efforts. We are reviewing our remittance policy to determine how we can maximize support to the Cuban people. And we are committed to restaffing our embassy in Havana to provide consular services to Cubans and enhance our ability to engage with civil society, while ensuring the safety of U.S. diplomats serving in Cuba.

Advancing human dignity and freedom is a top priority for my Administration, and we will work closely with our partners throughout the region, including the Organization of American States, to pressure the regime to immediately release wrongfully detained political prisoners, restore internet access, and allow the Cuban people to enjoy their fundamental rights.

United States Department of the Treasury
Washington DC
22 July 2021

SPECIALLY DESIGNATED NATIONALS LIST UPDATE

The following individual has been added to OFAC's SDN List: LOPEZ MIERA, Alvaro (Latin: LÓPEZ MIERA, Álvaro), Cuba; DOB 26 Dec 1943; POB Havana, Cuba; nationality Cuba; Gender Male (individual) [GLOMAG].

The following entity has been added to OFAC's SDN List: BRIGADA ESPECIAL NACIONAL DEL MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR, Cuba; Target Type Government Entity [GLOMAG].

Remittances To Cuba Again A Topic At United States Department Of State Daily Briefing

United States Department of State
Washington DC
21 July 2021

Briefing with Mr. Ned Price, Spokesperson

QUESTION: And you have nothing – there’s nothing new on the Cuba remittances or the embassy staffing review, correct?

MR PRICE: Nothing I’m in a position to add today.

QUESTION: Okay. And on the Iran prisoner thing, still – there’s nothing new on that either?

MR PRICE: We were very clear on this.

QUESTION: Okay, okay.

MR PRICE: We spoke over the weekend; we spoke on Monday.

QUESTION: Sorry, on Cuba.

QUESTION: Could I —

QUESTION: Assistant Secretary Julie Chung put out some tweets about Cuba, and one of them mentioned, “We are going to focus on applying hard-hitting sanctions on regime officials.” Could you tell us a bit more about, like, what kind of sanctions you’re considering? Is this going to be GLOMAG? Or is there – is there – there are other ways that you could do this? And then is this a situation where you think sanctioning officials is going to make a difference?

MR PRICE: Well, so as not to repeat everything I said yesterday and to not face the ire —

QUESTION: The wrath.

MR PRICE: — the wrath, I will just make the very brief point that we spoke yesterday of steps that we are studying and looking into that would support the Cuban people, but also steps that would seek to hold to account Cuban Government officials responsible for the repression, for the crackdown, for the violence in the context of these peaceful street protests.

When it comes to sanctions, the Treasury Department’s OFAC, the Office of Foreign Assets Control, is exploring designating Cuban officials responsible for violence, repression, human rights violations against those peaceful protesters. We’re also working diligently with the international community to condemn the violence and repression that the Cuban people have faced. This is, as is almost always the case, one of those areas where U.S. action will be meaningful, it will be, we expect, effective, but it will be all the more meaningful if we are able to speak with one voice with the international community and we are able to make clear that the international community does not abide the regimes repression, crackdown, deprivation of human rights and civil liberties for the Cuban people.

So as you can expect, I’m not in a position to detail now what any potential sanctions might look like, what authorities we might use, but we are certainly looking at ways that we can hold accountable those Cuban regime officials who have been responsible for what we’ve seen.

QUESTION: So you don’t – there aren’t enough sanctions against Cuba already?

MR PRICE: Well —

QUESTION: You feel there’s still more room?

MR PRICE: Well, there – we are confident there is more room. There are broad sanctions imposed against Cuba, of course, with humanitarian carve-outs and tools we can use to ensure that much-needed humanitarian supplies can reach the Cuban people. But we are confident that we have policy tools available to us, to potentially include sanctions, that could be wielded against specific individuals who may be responsible for some of what we’ve seen.

QUESTION: Ned, what about helping the Cubans receive internet service? Do you have anything on this?

MR PRICE: We discussed this yesterday.

QUESTION: Sure.

MR PRICE: I’m happy to give you the quick summary, but we are working with the private sector and with Congress to identify viable options to make the internet more accessible to the Cuban people. And when we talk about our collaboration with the private sector, we are actively collaborating to identify solutions and proposals that are creative and to seek to ensure that the Cuban people have access to that free flow of information. That’s so important to us in large part because we have seen the actions that the Cuban Government has taken in the context of these peaceful demonstrations — the internet crackdowns, the blockages, the efforts on the part of the regime to stifle the voice of the Cuban people, to stifle their access to information – and so we are exploring options with both Congress and the private sector to that effect.

Remittances To Cuba Are Topics Today At The White House And Department Of State Media Events

The White House
Washington DC
20 July 2021

Q And on the Cuba meeting that happened last night --

MS. PSAKI: Mm-hmm.

Q It was a virtual event -- a handful of people, primarily from South Florida. Has there been any conversation about having other meetings on that here? And what more might the President do himself on this issue? What might he do or say? I know the administration continues to monitor it every day, of course.

MS. PSAKI: Well, at the President's direction, we are actively pursuing measures that both the Cuban people -- that that support both the Cuban people and hold the Cuban regime accountable. And that has been the prism through which the President has made his decision. So that includes working closely with the private sector and Congress to identify viable options to make the Internet more accessible to the Cuban people. We’re looking at options. There are a lot of ideas out there. We are also looking to leverage our international -- international organization partners to increase humanitarian assistance flows to Cuba, and work with our international partners to help both voice concern and put public pressure on, but also work with international organizations. The Treasury Department via the Office of Foreign Assets Control will continue to explore designated Cuban officials responsible for violence, repression, and human rights violation against peaceful protesters in Cuba. And we will form a remittance working group to identify the most effective way to get remittances directly into the hands of the Cuban people. On the last piece, I would note that what the President said yesterday -- or sorry, not yesterday -- last week stands, which is that there has been longstanding concern about if you return remittances, if you return to a place where remittances are allowed, that that money or funding does not get into the hands of the regime or allow them to pad their pockets. That's certainly something that we're mindful when we're looking at -- that will be a point of discussion in these working groups.

Q And the President still hasn't met with any of these people who've met with other White House officials on the issue?

MS. PSAKI: I don't have -- he has not. We certainly remain open to, as we are engaging at quite a high level. I don't have anything to preview in terms of meetings at his level, but you can tell he's asked his team to take a number of steps and look into a range of options.

The United States Department of State
Washington DC
20 July 2021

QUESTION: There is a – there’s news of a working group on remittances. Can you explain a little bit about that? Is there an intention at all to restart remittances in some way, even if it’s in a different way from before?

MR PRICE: Sure, let me give you a little more context. And you heard this from the White House, and my colleague at the White House I believe spoke to this earlier today. But as you know, we have consistently stood with the Cuban people, including in the context of the recent protests across the island nation. We will continue to support the Cuban people in their legitimate aspirations for human rights, for democracy, for the values that have for far too long – since 1959 at least – been denied to them.

As part of that, we will always look for ways to support them but also to the Cuban regime accountable. This includes our efforts to build international pressure against the abuses of the regime, designating sanctions against those responsible for the violence, for the repression that has followed the recent protests. And when it comes to assisting the Cubans, we’ll look at any number of ways. And that includes – you mentioned both remittances, and we also spoke to helping to facilitate internet access as well.

When it comes to remittances, as you heard, we will form a remittances working group to identify the most effective ways to get remittances – this is important – directly into the hands of the Cuban people. Beyond that, we are also reviewing our plans to augment staffing at our embassy in Havana to facilitate the consular activities, the engagement with civil society, and to make sure we have an appropriate security posture as well.

When it comes to internet access, we are working with the private sector as well as with Congress, which, of course, has a keen interest in all of this, to identify viable options to make the internet more accessible to the Cuban people and will also leverage our international partners, including international organizations, to do what we can to increase humanitarian assistance flows to Cuba.

Now, when it comes to the other side of the equation, holding the regime accountable, the Treasury, specifically via their Office of Foreign Assets Control, will continue to explore designating Cuban officials who are responsible for what we have seen – namely the violence, the repression, the human rights violations – again, against these peaceful protestors in Cuba who were and are doing nothing more than exercising their universal rights.

We’re also working diligently with the international community to collectively condemn this repression and support the Cuban people, who very clearly are demanding the freedom and the rights that have long been denied to them.

When it comes to remittances, Shaun, the administration, as I said before, is focused on allowing such transfers only if we can guarantee that the money flows directly into the hands of the Cuban people. We are going to, as we explore this issue, make sure that we are doing everything we can to see to it that those proceeds go to the Cuban people and that they do not go into the regime’s coffers. Again, this is a regime that has denied its people of resources and of rights, and I think we have seen that come to the fore in Cuba in recent days. And we’re, as you heard from the White House, very closely studying how we might affect this going forward.

QUESTION: Can I just press you on one point about – you were saying planning to augment staff at the embassy. Is that something that’s going to happen imminently? And what have you done specifically to engage civil society? Could you explain a bit more what these extra people will be doing?

MR PRICE: Sure. The staffing at our embassy will serve to enhance our diplomatic, our engagement – our diplomatic activity, our engagement with civil society, our consular service engagement, all of which will be in service of helping the Cuban people to secure greater degrees of human rights, of freedom, of the universal rights that have been denied to them for far too long.

So I don’t have anything to offer in terms of time frame, but we do know that if we are going to be doing all we can to support the aspirations of the Cuban people we need to have a presence on the ground that will appropriately position us to do just that.

QUESTION: Yeah, I have two follow-ups. Last week, President Biden said pretty clearly that he was not going to consider remittances. I’m wondering what changed between that conversation with Chancellor Merkel and today. I think you flicked at it a little bit by saying that you want to make sure that the money is going to go to the Cuban people, but that was something that could have been considered last week as well. So, what’s changed in the last few days?

And then also when you’re talking about augmenting staffing in Embassy Havana, what kind of precautions is the State Department taking to make sure that they are not victim to some of the illnesses that we’ve seen in years past there? Thanks.

MR PRICE: Thank you. So, what you heard from President Biden last week was the concern that I expressed today, and that is namely the fact that we are going to do everything we can as we study this issue to devise ways to ensure that these remittances – that in many cases are hard-earned funds from Cuban Americans and their associates back here in the United States to Cubans on the island – to ensure that they go directly to the people. That has been the concern with remittances in the past.

Look, we are all about devising ways that we can support the Cuban people, but we have to make sure that these tactics, these tools, these procedures in this case, do, in fact, support the Cuban people. We’ve engaged in a number of consultations, including with senior members of Congress on this. And we are confident that through studying the issue we may be able to devise ways to do just that, to affect these remittances, to ensure that the funds get into the hands of the Cuban people, while ensuring that they do not, on the other hand, go into the coffers of the regime.

QUESTION: Is it fair then to assume – sorry – that after the President’s comments members of Congress and others in the government said, “Hey, let’s take another look at this. There is a way we could at least study getting the money directly to the Cuban people, as opposed to it going to the regime”?

MR PRICE: As we have seen these peaceful protests take place on the island, the Cuban people demand the legitimate aspirations for human rights, for greater degrees of freedom, for liberty. We have made clear that we are going to thoroughly investigate any, and all ways that we can support those legitimate aspirations. We have been in regular contact with members of Congress, of course both before the protests of recent days and in the aftermath. We have heard good ideas from members of Congress; we’ve shared our ideas with members of Congress and other important stakeholders as well. So, this idea – of course, there’s nothing new about this particular idea. It’s always been on the table. But what is new is the announcement that we are going to study it very carefully, very closely to determine what and how we might be able to move forward in a way that supports the Cuban people without adding to the coffers of the regime.

MR PRICE: To your second question —

QUESTION: Yes. Thank you.

MR PRICE: — and staffing at the embassy, of course we have spoken very clearly about the priority we attach to the safety, the security, the well-being of our personnel around the world. We have also spoken just yesterday of the unexplained health incidents that have plagued our personnel around the world, and it’s no secret that Havana was a site of some of these incidents. So, as you know, I am not in a position to detail security precautions or measures that we may take, but every time we deploy our personnel overseas, we do so taking into account precautions and doing everything we can to see to it that our people are protected, that they have what they need to do their job effectively, and that their safety, well-being, and welfare is an utmost priority.

QUESTION: So, in other words, you have confidence that Embassy Havana and its environs are safe for diplomats in order for them to return. There’s not a concern that this – these illnesses could crop up again. There’s —

MR PRICE: Well, so what we said is that we’re going to review planning to augment personnel back at the embassy. We are taking every consideration into account, as you expect we would. The safety and security concerns are certainly one of those issues we’re going to take into account. But we’re just starting this process, so I don’t want to prejudge it right now.

QUESTION: Ned, on the remittances, I’m just a little confused about how you – when you say you want it to go directly to the Cuban people. Well, obviously that’s what – every administration has wanted that. But is there a percentage fee or a percentage of an amount that is sent to Cuba that you’re okay with that is taken by – a processing fee, administrative fee, whatever you want to call it – by a bank, which is obviously state-run, or a state-controlled enterprise, or one that has to pay the government, like Western Union or something like that? Is there a maximum percentage that you’re prepared to allow?

Because short of flying remittances – cash, from remittances into the embassy and then having people come to the embassy to hand it out to people, I don’t see how you’re going to get – it’s got – there’s a transaction here that doesn’t involve – unless you are going to do that – that doesn’t involve U.S. officials. So, when you say you want the money to go directly to the Cuban people, is there an amount that can – that is acceptable to go to a Cuban Government-owned or controlled entity?

MR PRICE: Well, of course, there’s not an amount that is acceptable to us to go into the coffers of the Cuban Government. After our – after all, our goal is to support the Cuban people and to help them achieve their aspirations, the aspirations that this very regime has, for far too long, denied to the Cuban people. So again, what we are doing is forming a remittance working group to identify the most effective ways to get remittances directly into their hands.

QUESTION: I get that. But does that mean that no fee is the only thing that’s acceptable? No percentage cut of whatever is sent is – there can’t be any —

MR PRICE: Again, when it comes to this working group, which was just announced yesterday and spoken to today, when it comes to our planning for Embassy Havana, these are – they are just now – the planning for these are just now underway, so I don’t want to get ahead of where we are. But it’s something we’re looking at very, very closely.

QUESTION: Staying on Cuba, you mentioned you’re trying to – working with Congress and the private sector to try and help expand internet access. Does that mean you’re sort of looking towards a private sector solution to this rather than, say, the U.S. military? (Inaudible) happen in other countries often (inaudible) private sector (inaudible) want to go through that route.

MR PRICE: Well, we’re working closely, yes, with the private sector, but we’re also working with Congress, as we are across many of these lines of effort, to identify viable options to make the internet more accessible to the Cuban people. We’re – we will be actively collaborating with our private sector partners to identify ways that may, in fact, be creative to ensure that the Cuban people have access to the free flow of information on the internet.

You’ve heard us say this before, but in the interim and right now – today – we call on Cuba’s leaders to reinstate and to maintain access to all internet and telecommunications services for all people within its borders. We support, just as in Cuba as we do around the world, unrestricted access to the global, open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet, and we condemn actions by the Cuban Government to restrict this access.

Not only in Cuba but across the board, we very carefully examine and provide funding to support the development, the global deployment, and operation of the latest available secure and reliable technical solutions to internet censorship, to content blocking, and shutdowns. Our programming makes secure circumvention and communication tools available to internet users everywhere who may be – who may seek access to blocked websites and social media platforms, and that includes on Cuba.

We currently provide over $60 million in funding worldwide each year for programs to support that unrestricted access to the global, open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet. These programs are so important to us precisely because they can help to promote human rights, fundamental freedoms, the free flow of information online, regardless of national boundaries or frontiers, consistent with international human rights norms and standards. We believe that the Cuban people deserve what people around the world deserve, and we’ll be looking at ways to assist that going forward.

QUESTION: On Cuba.

MR PRICE: Staying on Cuba, let’s – sure, yeah.

QUESTION: One more. NBC News has confirmed the administration is looking at over 200 possible cases of these unexplained health incidents. Has the administration gotten any closer to determining who or what is behind them?

MR PRICE: Well, we have spoken to this in some detail, knowing that there’re going to be certain details that we’re not in a position to share broadly. But you heard me, in fact, say this yesterday, that the State Department is committed to ensuring the health, the safety, the well-being of our personnel and their families, and we are working diligently with our partners in the interagency to determine the cause of these incidents. The Secretary was asked about this on the Hill. Other members of the administration have been asked about that. We’re not in a position – we don’t yet know, precisely, the cause of these incidents, but we continue to encourage members of our mission communities around the world to report a potential UHI, or unexplained health incident, to their post’s security and medical personnel.

We are investigating and reviewing reports of incidents from all around the world. We’re also not in a position to confirm numbers. But as you know, Ambassador Spratlen, whom Secretary Blinken appointed to head the Health Incidents Response Task Force, along with our Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Brian McKeon, have been deeply engaged in this. And there have been communications to the entire workforce, to targeted members of the workforce; they have met with members of our workforce who have been – who have suffered from these unexplained health incidents. We are going to continue to do all we can to ensure that we are providing these employees with all the support they need as they deal with this going forward.

Analysis 

Regarding remittances, the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) needs to accept reality and then develop and implement decisions based upon what is in Republic of Cuba rather than what they want to be in the Republic of Cuba. 

The end of the discussion has been written- the government of the Republic of Cuba will gain in some measure from the arrival, exchange, and use of electronic remittances from the United States. 

For the Biden-Harris Administration, there remains the same question previously answered by the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) and maintained by the Biden-Harris Administration: The United States government will not permit electronic transfer remittance providers (Western Union Company, MoneyGram, etc.) to have as their counterpart in the Republic of Cuba a financial institution and distribution apparatus that is controlled by and/or affiliated with the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) of the Republic of Cuba. 

In 2020, the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2019- ) had options that were non-military controlled and/or affiliated to be the counterpart to Western Union Company.  The choice was to sacrifice the efficient electronic delivery of remittances. 

There are no commercial means to channel what is estimated to be up to US$2.5 billion in electronically-delivered remittances on an annual basis from the United to the Republic of Cuba absent participation of the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration.  

The Republic of Cuba uses the Peso, which is not convertible internationally.  So, any currency brought into the country will need to be changed into the Peso, and the exchange rate is established by the Central Bank of the Republic of Cuba, not the United States Department of the Treasury or the United States Federal Reserve.  

Absent the United States government, through the United States Embassy in Havana, becoming a currency exchange, the question for the Biden-Harris Administration is what level of indigestion is it and interested Members of the United States Congress are prepared to accept because the government of the Republic of Cuba is a stakeholder.

Biden Administration Wants To Deny Cuba's Government (Military) With Earnings- Conditional Resumption Of Product Filled Flights To Airports In Cuba Benefits Self-Employed; By-In From Congress?

Biden-Harris Administration Wants To Deny Cuba’s Government (Military) With Earnings From Remittances And Product Sales In Cuba
Resumption Of Airline Flights To Airports Throughout Cuba May Be A Solution
Flights Carry Passengers, Passengers Carry Products
Cuba Has Eliminated Duties And Fees On Imported Goods Through 31 December 2021
Three Options Have Support From Some Members Of Congress
As President Biden Says, “Here’s The Deal” (Agui esta el trato)

The Biden-Harris Administration continues to evaluate re-authorization of regularly-scheduled commercial airline flights where service is no longer limited to Jose Marti International Airport (HAV) in Havana.   

The United States Department of Transportation (DOT) would authorize airlines to again self-determine commercial schedules from existing authorized United States gateways and daily flight frequencies (per the 16 February 2016 Arrangement with the Republic of Cuba) to airports in the Republic of Cuba.   

The 2016 Arrangement: “For scheduled combination or all-cargo services to and from Havana, under the terms of the MOU, U.S. carriers may operate up to twenty (20) daily round-trip frequencies. For scheduled combination or all-cargo services to and from each of the other nine (9) international airports in Cuba, U.S. carriers may operate up to ten (10) daily round-trip frequencies, for a total of ninety (90) daily non-Havana U.S.-Cuba round-trip frequencies. The MOU also allows for unlimited charter services to and from any point in Cuba, in accordance with the regulations of each country.” 

The airports included in the MOU: HAV; Ignacio Agramonte International Airport in Camagüey (CMW); Jardines del Rey Airport in Cayo Coco (CCC); the Vilo Acuña Airport in Cayo Largo (CYO); Jaime González Airport in Cienfuegos (CFG); the Frank País Airport in Holguín (HOG); Sierra Maestra Airport in Manzanillo (MZO); Juan Gualberto Gómez Airport in Matanzas (VRA); Abel Santamaría Airport in Santa Clara (SNU); and Antonio Maceo Airport in Santiago de Cuba (SCU). 

In December 2019, the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) prohibited regularly-scheduled commercial airline services to airports other than HAV.  At the time, there were services from the United States to the cities of Havana, Holguin, Santa Clara, and Santiago de Cuba (the second-largest city in the Republic of Cuba and located 472 miles from the city of Havana).   

United States Department of State December 2019: “In line with the President’s foreign policy toward Cuba, this action prevents revenue from reaching the Cuban regime that has been used to finance its ongoing repression of the Cuban people and its support for Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela.”  The DOT issued its directive “at the request of the Secretary of State.” 

Airlines servicing the Republic of Cuba included Fort Worth, Texas-based American Airlines (2019 revenues approximately US$46 billion); Atlanta, Georgia-based Delta Air Lines (2019 revenue approximately US$47 billion); Long Island City, New York-based JetBlue Airways (2019 revenues approximately US$8 billion); Dallas, Texas-based Southwest Airlines (2019 revenues approximately US$22 billion); and Chicago, Illinois-based United Airlines (2019 revenues approximately US$43 billion). 

A decision by the Biden-Harris Administration to resurrect regularly-scheduled commercial airline flights to airports throughout the Republic of Cuba would arrive with a third-party impediment: The impact of COVID-19 restricts arrivals to the Republic of Cuba and restricts arrivals to the United States.  Due to continuing uncertainties as to requirements for quarantine upon entering the Republic of Cuba, if a resumption of regularly-scheduled commercial airline flights were implemented there would not be a flood of airline flights from the United States to the Republic of Cuba; and most would continue to be to HAV.   

A 1948-1949 Berlin-like airlift humanitarian optic of thousands of passengers bearing currency and excess baggage will not inoculate the Biden-Harris Administration from the perception that it is singularly bailing-out the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration since those passengers will be carrying U.S. Dollars, which will need to be exchanged in the Republic of Cuba at an exchange rate which is not indicative of the true value of the Cuban Peso.  Thus, the focus needs to be about the products accompanying those passengers.  There may exist options to lessen the bail-out narrative.  The Berlin Airlift transported approximately 2.3 million tons of cargo in one year.   

Option One that has support from members of the United States Congress is for the flights to resume provided the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration continues to implement its 14 July 2021 announcement to forgo import duties and fees for some products (hygiene, food, personal, cleaning products, etc.) in luggage and cargo on flights to the Republic of Cuba from 19 July 2021 through 31 December 2021.   

Option Two that has support from members of the United States Congress is to condition the resumption of regularly-scheduled commercial airline flights upon the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration removing all duties and fees for all items contained in luggage and cargo to all airports authorized by the 16 February 20216 MOU, not to selected airports.   

Option Three that has support from members of the United States Congress is for the DOT to authorize both Memphis, Tennessee-based FedEx Corporation (2019 revenues approximately US$79 billion) and Atlanta, Georgia-based United Parcel Service (2019 revenues approximately US$85 billion) to provide service from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  The Washington, DC-based United States Postal Service (2019 revenues approximately US$71 billion) does provide delivery services using commercial airline flights.  The Biden-Harris Administration could make these cargo-only flights a condition of re-establishing regularly-scheduled commercial airline flights to the Republic of Cuba. 

The three options materially benefit cuentapropistas (self-employed), non-government-controlled cooperatives, and independent small and medium-sized enterprises (SME’s), who the Biden-Harris Administration publicly continues to maintain is a primary focus of the Cuba Policy Review. 

Of useful note: On 14 July 2021, H.E. Alejandro Gil, Minister of Economy and Planning of the Republic of Cuba, reported that during the coming weeks regulations will be announced for the operation of SME’s.   

The Biden-Harris Administration could await the issuance of the SME regulations, but make public now its preferences so the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration may include the preferences in its decision-making process. 

Supporting Small Businesses 

If the Biden-Harris Administration creates as expected a policy and regulatory framework whereby individuals subject to United States jurisdiction may deliver equity investments and provide loans to cuentapropistas and SME’s, then the existing financial transaction infrastructure throughout the Republic of Cuba will be woefully inadequate to manage what would likely be thousands of commercial checking and savings accounts with foreign exchange arriving (investments and loans), foreign exchange departing (investor dividends, loan repayments, input purchases) on a daily basis. 

The Biden-Harris Administration will need to authorize direct correspondent banking so that electronic funds transfers could arrive efficiently, transparently, and cost-effectively.   

When using an electronic payment platform such as Denver, Colorado-based Western Union Company (2020 revenues approximately US$5 billion) and Dallas, Texas-based MoneyGram International (2020 revenues approximately US$1.2 billion) customers using checking accounts to send and receive funds is far less expensive than when using currency, credit card or debit card. 

LINK TO COMPLETE 3-PAGE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

LINK TO PREVIOUS ANALYSES 

Biden Administration Will Use Cuba's Authorization Of SMSE's As Means To Expand Support For Cuba Private Sector- U.S. Investments And Loans May Be Next June 02, 2021 

The Word For Today Is "cuentapropistas" And It Is The Fulcrum Around Which Biden Administration Cuba Policy Revolves May 20, 2021

What Happens Today In Cuba Will Advance Further Biden-Harris Administration Response To Protests Last Week

Today, Sunday, 21 July 2021, is one week since the first protests throughout the Republic of Cuba on Sunday, 11 July 2021. 

For the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) what transpired (and did not transpire) and what transpires today (and does not transpire) may be the awaited inflection point(s) to implement (or delay) components (or all) of the nearing six-month Cuba Policy Review.   

The White House (National Security Council- NSC), United States Department of State, United States Department of Defense (DOD), United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) are using outcome modeling analysis to determine how they craft recommendations:

• 1) Were the protests in size similar, smaller or larger than one week ago;

• 2) Were the protests in geographical areas similar, smaller or larger than one week ago;

• 3) Was the response by the [Miguel] Diaz-Canel Administration (2019- ) similar, less intensive or more intensive than one week ago;

• 4) Was there a visible the role of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) of the Republic of Cuba rather than personnel from the Ministry of Interior (MININT) of the Republic of Cuba and police departments.

Stakeholders in the United States and the Republic of Cuba have strategies that benefit from a second week of protests and/or no second week of protests. Political pressures on the Biden-Harris Administration and the Diaz-Canel Administration increase with a second week of protests and lessen absent a second week of protests. Optics lead the response.

EC/EU Inching Nearer To Decision Relating To Iberostar Hoteles Of Spain Libertad Act Lawsuit

MARIA DOLORES CANTO MARTI, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATES OF DOLORES MARTI MERCADE AND FERNANDO CANTO BORY V. IBEROSTAR HOTELES Y APARTAMENTOS SL [1:20-cv-20078; Southern Florida District]

Zumpano Patricios P.A. (plaintiff)
Bird & Bird (defendant)
Holland & Knight (defendant)

LINKS
Defendant's Status Report (16 July 2021)
Defendant's Status Report (16 June 2021)
Plaintiff's Notice Of Appeal (1 June 2021)
Plaintiff's 11th Circuit Court Of Appeals Confirmation (3 June 2021)

Excerpt From Plaintiff's June Notice Of Appeal:

"Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff Maria Dolores Canto Marti, as personal representative of the Estates of Dolores Martí Mercadé and Fernando Canto Bory, appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit from the Order Denying Renewed Motion to Vacate Stay [D.E. 38] entered in this action on May 4, 2021, which is appealable as a final order pursuant to Section 28 U.S.C. § 1291 under the principles set forth Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 559 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2009) or under the collateral order doctrine. Dated: June 1, 2021"

Excerpt From Defendant's July 2021 Status Report:

“Today, July 16, 2021, Iberostar received two communications on this matter. The first was a request for specific information regarding the status and the parties in this litigation. The second is a status update stating that the information requested is necessary for its evaluation and will enable the Commission to enter the final stages of the assessment.... Defendant will keep this Court duly apprised of any further developments regarding the request for authorization from the European Commission.”

U.S. Department Of Defense And Federal Aviation Administration "Monitoring With Concern" For Possible Repeat Of 1996 Aircraft Shoot Down

The United States Department of Defense (DOD) and United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) are monitoring with concern that one or more individuals subject to United States jurisdiction may seek to use general aviation aircraft departing from the United States to travel near or within the airspace of the Republic of Cuba, with intentions similar or with results similar to those on 24 February 1996 when two Cessna aircraft with four occupants were shot down by a MIG-29UB aircraft operated by the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) of the Republic of Cuba.  There is no indication that the Biden-Harris Administration in Washington and the [Miguel] Diaz-Canel Administration in Havana have engaged directly or indirectly as to this concern.  

Fifth Day For Cuba Questions At The White House; None At State Department

The White House
Washington DC
16 July 2021

Briefing with Ms. Jen Psaki

Speaker: And one on Cuba. The president did say yesterday that the United States was trying to reinstate internet access for Cubans. I was wondering if the White House or the administration has reached out to US tech companies, I mean the Google of the world, to help with that effort?

Jen Psaki: That effort would really be led by the State Department and other appropriate entities within the federal government. As the president noted yesterday, returning internet access to Cuba would certainly be something we’d love to be a part of. It is. We’re looking at what our capacities and what our tools are, we have. In terms of more specifics, the State Department would be the best entity to talk to about it.

The White House Won't Respond To Question: Who Else Is A "Failed State"? Are There Any? DOD Refers To White House. United Nations Has No List

On 15 July 2021, The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr, 46th President of the United States, referred to the Republic of Cuba as a “failed state” in answering a question at The White House today during a press conference with H.E. Angela Merkel, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.  

Early on 16 July 2021, the Economic Eye On Cuba, a publication of the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, contacted The White House (Press and NSC), United States Department of State, United States Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, United Nations, NATO, and European Commission/European Union with the following question: 

May I have a list of those locations which the [ENTITY] defines as "failed states"? 

As of 5:24 pm on 16 July 2021: 

United States Department of State: “The department has no established list of failed states.”  

United States Department of Defense: “I refer you to the White House on this.” 

United Nations: “The UN has no list of “failed states” and there’s no clear definition at the UN for what that term would constitute.  Different academic groups sometimes have defined what a failed state is, and you could refer to them.”   

The White House (Press/NSC): No Response.
Central Intelligence Agency: No Response.
NATO: No Response.
EC/EU: No Response.

United States Government Monitoring

Sunday, 21 July 2021, will be one week since the first protests throughout the Republic of Cuba on Sunday, 11 July 2021.  For the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) what happens this Sunday may be the awaited inflection point to implement components (or all) of the nearing six-month Cuba Policy Review.   

The White House, United States Department of State, United States Department of Defense (DOD), United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) will be using outcome modeling analysis to determine how they craft recommendations: 1) Are the protests in size similar, smaller or larger than one week ago 2) Are the protests in geographical areas similar, smaller or larger than one week ago 3) Is the response by the [Miguel] Diaz-Canel Administration similar, less intensive or more intensive than one week ago and 4) Is there a visible the role of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) of the Republic of Cuba rather than personnel from the Ministry of Interior (MININT) of the Republic of Cuba and police departments.

Another Brothers To The Rescue Moment?

The United States Department of Defense (DOD) and United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) are monitoring with concern that one or more individuals subject to United States jurisdiction may seek to use general aviation aircraft departing from the United States to travel near or within the airspace of the Republic of Cuba, with intentions similar or with results similar to those on 24 February 1996 when two Cessna aircraft with four occupants were shot down by a MIG-29UB aircraft operated by the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) of the Republic of Cuba.  There is no indication that the Biden-Harris Administration and the Diaz-Canel Administration have engaged directly or indirectly as to this concern.  

What Is A “Failed State”

ThoughtCo.: Failed states have become incapable of providing the basic functions of government, such as law enforcement and justice, military defense, education, and a stable economy.  Failed states have lost the trust of the people and tend to suffer from civil violence, crime, internal corruption, poverty, illiteracy, and crumbling infrastructure.  Factors contributing to state failure include insurgency, high crime rates, overly bureaucratic processes, corruption, judicial incompetence, and military interference in politics.  As of 2019, Yemen was considered the world’s most-failed state, followed by Somalia, South Sudan, and Syria. 

Wikipedia: “A failed state is a political body that has disintegrated to a point where basic conditions and responsibilities of a sovereign government no longer function properly (see also fragile state and state collapse). A state can also fail if the government loses its legitimacy even if it is performing its functions properly. For a stable state it is necessary for the government to enjoy both effectiveness and legitimacy. Likewise, when a nation weakens and its standard of living declines, it introduces the possibility of total governmental collapse. The Fund for Peace characterizes a failed state as having the following characteristics: Loss of control of its territory, or of the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force; Erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions; Inability to provide public services; Inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community.” 

Encyclopedia Britannica: “Common characteristics of a failing state include a central government so weak or ineffective that it has an inability to raise taxes or other support, and has little practical control over much of its territory and hence there is a non-provision of public services. When this happens, widespread corruption and criminality, the intervention of state and non-state actors, the appearance of refugees and the involuntary movement of populations, sharp economic decline, and military intervention from both within and without the state in question can occur.  Metrics have been developed to describe the level of governance of states. The precise level of government control required to avoid being considered a failed state varies considerably amongst authorities. Furthermore, the declaration that a state has "failed" is generally controversial and, when made authoritatively, may carry significant geopolitical consequences.  

Failed state, a state that is unable to perform the two fundamental functions of the sovereign nation-state in the modern world system: it cannot project authority over its territory and peoples, and it cannot protect its national boundaries. The governing capacity of a failed state is attenuated such that it is unable to fulfill the administrative and organizational tasks required to control people and resources and can provide only minimal public services. Its citizens no longer believe that their government is legitimate, and the state becomes illegitimate in the eyes of the international community. 

A failed state is composed of feeble and flawed institutions. Often, the executive barely functions, while the legislature, judiciary, bureaucracy, and armed forces have lost their capacity and professional independence. A failed state suffers from crumbling infrastructures, faltering utility supplies and educational and health facilities, and deteriorating basic human-development indicators, such as infant mortality and literacy rates. Failed states create an environment of flourishing corruption and negative growth rates, where honest economic activity cannot flourish. 

The dynamics leading to and compounding state failure are many and varied, including civil war, ethnic violence or genocide, and predatory government and bureaucratic behaviour. State failure comes in degrees and is often a function of both the collapse of state institutions and societal collapse. A strong state provides core guarantees to its citizens and others under its jurisdiction in the three interrelated realms of security, economics, and politics. A failed state cannot maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and minimize internal conflict. It cannot formulate or implement public policies to effectively build infrastructure and deliver services or effective and equitable economic policies. In addition, it cannot provide for the representation and political empowerment of its citizens or protect civil liberties and fundamental human rights. Thus, state failure manifests itself when a state can no longer deliver physical security, a productive economic environment, and a stable political system for its people. 

The total collapse of the state marks the final, extreme phase of state failure, and very few states can be described as completely failed or collapsed. Yet, research demonstrates that many states suffer from various degrees of weakness and are therefore potential candidates for failure. Weak states were failing with increasing frequency, most of them in Africa but also a handful in Asia and the Middle East, and failed states are known to be hospitable to and to harbour dangerous nonstate actors such as warlords and groups that commit terrorist acts. For example, at the end of the 20th century, Somalia descended into state collapse under rival warlords, and Afghanistan, a failed state under the Taliban regime, harboured the terrorist group al-Qaeda. Furthermore, state failure poses pressing humanitarian issues and possible emergency relief and state-building responsibilities for the international community. Consequently, understanding the dynamics of state failure and strengthening weak nation-states in the developing world assumed new urgency.” 

Fourth Day Of Cuba References At Briefings By The White House

The White House
Washington DC
15 July 2021

Press Briefing With Jen Psaki

Q Thank you, Jen. Now that you've had a few days to think about it, does this White House still think the protests in Cuba are happening because people are upset about a rise in COVID cases there or is there some thought, maybe, given to the possibility that they're protesting because they are sick of communism?

MS. PSAKI: Well, Peter, first, I would say: Communism is a failed ideology, and we certainly believe that. It has failed the people of Cuba. They deserve freedom. They deserve a government that supports them, whether that is making sure they have health and medical supplies, access to vaccines, or whether they have economic opportunity and prosperity. And instead, this has been a government -- an authoritarian communist regime -- that has repressed its people and has failed the people of Cuba. Hence, we're seeing them in the streets. But I would note that the ideology of the government, which has failed, has led to a fail- -- a lack of access to economic opportunity, to medical supplies, to COVID vaccines. So all of those pieces are true.

Q And there are protesters now in this country who are chanting, as these protests in Cuba are going on, "Where is Biden?" So, where is he? What is he doing to protect these people who are rising up against the leaders of this failed experiment?

MS. PSAKI: Well, first, he is certainly advocating for and speaking out, as we put out a statement -- multiple statements -- maybe one of you will ask him a question about Cuba today. I will -- I will leave it to all of you to determine that. But, one, he has made clear that he stands with the Cuban people and their call for freedom from both the pandemic and from decades of repression and economic suffering to which they've been subjected by Cuba's authoritarian regime. There's an ongoing review of our own policies. And as we look at those policies, one of the big factors is ensuring we are not doing anything to pad the pockets of a corrupt authoritarian regime. And that is certainly a factor as he's considering, but we're looking closely at how we can help in a humanitarian way, how we can help support the voices of the Cuban people, and there's an ongoing policy review in that regard.

Q We'd be happy to ask him about it later if he calls on us. (Laughter.) But one more --

MS. PSAKI: Anyone can ask anything they want. But go ahead.

Q One more for you: Why is the Secretary of State Blinken trying to address human rights in the U.S. by inviting experts -- U.N. experts from Cuba and China here?

MS. PSAKI: Well, first, I would say that the Secretary put out an extensive statement on why he is holding -- why he believes that we need to play a role in lifting up and pushing countries to do better on human rights, on ending systemic racism in their countries. Certainly, human rights is always going to be a priority for the Biden administration and for this State Department. As the Secretary said in his statement, he believes responsible nations must not shrink from scrutiny of their human rights record. Rather, they should acknowledge it with the intent to improve it, and also push and lift up and put a -- shine a light on other countries that need to do better. And that is the role we're playing here from the United States.

Q But you just rattled off all these problems with Cuba. They've got dissenters disappearing down there. In China, they've got a million religious minorities in internment camps. Why are they going to come here and tell us how to improve our country?

Q And can you provide a status update on investigative assistance for Haiti? And also, when can the public expect the administration to make a determination on whether it's changing its policy towards Cuba?

MS. PSAKI: Sure. I don't have anything for you on the timeline on Cuba policy. I will note that we certainly look at the policy through the prism of how we can most help the Cuban people -- the people who have been out in the streets looking to have their voices heard in these protests. And even as we look at individual components of policies that would be under consideration -- including, say, remittances -- there are a range of factors. There are a number, of course, of people who have called for a return for allowing remit- --- remittances to go from family members to individuals in Cuba. On the flip side of that, or one of the challenges is: the prevention or our desire to prevent remittances or any funding going in the hands or the pockets of leaders in Cuba. So, these are challenging issues. There's an ongoing review. I don't have a timeline to preview for you.

Q Okay, so the -- Florida’s governor and some FEC commissioner in Miami, representatives are calling on Biden to greenlight a plan that would allow the deployment of higher altitude communication balloons to beam Internet into Cuba. Is this something the administration plans to do? And if not, why not?

MS. PSAKI: Well, the lack of Internet access, as you know, which is why you're asking, is a huge issue in Cuba and one that is very challenging for the people of Cuba so they can gain access to accurate information, they can correspond with family members and others. We are certainly looking at that to see what can be done to address, but in terms of that specific proposal, I don't have an assessment of that. I can see if there's more specifics on it.

The White House
Washington DC
15 July 2021

Q I have a couple of questions for you. Also a question for the Chancellor. But, Mr. President, with respect to Latin America and the developments there in the last week-plus --

PRESIDENT BIDEN: Yes.

Q -- what are the circumstances under which you would send American troops to Haiti? That's the first question. The second question is: When it comes to Cuba, what is your current thinking on American sanctions toward Cuba and the embargo? And today, your Press Secretary said that communism is a “failed ideology.” I assume that's your view. I was wondering if you could also give us your view on socialism.

PRESIDENT BIDEN: In two minutes or less. (Laughter.)

Obviously, I know why they elected you president. (Laughter.) Well, let me start off by answering the question relative to Haiti and Cuba. And communism is a failed system -- a universally failed system. And I don't see socialism as a very useful substitute, but that's another story.

With regard to whether the circumstances in which we would send military troops to Haiti: We -- we’re only sending American Marines to our embassy to make sure that they are secure and nothing is out of whack at all. But the idea of sending American forces into Haiti is not on the agenda at this moment, number one.

Number two, with regard to Cuba: Cuba is a -- unfortunately, a failed state and repressing their citizens. There are a number of things that we would consider doing to help the people of Cuba, but it would require a different circumstance or a guarantee that they would not be taken advantage of by the government -- for example, the ability to send remittances to -- back to Cuba. I would not do that now because the fact is it’s highly likely that the regime would confiscate those remittances or big chunks of it.

With regard to the need COVID on -- I mean -- excuse me -- they have a COVID problem on -- in Cuba. I'd be prepared to give significant amounts of vaccine if, in fact, I was assured an international organization would administer those vaccines and do it in a way that average citizens would have access to those vaccines. And one of the things that you did not ask but we're considering is -- they've cut off access to the Internet. We're considering whether we have the technological ability to reinstate that access.

An Extraordinary Statement: President Biden Defines Cuba As A "Failed State" And Confirms No Change For Remittances; Will He Revise Definition?

The White House
Washington DC
15 July 2021

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr, 46th President of the United States, referred to the Republic of Cuba as a “failed state” in answering a question at The White House today during a press conference with H.E. Angela Merkel, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Wikipedia: “A failed state is a political body that has disintegrated to a point where basic conditions and responsibilities of a sovereign government no longer function properly (see also fragile state and state collapse). A state can also fail if the government loses its legitimacy even if it is performing its functions properly. For a stable state it is necessary for the government to enjoy both effectiveness and legitimacy. Likewise, when a nation weakens and its standard of living declines, it introduces the possibility of total governmental collapse. The Fund for Peace characterizes a failed state as having the following characteristics: Loss of control of its territory, or of the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force; Erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions; Inability to provide public services; Inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community.”

Encyclopedia Britannica: “Common characteristics of a failing state include a central government so weak or ineffective that it has an inability to raise taxes or other support, and has little practical control over much of its territory and hence there is a non-provision of public services. When this happens, widespread corruption and criminality, the intervention of state and non-state actors, the appearance of refugees and the involuntary movement of populations, sharp economic decline, and military intervention from both within and without the state in question can occur. Metrics have been developed to describe the level of governance of states. The precise level of government control required to avoid being considered a failed state varies considerably amongst authorities. Furthermore, the declaration that a state has "failed" is generally controversial and, when made authoritatively, may carry significant geopolitical consequences.

Failed state, a state that is unable to perform the two fundamental functions of the sovereign nation-state in the modern world system: it cannot project authority over its territory and peoples, and it cannot protect its national boundaries. The governing capacity of a failed state is attenuated such that it is unable to fulfill the administrative and organizational tasks required to control people and resources and can provide only minimal public services. Its citizens no longer believe that their government is legitimate, and the state becomes illegitimate in the eyes of the international community.

A failed state is composed of feeble and flawed institutions. Often, the executive barely functions, while the legislature, judiciary, bureaucracy, and armed forces have lost their capacity and professional independence. A failed state suffers from crumbling infrastructures, faltering utility supplies and educational and health facilities, and deteriorating basic human-development indicators, such as infant mortality and literacy rates. Failed states create an environment of flourishing corruption and negative growth rates, where honest economic activity cannot flourish.

The dynamics leading to and compounding state failure are many and varied, including civil war, ethnic violence or genocide, and predatory government and bureaucratic behaviour. State failure comes in degrees and is often a function of both the collapse of state institutions and societal collapse. A strong state provides core guarantees to its citizens and others under its jurisdiction in the three interrelated realms of security, economics, and politics. A failed state cannot maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and minimize internal conflict. It cannot formulate or implement public policies to effectively build infrastructure and deliver services or effective and equitable economic policies. In addition, it cannot provide for the representation and political empowerment of its citizens or protect civil liberties and fundamental human rights. Thus, state failure manifests itself when a state can no longer deliver physical security, a productive economic environment, and a stable political system for its people.

The total collapse of the state marks the final, extreme phase of state failure, and very few states can be described as completely failed or collapsed. Yet, research demonstrates that many states suffer from various degrees of weakness and are therefore potential candidates for failure. Weak states were failing with increasing frequency, most of them in Africa but also a handful in Asia and the Middle East, and failed states are known to be hospitable to and to harbour dangerous nonstate actors such as warlords and groups that commit terrorist acts. For example, at the end of the 20th century, Somalia descended into state collapse under rival warlords, and Afghanistan, a failed state under the Taliban regime, harboured the terrorist group al-Qaeda. Furthermore, state failure poses pressing humanitarian issues and possible emergency relief and state-building responsibilities for the international community. Consequently, understanding the dynamics of state failure and strengthening weak nation-states in the developing world assumed new urgency.”

The White House
Washington DC
15 July 2021

Q I have a couple of questions for you. Also a question for the Chancellor. But, Mr. President, with respect to Latin America and the developments there in the last week-plus --

PRESIDENT BIDEN: Yes.

Q -- what are the circumstances under which you would send American troops to Haiti? That's the first question. The second question is: When it comes to Cuba, what is your current thinking on American sanctions toward Cuba and the embargo? And today, your Press Secretary said that communism is a “failed ideology.” I assume that's your view. I was wondering if you could also give us your view on socialism.

PRESIDENT BIDEN: In two minutes or less. (Laughter.)

Obviously, I know why they elected you president. (Laughter.) Well, let me start off by answering the question relative to Haiti and Cuba. And communism is a failed system -- a universally failed system. And I don't see socialism as a very useful substitute, but that's another story.

With regard to whether the circumstances in which we would send military troops to Haiti: We -- we’re only sending American Marines to our embassy to make sure that they are secure and nothing is out of whack at all. But the idea of sending American forces into Haiti is not on the agenda at this moment, number one.

Number two, with regard to Cuba: Cuba is a -- unfortunately, a failed state and repressing their citizens. There are a number of things that we would consider doing to help the people of Cuba, but it would require a different circumstance or a guarantee that they would not be taken advantage of by the government -- for example, the ability to send remittances to -- back to Cuba. I would not do that now because the fact is it’s highly likely that the regime would confiscate those remittances or big chunks of it.

With regard to the need COVID on -- I mean -- excuse me -- they have a COVID problem on -- in Cuba. I'd be prepared to give significant amounts of vaccine if, in fact, I was assured an international organization would administer those vaccines and do it in a way that average citizens would have access to those vaccines.

And one of the things that you did not ask but we're considering is -- they've cut off access to the Internet. We're considering whether we have the technological ability to reinstate that access.

Is Biden-Harris Administration Nearing Decision To Reverse Trump-Pence Administration Prohibition On Cuba Military Earning Money From Remittances?

If Biden-Harris Administration Removes Quarterly Limits On Remittances To Cuba Will It Also Reverse Trump-Pence Administration Policy And Permit Cuba’s Military To Control And Earn Money From Each Remittance? 

Trump Administration Did Not Cancel Remittances; It Cancelled A Revenue Stream For Cuba’s Military 

Cuba Has Options To Retain Western Union Electronic Remittance Services
GASEA Transfers Or Sells Assets Of Fincimex to BICSA Or Another Bank
Cuba Banks Have A History With Transferring Operations

Biden-Harris Administration Has Restricted Connectivity To Military-Controlled Companies In China And Myanmar (Burma), But OK For Cuba? 

Calculating Desire To Help Family & Friends More Important To Members Of Congress And [Florida] Voters Than Providing Revenue To Cuba’s Military 

Restrictions Upon Connectivity With Cuba Military Received Bipartisan Support In The United States Congress Including By Senators Robert Menendez (D), Marco Rubio (D), Rick Scott (D) 

How Will 45th President Of The United States React?
How Will Governor Of Florida React?

To paraphrase statements by government officials in past administrations, the United States government must decide how and whether to respond to the “crisis you have rather than the crisis you want” based upon “realities on the ground.”  There are thus both limitations and opportunities.  

The Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) is evaluating how to confront what some individuals serving in the administration have hoped for- a moment to implement what in 2020 then-candidate Biden said he would implement if he became President Biden.  The do-what-you-said-you-would-do similarities to the “Trump Promise” about moving the United States Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem- he said it and he did it.  For others in the Biden-Harris Administration, a moment of dread as they believe there are no good domestic political outcomes for the administration- they want to be wrong, but feel they are right. 

The Biden-Harris Administration seems prepared to conclude without conditionality the only immediately viable means of re-establishing a direct electronic remittance transfer process from the United States to the Republic of Cuba requires at this time the participation of and limited revenue to two entities controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) of the Republic of Cuba.   

In announcing a decision, the Biden-Harris Administration would confirm humanitarian value trumps political indigestion.  The decision may be a weekend statement from The White House or United States Department of State or United States Department of the Treasury.    

The [Miguel] Diaz-Canel Administration (2019- ) in Havana was not inclined in 2020 and is not inclined in 2021 to permit the use of non-FAR-controlled entities, so the Biden-Harris Administration has a decision:  Implement what it has said it wants to do on terms that it does not want while preparing for and then absorbing the bipartisan incoming political projectiles from the United States Congress, state capitals, county seats, city officers, and town representatives… and the 45th President of the United States.  Or do nothing now, continue with the Cuba Policy Review, and await a moment, which may not arrive, defined by less political drama.  The Republic of Cuba is prepared to suffer.  Their question to the United States: Is the government of the United States prepared to allow the suffering?    

The Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) prohibited (with exceptions) individuals subject to United States jurisdiction and United States-based companies from engagement with entities controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) of the Republic of Cuba.  Thus far, the Biden-Harris Administration has not made changes to the prohibitions.     

• In June 2017, the United States Department of State created the Cuba Restricted List in accordance with National Security Presidential Memorandum-5 (Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba).  “The U.S. government generally prohibits direct financial transactions with listed entities and sub-entities because they would disproportionately benefit the Cuban military, intelligence, and security services or personnel at the expense of the Cuban people or private enterprise in Cuba.”   

• In September 2019, the Trump-Pence Administration limited to US$1,000.00 per quarter remittances and further restricted the recipients of remittances from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  The Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) had removed limitations.   

• In June 2020, the Cuba Restricted List was updated to include Republic of Cuba government-operated Financiera Cimex (Fincimex), a Panama-registered subsidiary of Republic of Cuba government-operated Corporacion Cimex which is a subsidiary of Grupo de Administracion Empresarial S.A. (GAESA) and controlled by the FAR.  Fincimex was permitted to continue as a component of electronic remittance transfers. 

• In September 2020, the Cuba Restricted List was updated to include Republic of Cuba government-operated American International Services (AIS) which was a component of the electronic remittance delivery process for Denver, Colorado-based Western Union Company (2020 revenues approximately US$5 billion).    

• In November 2020, the Cuba Restricted List was updated to prohibit Fincimex from continuing as a component of electronic remittance transfers with Western Union Company. 

• In January 2021, Republic of Cuba government-operated Banco Financiero Internacional S.A. (BFI) was added to the Cuba Restricted List.  BFI was a component of electronic remittance transfers with Western Union Company. 

The Republic of Cuba had evaluated, but decided against, options relating to Fincimex, including the sale or transfer of the subsidiary to a non-FAR-controlled Republic of Cuba government-operated entity, such as a financial institution (Banco de Crédito y Comercio S.A. (BANDEC), Banco Popular de Ahorro S.A. (BPA), Banco Internacional de Comercio S.A. (BICSA), and Banco Metropolitano S.A. (BM)) each of which could seamlessly absorb and maintain Fincimex operations.    

There is history for one Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institution transferring operations to another Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institution.  

From Banco Metropolitano S.A.: “(“BM”) is a Cuban commercial bank that has presence only in Havana.  Its corporate object is the pursuit of banking businesses, including but not limited to financial intermediation activities.  BM started its operations in 1996 with a Havana branch office specialized in the provision of banking services solely to the diplomatic community, as well as the foreign natural and legal persons who were residents in Cuba.  By resolution of Banco Central de Cuba (the Cuban Central Bank of “BCC,” for its Spanish acronym), BM’s corporate object, customer base, product portfolio and services were expanded effectively 2004 when BM acquired 30 offices hitherto held by Banco de Crédito y Comercio (“BANDEC,” for its Spanish acronym) and more than 50 offices hitherto held by Banco Popular de Ahorro (“BPA,” for its Spanish acronym), all located in Havana.  As a result, BM established a representative presence in every municipality of the province of Havana.”  

In 2015, BICSA, a member of Republic of Cuba government-operated Grupo Nuevo Banca SA, created by Corporate Charter No. 49 on 29 October 1993 and commenced operation on 3 January 1994, was vetted by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and approved for a correspondent banking relationship with Conway, Arkansas-based Home BancShares (2019 assets approximately US$14 billion) through its subsidiary Centennial Bank which in 2017 purchased Pompano Beach, Florida-based Stonegate Bank.   

Stonegate Bank  

In 2015, the OFAC authorized Pompano Beach, Florida-based Stonegate Bank (2017 assets approximately US$2.9 billion) to have an account with BICSA.  However, because the Obama Administration would not authorize BICSA under a license from the OFAC to have an account with Stonegate Bank which would make fully-operational Direct Correspondent Banking, United States export-related funds were sent and received through Panama City, Panama-based Multibank, which had, but no longer has extensive dealings with the Republic of Cuba.  From Bogota, Colombia-based Grupo Aval on 16 June 2020: “On May 25th, Banco de Bogotá, through its subsidiary Leasing Bogotá S.A. Panamá, acquired 96.6% of the ordinary shares of Multi Financial Group.  As part of the acquisition process, MFG’s operation in Cuba was closed and as part of the transaction.  Grupo Aval complies with OFAC regulations and doesn't have transactional relationships with Cuba.”   

Supporting Small Businesses 

If the Biden-Harris Administration creates as expected a policy and regulatory framework whereby individuals subject to United States jurisdiction may deliver equity investments and provide loans to cuentapropistas (self-employed) and SME’s, then the existing financial transaction infrastructure throughout the Republic of Cuba will be woefully inadequate to manage what would likely be thousands of commercial checking and savings accounts with foreign exchange arriving (investments and loans), foreign exchange departing (investor dividends, loan repayments, input purchases) on a daily basis. 

The Biden-Harris Administration would need to authorize direct correspondent banking so that electronic funds transfers could arrive efficiently, transparently, and cost-effectively.  When using an electronic payment platform such as Western Union, using checking accounts to send and receive funds is far less expensive than when using currency, credit card or debit card. 

On 14 July 2021, H.E. Alejandro Gil, Minister of Economy and Planning of the Republic of Cuba, reported that during the coming weeks regulations published for the operation of small and medium-size enterprises (SME’s).

LINK TO COMPLETE 3-PAGE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

LINKS To Previous Analyses 

Western Union Data For Transfers To Cuba: 2.88 Million Annually- 24% To Havana; Florida 1st, Texas 2nd, New Jersey 3rd; US$200,000+ Could Be Aboard Each Flight From Miami November 19, 2020 

Cuba Has Options To Retain Western Union Electronic Remittance Services- Transfer To A Bank? November 17, 2020 

If Western Union Ends Remittance Services To Cuba, That Means A Return Of “Mules On Steroids”- The Impact Could Cripple MIA November 16, 2020

U.S. Secretary Of State And Canada Foreign Minister Speak- Readout Does Not Mention Cuba. Is This Plausible? White House and State Department Third Day Of Responses

The United States Department of State
Washington DC
14 July 2021

Secretary Blinken’s Call with Canadian Foreign Minister Garneau

The below is attributable to State Department Spokesperson Ned Price: Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken spoke with Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau today to discuss collaboration between the United States and Canada to defeat the COVID-19 pandemic and the Foreign Minister’s trip to the Middle East. Noting our shared democratic values, they also discussed efforts to promote democracy and security throughout the Western Hemisphere. Secretary Blinken and Foreign Minister Garneau also reviewed progress towards the goals as outlined in the Roadmap for a Renewed U.S.-Canada Partnership.

NOTE: At 1:50 pm on 14 July 2021, Global Affairs Canada was requested to provide a readout of Minister Garneau’s discussion with Secretary Blinken. As of 6:50 am on 15 July 2021 there has been no response. This inquiry was delivered prior to the daily press briefing in Washington DC at the United States Department of State.

The United States Department of State
Washington DC
14 July 2021

QUESTION: All right. And then secondly, there was a call this – or a meeting this morning between Jake Sullivan and the French foreign minister. And I don’t expect you to talk about that, but there was also a call that the Secretary had with the Canadian foreign minister today, and the Secretary will be meeting with Foreign Minister Le Drian later today. But in the readouts of both Jake’s meeting and the Secretary’s call with the Canadian, the word “Haiti” is not mentioned at all. And I am just wondering, did they discuss Haiti, at least from the Secretary’s – in the Secretary’s call?

MR PRICE: Matt, if I recall the readout, it did make a reference to the Western Hemisphere and I think specifically a reference to —

QUESTION: It’s a big hemisphere.

MR PRICE: There is a lot going on in the hemisphere, too. But of course, Haiti is top of mind for the Secretary in this hemisphere. There are other countries as well that are top of mind, Cuba and Venezuela among them, that we talked about here yesterday alone. So I can assure you that issues —

QUESTION: So they did talk about Haiti and Cuba?

MR PRICE: I can assure you —

QUESTION: Not just the Western Hemisphere?

MR PRICE: — that issues of —

QUESTION: And the Monroe Doctrine and —

MR PRICE: — democracy and human rights and working together with our closest allies and partners in the world – and France would certainly qualify as one of our closest allies – that issue did come up.

QUESTION: The Department of Homeland Security’s Secretary said today that Haitians and Cubans fleeing political violence and arriving on U.S. shores will not be permitted to enter the United States and instead will be sent to a third country. Given the State Department is responsible for third-country referrals, are you in discussions with third countries? Has a third country agreed to take in Haitians and Cubans who are seeking refuge in that instance?

MR PRICE: Well, what Secretary Mayorkas was illustrating yesterday was our sincere concern with the reality, and that is that anyone who takes to the seas to seek refuge in the United States, be it from Cuba or from Haiti, would put their life at own risk – at their own risk and would not gain entry to the United States. This is a journey that is dangerous and not one that would allow them to secure entry. That was really the humanitarian concern that Secretary Mayorkas was voicing yesterday. I don’t have anything for you on third countries. Obviously, we work very closely with DHS when it comes to issues of asylum, but I wouldn’t want to comment beyond that.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.) This gets to what you were discussing yesterday, but reportedly Cuba, the internet restrictions have been eased slightly. But there – the Cuban foreign minister yesterday accused the United States of orchestrating the protests again through Twitter campaigns, through social media campaigns. Do you have any further comment on the situation there with the internet, and also about the detention of a journalists for the Spanish newspaper ABC, ABC?

MR PRICE: Well, when it comes to the detention of Camila Acosta of ABC, we know that the world is watching as Cuban authorities arrest and beat dozens of their own citizens, and that includes journalists and independent voices. We know that many remain missing. We join their families, Cuban human rights defenders, and people around the world in calling for the immediate release of those detained or missing for merely demanding freedom by exercising what is a universal right to free assembly and free expression. Violence and detentions of Cuban protesters and disappearances of independent activists remind us, constantly remind us that many Cubans pay very dearly for exercising rights that should be universal. And universal means everywhere around the world and anyone.

When it comes to the internet shutdowns, we spoke about this yesterday indeed, but we do condemn the use of partial or complete government-imposed internet shutdowns. We call on Cuba’s leaders to demonstrate restraint and urge respect for the voice of the people by opening all means of communication, both online and offline. The abuse of journalists, of independent voices, the attempted suppression, including through technological means, of the voice of the Cuban people, this is not something that could ever silence or quell the legitimate aspirations of the Cuban people for freedom, for human rights, for what their own government has denied to them for far too long.

QUESTION: Yeah, just – if I can, just one follow-up on Cuba, your comments about the internet, matter of internet access there. Senator Rubio has called for the U.S. to use satellite-based technology to provide internet access to overcome Cuban Government efforts to cut that. Is that something that the administration is considering?

MR PRICE: We are considering any number of ways and we have considered any number of ways to support the Cuban people – that is, to support them, their humanitarian needs; it is to support them in their broader efforts to secure greater degrees of liberty and freedom and human rights. But I don’t have anything specific to offer at this time.

The White House
Washington DC
14 July 2021

Q And then, secondly, on Cuba: What is the status of the review of the Trump-era policy?

MS. PSAKI: Sure. So, I would say, Steve, that -- and you and others who’ve covered this certainly know that, one, first, I will confirm, of course, we’re still reviewing our Cuba policy with an eye toward its impact on the political and economic wellbeing of the Cuban people. The nature of the kinds of changes that were made by the previous administration, like redesignated -- redesignating Cuba as a state sponsor of terror, carries significant statutory restrictions. We’ve been running a thorough policy process on these and other issues with support for democracy and human rights always at the core of our work.

Now there’s no question that the protests over the weekend and the events of the last several days are significant event -- significant events. And it was the largest protest we’ve seen in Cuba in a long time. That will obviously have an impact on how we proceed. So, we will see how things develop in the days ahead and develop our policy responses accordingly. We don't want to do it as one-offs. We want to look at it, as we have been, with a comprehensive approach in mind.

Q And then just quickly on Cuba: DHS Secretary Mayorkas is warning people there, “If you take to the sea, you will not come to the United States” -- why is that?

MS. PSAKI: Well, first, I think it's important to understand the context of what the Secretary was conveying yesterday, which is just that it is still the case that it is not -- the way to come to the United States is not through -- through processes of trying to come to the border without going through an asylum process or coming by sea without going through an asylum application process.

There are certainly programs that -- through which that some of them have been -- have not been reinstated, I should say, that were in place -- put in place by the Trump administration that are being reviewed, as he said yesterday. That would apply to the individuals and people of Haiti and the people of Cuba as well.

Those have not been reinstated. They're being reviewed. That's what the Secretary said yesterday. What he was reiterating is that this is not the time to travel irregularly. It's dangerous. People can lose their lives, as they have in the past.

Q And as the administration tries to figure out the root causes of migration to the country, don't we know that the reason people want to leave Cuba is because they don't like communism?

MS. PSAKI: We --

Q And so, as you're trying to figure out, like, what the processes are for these people who want to leave Cuba, is --

MS. PSAKI: Well, I’m not sure what your question is.

Q You guys have spent a lot of time --

MS. PSAKI: Why are people leaving Cuba? Or what is the process for them getting here? I can explain either of them, but you tell me.

Q Sure. Yeah. Do you think that people are leaving Cuba because they don't like communism?

MS. PSAKI: I think we've been pretty clear that we think people are leaving Cuba -- or not -- leaving Cuba or protesting in the streets, as well, because they are opposed to the oppression, to the mismanagement of the government in the country. And we certainly support their right to protest. We support their efforts to speak out against their treatment in Cuba.

I will say, separately, an important question is also: What happens when people are seeking protection or what happens when they are attempting to flee? In the past, as I noted, we've had several humanitarian programs, such as Family Reunification Parole Programs for both Haiti and Cuba. Those were policies or pol- -- processes that were in place prior to the Trump administration.

Though have not -- those have not been turned back on, as Secretary Mayorkas said yesterday. He also said we're assessing the status of those parole programs. Haitian and Cuban nationals in the United States with a fear of return for -- for -- to their home countries may be eligible for protection, such as asylum, under U.S. law. Haitian nationals already in the United States may be eligible for Temporary Protected Status.

But migrants interdicted in the Caribbean, who manifested in fear, are referred to USCIS for protection screening. That's what happens. Those who do not manifest in fear or who are not found to have a credible fear following the screening are repatriated to their country of origin. Those found to have a well-founded fear of persecution or torture are not brought to the United States; they are referred to a third country for resettlement.

I'm sharing all of that with you so people understand what the process is when they're trying to make what a treacherous journey is and a challenging journey where people can lose their lives.

But certainly, we have said many times -- and I will reiterate here -- that we support not -- not just the -- the role of peace -- of protest and peaceful protest. We stand with the Cuban people in their call for pre- -- freedom from both the pandemic and from decades of oppression and economic suffering to which they have been subjected by Cuba's authoritarian regime.

Q Just to return to Cuba, will we hear from the President this week? He said the other day that he would speak out on that. And secondly, is it -- is his position still that he feels that the Trump policies were a failure, didn’t effect change? Is that still his policy?

MS. PSAKI: Well, again, I would say: One, in terms of whether you’ll hear from him, he says that often, as you know. And what he means is he speaks out publicly nearly every day at events; sometimes you all ask questions. If there's an update to provide on what we're doing, on what our policies are, certainly he’ll provide that. Is there a planned speech or trip? Not at this time.

In terms of our policies: Again, I would say, Alex, that we are continuing to review our policies. It's been an ongoing process to review the policies that were put in place by the prior administration.

We also recognize that this was a significant event over the last couple of days, the largest protest in a long time that we saw in Cuba -- people speaking out -- Cuban people speaking out, calling for freedom from both the pandemic and from decades of repression. That's significant. And, of course, that will play a role as we consider and factor in what our policies will be moving forward.

I would also note, though, that we will do that through the prism of what will help the people of Cuba, not what will help pad the pockets of the regime. And that is challenging circumstance, given the control of the of the regime currently on the people.

Q Thanks, Jen. So, as we speak, outside, right now, there's solidarity protests with the Cuban people right outside the fences of the White House. We've been seeing this all across the country, here. And Democratic lawmakers in South Florida have actually called on Biden to come down to Miami to give a speech. You all are reviewing your policies, but is there a way that you believe -- either to answer these calls -- that you can more forcefully show support for the Cuban people in that way? Or is there anything in the works?

MS. PSAKI: Through a speech?

Q Yeah. It -- it’s been asked. So --

MS. PSAKI: Well, certainly I understand that, but I would say that I think what is most important to the Cuban people is understanding that the United States stands with them and their call for freedom from both the pandemic and from the decades of repression and economic suffering to which they have been subjected -- subjected by Cuba's authoritarian regime.

And also, I would just note that, again, it is a policy process that has been under review. There were a number of policies that were put in place by the prior administration. We want to do that in a comprehensive and not a one-off manner. We want to do it through the prism of what is going to help the Cuban people directly and help incentivize a change in behavior, if that is possible.

And certainly, the events, the protests, the reaction, the continued oppression of the Cuban people weighs in on our decision-making process. But I don't have any speech or visit to preview for you.

Q And then -- so then, on policy changes: On the campaign trail, Biden promised that he would reinstate the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program. Is that -- can you give us a readout, maybe, on where that process has gone so far in these comprehensive reviews or --

MS. PSAKI: There is, again, an ongoing review. Of course, the events and the protests and the reaction and the continued oppression of the Cuban people will weigh in on our -- will be a factor in the -- our decision-making process. But I don't have anything to preview for you.

Q A question on Cuba, and then a question on COVID after that.

MS. PSAKI: Sure.

Q Given the lack of Internet access in Cuba, how is the administration monitoring the situation, the crackdown on protesters? And if the administration determines that there is violence against protesters, what options are at the President's disposal?

MS. PSAKI: Well, first, I would say we continue to call for the swift release of pe- -- those peaceful protesters who have been unjustly detained. Again, we stand with the Cuban people and their call for freedom from both the pandemic and from decades of repression.

The protests in Cuba, as you all know, have largely stopped because of the regime’s violent crackdown and retaliatory measures against Cubans exercising their fundamental and universal rights. This is unacceptable.

Of course, we will continue to call for a change in approach, and we will continue to review our own policies about what is possible and work with our partners around the world in a coordinated fashion as well.

Q -- for just a moment. I know that President Biden has previously said that his administration is going to work to address illegal immigration in Central America by addressing root causes of it, including corruption. And I'm wondering, with what we're seeing right now in Cuba and Haiti -- I think that was just that that can be a very long and tricky process that can lead to very dangerous situations. Do you think that that throws any sort of wrench into the administration’s, kind of, plan to address illegal immigration in Central America in that way?

MS. PSAKI: I don't think so. But tell me more about your question.

Q I mean, really, I'm just asking, you know, given what we're seeing in Cuba and Haiti, it's clear that trying to address these issues -- while I think everyone would agree that's important -- leads to potentially, you know, a lot of unrest. Do -- does that give anybody pause in the Biden administration for addressing illegal immigration in Central America in that way?

MS. PSAKI: No.

Biden-Harris Administration Considerations. Counterintuitive? Might Now Be Time For A U.S. Ambasador To Cuba? Three U.S. Senators Believe So.

Two questions to which the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) seeks answers as it determines how to respond to the protests in the Republic of Cuba commencing on Sunday, 11 July 2021:

1) Are the events in the Republic of Cuba a crisis for the United States? and 2) Is the Republic of Cuba near, at or beyond an inflection point such that a response from the United States Government is necessary?

Thus far, the answer to the first question is no.

The answer to the second question generates greater complexity because the commercial, economic, and political infrastructure in the Republic of Cuba continues to change- not necessarily because of desire, but a result of the lessening of external support to the Republic of Cuba prioritized to maintaining existing yet grotesquely inefficient commercial, economic, and political infrastructure. The Republic of Cuba continues to change, glacier-like in most aspects, and not at the velocity preferred by the 11.3 million citizens residing atop the 800-mile archipelago and acutely by individuals of Cuban descent residing in the United States and their supporters in the United States Congress.

Important too to remind that the mistakes of the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) and [Raul] Castro Administration (2008-2019) to not mandate expansive opportunities for United States companies to re-engage widely and deeply throughout the commercial and economic sectors in the Republic of Cuba provided for the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) a landscape from which to easily and swiftly remove what re-engagement existed. Had the widespread presence of United States companies in the Republic of Cuba been responsible for thousands of employment opportunities within hundreds of operations- and for the last seven years influence the decisions of the Republic of Cuba, where the country is today may not have been where the country is today.

The Republic of Cuba since 1959 has never been defined by a moment, but rather as a series of moments. The bilateral relationship between the Republic of Cuba and the United States has also never been defined by a moment, but rather as a series of moments- each former building atop the latter.

The Republican Party wants the Biden-Harris Administration to be aggressive knowing that President Biden is disinclined to do so- with the result a Biden-Harris Administration portrayed as “soft” on Communism and Socialism- a political death star given United States election dynamics for 2021, 2022, and 2024.

The Democratic Party wants the Biden-Harris Administration to return to the Obama-Biden Administration policies impacting the Republic of Cuba. President Biden was never going to embrace again the quid-absent-quo strategy announced on 17 December 2014 that would soon be surgically undone by the Trump-Pence Administration.

The goal of the Biden-Harris Administration is to de-escalate by not reinforcing the narrative that there exists a crisis in the Republic of Cuba which necessitates a response by the United States. Absent a crisis, the Biden-Harris Administration can delay a response. The Diaz-Canel Administration (2019- ) also wants, domestically, to portray absence of a crisis- but simultaneously wants what is happening in the Republic of Cuba to be viewed in the United States as a crisis- so as to stimulate the Biden-Harris Administration to modify its policies and regulations relating to the Republic of Cuba. Yes, it’s complicated.

The events in Haiti are a crisis for Haiti. But, are the events in Haiti a crisis for the United States? Thus far, no.

The events in the Republic of Cuba are a crisis for the Republic of Cuba. But, are the events in the Republic of Cuba a crisis for the United States? Thus far, no.

As head-of-state, President Joe Biden needs to project empathy. The Democratic Party needs to show strength. As head-of-state, President Miguel Diaz-Canel needs to project empathy. The Communist Party needs to show strength.

The demonstrations in the Republic of Cuba do create pressure upon the Biden-Harris Administration to complete its Cuba Policy Review and then implement the recommendations of its Cuba Policy Review. Some members of the United States Congress will ask "what is being done to support those who protest?"

The government of Cuba may benefit from the demonstrations because it is seeking from the Biden Administration any change to existing policies and regulations- and believes that regardless of the intention of those policies and regulations, the government of Cuba can create value from them rather than endure pressures from them. May seem counterintuitive....

As for whether the demonstrations serve as a trigger for greater unrest and sustainable unrest and then catalyst for fundamental and prompt commercial, economic, and political changes within Cuba. Doubtful.

Three members of the United States Senate, who requested anonymity, are supportive of the appointment of a United States Ambassador to the Republic of Cuba believing the protests commencing on Sunday, 11 July 2021, provide a unique opportunity- provided the individual is fluent in the Spanish language, formidable, media savvy (a former journalist for example), has a successful private sector career, can negotiate, not adverse to confrontation, and, as one United States Senator shared, “appreciates the value of being an “eternal pest.’” One of the United States Senators offered that the idea had been shared with officials at The White House. The nominee could be one of the 5,913 individuals (or company representative) with certified claims for expropriated property against the Republic of Cuba. The nominee could be an individual of Cuban descent, although the Republic of Cuba may refuse to accept his/her credentials- which might provide the Biden-Harris Administration a victory.

As quo for the quid, the Republic of Cuba would expectantly request that H.E. Lianys Torres Rivera as Charge d’Affaires ad Interim For Bilateral Missions, who arrived to the United States during the Trump Administration in January 2021, be credentialed as Ambassador Extraordinary And Plenipotentiary.

Lastly, will be watching to see if the demonstrations are repeated on Sunday, 18 July 2021, with the same intensity and same geographical distribution as the demonstrations on Sunday, 11 July 2021. If the demonstrations are repeated, what will be the response from the Diaz-Canel Administration?

Carnival Corporation And Royal Caribbean Win/Lose "In Part" With Libertad Act Cuba Lawsuit Court Rulings

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD. [1:19-cv-23590; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Holland & Knight (defendant)

LINK: ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL (7/12/21)
LINK: JOINT NOTICE OF RESOLUTION OF PRIVILEGE DISPUTE REGARDING COMAR (7/12/21)

Excerpts:

This cause is before the Court on Havana Docks Corporation’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Compel Production of Evidence Withheld Under the Attorney-Client Privilege. ECF No. 86. Plaintiff challenges Defendant’s assertion of privilege over the following: (1) documents related to Defendant’s knowledge of the Act and OFAC regulations, for which Plaintiff argues that Defendant waived privilege; (2) certain exchanges pertaining to contract negotiations between Defendant and the Cuban Government. Defendant filed a Response, ECF No. 91, and Plaintiff further filed a Reply, ECF No. 92. Upon consideration of the Motion, Response, Reply, and being otherwise apprised in the matter, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel is DENIED in part and DENIED as withdrawn in part.

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. CARNIVAL CORPORATION D/B/A/ CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES [1:19-cv-21724; Southern Florida District]
Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Jones Walker (defendant)
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

LINK: ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO COMPEL EVIDENCE WITHHELD UNDER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE (7/13/21)

Excerpts:

Plaintiff, Havana Docks Corporation, filed a motion to compel Defendant, Carnival Corporation, to produce eleven documents that are a series of emails, that include some attachments.1 (ECF Nos. 234; 239). The parties put those emails into two groups: “Talking Points” (eight emails) and “Other Lobbying Communications” (three emails). (Id.). Carnival withholds the emails, which are responsive to discovery requests Plaintiff issued, as protected attorney-client communications and/or work product. (Privilege Logs, ECF Nos. 239-8; 239-9).3 Carnival filed a response to Havana Docks’ motion, and Havana Docks filed a reply. (ECF Nos. 241; 245; 256; 259).4 The Honorable Beth Bloom referred the motion to me. (ECF No. 80). I reviewed the eleven documents in camera and on June 14, 2021, I heard oral argument. For the reasons that follow, I grant Havana Docks’ motion in part.

LINK To Libertad Act Title III Lawsuit Filing Statistics

For Second Day, United States Department Of State and The White House Answer Questions About Cuba

The White House
Washington DC
13 July 2021

Press Gaggle by Principal Deputy Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre
Aboard Air Force One En Route Philadelphia, PA

As for Cuba, yesterday, as well, the President recognized the protests that are happening in Cuba, calling them “remarkable,” saying that the Cuban people are demanding their freedom from an authoritarian regime. The President reiterated that the United States stands firmly with the people of Cuba as they assert their universal rights. And he called on the government of Cuba to refrain from violence or attempts to silence the voice of the people of Cuba.

United States Department of State
Washington DC
13 July 2021

We continue to follow widespread, peaceful protests throughout Cuba as Cubans are calling for freedom and human rights. They are standing up to Cuba’s authoritarian regime. Their basic needs are not being met and they are understandably exhausted. We commend the people of Cuba for showing great bravery, the strength of their will, and the power of their voice. In response, the Cuban Government has attempted to silence their voices and communications through internet shutdowns, violence, and arbitrary detentions of dozens of protesters, journalists, activists, and other repressive tactics. We remain deeply concerned by the Cuban Government’s, quote, “call to combat” and by the images of violence that we have seen over the past two days. We call for calm and we condemn any violence against those protesting peacefully, and we equally call on the Cuban Government to release anyone detained for peaceful protest.

Turning to Venezuela, the United States strongly condemns the unjust detention of 2015 National Assembly representative Freddy Guevara and harassment of Interim President Juan Guaido in Venezuela. These reprehensible acts are incompatible with efforts to create conditions for comprehensive negotiations between the Venezuelan opposition and the Nicolas Maduro regime to resolve Venezuela’s crisis. We call for the immediate release of Congressman Guevara and urge the international community to join us in condemning his detention in the strongest terms. Venezuelans have suffered for far too long under a regime that engages in widespread repression and human rights abuses, targeting those who are attempting to build a democratic country with leaders and institutions that are accountable to the people.

QUESTION: Okay. On Cuba, there are quite a few critics of the previous administration’s Cuba policy who are now, because you haven’t changed that policy at all, by extension, critics of this administration’s Cuba policy who have pointed out or made the argument that the very sharp reduction in remittances that Cuban Americans are allowed to send back to the island is one, not the – not – surely not the only, but is one reason why the basic needs of Cuban people are not being met, as – in your words.

Do you accept – do you see any validity to that argument? And whether you do or not, are remittances or – and allowing them or allowing them to go back up to the level that they were under the Obama administration, is that part of the review?

MR PRICE: Well, I would say our review is taking a broad look at what we can do to support the core principles at the center of our policy, and that is democracy and human rights. To your point, Matt, we are always considering options available to us that would allow us to support the Cuban people, to support their humanitarian needs, which are indeed profound, and they are profound because of not anything the United States has done, but from the actions and inactions, mismanagement, corruption of the Cuban regime.

Look, the other point I would make is that current U.S. policy, the so-called embargo, it allows humanitarian goods to reach Cuba, and we do expedite any request to export humanitarian or medical supplies to the island. We regularly authorize the export of agricultural products, medicine, medical equipment, and humanitarian goods to Cuba. And we’ve authorized billions of dollars’ worth of goods over the past couple decades, since the latest iteration of this has been in effect. But just in 2020 alone, we exported more than $175 million worth of goods to Cuba, including food and medicine, to help the Cuban people. In the first six months of 2021 alone, Cuba imported $123 million worth of, in this case, chicken from the United States.

Now, the pandemic has added an extra layer of pain and suffering onto the Cuban people as it has around the world, and we share the concern that the Cuban people have as they have faced an exponential rise in COVID cases across the island. Now, Cuba has made a sovereign decision regarding how it will address the pandemic, and that includes, in this case, the use of its own indigenously produced vaccine. Cuba, as you know, has not joined COVAX. The Cuban Government could always decide to receive outside vaccine donations, but the Cuban Government has decided not to do so yet.

QUESTION: Well, okay, but – so does that mean you do or do not agree with the argument that a sharp reduction in remittances has contributed to the lack of basic needs for —

MR PRICE: Matt, I have not seen a comprehensive study of it, so I’m not prepared to comment on that from here. What I would say, again, is that we are always looking for ways that we can support the Cuban people. We are consistent – we are constantly reviewing what policy measures might bring that about, and by “bring that about” I mean support of democracy, support for human rights on the island. That policy review is ongoing. We are engaging a wide range of stakeholders. We’re taking a close look not only what our immediate predecessor did but, of course, the actions of the Obama-Biden administration, administrations before that. Across any number of policy areas, we are seeking to learn from and to take into account the lessons of previous administrations – what they’ve done well, where there’s room to do something better or to do something different – and so that’s what we’re doing here. This is no different.

QUESTION: All right. And then just the last one: You mentioned that the current U.S. policy – you called it the “so-called embargo.” What exactly would you call it?

MR PRICE: The embargo. I’m not arguing with that.

QUESTION: Can I follow up on that regarding remittances?

QUESTION: Because my understanding is that the wire transfers are part of the late November, post-election additional sanctions by the Trump administration and that that is what many Cuban Americans are complaining about, where they can no longer send – from Miami, who support the overall embargo. So I was wondering today if there was any running room, any flexibility that the administration would be considering. Then I asked that question of Senator Menendez within the last hour or two and he said absolutely not, because the Cuban Government takes 20 percent off the top on the remittances and then transfers the money to pesos, the dollars to pesos, and so the people there are getting a fraction of what their relatives are sending home. That said, I understand he’s been in touch with the White House at the highest levels on this very issue today. Is there anything that the White House would do that would go against the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who wrote section two Helms-Burton?

MR PRICE: Far be it from me to speak for our – speak for the White House. I will —

QUESTION: Well, as an administration official, how likely – especially one where nominations go through that committee and are being held by a singular – single Republican.

MR PRICE: What I will say is that – and I think there is widespread support; we recognize this in the administration; there is widespread support for this idea in Congress – is that the idea that Americans, and especially Cuban Americans, have the potential to be, and oftentimes are, the best – our best ambassadors for what we hope to see on the island nation of Cuba. That is also central to our policy review. We have absolutely been in touch with senior members of Congress. I won’t be in a position to confirm those discussions or to read them out, but as part of our dialogue when it comes to our review of the Cuba policy, we have engaged with Congress. In the aftermath – well, I shouldn’t say the aftermath, of course; they’re still ongoing – in the midst of the protests on Cuba, we have been engaged with senior members of Congress as well. We do recognize that for our policies to have the most effect, to have broad legitimacy and support, it’s important that they have, to the maximum extent possible, support of Congress, and, of course, Cuba is no different. So those consultations are ongoing. Our policy review is ongoing. Even in the midst of that review, we’re going to be looking for ways we can support the Cuban people.

QUESTION: Well, when you said that our Cuban Americans are the best advocates, the best ambassadors for democracy versus authoritarianism, let’s say – I’m paraphrasing, but that seems to be the import of what you’re saying – is there some flexibility, as you said you’re discussing with members of Congress, to some of the travel restrictions, COVID permitting?

MR PRICE: Again, I’m not in a position to preview what we might do going forward from the podium. What I can say is that even before these protests started, we are looking for ways in the midst of COVID, in the midst of the other hardships that the Cuban people have endured because of, again, the corruption, the mismanagement of their own government – perhaps the indifference of their own government – we are looking for ways that we might support the Cuban people in a way that’s consistent with our interests, that’s consistent with our values. We are, of course, doing that in the midst of these protests. These protests are about many things, but certainly the suffering of the Cuban people that is – has been made all the more acute during the pandemic. It’s top of mind. Of course, their quest for additional freedom, for human rights, central to it as well, and what we can do in a way that is responsible and effective to support those aims, including their humanitarian needs, we’ll continue to consider and move forward as appropriate.

QUESTION: Thanks, Ned. Yesterday Jen Psaki said at the White House podium that the United States has spent something like $20 million to support democracy assistance programs in Cuba since 2009. Can you give us some granular detail on how that money was spent? Was it mostly for broadcast channels? Was there nothing else? And if it was mostly for broadcast, was that normal operating costs, or was that above and beyond what had already been budgeted in previous years?

MR PRICE: Well, what Jen was referring to yesterday was the fact that we do provide economic support funds for democracy promotion programs to Cuba on an annual basis, and that amount has been $20 million per year for several years now. And now these U.S.-funded programs, they are – they do go to broadcast funding. They inform the Cuban public through support for independent media. They support Cubans to promote free expression in their communities. They increase access to information on democracy, participatory government, human rights, and market economics. They provide emergency and humanitarian assistance to human rights defenders and to political prisoners, and they prepare those who seek, who aspire, to have a voice in a free and democratic Cuba. All of this funding, all of these programs, they do adhere to the laws and the guidelines laid out in the Helms-Burton Act of 1996 and the Cuban Liberty and Solidarity Act.

We’ve made no secret of the fact that support for democracy, support for human rights, is really at the core of our approach to Cuba. They are going to be anchors of our – not only our policy review, but where we net out on that policy. I would make one other point, that as these protests have taken place, we have seen the Cuban Government respond with internet shutdowns, with blackouts. These are government-imposed internet shutdowns. And so just as we’ve been doing with this funding, we call on Cuba’s leaders to demonstrate restraint, to urge respect for the voice of the people by opening all means of communication, both online and offline. Shutting down technology, shutting down information pathways – that does nothing to address the legitimate needs and aspirations of the Cuban people. And so we’ve been very clear on that from the start.

QUESTION: So just to drill down a tiny bit on a technical detail, is it fair to assume that that money has come out of this building and/or USAID? And did it go strictly through NGOs?

MR PRICE: Well, of course, we’re not providing any funding directly to the Cuban Government. Oftentimes, as you know, we work through partners on the ground. For additional details you may want to reach out USAID for how they may administer it.

QUESTION: Because during the campaign, President Biden said that Trump’s reversals on Cuba policy have inflicted harm to the Cuban people and done nothing to advance democracy and human rights. So does President Biden still want to change Trump’s policy on Cuba? And when would be a good time, if not now?

MR PRICE: Well, we are undertaking a review of our – of a Cuba policy precisely to determine how best we can support the human rights of Cubans, how best we can support the prospect for democracy on the island. Now, of course, successive administrations have sought in some ways to do that, and so as I said before, we are going to be taking a close look at what has and has not worked in the past, and unfortunately, in the case of Cuba there may be more that has not worked than what has worked. And so we are going to be, as we’ve done in other cases as well, studying that very closely to determine what we can do most effectively, consistent with our values, consistent with our interests, to move the ball forward, especially when it comes to democracy and human rights.

QUESTION: Will Cuba become a priority now, after the events on the ground?

MR PRICE: Well, of course, you heard from the President directly, you heard from the Secretary directly standing right here. We have not been shy about speaking to what is going on. Of course, it’s always a priority for us when citizens are taking to the streets peacefully to express their aspirations for democracy and human rights. We’ll continue to watch this very closely.

QUESTION: On Cuba – just because you’re on Cuba – my colleague asked about the urgency of this ongoing policy review. Is there a timeline for completion? I think we’ve continued to ask, and obviously the protests sort of lend a greater immediacy to the question.

On the Cuba policy review, of course, we are moving as expeditiously as appropriate in this case. We are making sure that we are consulting with, as I said before, a broad and wide variety of stakeholders. We are taking a close look at what the United States can best do to support the needs of the Cuban people, to support their legitimate and long-denied aspirations for democracy and human rights.